7 North Carolina opinions name it 2 courts 1984–2016 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by North Carolina courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Douglas D. Chappee v. George Vosegreen1 sentence2006Chappee v. Vose, 843 F.2d 25, 29 (1st Cir. 1988) (citing Taylor, 484 U.S. at 414-15 , 98 L. | 1 | 1 |
International Shoe Co. v. Washingtongreen2 sentences2005For the exercise of personal jurisdiction to comport with the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 , 66 S.Ct. 154 , 90 L.Ed. 95, 102 (1945), a non-resident defendant must have minimum contacts with the forum state so as not to offend "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice." It is a well-settled principle that the determination of minimum contacts with the forum is not calculated by a mechanical test, but rather it varies depending on the facts of the particular case. 2005For the exercise of personal jurisdiction to comport with the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 , 66 S.Ct. 154 , 90 L.Ed. 95, 102 (1945), a non-resident defendant must have minimum contacts with the forum state so as not to offend "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice." It is a well-settled principle that the determination of minimum contacts with the forum is not calculated by a mechanical test, but rather it varies depending on the facts of the particular case. | 1 | 1 |
Dillon v. Numismatic Funding Corp.green2 sentences2005Dillon v. Numismatic Funding Corp., 291 N.C. 674, 679 , 231 S.E.2d 629, 632 (1977). 2005Dillon v. Numismatic Funding Corp., 291 N.C. 674, 679 , 231 S.E.2d 629, 632 (1977). | 1 | 1 |
Price v. Seaboard Air Line Railroad Co.green2 sentences1994See Dixon v. CSX Transp., Inc., 990 F.2d 1440 , 1449, 1453 (1993) (Where the crossing is “extrahazardous,” mechanical warnings may be required.); Price v. Seaboard R.R., 274 N.C. 32, 45-46 , 161 S.E.2d 590, 600 (1968) (Mechanical warnings are ordinarily required only where the crossing is so dangerous that a prudent person cannot use it unless there are extraordinary protective devices.). 1994See Dixon v. CSX Transp., Inc., 990 F.2d 1440 , 1449, 1453 (1993) (Where the crossing is “extrahazardous,” mechanical warnings may be required.); Price v. Seaboard R.R., 274 N.C. 32, 45-46 , 161 S.E.2d 590, 600 (1968) (Mechanical warnings are ordinarily required only where the crossing is so dangerous that a prudent person cannot use it unless there are extraordinary protective devices.). | 1 | 1 |
Dixon v. Csx Transportation, Incorporatedgreen1 sentence1994See Dixon v. CSX Transp., Inc., 990 F.2d 1440 , 1449, 1453 (1993) (Where the crossing is “extrahazardous,” mechanical warnings may be required.); Price v. Seaboard R.R., 274 N.C. 32, 45-46 , 161 S.E.2d 590, 600 (1968) (Mechanical warnings are ordinarily required only where the crossing is so dangerous that a prudent person cannot use it unless there are extraordinary protective devices.). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in North Carolina. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Jasubhai Desai v. Raymond Booker
green
2 sentences2016Rather, the unifying principle is that these factors relate to whether the child declarant was particularly likely to be telling the truth when the statement was made. " (emphasis added)), overruling recognized by Desai v. Booker, 732 F.3d 628 (6th Cir.2013). 2016Rather, the unifying principle is that these factors relate to whether the child declarant was particularly likely to be telling the truth when the statement was made.” (emphasis added)), overruling recognized by Desai v. Booker, 732 F.3d 628 (6th Cir. 2013). - 26 - STATE V. | 2 | 2016–2016 |
Taylor v. Illinois
green
2 sentences2014Ed. 2d. 798, 108 S. Ct. 646 (1988), to be considered in determining the appropriate sanction, consistent with that constitutional right, when a defendant has failed to disclose a witness: “Although the Taylor Court declined to cast a mechanical standard to govern all possible cases, it established that, as a general matter, the trial judge (in deciding which sanction to impose) must weigh the defendant’s right to compulsory process against the countervailing public interests: (1) the integrity of the adversary process, (2) the interest in the fair and efficient administration of justice, and ( 2006Chappee v. Vose, 843 F.2d 25, 29 (1st Cir. 1988) (citing Taylor, 484 U.S. at 414-15 , 98 L. | 2 | 2006–2014 |
Alaska Steamship Co. v. Petterson
green
1 sentence2006Chappee v. Vose, 843 F.2d 25, 29 (1st Cir. 1988) (citing Taylor, 484 U.S. at 414-15 , 98 L. | 1 | 2006–2006 |
United States v. Millard Robert Beasley, Defendnat-Appellant
green
2 sentences1984The Court responded that: [T]here could have been nothing accusatorial in the technician's testimony that he properly performed the mechanical test of "bringing out" the latent prints on the note paper; therefore he was not a witness "against" the Appellant, and the Sixth Amendment guarantee of confrontation *324 and cross examination does not apply. 438 F.2d at 1281 . 1984The Court responded that: [T]here could have been nothing accusatorial in the technician’s testimony that he properly performed the mechanical test of “bringing out” the latent prints on the note paper; therefore he was not a witness “against” the Appellant, and the Sixth Amendment guarantee of confrontation and cross examination does not apply. 438 F. 2d at 1281 . | 1 | 1984–1984 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.