second assignment error in Pennsylvania

1974Under these circumstances appellant's contention in this regard is without merit. [3] See Commonwealth v. Conner, 445 Pa. 36 , 282 A.2d 23 (1971). *242 The second assignment of error is that his confession should have been suppressed because he was not informed of the nature of the crime about which he was to be questioned, he was not provided with counsel, and his physical and mental condition was such that his will was overborne, rendering his confession involuntary.

1974Under these circumstances appellant's contention in this regard is without merit. [3] See Commonwealth v. Conner, 445 Pa. 36 , 282 A.2d 23 (1971). *242 The second assignment of error is that his confession should have been suppressed because he was not informed of the nature of the crime about which he was to be questioned, he was not provided with counsel, and his physical and mental condition was such that his will was overborne, rendering his confession involuntary.

1972But it does not of necessity follow that appellant is entitled to the same consideration, for as the court said in Hazen Engineering Co. v. Pittsburgh, 189 Pa. Superior Ct. 531, 540-41 , 151 A. 2d 855 (1959): "Doing the same thing by different people under different circumstances has been held to be manufacturing in one case and not manufacturing in the other." The second assignment of error is that the lower court abused its discretion in not permitting appellant to reopen the record for the purpose of offering additional evidence which would have demonstrated eligibility for the manufacturin

1972But it does not of necessity follow that appellant is entitled to the same consideration, for as the court said in Hazen Engineering Co. v. Pittsburgh, 189 Pa. Superior Ct. 531, 540-41 , 151 A. 2d 855 (1959): "Doing the same thing by different people under different circumstances has been held to be manufacturing in one case and not manufacturing in the other." The second assignment of error is that the lower court abused its discretion in not permitting appellant to reopen the record for the purpose of offering additional evidence which would have demonstrated eligibility for the manufacturin

1964Where one pleads guilty to a criminal charge before the court, that is a confession of guilt: Commonwealth v. Simmons, 361 Pa. 391 , 65 A. 2d 353 (1919), cert. denied, 338 U. S. 862 , 70 S. Ct. 96 (1949); United States v. Lynch, 132 F. 2d 111 (1942), cert. denied, 318 U. S. 777 , 63 S. Ct. 831 (1943); United States v. Fox, 130 F. 2d 56 (1942), cert. denied, 317 U. S. 666 , 63 S. Ct. 74 (1942); Com. ex rel.

1964Where one pleads guilty to a criminal charge before the court, that is a confession of guilt: Commonwealth v. Simmons, 361 Pa. 391 , 65 A. 2d 353 (1919), cert. denied, 338 U. S. 862 , 70 S. Ct. 96 (1949); United States v. Lynch, 132 F. 2d 111 (1942), cert. denied, 318 U. S. 777 , 63 S. Ct. 831 (1943); United States v. Fox, 130 F. 2d 56 (1942), cert. denied, 317 U. S. 666 , 63 S. Ct. 74 (1942); Com. ex rel.

1964Where one pleads guilty to a criminal charge before the court, that is a confession of guilt: Commonwealth v. Simmons, 361 Pa. 391 , 65 A. 2d 353 (1919), cert. denied, 338 U. S. 862 , 70 S. Ct. 96 (1949); United States v. Lynch, 132 F. 2d 111 (1942), cert. denied, 318 U. S. 777 , 63 S. Ct. 831 (1943); United States v. Fox, 130 F. 2d 56 (1942), cert. denied, 317 U. S. 666 , 63 S. Ct. 74 (1942); Com. ex rel.

1964Where one pleads guilty to a criminal charge before the court, that is a confession of guilt: Commonwealth v. Simmons, 361 Pa. 391 , 65 A. 2d 353 (1919), cert. denied, 338 U. S. 862 , 70 S. Ct. 96 (1949); United States v. Lynch, 132 F. 2d 111 (1942), cert. denied, 318 U. S. 777 , 63 S. Ct. 831 (1943); United States v. Fox, 130 F. 2d 56 (1942), cert. denied, 317 U. S. 666 , 63 S. Ct. 74 (1942); Com. ex rel.

1964Where one pleads guilty to a criminal charge before the court, that is a confession of guilt: Commonwealth v. Simmons, 361 Pa. 391 , 65 A. 2d 353 (1919), cert. denied, 338 U. S. 862 , 70 S. Ct. 96 (1949); United States v. Lynch, 132 F. 2d 111 (1942), cert. denied, 318 U. S. 777 , 63 S. Ct. 831 (1943); United States v. Fox, 130 F. 2d 56 (1942), cert. denied, 317 U. S. 666 , 63 S. Ct. 74 (1942); Com. ex rel.

1964Where one pleads guilty to a criminal charge before the court, that is a confession of guilt: Commonwealth v. Simmons, 361 Pa. 391 , 65 A. 2d 353 (1919), cert. denied, 338 U. S. 862 , 70 S. Ct. 96 (1949); United States v. Lynch, 132 F. 2d 111 (1942), cert. denied, 318 U. S. 777 , 63 S. Ct. 831 (1943); United States v. Fox, 130 F. 2d 56 (1942), cert. denied, 317 U. S. 666 , 63 S. Ct. 74 (1942); Com. ex rel.

1964Where one pleads guilty to a criminal charge before the court, that is a confession of guilt: Commonwealth v. Simmons, 361 Pa. 391 , 65 A. 2d 353 (1919), cert. denied, 338 U. S. 862 , 70 S. Ct. 96 (1949); United States v. Lynch, 132 F. 2d 111 (1942), cert. denied, 318 U. S. 777 , 63 S. Ct. 831 (1943); United States v. Fox, 130 F. 2d 56 (1942), cert. denied, 317 U. S. 666 , 63 S. Ct. 74 (1942); Com. ex rel.

1964Where one pleads guilty to a criminal charge before the court, that is a confession of guilt: Commonwealth v. Simmons, 361 Pa. 391 , 65 A. 2d 353 (1919), cert. denied, 338 U. S. 862 , 70 S. Ct. 96 (1949); United States v. Lynch, 132 F. 2d 111 (1942), cert. denied, 318 U. S. 777 , 63 S. Ct. 831 (1943); United States v. Fox, 130 F. 2d 56 (1942), cert. denied, 317 U. S. 666 , 63 S. Ct. 74 (1942); Com. ex rel.

1964Where one pleads guilty to a criminal charge before the court, that is a confession of guilt: Commonwealth v. Simmons, 361 Pa. 391 , 65 A. 2d 353 (1919), cert. denied, 338 U. S. 862 , 70 S. Ct. 96 (1949); United States v. Lynch, 132 F. 2d 111 (1942), cert. denied, 318 U. S. 777 , 63 S. Ct. 831 (1943); United States v. Fox, 130 F. 2d 56 (1942), cert. denied, 317 U. S. 666 , 63 S. Ct. 74 (1942); Com. ex rel.

1964Where one pleads guilty to a criminal charge before the court, that is a confession of guilt: Commonwealth v. Simmons, 361 Pa. 391 , 65 A. 2d 353 (1919), cert. denied, 338 U. S. 862 , 70 S. Ct. 96 (1949); United States v. Lynch, 132 F. 2d 111 (1942), cert. denied, 318 U. S. 777 , 63 S. Ct. 831 (1943); United States v. Fox, 130 F. 2d 56 (1942), cert. denied, 317 U. S. 666 , 63 S. Ct. 74 (1942); Com. ex rel.

1941Kress House Moving Co. v. George Hogg Co., 263 Pa. 191, 195 , 106 A. 351 ; Kennedy et al. v. Rothrock Co., Inc., 261 Pa. 580, 588 , 104 A. 746 .

1941Kress House Moving Co. v. George Hogg Co., 263 Pa. 191, 195 , 106 A. 351 ; Kennedy et al. v. Rothrock Co., Inc., 261 Pa. 580, 588 , 104 A. 746 .

1941Meyers.” The appellee contends that this case falls squarely within the rule as laid down by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in the case of Pennsylvania Co. for Insurance on Lives and Granting Annuities, Trustee v. Philadelphia, 262 Pa. 439 , 105 A. 630 .

1941Meyers.” The appellee contends that this case falls squarely within the rule as laid down by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in the case of Pennsylvania Co. for Insurance on Lives and Granting Annuities, Trustee v. Philadelphia, 262 Pa. 439 , 105 A. 630 .

1941Kress House Moving Co. v. George Hogg Co., 263 Pa. 191, 195 , 106 A. 351 ; Kennedy et al. v. Rothrock Co., Inc., 261 Pa. 580, 588 , 104 A. 746 .

1941Kress House Moving Co. v. George Hogg Co., 263 Pa. 191, 195 , 106 A. 351 ; Kennedy et al. v. Rothrock Co., Inc., 261 Pa. 580, 588 , 104 A. 746 .

1936Co., 213 Pa. 485 , 62 A. 1085 , that a party against whose interest a witness has testified may show that the opinion expressed is valueless as evidence because it is founded on a misapprehension of the facts, and that this rule does not offend against the rule that “the proper test of the value of land taken under the right of eminent domain is its market value and that this value is not to be ascertained by proof of particular sales but by the general selling price of land similarly situated.” The second assignment of error is based on the court’s sustaining plaintiffs’ objection to defendan

1936Co., 213 Pa. 485 , 62 A. 1085 , that a party against whose interest a witness has testified may show that the opinion expressed is valueless as evidence because it is founded on a misapprehension of the facts, and that this rule does not offend against the rule that “the proper test of the value of land taken under the right of eminent domain is its market value and that this value is not to be ascertained by proof of particular sales but by the general selling price of land similarly situated.” The second assignment of error is based on the court’s sustaining plaintiffs’ objection to defendan

1936(See McGlinn Distilling Co. v. Dervin, 260 Pa. 414 , 103 A. 872 .) Appellant complains of a ruling by the trial judge on the matter of evidence and contends that the charge was, inter alia, “erroneous, inadequate and prejudicial.” The second assignment of error is based upon the court’s overruling defendant’s objection to the question put to the witness David D.

1936(See McGlinn Distilling Co. v. Dervin, 260 Pa. 414 , 103 A. 872 .) Appellant complains of a ruling by the trial judge on the matter of evidence and contends that the charge was, inter alia, “erroneous, inadequate and prejudicial.” The second assignment of error is based upon the court’s overruling defendant’s objection to the question put to the witness David D.

1935Kirker v. Wylie, supra; Greenspan v. Margolis, 70 Pa. Superior Ct. 373 . *202 The appellant’s second assignment of error is to the court’s failure to charge as follows: “If the jury believe from the testimony that the insertion of the personal liability clause in the deed from Nedwidek to Larson was a mistake of the scrivener and that no one authorized him to insert the same, their verdict must be for the defendant.” Marcellus G.

1934So that you may take the corroboration of one co-defendant by the other co-defendant, and if you do not think that is corroboration, if you do not think they are credible witnesses, of course you have no right to accept their testimony.” There is no rule of law in this state that forbids a conviction on the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice (Com. v. DeMasi, 234 Pa. 570, 572 , 83 A. 601 ; Com. v. Elliot, 292 Pa. 16, 22 , 140 A. 537 ; Com. v. Howe, 84 Pa. Superior Ct. 295, 297 ) but that the testimony of one accomplice can not be taken as corroboration of another accomplice was squarely

1934So that you may take the corroboration of one co-defendant by the other co-defendant, and if you do not think that is corroboration, if you do not think they are credible witnesses, of course you have no right to accept their testimony.” There is no rule of law in this state that forbids a conviction on the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice (Com. v. DeMasi, 234 Pa. 570, 572 , 83 A. 601 ; Com. v. Elliot, 292 Pa. 16, 22 , 140 A. 537 ; Com. v. Howe, 84 Pa. Superior Ct. 295, 297 ) but that the testimony of one accomplice can not be taken as corroboration of another accomplice was squarely

1934So that you may take the corroboration of one co-defendant by the other co-defendant, and if you do not think that is corroboration, if you do not think they are credible witnesses, of course you have no right to accept their testimony.” There is no rule of law in this state that forbids a conviction on the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice (Com. v. DeMasi, 234 Pa. 570, 572 , 83 A. 601 ; Com. v. Elliot, 292 Pa. 16, 22 , 140 A. 537 ; Com. v. Howe, 84 Pa. Superior Ct. 295, 297 ) but that the testimony of one accomplice can not be taken as corroboration of another accomplice was squarely

1934So that you may take the corroboration of one co-defendant by the other co-defendant, and if you do not think that is corroboration, if you do not think they are credible witnesses, of course you have no right to accept their testimony.” There is no rule of law in this state that forbids a conviction on the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice (Com. v. DeMasi, 234 Pa. 570, 572 , 83 A. 601 ; Com. v. Elliot, 292 Pa. 16, 22 , 140 A. 537 ; Com. v. Howe, 84 Pa. Superior Ct. 295, 297 ) but that the testimony of one accomplice can not be taken as corroboration of another accomplice was squarely

1934So that you may take the corroboration of one co-defendant by the other co-defendant, and if you do not think that is corroboration, if you do not think they are credible witnesses, of course you have no right to accept their testimony.” There is no rule of law in this state that forbids a conviction on the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice (Com. v. DeMasi, 234 Pa. 570, 572 , 83 A. 601 ; Com. v. Elliot, 292 Pa. 16, 22 , 140 A. 537 ; Com. v. Howe, 84 Pa. Superior Ct. 295, 297 ) but that the testimony of one accomplice can not be taken as corroboration of another accomplice was squarely

1934But sustaining that assignment, upon *150 the ground stated, would only require us to reverse the sentences and remit the record for new sentences .in conformity with the statute: Com. v. Camwell, supra, and cases there cited.

1934So that you may take the corroboration of one co-defendant by the other co-defendant, and if you do not think that is corroboration, if you do not think they are credible witnesses, of course you have no right to accept their testimony.” There is no rule of law in this state that forbids a conviction on the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice (Com. v. DeMasi, 234 Pa. 570, 572 , 83 A. 601 ; Com. v. Elliot, 292 Pa. 16, 22 , 140 A. 537 ; Com. v. Howe, 84 Pa. Superior Ct. 295, 297 ) but that the testimony of one accomplice can not be taken as corroboration of another accomplice was squarely

1931The third assignment of error relates to the refusal of the court to affirm the third point, as follows: “Care at street crossings is the highest duty of motorists.” The answer of the court was: “The third point has been covered.” This third point is taken verbatim from the language of this court in Newman v. Protective Motor *323 Service Co., 298 Pa. 509 .

1928In Hollister v. Hollister, 6 Pa. 449 , the husband and wife resided in Pennsylvania.

1928On the other branch of the case, however, we are of opinion that,, under the principles announced for this court by our late President Judge Oklady in the case of Com. v. Veley, 63 Pa. Superior Ct. 489 , the trial judge erred in sentencing the appellants upon more than one count in the indictment.

1928Section 7 of that act declares that if, after a decision is made by the salary board, “any officer shall think that the number of his clerks or deputies is too few, or the compensation fixed for either is too small, as the same may have been determined by the board, he may appeal from the action thereof to the judge or judges of the court of common pleas of the county in which he is an officer.” This right of appeal is from any conclusion reached by the salary board: Bedford v. Rosser, supra. The second assignment of error charges the lower court with error in proceeding with the case and over