second assignment error in Georgia

1973Co. v. Fountain, 173 Ga. 593 ( 160 SE 789 ). *182 The second assignment of error contends the court should have charged the railroad’s defenses that the plaintiff could be barred from recovering under comparative negligence and under avoidance of consequences doctrine, both of which were pleaded in their answer.

1973Co. v. Fountain, 173 Ga. 593 ( 160 SE 789 ). *182 The second assignment of error contends the court should have charged the railroad’s defenses that the plaintiff could be barred from recovering under comparative negligence and under avoidance of consequences doctrine, both of which were pleaded in their answer.

1973Scott Properties, Inc. v. Lawson, 124 Ga. App. 158 ( 183 SE2d 238 ).

1973Scott Properties, Inc. v. Lawson, 124 Ga. App. 158 ( 183 SE2d 238 ).

1967Counsel for the husband cites Weeks v. Weeks, 160 Ga. 369 (3) ( 127 SE 772 ), in support of the contention that the wife was incompetent to give this testimony.

1967Counsel for the husband cites Weeks v. Weeks, 160 Ga. 369 (3) ( 127 SE 772 ), in support of the contention that the wife was incompetent to give this testimony.

1967This was done “at some stage in the proceedings” within the meaning of the decision in Jackson v. Denno, supra, and the assignments of error on the denial of the motion to suppress evidence are without merit. *681 The second assignment of error is the failure of the judge to make a specific finding as to whether or not any statements or admissions made by the defendant were voluntary, prior to submitting the issue to the jury.

1966Furthermore, even if the jury believed that appellant had offered to resume marital relations and that appellee had refused to do so, the verdict would be proper under the ruling in Born v. Born, 213 Ga. 830 (1) ( 102 SE2d 170 ) that “the questions of good faith on the part of the husband in making the offer and whether the refusal of the wife to resume marital relations was justified or not under the circumstances and the period of time when the desertion began, are all for the determination of the jury and cannot be resolved on demurrer.” The second assignment of error is upon the admission

1966Furthermore, even if the jury believed that appellant had offered to resume marital relations and that appellee had refused to do so, the verdict would be proper under the ruling in Born v. Born, 213 Ga. 830 (1) ( 102 SE2d 170 ) that “the questions of good faith on the part of the husband in making the offer and whether the refusal of the wife to resume marital relations was justified or not under the circumstances and the period of time when the desertion began, are all for the determination of the jury and cannot be resolved on demurrer.” The second assignment of error is upon the admission

1965The second assignment of error is to the judgment of the trial court imposing the death sentence upon tire defendant on the ground that it was contrary to law because the “order and judgment, together with the statute upon which it was based, which statute, Georgia Code § 26-1302, makes the death sentence mandatory upon rendition of a guilty verdict without a recommendation of mercy, violates Article 1, section 1, paragraph 9, of the Constitution of this State, and of the Eighth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, which declare that ‘Excessive bail shall not be required, nor ex

1965The second assignment of error is to the judgment of the trial court imposing the death sentence upon tire defendant on the ground that it was contrary to law because the “order and judgment, together with the statute upon which it was based, which statute, Georgia Code § 26-1302, makes the death sentence mandatory upon rendition of a guilty verdict without a recommendation of mercy, violates Article 1, section 1, paragraph 9, of the Constitution of this State, and of the Eighth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, which declare that ‘Excessive bail shall not be required, nor ex

1963Harper v. Mayes, 209 Ga. 361 ( 72 SE2d 710 ); Reardon v. Bland, 206 Ga. 633 (6) ( 58 SE2d 377 ).

1963Harper v. Mayes, 209 Ga. 361 ( 72 SE2d 710 ); Reardon v. Bland, 206 Ga. 633 (6) ( 58 SE2d 377 ).

1963Harper v. Mayes, 209 Ga. 361 ( 72 SE2d 710 ); Reardon v. Bland, 206 Ga. 633 (6) ( 58 SE2d 377 ).

1963Harper v. Mayes, 209 Ga. 361 ( 72 SE2d 710 ); Reardon v. Bland, 206 Ga. 633 (6) ( 58 SE2d 377 ).

1951Griffin v. Henderson, 117 Ga. 382 (2) ( 43 S. E. 712 ); Bowden v. Bowden, 125 Ga. 107 (1) ( 53 S. E. 606 ); DeLoach v. Sikes, 166 Ga. 39 (3) ( 142 S. E. 150 ). 3.

1951Griffin v. Henderson, 117 Ga. 382 (2) ( 43 S. E. 712 ); Bowden v. Bowden, 125 Ga. 107 (1) ( 53 S. E. 606 ); DeLoach v. Sikes, 166 Ga. 39 (3) ( 142 S. E. 150 ). 3.

1951Griffin v. Henderson, 117 Ga. 382 (2) ( 43 S. E. 712 ); Bowden v. Bowden, 125 Ga. 107 (1) ( 53 S. E. 606 ); DeLoach v. Sikes, 166 Ga. 39 (3) ( 142 S. E. 150 ). 3.

1951Griffin v. Henderson, 117 Ga. 382 (2) ( 43 S. E. 712 ); Bowden v. Bowden, 125 Ga. 107 (1) ( 53 S. E. 606 ); DeLoach v. Sikes, 166 Ga. 39 (3) ( 142 S. E. 150 ). 3.

1951Griffin v. Henderson, 117 Ga. 382 (2) ( 43 S. E. 712 ); Bowden v. Bowden, 125 Ga. 107 (1) ( 53 S. E. 606 ); DeLoach v. Sikes, 166 Ga. 39 (3) ( 142 S. E. 150 ). 3.

1951Griffin v. Henderson, 117 Ga. 382 (2) ( 43 S. E. 712 ); Bowden v. Bowden, 125 Ga. 107 (1) ( 53 S. E. 606 ); DeLoach v. Sikes, 166 Ga. 39 (3) ( 142 S. E. 150 ). 3.

1941The ruling in Black v. State, 41 Ga. App. 349 ( 152 S. E. 922 ), cited by the plaintiff in error, does not sustain his contention.

1941The ruling in Black v. State, 41 Ga. App. 349 ( 152 S. E. 922 ), cited by the plaintiff in error, does not sustain his contention.

1932The same question as is now before us was before this .court in Harris v. Woodard, 133 Ga. 104 ( 65 S. E. 250 ).

1932The same question as is now before us was before this .court in Harris v. Woodard, 133 Ga. 104 ( 65 S. E. 250 ).

1922Barnes v. State, 113 Ga. 189 ( 38 S. E. 396 ); Bowden v. State, 151 Ga. 336 (4) ( 106 S. E. 575 ); 1 Stevens I.

1922Barnes v. State, 113 Ga. 189 ( 38 S. E. 396 ); Bowden v. State, 151 Ga. 336 (4) ( 106 S. E. 575 ); 1 Stevens I.

1922Barnes v. State, 113 Ga. 189 ( 38 S. E. 396 ); Bowden v. State, 151 Ga. 336 (4) ( 106 S. E. 575 ); 1 Stevens I.

1922Barnes v. State, 113 Ga. 189 ( 38 S. E. 396 ); Bowden v. State, 151 Ga. 336 (4) ( 106 S. E. 575 ); 1 Stevens I.

1920“If there has been a lawful verdict of conviction rendered in a criminal ease, an error committed by the judge in the imposition of the sentence will be no sufficient reason for setting aside the verdict and trying the accused again upon the question of his guilt or innocence.” Sable v. State, 22 Ga. App. 769 ( 97 S. E. 271 ), and cit.

1913In Kimbrough v. State, 101 Ga. 583 ( 29 S. E. 39 ), it is held that “an indictment which charges the accused with entering a dwelling-house and stealing therefrom valuable goods is, though the word ‘privately’ be omitted, a good indictment under section 178 [now 175] of the Penal Code.” It is probably this decision which induced the trial judge’s ruling.

1913In Kimbrough v. State, 101 Ga. 583 ( 29 S. E. 39 ), it is held that “an indictment which charges the accused with entering a dwelling-house and stealing therefrom valuable goods is, though the word ‘privately’ be omitted, a good indictment under section 178 [now 175] of the Penal Code.” It is probably this decision which induced the trial judge’s ruling.

1910In the second assignment of error it is alleged that the court intimated an opinion that the defendant had a pistol at the time in question; and it was argued that the ruling in Jenkins v. State, 3 Ga. App. 646 ( 58 S. E. 1063 ), is direqtly in point and requires a reversal.

1907Peavy v. Atkinson, 108 Ga. 167 , and cit.

1901That act was passed in consets produced by the decision of the Supreme- Court of the United States in Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U. S. 100 , where it was held, that, under the provisions of the constitution of the United States, merchandise imported from a foreign country, or from one State into another, could be sold by the importer thereof, in the original packages in which it was imported, free from the interference of State laws,, as until such sale the goods were not commingled with the mass of property in the State to which they were imported, but still retained the character of interstate-com