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20 New Jersey opinions name it 2 courts 1976–2025 4 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New Jersey courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. O'CONNORgreen2 sentences2024Courts should refrain from rewriting plainly written statutes, but "[if], however, the Court determines that 'a literal interpretation would create a manifestly absurd result, contrary to public policy, the spirit of the law should control.'" State v. Frye, 217 N.J. 566, 575 (2014) (quoting Turner v. First Union Nat'l Bank, 162 N.J. 75, 84 (1999)); see also State v. O'Connor, 105 N.J. 399, 408 (1987) (courts should not "accord controlling significance to a mechanical rule of statutory construction when to do so would violate the clear policies that form the foundation" of a statute). 2023More importantly, while it is the "general rule that a word or phrase should have the same meaning throughout the statute in the absence of a clear indication to the contrary," Perez v. Pantasote, Inc., 95 N.J. 105, 116 (1984), courts should not "accord controlling significance to a mechanical rule of statutory construction when to do so would violate the clear policies that form the foundation of" a statute, State v. O'Connor, 105 N.J. 399, 408 (1987). | 2 | 2 |
Idaho v. Wrightgreen2 sentences1999Id. at 821-22, 827, 110 S.Ct. at 3150, 3153 , 111 L.Ed.2d at 656, 659-60 . 1999Id. at 821-22, 827, 110 S.Ct. at 3150, 3153 , 111 L.Ed.2d at 656, 659-60 . | 2 | 2 |
Heavner v. Uniroyal, Inc.green2 sentences1996Id. at 140-41, 305 A.2d 412 . 1976Heavner 63 N.J. at 140-141 , discarded "the mechanical rule that the limitations law of this state must be employed in every suit on a foreign cause of action." It did not adopt the mechanical application of the limitation statute of the lex loci delicti. | 1 | 3 |
Lozano v. Frank DeLuca Constructiongreen1 sentence2024Additionally, if statutory language is unambiguous, a "court should not 'resort to extrinsic interpretative aids.'" DiProspero, 183 N.J. at 492 (quoting Lozano v. Frank DeLuca Const., 178 N.J. 513, 522 (2004)). | 1 | 1 |
Turner v. First Union National Bankgreen1 sentence2024Courts should refrain from rewriting plainly written statutes, but "[if], however, the Court determines that 'a literal interpretation would create a manifestly absurd result, contrary to public policy, the spirit of the law should control.'" State v. Frye, 217 N.J. 566, 575 (2014) (quoting Turner v. First Union Nat'l Bank, 162 N.J. 75, 84 (1999)); see also State v. O'Connor, 105 N.J. 399, 408 (1987) (courts should not "accord controlling significance to a mechanical rule of statutory construction when to do so would violate the clear policies that form the foundation" of a statute). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Roger Paul Frye (070975)green1 sentence2024Courts should refrain from rewriting plainly written statutes, but "[if], however, the Court determines that 'a literal interpretation would create a manifestly absurd result, contrary to public policy, the spirit of the law should control.'" State v. Frye, 217 N.J. 566, 575 (2014) (quoting Turner v. First Union Nat'l Bank, 162 N.J. 75, 84 (1999)); see also State v. O'Connor, 105 N.J. 399, 408 (1987) (courts should not "accord controlling significance to a mechanical rule of statutory construction when to do so would violate the clear policies that form the foundation" of a statute). | 1 | 1 |
Perez v. Pantasote, Inc.green1 sentence2023More importantly, while it is the "general rule that a word or phrase should have the same meaning throughout the statute in the absence of a clear indication to the contrary," Perez v. Pantasote, Inc., 95 N.J. 105, 116 (1984), courts should not "accord controlling significance to a mechanical rule of statutory construction when to do so would violate the clear policies that form the foundation of" a statute, State v. O'Connor, 105 N.J. 399, 408 (1987). | 1 | 1 |
Veazey v. Doremusgreen2 sentences2008See Veazey v. Doremus, 103 N.J. 244, 247 , 510 A. 2d 1187 (1986). 2008See Veazey v. Doremus, 103 N.J. 244, 247 , 510 A. 2d 1187 (1986). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Kennedygreen2 sentences1999The dissenter there quoted from Justice Holmes in Commonwealth v. Kennedy, 170 Mass. 18 , 48 N.E. 770, 771 (1897), to the effect that the determination of whether a defendant's conduct has crossed the line of mere preparation cannot be reduced to a mechanical test. 1999The dissenter there quoted from Justice Holmes in Commonwealth v. Kennedy, 170 Mass. 18 , 48 N.E. 770, 771 (1897), to the effect that the determination of whether a defendant's conduct has crossed the line of mere preparation cannot be reduced to a mechanical test. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Reedgreen2 sentences1987See, e.g., Thig *105 pen v. Roberts, 468 U.S. 27 , 104 S.Ct. 2916 , 82 L.Ed.2d 23 (1984) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); State v. Zegart, 452 U.S. 948 , 101 S.Ct. 3094 , 69 L.Ed.2d 961 (1981) (Burger, C.J., dissenting from denial of certiorari); United States v. Kimberlin, 781 F. 2d 1247, 1256 (7th Cir.1985), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 107 S.Ct. 419 , 93 L.Ed.2d 370 (1986); People v. Reed, 92 Ill.App.3d 1115, 1119 , 48 Ill.Dec. 421, 425 , 416 N.E.2d 694, 698 (1981). 1987See, e.g., Thig *105 pen v. Roberts, 468 U.S. 27 , 104 S.Ct. 2916 , 82 L.Ed.2d 23 (1984) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); State v. Zegart, 452 U.S. 948 , 101 S.Ct. 3094 , 69 L.Ed.2d 961 (1981) (Burger, C.J., dissenting from denial of certiorari); United States v. Kimberlin, 781 F. 2d 1247, 1256 (7th Cir.1985), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 107 S.Ct. 419 , 93 L.Ed.2d 370 (1986); People v. Reed, 92 Ill.App.3d 1115, 1119 , 48 Ill.Dec. 421, 425 , 416 N.E.2d 694, 698 (1981). | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Brett C. Kimberlingreen1 sentence1987See, e.g., Thig *105 pen v. Roberts, 468 U.S. 27 , 104 S.Ct. 2916 , 82 L.Ed.2d 23 (1984) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); State v. Zegart, 452 U.S. 948 , 101 S.Ct. 3094 , 69 L.Ed.2d 961 (1981) (Burger, C.J., dissenting from denial of certiorari); United States v. Kimberlin, 781 F. 2d 1247, 1256 (7th Cir.1985), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 107 S.Ct. 419 , 93 L.Ed.2d 370 (1986); People v. Reed, 92 Ill.App.3d 1115, 1119 , 48 Ill.Dec. 421, 425 , 416 N.E.2d 694, 698 (1981). | 1 | 1 |
Estelle v. Williamsgreen1 sentence1987Instead, they have recognized that the particular evil proscribed is compelling a defendant, against his will, to be tried in jail attire. [ Id. at 507, 96 S.Ct. at 1694, 48 L.Ed. 2d at 132-33]. | 1 | 1 |
Alexander v. New Jersey Power & Light Co.green1 sentence1987See Alexander v. New Jersey Power & Light Co., 21 N.J. 373, 378 (1956). *409 Moreover, we are persuaded that the Legislature intended that “imprisonment for a term” as a condition of probation and a sentence of imprisonment be treated as two distinct and different sentencing alternatives. | 1 | 1 |
Thigpen v. Robertsgreen2 sentences1987See, e.g., Thig *105 pen v. Roberts, 468 U.S. 27 , 104 S.Ct. 2916 , 82 L.Ed.2d 23 (1984) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); State v. Zegart, 452 U.S. 948 , 101 S.Ct. 3094 , 69 L.Ed.2d 961 (1981) (Burger, C.J., dissenting from denial of certiorari); United States v. Kimberlin, 781 F. 2d 1247, 1256 (7th Cir.1985), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 107 S.Ct. 419 , 93 L.Ed.2d 370 (1986); People v. Reed, 92 Ill.App.3d 1115, 1119 , 48 Ill.Dec. 421, 425 , 416 N.E.2d 694, 698 (1981). 1987See, e.g., Thig *105 pen v. Roberts, 468 U.S. 27 , 104 S.Ct. 2916 , 82 L.Ed.2d 23 (1984) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); State v. Zegart, 452 U.S. 948 , 101 S.Ct. 3094 , 69 L.Ed.2d 961 (1981) (Burger, C.J., dissenting from denial of certiorari); United States v. Kimberlin, 781 F. 2d 1247, 1256 (7th Cir.1985), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 107 S.Ct. 419 , 93 L.Ed.2d 370 (1986); People v. Reed, 92 Ill.App.3d 1115, 1119 , 48 Ill.Dec. 421, 425 , 416 N.E.2d 694, 698 (1981). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Bestgreen1 sentence1985See State v. Best, supra, 70 N.J. at 66-67; State v. Trent, 157 N.J. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Trentgreen1 sentence1985See State v. Best, supra, 70 N.J. at 66-67; State v. Trent, 157 N.J. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New Jersey. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Illinois v. Vitale
green
2 sentences1987The Court then indicated that more was required than a mechanical analysis of the elements of the two offenses if in the pending manslaughter prosecution Illinois relies on and proves a failure to slow to avoid an accident as the reckless act necessary to prove manslaughter, Vitale would have a substantial claim of double jeopardy under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution. [Id. at 421, 100 S.Ct. at 2267 , 65 L.Ed.2d at 238 .] This seemingly inconsistent language in Vitale has created some confusion among state courts, federal courts, and some members of the Un 1987The Court then indicated that more was required than a mechanical analysis of the elements of the two offenses if in the pending manslaughter prosecution Illinois relies on and proves a failure to slow to avoid an accident as the reckless act necessary to prove manslaughter, Vitale would have a substantial claim of double jeopardy under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution. [Id. at 421, 100 S.Ct. at 2267 , 65 L.Ed.2d at 238 .] This seemingly inconsistent language in Vitale has created some confusion among state courts, federal courts, and some members of the Un | 2 | 1987–2017 |
Cesare v. Cesare
green
2 sentences2014Allowing our family courts to weigh the seriousness of the history of domestic violence against the other N.J.S.A 9:2-4 factors, rather than binding them with a mechanical presumption, better enables them to consider the best interests of the child in determining the vital issue of child custody in divorce, using their “special expertise in the field of domestic relations.” Cesare, supra, 154 N.J. at 412 , 713 A.2d 390 . 2014Allowing our family courts to weigh the seriousness of the history of domestic violence against the other N.J.S.A 9:2-4 factors, rather than binding them with a mechanical presumption, better enables them to consider the best interests of the child in determining the vital issue of child custody in divorce, using their “special expertise in the field of domestic relations.” Cesare, supra, 154 N.J. at 412 , 713 A.2d 390 . | 2 | 2014–2014 |
Citibank v. Estate of Simpson
green
1 sentence2025Ibid. | 1 | 2025–2025 |
DiProspero v. Penn
green
1 sentence2024Additionally, if statutory language is unambiguous, a "court should not 'resort to extrinsic interpretative aids.'" DiProspero, 183 N.J. at 492 (quoting Lozano v. Frank DeLuca Const., 178 N.J. 513, 522 (2004)). | 1 | 2024–2024 |
State v. Diaz
green
1 sentence2022We also consider specific elements of the offenses in light of the New Jersey Code of Criminal Justice (Code) merger provision, N.J.S.A. 2C:1-8 . . . . [ 120 N.J. at 327 .] In State v. Diaz, the Supreme Court eschewed the mechanical analysis used in Bowens in favor of a more "flexible" approach. 144 N.J. 628 , 643 (1996). | 1 | 2022–2022 |
State v. Cole
green
1 sentence2022We also consider specific elements of the offenses in light of the New Jersey Code of Criminal Justice (Code) merger provision, N.J.S.A. 2C:1-8 . . . . [ 120 N.J. at 327 .] In State v. Diaz, the Supreme Court eschewed the mechanical analysis used in Bowens in favor of a more "flexible" approach. 144 N.J. 628 , 643 (1996). | 1 | 2022–2022 |
State v. Troy N. Tate (069314)
green
1 sentence2022Noting the tension between the Diaz and Bowens holdings, the Court more recently in Tate made clear that "the better course is to follow Diaz in deciding this and future merger disputes." 216 N.J. at 312 . | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Braham v. State
green
2 sentences1999The defendant's acts "[M]ust come pretty near to accomplishing [the] result before the law will notice it...." Braham, supra, 571 P. 2d at 650 . 1999The defendant's acts "[M]ust come pretty near to accomplishing [the] result before the law will notice it...." Braham, supra, 571 P. 2d at 650 . | 1 | 1999–1999 |
49 Prospect Street v. Sheva Gardens, Inc.
green
1 sentence1993It is true that, as the trial judge observed, we stated in 49 Prospect Street, 227 N.J. | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Illinois v. Zegart
green
2 sentences1987See, e.g., Thig *105 pen v. Roberts, 468 U.S. 27 , 104 S.Ct. 2916 , 82 L.Ed.2d 23 (1984) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); State v. Zegart, 452 U.S. 948 , 101 S.Ct. 3094 , 69 L.Ed.2d 961 (1981) (Burger, C.J., dissenting from denial of certiorari); United States v. Kimberlin, 781 F. 2d 1247, 1256 (7th Cir.1985), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 107 S.Ct. 419 , 93 L.Ed.2d 370 (1986); People v. Reed, 92 Ill.App.3d 1115, 1119 , 48 Ill.Dec. 421, 425 , 416 N.E.2d 694, 698 (1981). 1987See, e.g., Thig *105 pen v. Roberts, 468 U.S. 27 , 104 S.Ct. 2916 , 82 L.Ed.2d 23 (1984) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); State v. Zegart, 452 U.S. 948 , 101 S.Ct. 3094 , 69 L.Ed.2d 961 (1981) (Burger, C.J., dissenting from denial of certiorari); United States v. Kimberlin, 781 F. 2d 1247, 1256 (7th Cir.1985), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 107 S.Ct. 419 , 93 L.Ed.2d 370 (1986); People v. Reed, 92 Ill.App.3d 1115, 1119 , 48 Ill.Dec. 421, 425 , 416 N.E.2d 694, 698 (1981). | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Jones v. United States
green
1 sentence1987See, e.g., Thig *105 pen v. Roberts, 468 U.S. 27 , 104 S.Ct. 2916 , 82 L.Ed.2d 23 (1984) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); State v. Zegart, 452 U.S. 948 , 101 S.Ct. 3094 , 69 L.Ed.2d 961 (1981) (Burger, C.J., dissenting from denial of certiorari); United States v. Kimberlin, 781 F. 2d 1247, 1256 (7th Cir.1985), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 107 S.Ct. 419 , 93 L.Ed.2d 370 (1986); People v. Reed, 92 Ill.App.3d 1115, 1119 , 48 Ill.Dec. 421, 425 , 416 N.E.2d 694, 698 (1981). | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Board of Education of the Oklahoma City Public Schools, Independent District No. 89 v. Dowell
green
1 sentence1987See, e.g., Thig *105 pen v. Roberts, 468 U.S. 27 , 104 S.Ct. 2916 , 82 L.Ed.2d 23 (1984) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); State v. Zegart, 452 U.S. 948 , 101 S.Ct. 3094 , 69 L.Ed.2d 961 (1981) (Burger, C.J., dissenting from denial of certiorari); United States v. Kimberlin, 781 F. 2d 1247, 1256 (7th Cir.1985), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 107 S.Ct. 419 , 93 L.Ed.2d 370 (1986); People v. Reed, 92 Ill.App.3d 1115, 1119 , 48 Ill.Dec. 421, 425 , 416 N.E.2d 694, 698 (1981). | 1 | 1987–1987 |
State v. Hill
green
1 sentence1985Our courts have, in the past, applied a mechanical test for merger, as stated by Judge (later Justice) Francis in State v. Hill, 44 N.J. | 1 | 1985–1985 |
Popular Refreshments, Inc. v. Fuller's Milk Bar
green
1 sentence1977Id. | 1 | 1977–1977 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.