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7 Michigan opinions name it 2 courts 1966–2009 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Michigan courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Idaho v. Wrightgreen2 sentences1993Our precedents have recognized that statements admitted under a "firmly rooted” hearsay exception are so trustworthy that adversarial testing would add little to their reliability. [Wright, supra at 820-821 .] The Court, however, "decline[d] to endorse a mechanical test for determining 'particular guarantees of trustworthiness’ under the Confrontation Clause.” Id. at 822 . 1993Our precedents have recognized that statements admitted under a "firmly rooted” hearsay exception are so trustworthy that adversarial testing would add little to their reliability. [Wright, supra at 820-821 .] The Court, however, "decline[d] to endorse a mechanical test for determining 'particular guarantees of trustworthiness’ under the Confrontation Clause.” Id. at 822 . | 1 | 2 |
People v. Andersongreen1 sentence1988See People v Anderson, 409 Mich 474, 485 ; 295 NW2d 482 (1980). 46 See n 5 supra. 47 Where a reviewing court holds that the mistrial was not mani *253 festly necessary, the double jeopardy prohibition bars retrial. | 1 | 1 |
In Re Apportionment of State Legislature-1964green1 sentence1966See 373 Mich 250, 251, 255 , and 257. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Michigan. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Stewart v. People
green
2 sentences1975Defendant has cited this passage by Justice Cooley in Stewart v People, 23 Mich 63 ; 9 Am Rep 78 (1871) concerning the use of impeachment evidence: " 'The proper test for the admissibility of evidence ought to be, we think, whether it has a tendency to affect belief in the mind of a reasonably cautious person, who should receive it and weigh it with judicial fairness.’ (p 75.) Justice Cooley further said the judge 'ought to be allowed a reasonable discretion in such cases’ which 'ought not to be set aside except in a clear case of abuse’, (p 76.) “This preeminent jurist understood the difficul 1974Defendant has cited this passage by Justice COOLEY in Stewart v People, 23 Mich 63 ; 9 Am Rep 78 (1871) concerning the use of impeachment evidence: "The proper test for the admissibility of evidence ought to be, we think, whether it has a tendency to affect belief in the mind of a reasonably cautious person, who should receive it and weigh it with judicial fairness." (p 75.) Justice COOLEY further said the judge "ought to be allowed a reasonable discretion in such cases" which "ought not to be set aside except in a clear case of abuse". (p 76.) This preeminent jurist understood the difficulty | 2 | 1974–1975 |
Smith v. Estate of Smith
green
2 sentences2009Justice CAVANAGH would extend the mechanical rule established in Smith v Smith Estate, 91 Mich 7 ; 51 NW 694 (1892), to bar recovery on any loan made more than 12 years before the plaintiff filed her complaint. 2009Justice CAVANAGH would extend the mechanical rule established in Smith v Smith Estate, 91 Mich 7 ; 51 NW 694 (1892), to bar recovery on any loan made more than 12 years before the plaintiff filed her complaint. | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Wade v. Hunter
green
2 sentences1988Our decisions in the mistrial setting accordingly have accommodated the defendant’s double jeopardy interests with legitimate prosecutorial interests.”); United States v Jorn, n 40 supra, p 480 ("[I]t becomes readily apparent that a mechanical rule prohibiting retrial whenever circumstances compel the discharge of a jury without the defendant’s consent would be too high a price to pay for the added assurance of personal security and freedom from governmental harassment which such a mechanical rule would provide.”); Wade v Hunter, 336 US 684, 688-690 ; 69 S Ct 834 ; 93 L Ed 974 (1949). 45 See n 1988Our decisions in the mistrial setting accordingly have accommodated the defendant’s double jeopardy interests with legitimate prosecutorial interests.”); United States v Jorn, n 40 supra, p 480 ("[I]t becomes readily apparent that a mechanical rule prohibiting retrial whenever circumstances compel the discharge of a jury without the defendant’s consent would be too high a price to pay for the added assurance of personal security and freedom from governmental harassment which such a mechanical rule would provide.”); Wade v Hunter, 336 US 684, 688-690 ; 69 S Ct 834 ; 93 L Ed 974 (1949). 45 See n | 1 | 1988–1988 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.