mechanical rule in Pennsylvania

1987(Citations omitted)” Jenkins, supra, 500 Pa. at 148 , 454 A.2d at 1006 .

1987(Citations omitted)” Jenkins, supra, 500 Pa. at 148 , 454 A.2d at 1006 .

1982After discussing the Supreme Court's opinions in Hanson v. Denckla, supra, and McGee v. International Life Insurance Company, 355 U.S. 220 , 78 S.Ct. 199 , 2 L.Ed.2d 223 (1957) (finding minimum contacts in solicitation and sale of single insurance contract by foreign corporation), our court explained, *30 These decisions provide only a framework under the broad formula of "fair play and substantial justice" and a determination of whether or not the "minimum contacts" of a foreign corporation with a particular state are sufficient to make the corporation constitutionally amenable to process in

1982After discussing the Supreme Court's opinions in Hanson v. Denckla, supra, and McGee v. International Life Insurance Company, 355 U.S. 220 , 78 S.Ct. 199 , 2 L.Ed.2d 223 (1957) (finding minimum contacts in solicitation and sale of single insurance contract by foreign corporation), our court explained, *30 These decisions provide only a framework under the broad formula of "fair play and substantial justice" and a determination of whether or not the "minimum contacts" of a foreign corporation with a particular state are sufficient to make the corporation constitutionally amenable to process in

1978Whether a foreign corporation is amenable to this court’s jurisdiction (the necessary minimum contacts established) is a factual question to be resolved on a case-by-case basis and not by application of a mechanical rule: Wenzel v. Morris Distributing Co., Inc., 439 Pa. 364 , 266 A. 2d 662 (1970).

1978Whether a foreign corporation is amenable to this court’s jurisdiction (the necessary minimum contacts established) is a factual question to be resolved on a case-by-case basis and not by application of a mechanical rule: Wenzel v. Morris Distributing Co., Inc., 439 Pa. 364 , 266 A. 2d 662 (1970).

1976Campbell v. Triangle Corp., 336 F.Supp. 1002 (E.D.

1974Campbell v. Triangle Corp., 336 F. Supp. 1002 (E.

1972Myers v. Mooney Aircraft, Inc., 429 Pa. 177, 185 , 240 A. 2d 505 (1967) and Lutz v. Foster & Kester Co., Inc., 367 Pa. 125 , 79 A. 2d 222 (1951).

1972Myers v. Mooney Aircraft, Inc., 429 Pa. 177, 185 , 240 A. 2d 505 (1967) and Lutz v. Foster & Kester Co., Inc., 367 Pa. 125 , 79 A. 2d 222 (1951).

1972Myers v. Mooney Aircraft, Inc., 429 Pa. 177, 185 , 240 A. 2d 505 (1967) and Lutz v. Foster & Kester Co., Inc., 367 Pa. 125 , 79 A. 2d 222 (1951).

1972Myers v. Mooney Aircraft, Inc., 429 Pa. 177, 185 , 240 A. 2d 505 (1967) and Lutz v. Foster & Kester Co., Inc., 367 Pa. 125 , 79 A. 2d 222 (1951).

1959The Leto case did not expressly or by implication overrule the line of cases exemplified by the Byerly Unemployment Compensation Case, supra, 171 Pa. Superior Ct. 303 , 90 A. 2d 322 ; nor did it purport, either ’expressly or by implication, to lay down a single mechanical test for determination of the final responsibility for the work stoppage.

1959The Leto case did not expressly or by implication overrule the line of cases exemplified by the Byerly Unemployment Compensation Case, supra, 171 Pa. Superior Ct. 303 , 90 A. 2d 322 ; nor did it purport, either ’expressly or by implication, to lay down a single mechanical test for determination of the final responsibility for the work stoppage.

2016Relying on Drozd v. Workmens' Compensation Appeal Board (The Lion, Inc.), 86 Pa.Cmwlth. 364 , 485 A.2d 96 (1984), Claimant argues that because he prevailed in the suspension proceeding, the Board's failure to award costs and attorney's fees is a mechanical error appropriately corrected by way of a petition for review.

2016Relying on Drozd v. Workmens' Compensation Appeal Board (The Lion, Inc.), 86 Pa.Cmwlth. 364 , 485 A.2d 96 (1984), Claimant argues that because he prevailed in the suspension proceeding, the Board's failure to award costs and attorney's fees is a mechanical error appropriately corrected by way of a petition for review.

2016In Justice Eakin’s view, “the adoption of a mechanical rule whereby the passage of a specific amount of time automatically triggers the possibility of dismissal, without taking into account the circumstances mentioned in Barker[ v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972)], merely set the stage for a different form of evil: procedural gamesmanship.” Id.

2016In Justice Eakin’s view, “the adoption of a mechanical rule whereby the passage of a specific amount of time automatically triggers the possibility of dismissal, without taking into account the circumstances mentioned in Barker[ v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972)], merely set the stage for a different form of evil: procedural gamesmanship.” Id.

2005This positive consideration is not a mechanical presumption, but part of “a close scrutiny of all particular facts relevant to determining the child’s best interests.” See Wiseman, 718 A.2d at 848 (quoting Jordan, 448 A.2d at 1117 ). ¶ 14 In Wiseman , the trial court made an order of shared physical custody similar to the one in this case.

2005This positive consideration is not a mechanical presumption, but part of “a close scrutiny of all particular facts relevant to determining the child’s best interests.” See Wiseman, 718 A.2d at 848 (quoting Jordan, 448 A.2d at 1117 ). ¶ 14 In Wiseman , the trial court made an order of shared physical custody similar to the one in this case.

2002More recently, in Baldwin v. Richard, 561 Pa. 489 , 751 A.2d 647 (2000), this Court reiterated the above classification, and continued: As we see no reason to depart from such an established principle, we reaffirm that a crime is infamous for purposes of Article II, Section 7, if its underlying facts establish a felony, a crimen falsi offense, or a like offense involving the charge of falsehood that affects the public administration of justice. * * * Our Court has consistently applied this definition without employing a mechanical rule whereby we deem a crime infamous solely on the grounds tha

2002More recently, in Baldwin v. Richard, 561 Pa. 489 , 751 A.2d 647 (2000), this Court reiterated the above classification, and continued: As we see no reason to depart from such an established principle, we reaffirm that a crime is infamous for purposes of Article II, Section 7, if its underlying facts establish a felony, a crimen falsi offense, or a like offense involving the charge of falsehood that affects the public administration of justice. * * * Our Court has consistently applied this definition without employing a mechanical rule whereby we deem a crime infamous solely on the grounds tha

2000In the case of In re Greenberg, 442 Pa. 411 , 280 A.2d 370 (1971), a common pleas court judge was convicted of conspiracy to use the United States mail to perpetrate a fraud to “kite” bank checks. 13 The issue was whether such conviction constituted an infamous crime as set forth in Article V, Section 18 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, concerning the removal of public officers “on conviction of misbehavior in office or of any infamous crime.” In resolving the issue, our Court examined the nature of the crime and concluded that the federal crime of using the mails to defraud fell within the a

2000In the case of In re Greenberg, 442 Pa. 411 , 280 A.2d 370 (1971), a common pleas court judge was convicted of conspiracy to use the United States mail to perpetrate a fraud to “kite” bank checks. 13 The issue was whether such conviction constituted an infamous crime as set forth in Article V, Section 18 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, concerning the removal of public officers “on conviction of misbehavior in office or of any infamous crime.” In resolving the issue, our Court examined the nature of the crime and concluded that the federal crime of using the mails to defraud fell within the a

1996Kentucky Fried Chicken, 309 A.2d at 167 .

1987That, however, is a mechanical rule which we decline to apply. “[T]o the extent the Restatement [2d] suggests that the conflict be resolved by analysis rather than by resort to a mechanical rule, we adopt its treatment of the problem.” Elston, 420 Pa. at 105-106 , 216 A.2d at 322 .

1987That, however, is a mechanical rule which we decline to apply. “[T]o the extent the Restatement [2d] suggests that the conflict be resolved by analysis rather than by resort to a mechanical rule, we adopt its treatment of the problem.” Elston, 420 Pa. at 105-106 , 216 A.2d at 322 .

1986Relying on Skinner v. Flymo, Inc., 351 Pa.Super. 234 , 505 A.2d 616 (1986), the majority states that in United Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Co. v. United States Fidelity and Guaranty Co. (United Farm), 501 Pa. 646 , 462 A.2d 1300 (1983), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has rejected the Proctor three-part jurisdictional analysis and has adopted “the more flexible ... ‘minimum contacts’ approach.” Majority op. at 356 n. 3 (emphasis added).

1986Relying on Skinner v. Flymo, Inc., 351 Pa.Super. 234 , 505 A.2d 616 (1986), the majority states that in United Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Co. v. United States Fidelity and Guaranty Co. (United Farm), 501 Pa. 646 , 462 A.2d 1300 (1983), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has rejected the Proctor three-part jurisdictional analysis and has adopted “the more flexible ... ‘minimum contacts’ approach.” Majority op. at 356 n. 3 (emphasis added).

1986Relying on Skinner v. Flymo, Inc., 351 Pa.Super. 234 , 505 A.2d 616 (1986), the majority states that in United Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Co. v. United States Fidelity and Guaranty Co. (United Farm), 501 Pa. 646 , 462 A.2d 1300 (1983), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has rejected the Proctor three-part jurisdictional analysis and has adopted “the more flexible ... ‘minimum contacts’ approach.” Majority op. at 356 n. 3 (emphasis added).

1986Relying on Skinner v. Flymo, Inc., 351 Pa.Super. 234 , 505 A.2d 616 (1986), the majority states that in United Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Co. v. United States Fidelity and Guaranty Co. (United Farm), 501 Pa. 646 , 462 A.2d 1300 (1983), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has rejected the Proctor three-part jurisdictional analysis and has adopted “the more flexible ... ‘minimum contacts’ approach.” Majority op. at 356 n. 3 (emphasis added).

1982Commonwealth v. Futch, supra; accord, Commonwealth v. Smith, supra; Commonwealth v. Bey, supra; Commonwealth v. Rowe, 459 Pa. 163 , 327 A.2d 358 (1974); Commonwealth v. Williams, supra; Commonwealth v. Dixon, supra; Common wealth v. Wayman, supra; Commonwealth v. Dutton, supra; Commonwealth v. Tingle, supra. Our concern with the coercive aspect of the delay was reflected also in our determinations as what constituted an “unreasonable delay.” Commonwealth v. McGeachy, supra; Commonwealth v. Bowen, supra; Commonwealth v. Morton, supra; Commonwealth v. Barilak, supra; Commonwealth v. Sanders, 458

1982Commonwealth v. Futch, supra; accord, Commonwealth v. Smith, supra; Commonwealth v. Bey, supra; Commonwealth v. Rowe, 459 Pa. 163 , 327 A.2d 358 (1974); Commonwealth v. Williams, supra; Commonwealth v. Dixon, supra; Common wealth v. Wayman, supra; Commonwealth v. Dutton, supra; Commonwealth v. Tingle, supra. Our concern with the coercive aspect of the delay was reflected also in our determinations as what constituted an “unreasonable delay.” Commonwealth v. McGeachy, supra; Commonwealth v. Bowen, supra; Commonwealth v. Morton, supra; Commonwealth v. Barilak, supra; Commonwealth v. Sanders, 458

1982Commonwealth v. Futch, supra ; accord, Commonwealth v. Smith, supra ; Commonwealth v. Bey, supra ; Commonwealth v. Rowe, 459 Pa. 163 , 327 A.2d 358 (1974); Commonwealth v. Williams, supra ; Commonwealth v. Dixon, supra ; Commonwealth *149 v. Wayman, supra ; Commonwealth v. Dutton, supra ; Commonwealth v. Tingle, supra .

1982Commonwealth v. Futch, supra ; accord, Commonwealth v. Smith, supra ; Commonwealth v. Bey, supra ; Commonwealth v. Rowe, 459 Pa. 163 , 327 A.2d 358 (1974); Commonwealth v. Williams, supra ; Commonwealth v. Dixon, supra ; Commonwealth *149 v. Wayman, supra ; Commonwealth v. Dutton, supra ; Commonwealth v. Tingle, supra .

1982Indeed, the majority expressly said: “Questions regarding retrial after the discharge of a jury without a verdict are not to be decided by a rigid application of mechanical formulae.” Id. at 1043 .