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15 Georgia opinions name it 2 courts 1968–2022 5 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Georgia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Kent v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurancegreen2 sentences2022Co., 265 Ga. App. 603, 604 ( 595 SE2d 97 ) (2004) (relying upon Kent for the proposition that “[i]f the insured is not legally entitled to recover from the uninsured motorist, then the insured has no claim against his uninsured motorist insurance carrier under [OCGA § 33-7-11]”). 5 See Kent, 233 Ga. App. at 564 . 6 Id. at 565 (1). 5 liability, they were barred from recovering UM benefits from their insurance company.7 In addition, and importantly, we rejected the plaintiffs’ argument in Kent that the dismissal with prejudice should be set aside under OCGA § 9-11-60 (d) (2) due to “[f]raud, acc 2022Co., 265 Ga. App. 603, 604 ( 595 SE2d 97 ) (2004) (relying upon Kent for the proposition that “[i]f the insured is not legally entitled to recover from the uninsured motorist, then the insured has no claim against his uninsured motorist insurance carrier under [OCGA § 33-7-11]”). 5 See Kent, 233 Ga. App. at 564 . 6 Id. at 565 (1). 5 liability, they were barred from recovering UM benefits from their insurance company.7 In addition, and importantly, we rejected the plaintiffs’ argument in Kent that the dismissal with prejudice should be set aside under OCGA § 9-11-60 (d) (2) due to “[f]raud, acc | 2 | 2 |
Piedmont Office Realty Trust, Inc. v. Xl Specialty Insurance Companygreen2 sentences2021Co., 297 Ga. 38, 41-42 ( 771 SE2d 864 ) (2015) (The insured was precluded from pursuing a bad faith failure-to-settle claim against its excess insurer under OCGA § 33-4-6 because the insured had settled the underlying claim without obtaining the 26 insurer’s consent, which was a contractually agreed upon condition precedent to the insurer’s obligation to make a payment to the insured under the policy.).20 Thus, under the facts and circumstances of this case, OCGA § 33-7-15 and the corresponding policy provisions regarding notice to the insurer of the filing of a suit against the insured do not 2021Co., 297 Ga. 38, 41-42 ( 771 SE2d 864 ) (2015) (The insured was precluded from pursuing a bad faith failure-to-settle claim against its excess insurer under OCGA § 33-4-6 because the insured had settled the underlying claim without obtaining the 26 insurer’s consent, which was a contractually agreed upon condition precedent to the insurer’s obligation to make a payment to the insured under the policy.).20 Thus, under the facts and circumstances of this case, OCGA § 33-7-15 and the corresponding policy provisions regarding notice to the insurer of the filing of a suit against the insured do not | 2 | 2 |
Sandner, Inc. v. Centennial Insurancegreen2 sentences2001Co., 189 Ga.App. 277, 280 (1), 375 S.E.2d 611 (1988), rev'd in part on other grounds, 259 Ga. 317 , 380 S.E.2d 704 (1989); American Resources Ins. 2001Co., 189 Ga.App. 277, 280 (1), 375 S.E.2d 611 (1988), rev'd in part on other grounds, 259 Ga. 317 , 380 S.E.2d 704 (1989); American Resources Ins. | 2 | 2 |
Builders Insurance v. Tenenbaumgreen2 sentences2022Co. v. Morgan Fleet Svcs., 356 Ga. App. 372 , 376 ( 847 SE2d 378 ) (2020). 7 particular ground for noncoverage, [but] it must act reasonably promptly upon learning of a policy defense.”6 Here, it is undisputed that within 24 hours of a discussion about assuming the Insured’s defense, GAAIC sent the Insureds its first reservation of rights letter.7 This letter was sufficiently prompt8 and quoted the firearms exclusion in the underlying AIIC policy, as well as GAAIC’s umbrella coverage provision triggered by an “occurrence,” which is defined in GAAIC’s policy as “an accident.” Further, the lette 2022Co. v. Morgan Fleet Svcs., 356 Ga. App. 372 , 376 ( 847 SE2d 378 ) (2020). 7 particular ground for noncoverage, [but] it must act reasonably promptly upon learning of a policy defense.”6 Here, it is undisputed that within 24 hours of a discussion about assuming the Insured’s defense, GAAIC sent the Insureds its first reservation of rights letter.7 This letter was sufficiently prompt8 and quoted the firearms exclusion in the underlying AIIC policy, as well as GAAIC’s umbrella coverage provision triggered by an “occurrence,” which is defined in GAAIC’s policy as “an accident.” Further, the lette | 1 | 1 |
Ward v. Allstate Insurancegreen2 sentences2022Co., 265 Ga. App. 603, 604 ( 595 SE2d 97 ) (2004) (relying upon Kent for the proposition that “[i]f the insured is not legally entitled to recover from the uninsured motorist, then the insured has no claim against his uninsured motorist insurance carrier under [OCGA § 33-7-11]”). 5 See Kent, 233 Ga. App. at 564 . 6 Id. at 565 (1). 5 liability, they were barred from recovering UM benefits from their insurance company.7 In addition, and importantly, we rejected the plaintiffs’ argument in Kent that the dismissal with prejudice should be set aside under OCGA § 9-11-60 (d) (2) due to “[f]raud, acc 2022Co., 265 Ga. App. 603, 604 ( 595 SE2d 97 ) (2004) (relying upon Kent for the proposition that “[i]f the insured is not legally entitled to recover from the uninsured motorist, then the insured has no claim against his uninsured motorist insurance carrier under [OCGA § 33-7-11]”). 5 See Kent, 233 Ga. App. at 564 . 6 Id. at 565 (1). 5 liability, they were barred from recovering UM benefits from their insurance company.7 In addition, and importantly, we rejected the plaintiffs’ argument in Kent that the dismissal with prejudice should be set aside under OCGA § 9-11-60 (d) (2) due to “[f]raud, acc | 1 | 1 |
Southern General Insurance v. Holtgreen2 sentences2021The holding in Holt is: “an insured has a claim for bad faith against an insurance company for its failure to settle a claim within the policy limits based on a time-limited settlement offer by the injured person’s attorney.” Id. 2021Holt expressly disavows any “inten[t] to lay down a rule of law that would mean that a plaintiff’s attorney . . . could ‘set up’ an insurer for an excess judgment merely by offering to settle within the policy limits and by imposing an unreasonably short time within which the offer would remain open.” Holt, 262 Ga. at 169 (1). | 1 | 1 |
Winters v. Government Employees Insurancegreen2 sentences1981Co., 132 Ga. App. 756, 760 ( 209 SE2d 32 ) (1974). 1981Co., 132 Ga. App. 756, 760 ( 209 SE2d 32 ) (1974). | 1 | 1 |
Trust Co. v. Kennygreen2 sentences1976As was said in Trust Co. of Ga. v. Kenny, 188 Ga. 243, 250 ( 3 SE2d 553 ): "The quantum of precedent is one way; the quality the other." Where the consent of the insured is a requirement for a defense under a reservation of rights the insured's refusal to give such consent places the insurer between Scylla and Charybdis. 1976As was said in Trust Co. of Ga. v. Kenny, 188 Ga. 243, 250 ( 3 SE2d 553 ): "The quantum of precedent is one way; the quality the other." Where the consent of the insured is a requirement for a defense under a reservation of rights the insured's refusal to give such consent places the insurer between Scylla and Charybdis. | 1 | 1 |
Cato v. Ætna Life Insurancegreen2 sentences1973Co., 164 Ga. 392, 398 ( 138 SE2d 787 ); Hartford Accident & Ind. Co. v. Hulsey, 220 Ga. 240, 241 ( 133 SE2d 310 ).” In short, we submit that in the exercise of the constitutional freedom to contract the legislature gave the insured the privilege of saving money, if he did not want to take out this additional coverage that would protect him on uninsured motorists. 1973Co., 164 Ga. 392, 398 ( 138 SE2d 787 ); Hartford Accident & Ind. Co. v. Hulsey, 220 Ga. 240, 241 ( 133 SE2d 310 )." In short, we submit that in the exercise of the constitutional freedom to contract the legislature gave the insured the privilege of saving money if he did not want to take out this additional coverage that would protect him on uninsured motorists. | 1 | 1 |
Hartford Accident & Indemnity Company v. Hulseygreen2 sentences1973Co., 164 Ga. 392, 398 ( 138 SE2d 787 ); Hartford Accident & Ind. Co. v. Hulsey, 220 Ga. 240, 241 ( 133 SE2d 310 ).” In short, we submit that in the exercise of the constitutional freedom to contract the legislature gave the insured the privilege of saving money, if he did not want to take out this additional coverage that would protect him on uninsured motorists. 1973Co., 164 Ga. 392, 398 ( 138 SE2d 787 ); Hartford Accident & Ind. Co. v. Hulsey, 220 Ga. 240, 241 ( 133 SE2d 310 )." In short, we submit that in the exercise of the constitutional freedom to contract the legislature gave the insured the privilege of saving money if he did not want to take out this additional coverage that would protect him on uninsured motorists. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Georgia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
CENTENNIAL INSURANCE COMPANY v. Sandner, Inc.
green
2 sentences2001Co., 189 Ga.App. 277, 280 (1), 375 S.E.2d 611 (1988), rev'd in part on other grounds, 259 Ga. 317 , 380 S.E.2d 704 (1989); American Resources Ins. 2001Co., 189 Ga.App. 277, 280 (1), 375 S.E.2d 611 (1988), rev'd in part on other grounds, 259 Ga. 317 , 380 S.E.2d 704 (1989); American Resources Ins. | 2 | 1993–2001 |
Trinity Outdoor, LLC v. Central Mutual Insurance Co.
green
2 sentences2021Co., 297 Ga. 38, 41-42 ( 771 SE2d 864 ) (2015) (The insured was precluded from pursuing a bad faith failure-to-settle claim against its excess insurer under OCGA § 33-4-6 because the insured had settled the underlying claim without obtaining the 26 insurer’s consent, which was a contractually agreed upon condition precedent to the insurer’s obligation to make a payment to the insured under the policy.).20 Thus, under the facts and circumstances of this case, OCGA § 33-7-15 and the corresponding policy provisions regarding notice to the insurer of the filing of a suit against the insured do not 2021Co., 297 Ga. 38, 41-42 ( 771 SE2d 864 ) (2015) (The insured was precluded from pursuing a bad faith failure-to-settle claim against its excess insurer under OCGA § 33-4-6 because the insured had settled the underlying claim without obtaining the 26 insurer’s consent, which was a contractually agreed upon condition precedent to the insurer’s obligation to make a payment to the insured under the policy.).20 Thus, under the facts and circumstances of this case, OCGA § 33-7-15 and the corresponding policy provisions regarding notice to the insurer of the filing of a suit against the insured do not | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Georgia Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance v. Brown
green
2 sentences1993“Had a loss eventuated from or during the existence of the increased risk [created by the violation of the terms of the policy], however, then . . . the policy would have been voided.” Id. 1993"Had a loss eventuated from or during the existence of the increased risk [created by the violation of the terms of the policy], however, then ... the policy would have been voided." Id. | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Residential Developments, Inc. v. Merchants Indemnity Co.
neutral
1 sentence1988Co., supra, as implicitly endorsed in Residential Dev., 227 Ga. 332 , supra, the trial court’s grant of the Insurers’ motions to dismiss the Insured’s claim for declaratory relief must be affirmed. | 1 | 1988–1988 |
Saylor v. Terminal Transport Co.
neutral
2 sentences1976This court decided that the question of the insurer's right to continue the defense for five months with knowledge of facts possibly constituting noncoverage depended upon a factual determination of the intent of the parties and whether there was "a knowing acceptance by the insured of defense of the tort action under a reservation of rights by the insurer." 132 Ga. App. 760 . 1976This court decided that the question of the insurer’s right to continue the defense for five months with knowledge of facts possibly constituting noncoverage depended upon a factual determination of the intent of the parties and whether there was "a knowing acceptance by the insured of defense of the tort action under a reservation of rights by the insurer.” 132 Ga. App. 760 . | 1 | 1976–1976 |
State v. Blackwelder
neutral
2 sentences1973Co., 164 Ga. 392, 398 ( 138 SE2d 787 ); Hartford Accident & Ind. Co. v. Hulsey, 220 Ga. 240, 241 ( 133 SE2d 310 ).” In short, we submit that in the exercise of the constitutional freedom to contract the legislature gave the insured the privilege of saving money, if he did not want to take out this additional coverage that would protect him on uninsured motorists. 1973Co., 164 Ga. 392, 398 ( 138 SE2d 787 ); Hartford Accident & Ind. Co. v. Hulsey, 220 Ga. 240, 241 ( 133 SE2d 310 )." In short, we submit that in the exercise of the constitutional freedom to contract the legislature gave the insured the privilege of saving money if he did not want to take out this additional coverage that would protect him on uninsured motorists. | 1 | 1973–1973 |
Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Brooks
green
2 sentences1972Co. v. Brooks, 218 Ga. 593 ( 129 SE2d 798 ), the Supreme Court held that language granting to the insurer a right to "make such investigation and settlement of any claim or suit as it deemed expedient” established an agency relationship between the insurer and the insured thus causing a settlement entered into by the insurer without the consent of the insured to be a bar to the assertion of a claim by the insured against the party with whom the insurer had settled. 1972Co. v. Brooks, 218 Ga. 593 ( 129 SE2d 798 ), the Supreme Court held that language granting to the insurer a right to "make such investigation and settlement of any claim or suit as it deemed expedient” established an agency relationship between the insurer and the insured thus causing a settlement entered into by the insurer without the consent of the insured to be a bar to the assertion of a claim by the insured against the party with whom the insurer had settled. | 1 | 1972–1972 |
Bowsher v. State Farm Fire and Casualty Co.
red
2 sentences1968Co., 244 Ore. 549 ( 419 P2d 606 ), cited by counsel, did not expressly exclude automobiles owned by the insured from its requirement for uninsured automobile coverage. 1968Co., 244 Ore. 549 ( 419 P2d 606 ), cited by counsel, did not expressly exclude automobiles owned by the insured from its requirement for uninsured automobile coverage. | 1 | 1968–1968 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.