second assignment error in West Virginia

2022Va. 641 , 398 S.E.2d 123 (1990). 2 Petitioner also raises a second assignment of error in which she alleges that the circuit court erred in failing to reinstate supervised visitation between her and the child.

2020Va. 641 , 398 S.E.2d 123 (1990). 2 In his table of contents, petitioner lists a second assignment of error that is drastically different from the one presented in his argument section.

2026In Stuck v. Stuck, 218 W.

2021They argue on appeal that these damages were duplicative and that the award for aggravation and inconvenience should have been set aside “on post-trial motions,” as this Court did in Hardman Trucking, Inc. v. Poling Trucking Co., Inc., 176 W.

2020However, the only 3 Furthermore, when declaring West Virginia Code § 48-24-101 partly unconstitutional, the Stone Court recognized that “[m]erely identifying that a law affects an individual liberty is not the end of the matter; our doctrines permit the State to intrude upon liberties protected by the Due Process Clause when reasonably necessary to accomplish a goal of countervailing importance.” 196 W.Va. at 633 , 474 S.E.2d at 563 .

2020However, the only 3 Furthermore, when declaring West Virginia Code § 48-24-101 partly unconstitutional, the Stone Court recognized that “[m]erely identifying that a law affects an individual liberty is not the end of the matter; our doctrines permit the State to intrude upon liberties protected by the Due Process Clause when reasonably necessary to accomplish a goal of countervailing importance.” 196 W.Va. at 633 , 474 S.E.2d at 563 .

2018II, 230 W.Va. 731 , 742 S.E.2d 419 (2013); State v. Brandon B., 218 W.Va. 324 , 624 S.E.2d 761 (2005); State v. Edward Charles L., 183 W.Va. 641 , 398 S.E.2d 123 (1990). 2 Petitioner asserts a second assignment of error that alleges error in the circuit court’s finding that she failed to remedy the conditions of abuse and neglect that led to the prior involuntary termination of her parental rights.

2018II, 230 W.Va. 731 , 742 S.E.2d 419 (2013); State v. Brandon B., 218 W.Va. 324 , 624 S.E.2d 761 (2005); State v. Edward Charles L., 183 W.Va. 641 , 398 S.E.2d 123 (1990). 2 Petitioner asserts a second assignment of error that alleges error in the circuit court’s finding that she failed to remedy the conditions of abuse and neglect that led to the prior involuntary termination of her parental rights.

2018II, 230 W.Va. 731 , 742 S.E.2d 419 (2013); State v. Brandon B., 218 W.Va. 324 , 624 S.E.2d 761 (2005); State v. Edward Charles L., 183 W.Va. 641 , 398 S.E.2d 123 (1990). 2 Petitioner asserts a second assignment of error that alleges error in the circuit court’s finding that she failed to remedy the conditions of abuse and neglect that led to the prior involuntary termination of her parental rights.

2018II, 230 W.Va. 731 , 742 S.E.2d 419 (2013); State v. Brandon B., 218 W.Va. 324 , 624 S.E.2d 761 (2005); State v. Edward Charles L., 183 W.Va. 641 , 398 S.E.2d 123 (1990). 2 Petitioner asserts a second assignment of error that alleges error in the circuit court’s finding that she failed to remedy the conditions of abuse and neglect that led to the prior involuntary termination of her parental rights.

2010In State v. Williams, 172 W.Va. 295 , 305 S.E.2d 251 (1983), this Court explained that: The decision to declare a mistrial, discharge the jury and order a new trial in a criminal case is a matter within the sound discretion of the trial court.

2010In State v. Williams, 172 W.Va. 295 , 305 S.E.2d 251 (1983), this Court explained that: The decision to declare a mistrial, discharge the jury and order a new trial in a criminal case is a matter within the sound discretion of the trial court.

2009In Syllabus Point 1 of Mathena v. Haines, 219 W.Va. 417 , 633 S.E.2d 771 (2006), this Court held: *476 In reviewing challenges to the findings and conclusions of the circuit court in a habeas corpus action, we apply a three-prong standard of review.

2009In Syllabus Point 1 of Mathena v. Haines, 219 W.Va. 417 , 633 S.E.2d 771 (2006), this Court held: *476 In reviewing challenges to the findings and conclusions of the circuit court in a habeas corpus action, we apply a three-prong standard of review.

2002However, even if Rule 52(a) required findings of fact and conclusions of law in the circuit court's order, we held in Syllabus Point 1 of Tomkies v. Tomkies, 158 W.Va. 872 , 215 S.E.2d 652 (1975), that "[f]ailure to comply with the requirements of Rule 52(a), W.Va.R.C.P. authorizes the appellate court to make independent factual determinations without resorting to remand where the record contains sufficient dispositive facts for decision." Our review of the record indicates that it contains sufficient dispositive facts for this Court to make independent factual determinations without resort to

2002However, even if Rule 52(a) required findings of fact and conclusions of law in the circuit court's order, we held in Syllabus Point 1 of Tomkies v. Tomkies, 158 W.Va. 872 , 215 S.E.2d 652 (1975), that "[f]ailure to comply with the requirements of Rule 52(a), W.Va.R.C.P. authorizes the appellate court to make independent factual determinations without resorting to remand where the record contains sufficient dispositive facts for decision." Our review of the record indicates that it contains sufficient dispositive facts for this Court to make independent factual determinations without resort to

1995Although this court has never specifically addressed this issue, the language of the federal statute and the body of case law in other jurisdictions support the appellants’ position. 29 U.S.C. § 152 , provides in pertinent part: When used in this subchapter— ****** (2) The term “employer” includes any person acting as an agent of an employer, directly or indirectly, but shall not include the United States or any wholly owned Government corporation, or any Federal Reserve Bank, or any State or political subdivision thereof, or any person subject to the Railway Labor Act [ 45 U.S.C.A. § 151 et s

1995Although this court has never specifically addressed this issue, the language of the federal statute and the body of case law in other jurisdictions support the appellants’ position. 29 U.S.C. § 152 , provides in pertinent part: When used in this subchapter— ****** (2) The term “employer” includes any person acting as an agent of an employer, directly or indirectly, but shall not include the United States or any wholly owned Government corporation, or any Federal Reserve Bank, or any State or political subdivision thereof, or any person subject to the Railway Labor Act [ 45 U.S.C.A. § 151 et s

1994The trial court further ruled that, to allow the appellant to present evidence concerning Ms. Hall's and Ms. Posey's inability to identify the appellant in pretrial photographic lineups would "open the door" to the State to introduce their evidence of pretrial identification. `The action of a trial court in admitting or excluding evidence in the exercise of its discretion will not be disturbed by the appellate court unless it appears that such action amounts to an abuse of discretion.' Syllabus Point 10, State v. Huffman, 141 W.Va. 55 , 87 S.E.2d 541 (1955).

1994The trial court further ruled that, to allow the appellant to present evidence concerning Ms. Hall's and Ms. Posey's inability to identify the appellant in pretrial photographic lineups would "open the door" to the State to introduce their evidence of pretrial identification. `The action of a trial court in admitting or excluding evidence in the exercise of its discretion will not be disturbed by the appellate court unless it appears that such action amounts to an abuse of discretion.' Syllabus Point 10, State v. Huffman, 141 W.Va. 55 , 87 S.E.2d 541 (1955).

1987We have addressed this issue in the recent cases of State v. Hall, 172 W.Va. 138 , 304 S.E.2d 43, 48 (1983), and State v. Manns, 174 W.Va. 793 , 329 S.E.2d 865 (1985).

1987We have addressed this issue in the recent cases of State v. Hall, 172 W.Va. 138 , 304 S.E.2d 43, 48 (1983), and State v. Manns, 174 W.Va. 793 , 329 S.E.2d 865 (1985).

1986II The appellant’s second assignment of error is the trial court’s failure to suppress, as “ ‘fruit of the poisonous tree,’ clothing seized from his home pursuant to a search warrant obtained following a warrantless search of the premises.” See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 , 83 S.Ct. 407 , 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963). 4 Unquestionably, as this Court held in Syllabus Point 2 of State v. Stone, 165 W.Va. 266 , 268 S.E.2d 50 (W.Va.1980), “Property observed during an illegal or improper search cannot be subsequently seized pursuant to a lawful search warrant which was based solely upon observa

1986II The appellant’s second assignment of error is the trial court’s failure to suppress, as “ ‘fruit of the poisonous tree,’ clothing seized from his home pursuant to a search warrant obtained following a warrantless search of the premises.” See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 , 83 S.Ct. 407 , 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963). 4 Unquestionably, as this Court held in Syllabus Point 2 of State v. Stone, 165 W.Va. 266 , 268 S.E.2d 50 (W.Va.1980), “Property observed during an illegal or improper search cannot be subsequently seized pursuant to a lawful search warrant which was based solely upon observa

1986II The appellant’s second assignment of error is the trial court’s failure to suppress, as “ ‘fruit of the poisonous tree,’ clothing seized from his home pursuant to a search warrant obtained following a warrantless search of the premises.” See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 , 83 S.Ct. 407 , 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963). 4 Unquestionably, as this Court held in Syllabus Point 2 of State v. Stone, 165 W.Va. 266 , 268 S.E.2d 50 (W.Va.1980), “Property observed during an illegal or improper search cannot be subsequently seized pursuant to a lawful search warrant which was based solely upon observa

1986II The appellant’s second assignment of error is the trial court’s failure to suppress, as “ ‘fruit of the poisonous tree,’ clothing seized from his home pursuant to a search warrant obtained following a warrantless search of the premises.” See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 , 83 S.Ct. 407 , 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963). 4 Unquestionably, as this Court held in Syllabus Point 2 of State v. Stone, 165 W.Va. 266 , 268 S.E.2d 50 (W.Va.1980), “Property observed during an illegal or improper search cannot be subsequently seized pursuant to a lawful search warrant which was based solely upon observa

1985With respect to the reception of evidence in general, however, we note that, “Motions to introduce and motions and objections for exclusion are addressed to the sound discretion of the court.” State v. Thomas, 157 W.Va. 640, 657 , 203 S.E.2d 445, 456 (1974); see also State v. Gum, 172 W.Va. 534 , 309 S.E.2d 32, 40 (1983); State v. Messer, 166 W.Va. 806 , 277 S.E.2d 634, 636 (1981); State v. Sette, 161 W.Va. 384 , 395 n. 3, 242 S.E.2d 464 , 471 n. 3 (1978).

1985With respect to the reception of evidence in general, however, we note that, “Motions to introduce and motions and objections for exclusion are addressed to the sound discretion of the court.” State v. Thomas, 157 W.Va. 640, 657 , 203 S.E.2d 445, 456 (1974); see also State v. Gum, 172 W.Va. 534 , 309 S.E.2d 32, 40 (1983); State v. Messer, 166 W.Va. 806 , 277 S.E.2d 634, 636 (1981); State v. Sette, 161 W.Va. 384 , 395 n. 3, 242 S.E.2d 464 , 471 n. 3 (1978).

1982The court need not repeat instructions already substantially given.’ Syllabus point 4, State v. Bingham, 42 W.Va. 234 , 24 S.E. 883 (1896).” Syllabus point 4, State v. Johnson, 157 W.Va. 341 , 201 S.E.2d 309 (1973). *68 III.

1982The court need not repeat instructions already substantially given.’ Syllabus point 4, State v. Bingham, 42 W.Va. 234 , 24 S.E. 883 (1896).” Syllabus point 4, State v. Johnson, 157 W.Va. 341 , 201 S.E.2d 309 (1973). *68 III.

1982Co., 44 W.Va. 218 , 28 S.E. 932 (1897): “The verdict of a jury will be held sacred by this Court, unless there is a plain preponderance of credible evidence against it, evincing a miscarriage of justice from some cause, such as prejudice, bias, undue influence, misconduct, oversight, or some misconception of the facts or law.” The appellants’ second assignment of error is that the trial court erred in excluding 0.

1982Co., 44 W.Va. 218 , 28 S.E. 932 (1897): “The verdict of a jury will be held sacred by this Court, unless there is a plain preponderance of credible evidence against it, evincing a miscarriage of justice from some cause, such as prejudice, bias, undue influence, misconduct, oversight, or some misconception of the facts or law.” The appellants’ second assignment of error is that the trial court erred in excluding 0.

1982The court need not repeat instructions already substantially given.’ Syllabus point 4, State v. Bingham, 42 W.Va. 234 , 24 S.E. 883 (1896).” Syllabus point 4, State v. Johnson, 157 W.Va. 341 , 201 S.E.2d 309 (1973). *68 III.

1982The court need not repeat instructions already substantially given.’ Syllabus point 4, State v. Bingham, 42 W.Va. 234 , 24 S.E. 883 (1896).” Syllabus point 4, State v. Johnson, 157 W.Va. 341 , 201 S.E.2d 309 (1973). *68 III.

1981Appellant relies on our recent case of Murredu v. Murredu, 160 W.Va. 610 , 236 S.E. 2d 452 (1977) where, citing Wood v. Wood, 126 *386 W.Va. 189, 28 S.E. 2d 423 (1943), we held in Syllabus point 3 that, “[u]nder the provisions of W.Va.

1981Appellant relies on our recent case of Murredu v. Murredu, 160 W.Va. 610 , 236 S.E. 2d 452 (1977) where, citing Wood v. Wood, 126 *386 W.Va. 189, 28 S.E. 2d 423 (1943), we held in Syllabus point 3 that, “[u]nder the provisions of W.Va.

1981Appellant relies on our recent case of Murredu v. Murredu, 160 W.Va. 610 , 236 S.E. 2d 452 (1977) where, citing Wood v. Wood, 126 *386 W.Va. 189, 28 S.E. 2d 423 (1943), we held in Syllabus point 3 that, “[u]nder the provisions of W.Va.