29 Minnesota opinions name it 2 courts 1983–2018 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Minnesota courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Rudgreen2 sentences2015But the mootness doctrine is not a mechanical rule that we invoke automatically; rather, it is a “flexible discretionary doctrine.” Dean, 868 N.W.2d at 4 (citing Rud, 359 N.W.2d at 576 ). 2014It is also true that we have described mootness as “a flexible discretionary doctrine, not a mechanical rule that is invoked automatically whenever the underlying dispute between the particular parties is settled or otherwise resolved.” State v. Rud, 359 N.W.2d 573, 576 (Minn. 1984). | 9 | 10 |
Jasper v. Commissioner of Public Safetygreen2 sentences2016Safety, 642 N.W.2d 435, 439 (Minn. 2002). 2012Safety, 642 N.W.2d 435, 439 (Minn.2002). | 8 | 8 |
Kahn v. Griffingreen2 sentences2018This distinguishes standing from mootness, which is a "flexible discretionary doctrine, not a mechanical rule that is invoked automatically." Kahn v. Griffin , 701 N.W.2d 815 , 821 (Minn. 2005). 2014Kahn v. Griffin, 701 N.W.2d 815, 821 (Minn.2005). 7 Our prece dent illustrates our careful analysis of all aspects of the issues presented before we determine whether to dismiss the case or exercise our discretion to consider the appeal as an exception to the mootness doctrine. | 1 | 2 |
Ethan Dean v. City of Winonagreen2 sentences2017“The mootness doctrine is not a mechanical rule that is automatically invoked whenever the underlying dispute between the parties is settled or otherwise resolved.” Dean v. City of Winona, 868 N.W.2d 1, 4 (Minn. 2015). “[A]n appeal is not moot, however, where the issue raised is capable of repetition yet evades review or where collateral consequences attach to the judgment.” In re McCaskill, 603 N.W.2d 326, 327 (Minn. 1999) (quotation omitted). 2015But the mootness doctrine is not a mechanical rule that we invoke automatically; rather, it is a “flexible discretionary doctrine.” Dean, 868 N.W.2d at 4 (citing Rud, 359 N.W.2d at 576 ). | 1 | 2 |
State v. Sotogreen2 sentences2005“The determination of whether multiple offenses are part of a single behavioral act under section 609.035 is not a mechanical test, but involves an examination of all the facts and circumstances.” State v. Soto, 562 N.W.2d 299, 304 (Minn.1997). 2001Soto, 562 N.W.2d at 304 . | 1 | 2 |
In Re McCaskillgreen1 sentence2017“The mootness doctrine is not a mechanical rule that is automatically invoked whenever the underlying dispute between the parties is settled or otherwise resolved.” Dean v. City of Winona, 868 N.W.2d 1, 4 (Minn. 2015). “[A]n appeal is not moot, however, where the issue raised is capable of repetition yet evades review or where collateral consequences attach to the judgment.” In re McCaskill, 603 N.W.2d 326, 327 (Minn. 1999) (quotation omitted). | 1 | 1 |
Houck v. EASTERN CARVER COUNTY SCHOOLSgreen1 sentence2015Ultimately, “[m]ootness is . . . a flexible discretionary doctrine, not a mechanical rule that is invoked automatically.” Houck, 787 N.W.2d at 231 (quotation omitted). | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Jorngreen2 sentences2006Somerville, 410 U.S. 458 , 93 S.Ct. 1066 , 35 L.Ed.2d 425 (noting that the standard “abjures the application of any mechanical formula,” id. at 462 , 93 S.Ct. 1066 ; and “virtually all of the cases turn on the particular facts and thus escape meaningful categorization,” id. at 464 , 93 S.Ct. 1066 ); see also United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470, 480 , 91 S.Ct. 547 , 27 L.Ed.2d 543 (1971) (noting, in a case affirming the application of the Double Jeopardy Clause to bar retrial, that “a mechanical rule prohibiting retrial * * * would be too high a price to pay for the added assurance of personal 2006Somerville, 410 U.S. 458 , 93 S.Ct. 1066 , 35 L.Ed.2d 425 (noting that the standard “abjures the application of any mechanical formula,” id. at 462 , 93 S.Ct. 1066 ; and “virtually all of the cases turn on the particular facts and thus escape meaningful categorization,” id. at 464 , 93 S.Ct. 1066 ); see also United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470, 480 , 91 S.Ct. 547 , 27 L.Ed.2d 543 (1971) (noting, in a case affirming the application of the Double Jeopardy Clause to bar retrial, that “a mechanical rule prohibiting retrial * * * would be too high a price to pay for the added assurance of personal | 1 | 1 |
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Budget Rent-A-Car Systems, Inc.green1 sentence2002The mootness doctrine, however, “is a flexible discretionary doctrine, not a mechanical rule that is invoked automatically.” State v. Rud, 359 N.W.2d 673, 576 (Minn.1984). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Kempgreen2 sentences1983We explained this as follows in State v. Zuehlke, 320 N.W.2d 79, 82 (Minn.1982): That there is a factual nature to the determination by the trial court something which we explicitly recognized in State v. Kemp, 305 N.W.2d 322, 326 (Minn.1981) is illustrated by considering the case of State v. Finn, 295 Minn. 520 , 203 N.W.2d 114 (1972), where we held that the offense of driving recklessly was part of the same behavioral incident as the offense of using a vehicle without authorization where both violations occurred during a continuous and uninterrupted course of driving and the defendant dr 1983We explained this as follows in State v. Zuehlke, 320 N.W.2d 79, 82 (Minn.1982): That there is a factual nature to the determination by the trial court — something which we explicitly recognized in State v. Kemp, 305 N.W.2d 322, 326 (Minn.1981) — is illustrated by considering the case of State v. Finn, 295 Minn. 520 , 203 N.W.2d 114 (1972), where we held that the offense of driving recklessly was part of the same behavioral incident as the offense of using a vehicle without authorization where both violations occurred during a continuous and uninterrupted course of driving and the defendant dr | 1 | 1 |
State v. Zuehlkegreen2 sentences1983We explained this as follows in State v. Zuehlke, 320 N.W.2d 79, 82 (Minn.1982): That there is a factual nature to the determination by the trial court something which we explicitly recognized in State v. Kemp, 305 N.W.2d 322, 326 (Minn.1981) is illustrated by considering the case of State v. Finn, 295 Minn. 520 , 203 N.W.2d 114 (1972), where we held that the offense of driving recklessly was part of the same behavioral incident as the offense of using a vehicle without authorization where both violations occurred during a continuous and uninterrupted course of driving and the defendant dr 1983We explained this as follows in State v. Zuehlke, 320 N.W.2d 79, 82 (Minn.1982): That there is a factual nature to the determination by the trial court — something which we explicitly recognized in State v. Kemp, 305 N.W.2d 322, 326 (Minn.1981) — is illustrated by considering the case of State v. Finn, 295 Minn. 520 , 203 N.W.2d 114 (1972), where we held that the offense of driving recklessly was part of the same behavioral incident as the offense of using a vehicle without authorization where both violations occurred during a continuous and uninterrupted course of driving and the defendant dr | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Minnesota. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Banks
green
2 sentences1997Banks, 331 N.W.2d at 493 . 1989This is not “a mechanical test but one which involves an examination of all the facts and circumstances of the case.” Id. | 3 | 1989–1997 |
Idaho v. Wright
green
2 sentences1999In Idaho v. Wright, the Supreme Court declined to “endorse a mechanical test” for what factors may be considered under the totality of circumstances, and noted that “courts have considerable leeway in their consideration of appropriate factors.” Id. at 822 , 110 S.Ct. 3139 . 1999In Idaho v. Wright, the Supreme Court declined to “endorse a mechanical test” for what factors may be considered under the totality of circumstances, and noted that “courts have considerable leeway in their consideration of appropriate factors.” Id. at 822 , 110 S.Ct. 3139 . | 2 | 1993–1999 |
In Re the GUARDIANSHIP OF Jeffers J. TSCHUMY, Ward
green
1 sentence2018Our conclusion that Glaze's death terminated the attorneys' authority to act on his behalf is not inconsistent with In re Guardianship of Tschumy , 853 N.W.2d 728 (Minn. 2014). | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Illinois v. Somerville
green
2 sentences2006Somerville, 410 U.S. 458 , 93 S.Ct. 1066 , 35 L.Ed.2d 425 (noting that the standard “abjures the application of any mechanical formula,” id. at 462 , 93 S.Ct. 1066 ; and “virtually all of the cases turn on the particular facts and thus escape meaningful categorization,” id. at 464 , 93 S.Ct. 1066 ); see also United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470, 480 , 91 S.Ct. 547 , 27 L.Ed.2d 543 (1971) (noting, in a case affirming the application of the Double Jeopardy Clause to bar retrial, that “a mechanical rule prohibiting retrial * * * would be too high a price to pay for the added assurance of personal 2006Somerville, 410 U.S. 458 , 93 S.Ct. 1066 , 35 L.Ed.2d 425 (noting that the standard “abjures the application of any mechanical formula,” id. at 462 , 93 S.Ct. 1066 ; and “virtually all of the cases turn on the particular facts and thus escape meaningful categorization,” id. at 464 , 93 S.Ct. 1066 ); see also United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470, 480 , 91 S.Ct. 547 , 27 L.Ed.2d 543 (1971) (noting, in a case affirming the application of the Double Jeopardy Clause to bar retrial, that “a mechanical rule prohibiting retrial * * * would be too high a price to pay for the added assurance of personal | 1 | 2006–2006 |
State v. Finn
green
2 sentences1983We explained this as follows in State v. Zuehlke, 320 N.W.2d 79, 82 (Minn.1982): That there is a factual nature to the determination by the trial court — something which we explicitly recognized in State v. Kemp, 305 N.W.2d 322, 326 (Minn.1981) — is illustrated by considering the case of State v. Finn, 295 Minn. 520 , 203 N.W.2d 114 (1972), where we held that the offense of driving recklessly was part of the same behavioral incident as the offense of using a vehicle without authorization where both violations occurred during a continuous and uninterrupted course of driving and the defendant dr 1983We explained this as follows in State v. Zuehlke, 320 N.W.2d 79, 82 (Minn.1982): That there is a factual nature to the determination by the trial court — something which we explicitly recognized in State v. Kemp, 305 N.W.2d 322, 326 (Minn.1981) — is illustrated by considering the case of State v. Finn, 295 Minn. 520 , 203 N.W.2d 114 (1972), where we held that the offense of driving recklessly was part of the same behavioral incident as the offense of using a vehicle without authorization where both violations occurred during a continuous and uninterrupted course of driving and the defendant dr | 1 | 1983–1983 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.