mechanical rule in Louisiana

1978Under these circumstances, Everett cannot rely on a statutory right-of-way to justify his entry into the Glendale intersection. *1085 In Gutelius v. Phoenix Insurance Company, 266 So.2d 717 (La.App. 4th Cir. 1972, writ refused), the court stated: "The so-called directional right-of-way rule does not convert the street into a superior one, having the right-of-way; nor is it a mechanical rule which determines liability after an accident by the mere direction of the vehicles.

1973This court had occasion to say, in the case of Gutelius v. Phoenix Insurance Company, 266 So.2d 717 (La.App.1972), concerning the right-of-way in a case such as this, that: “The so-called directional right-of-way rule does not convert the street into a superior one, having the right-of-way; nor is it a mechanical rule which determines liability after an accident by the mere direction of the vehicles.

1989Lawrence v. Grant Parish School Board, 409 So.2d 1316 (La.App. 3d Cir.1982).

1987Bouvier v. Krenz, 702 F.2d 89 (5th Cir. 1983).

1987However, the Robison, supra test is a guideline rather than a mechanical test.

1986In Jordan v. Travelers Insurance Co., supra, the Supreme Court, per Tate, J., reversed our holding that plaintiff had failed to prove "with reasonable certainty" his entitlement to an award for loss of earnings and diminished earning capacity, because of his failure to "prove it be corroborative evidence such as income tax returns or employment records." Justice Tate observed that plaintiff, his wife and his employer testified regarding earnings and their testimony was not contradicted, and reasoned that the jurisprudence cited by defendant "does not provide a mechanical rule denying any recov

1986Therefore, the Court held that it could "find no reason to question the proof of more-probable-than-not loss of earnings so made, simply because Jordan did not introduce his income tax returns or other records to substantiate whatever loss his testimony proved." 245 So.2d at 156 .