Already have an account? Sign in instead.
You stay signed in for 30 days on this browser.
Continue with Google Continue with MicrosoftNo account yet? Create a free one.
We sent a six-digit code.
It expires in ten minutes, works once, and only in this browser. Five wrong tries void it. Send another code.
Your account is live and the Cloudflare checks are off for this browser.
8 Maryland opinions name it 2 courts 1972–2004 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Maryland courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Idaho v. Wrightgreen2 sentences2002See Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 822 , 110 S.Ct. 3139 , 111 L.Ed.2d 638 (1990) (“We therefore decline to endorse a mechanical test for determining ‘particularized guarantees of trustworthiness’ under the [Confrontation] Clause.”). 2002See Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 822 , 110 S.Ct. 3139 , 111 L.Ed.2d 638 (1990) (“We therefore decline to endorse a mechanical test for determining ‘particularized guarantees of trustworthiness’ under the [Confrontation] Clause.”). | 1 | 5 |
Associated Indemnity Corp. v. Industrial Accident Commissiongreen2 sentences2004It quoted with approval, id, Associated Indemnity Corp. v. Industrial Accident Commission, 124 Cal.App. 378, 381 , 12 P.2d 1075, 1076 (1932), as that case distinguished, for accrual purposes, between a period of time and a point of time. 2004It quoted with approval, id, Associated Indemnity Corp. v. Industrial Accident Commission, 124 Cal.App. 378, 381 , 12 P.2d 1075, 1076 (1932), as that case distinguished, for accrual purposes, between a period of time and a point of time. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Maryland. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Urie v. Thompson
green
2 sentences2004The Supreme Court rejected the railroad’s mechanical analysis of the “accrual” of petitioner’s injury— whether breath by breath, or at one unrecorded moment in the progress of the disease. 337 U.S. at 169 , 69 S.Ct. 1018 . 2004The Supreme Court rejected the railroad’s mechanical analysis of the “accrual” of petitioner’s injury— whether breath by breath, or at one unrecorded moment in the progress of the disease. 337 U.S. at 169 , 69 S.Ct. 1018 . | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Simmons v. State
green
2 sentences1995With regard to specific factors to be considered, we recognize that trial “courts have considerable leeway in their consideration of appropriate factors to determine the existence of particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.” Simmons, 333 Md. at 560 , 636 A.2d 463 (citing Wright, 497 U.S. at 822 , 110 S.Ct. at 3150 ) (refusing “to endorse a mechanical test for determining ‘particularized guarantees of trustworthiness’ under the [Confrontation] Clause.”). 1995With regard to specific factors to be considered, we recognize that trial “courts have considerable leeway in their consideration of appropriate factors to determine the existence of particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.” Simmons, 333 Md. at 560 , 636 A.2d 463 (citing Wright, 497 U.S. at 822 , 110 S.Ct. at 3150 ) (refusing “to endorse a mechanical test for determining ‘particularized guarantees of trustworthiness’ under the [Confrontation] Clause.”). | 1 | 1995–1995 |
cluster 353283
green
1 sentence1979“It is manifest from this legislative history of the 1974 Amendments that Congress intended to proscribe the use of a mechanical test such as that enunciated in Title Guarantee in favor of ‘a case-by-case’ factual inquiry in determining whether to require disclosure of investigatory records.” Id. at 202 . | 1 | 1979–1979 |
United States v. Tateo
green
1 sentence1972It states at n. 11 at 557, discussing United States v. Tateo, 377 U.S. 463 , that "the question of `voluntariness' for purposes of assessing the validity of a plea of guilty — whether offered before or at trial — must be distinguished from the question of `voluntariness' for purposes of assessing reprosecutability under the Double Jeopardy Clause." [12] The opinion pointed out that it was readily apparent that a mechanical rule prohibiting retrial would be too high a price to pay for the added assurance of personal security and freedom from governmental harassment such a rule would provide. | 1 | 1972–1972 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.