second assignment error in Washington

1969Gatterdam v. Department of Labor & Industries, 185 Wash. 628 , 56 P. (2d) 693 ; McFarland v. Department of Labor & Industries, 188 Wash. 357 , 62 P. (2d) 714 .

1969Gatterdam v. Department of Labor & Industries, 185 Wash. 628 , 56 P. (2d) 693 ; McFarland v. Department of Labor & Industries, 188 Wash. 357 , 62 P. (2d) 714 .

1969Gatterdam v. Department of Labor & Industries, 185 Wash. 628 , 56 P. (2d) 693 ; McFarland v. Department of Labor & Industries, 188 Wash. 357 , 62 P. (2d) 714 .

1969Gatterdam v. Department of Labor & Industries, 185 Wash. 628 , 56 P. (2d) 693 ; McFarland v. Department of Labor & Industries, 188 Wash. 357 , 62 P. (2d) 714 .

1956We have held, indeed ( Cranford v. O'Shea, 75 Wash. 33 , 134 Pac. 486 ), that, even without concomitant objection, abuses of that kind may be raised in the trial court upon motion for new trial, and thus be saved for consideration here." (Italics mine.) See, also State v. Hart, 26 Wn. (2d) 776, 175 P. (2d) 944 (1946).

1956We have held, indeed ( Cranford v. O'Shea, 75 Wash. 33 , 134 Pac. 486 ), that, even without concomitant objection, abuses of that kind may be raised in the trial court upon motion for new trial, and thus be saved for consideration here." (Italics mine.) See, also State v. Hart, 26 Wn. (2d) 776, 175 P. (2d) 944 (1946).

1927If we are correctly advised, the court based its ruling upon the case of Alexander v. Barnes Amusement Co., 105 Wash. 346 , 177 Pac. 786 , in which we held that the measure of damages for injuries to personal property, where the property was only partially destroyed, was the difference between the market value of the property immediately before and immediately after the injury; the trial court construing the case to mean that the only testimony competent to prove such values was the opinions of witnesses having expert knowledge in such matters.

1927If we are correctly advised, the court based its ruling upon the case of Alexander v. Barnes Amusement Co., 105 Wash. 346 , 177 Pac. 786 , in which we held that the measure of damages for injuries to personal property, where the property was only partially destroyed, was the difference between the market value of the property immediately before and immediately after the injury; the trial court construing the case to mean that the only testimony competent to prove such values was the opinions of witnesses having expert knowledge in such matters.

2019We exercise our discretion under State v. Blazina, 182 Wn.2d at 832 , and address this assignment of error.

2014The second assignment of error correctly identifies a problem with the instruction on the factors relied upon by the State for its charge of aggravated murder but, for reasons explained below, the error was harmless. 3 "Aggravated first degree murder is not a crime in and of itself," State v. Roberts, 142 Wn.2d 471, 501 , 14 P.3d 713 (2000); instead, "[a] person is guilty of aggravated first degree murder ... ifhe or she commits first degree murder as defined by RCW 9A.32.030(1)(a)" and one or more of 14 statutory aggravating circumstances exists.

2014The second assignment of error correctly identifies a problem with the instruction on the factors relied upon by the State for its charge of aggravated murder but, for reasons explained below, the error was harmless. 3 "Aggravated first degree murder is not a crime in and of itself," State v. Roberts, 142 Wn.2d 471, 501 , 14 P.3d 713 (2000); instead, "[a] person is guilty of aggravated first degree murder ... ifhe or she commits first degree murder as defined by RCW 9A.32.030(1)(a)" and one or more of 14 statutory aggravating circumstances exists.

1982Defendant contends that a cautionary instruction is mandatory where the prosecution relies solely upon the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice, citing State v. Carothers, 84 Wn.2d 256, 269 , 525 P.2d 731 (1974).

1982Defendant contends that a cautionary instruction is mandatory where the prosecution relies solely upon the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice, citing State v. Carothers, 84 Wn.2d 256, 269 , 525 P.2d 731 (1974).

1979In Haysom v. Coleman Lantern Co., 89 Wn.2d 474, 479-80 , 573 P.2d 785 (1978), decided subsequent to filing this appeal, the court stated: It is, however, equally well recognized that a warning need not be given at all in instances where a danger is obvious or known. . . .

1979In Haysom v. Coleman Lantern Co., 89 Wn.2d 474, 479-80 , 573 P.2d 785 (1978), decided subsequent to filing this appeal, the court stated: It is, however, equally well recognized that a warning need not be given at all in instances where a danger is obvious or known. . . .

1978App. 121 , 480 P.2d 778 (1971). 1 The second assignment of error concerns admonitions of defense counsel by the trial court which, it is alleged, "indicated a lack of respect for the defense role and also for counsel's role both throughout the voir dire and through the trial;..." Gairns contends that remarks such as, "Oh, that is enough of it," "He answered the question, but counsel, just don't try the case on voir dire," and "You are not giving [the prospective juror] a fair chance," impaired the effectiveness of counsel and contravened the right to a fair and impartial trial.

1975Although we recognize that this instruction has its detractors, it was specifically approved in State v. Tanzymore, 54 Wn.2d 290 , 340 P.2d 178 (1959); and also in State v. Nabors, 8 Wn.

1975Although we recognize that this instruction has its detractors, it was specifically approved in State v. Tanzymore, 54 Wn.2d 290 , 340 P.2d 178 (1959); and also in State v. Nabors, 8 Wn.

1975Although we recognize that this instruction has its detractors, it was specifically approved in State v. Tanzymore, 54 Wn.2d 290 , 340 P.2d 178 (1959); and also in State v. Nabors, 8 Wn.

1964We find no merit in this assignment for the reason stated in Primm v. Wockner, 56 Wn. (2d) 215, 218, 351 P. (2d) 933 (1960): “ . . .

1961State v. Thomas, 52 Wn. (2d) 255, 324 P. (2d) 821 . *157 The second assignment of error is that evidence of agency between Champine and his principal, Dainard, should have been excluded.

1960As we said in State v. Cummings (1928), 148 Wash. 384, 385 , 268 Pac. 1035 , “the theory of the statute is that force is even presumed, the child can not give consent.” And, in State v. Roller (1903), 30 Wash. 692, 697 , 71 Pac. 718 , we said, “When it was alleged and proved that the prosecutrix was under the age of eighteen years, it was not necessary to prove force.

1960As we said in State v. Cummings (1928), 148 Wash. 384, 385 , 268 Pac. 1035 , “the theory of the statute is that force is even presumed, the child can not give consent.” And, in State v. Roller (1903), 30 Wash. 692, 697 , 71 Pac. 718 , we said, “When it was alleged and proved that the prosecutrix was under the age of eighteen years, it was not necessary to prove force.

1960As we said in State v. Cummings (1928), 148 Wash. 384, 385 , 268 Pac. 1035 , “the theory of the statute is that force is even presumed, the child can not give consent.” And, in State v. Roller (1903), 30 Wash. 692, 697 , 71 Pac. 718 , we said, “When it was alleged and proved that the prosecutrix was under the age of eighteen years, it was not necessary to prove force.

1960As we said in State v. Cummings (1928), 148 Wash. 384, 385 , 268 Pac. 1035 , “the theory of the statute is that force is even presumed, the child can not give consent.” And, in State v. Roller (1903), 30 Wash. 692, 697 , 71 Pac. 718 , we said, “When it was alleged and proved that the prosecutrix was under the age of eighteen years, it was not necessary to prove force.

1956We have held, indeed ( Cranford v. O'Shea, 75 Wash. 33 , 134 Pac. 486 ), that, even without concomitant objection, abuses of that kind may be raised in the trial court upon motion for new trial, and thus be saved for consideration here." (Italics mine.) See, also State v. Hart, 26 Wn. (2d) 776, 175 P. (2d) 944 (1946).

1956We have held, indeed (Cranford v. O’Shea, 75 Wash. 33 , 134 Pac. 486 ), that, even without concomitant objection, abuses of that kind may be raised in the trial court upon motion for new trial, and thus be saved for consideration here.” (Italics mine.) See, also State v. Hart, 26 Wn. (2d) 776, 175 P. (2d) 944 (1946).

1955Under the circumstances, the evidence must be interpreted most strongly against the moving party, and the ruling of the trial court will not be *151 disturbed except for clear abuse; Holloway v. Savage, 68 Wash. 614 , 123 Pac. 1021 ; see, also, Billingsley v. Rovig-Temple Co., 16 Wn. (2d) 202, 133 P. (2d) 265 ; Neel v. Henne, 30 Wn. (2d) 24, 190 P. (2d) 775 .

1955Under the circumstances, the evidence must be interpreted most strongly against the moving party, and the ruling of the trial court will not be *151 disturbed except for clear abuse; Holloway v. Savage, 68 Wash. 614 , 123 Pac. 1021 ; see, also, Billingsley v. Rovig-Temple Co., 16 Wn. (2d) 202, 133 P. (2d) 265 ; Neel v. Henne, 30 Wn. (2d) 24, 190 P. (2d) 775 .

1955Under the circumstances, the evidence must be interpreted most strongly against the moving party, and the ruling of the trial court will not be *151 disturbed except for clear abuse; Holloway v. Savage, 68 Wash. 614 , 123 Pac. 1021 ; see, also, Billingsley v. Rovig-Temple Co., 16 Wn. (2d) 202, 133 P. (2d) 265 ; Neel v. Henne, 30 Wn. (2d) 24, 190 P. (2d) 775 .

1953Appellant contends that failure to so instruct is prejudicial error and cites State v. Fliehman, 35 Wn. (2d) 243, 212 P. (2d) 794 .

1948Comer, 176 Wash. 257 , 28 P. (2d) 1027 ; State v. Guthrie, 185 Wash. 464 , 56 P. (2d) 160 . *484 The second assignment of error is: “The trial court erred in allowing in evidence to impeach and incriminate the appellant Aaron Johnson statements elicited from him by continuous and threatening questioning for a period of eleven days before his request to see counsel was granted.” The examination in question was that of the state in cross-examination of the appellant Johnson, in which the state impeached his testimony by cross-examination as to his contrary voluntary statements made before the tr

1948Comer, 176 Wash. 257 , 28 P. (2d) 1027 ; State v. Guthrie, 185 Wash. 464 , 56 P. (2d) 160 . *484 The second assignment of error is: “The trial court erred in allowing in evidence to impeach and incriminate the appellant Aaron Johnson statements elicited from him by continuous and threatening questioning for a period of eleven days before his request to see counsel was granted.” The examination in question was that of the state in cross-examination of the appellant Johnson, in which the state impeached his testimony by cross-examination as to his contrary voluntary statements made before the tr

1948Comer, 176 Wash. 257 , 28 P. (2d) 1027 ; State v. Guthrie, 185 Wash. 464 , 56 P. (2d) 160 . *484 The second assignment of error is: “The trial court erred in allowing in evidence to impeach and incriminate the appellant Aaron Johnson statements elicited from him by continuous and threatening questioning for a period of eleven days before his request to see counsel was granted.” The examination in question was that of the state in cross-examination of the appellant Johnson, in which the state impeached his testimony by cross-examination as to his contrary voluntary statements made before the tr

1948Comer, 176 Wash. 257 , 28 P. (2d) 1027 ; State v. Guthrie, 185 Wash. 464 , 56 P. (2d) 160 . *484 The second assignment of error is: “The trial court erred in allowing in evidence to impeach and incriminate the appellant Aaron Johnson statements elicited from him by continuous and threatening questioning for a period of eleven days before his request to see counsel was granted.” The examination in question was that of the state in cross-examination of the appellant Johnson, in which the state impeached his testimony by cross-examination as to his contrary voluntary statements made before the tr

1938In State v. Eyres Storage & Distributing Co., 115 Wash. 682 , 198 Pac. 390 , we said: “The second assignment of error is without merit also.

1938In State v. Eyres Storage & Distributing Co., 115 Wash. 682 , 198 Pac. 390 , we said: “The second assignment of error is without merit also.

1935Messick v. National Council of the Knights & Ladies of Security, 103 Wash. 143 , 173 Pac. 940 .

1935Messick v. National Council of the Knights & Ladies of Security, 103 Wash. 143 , 173 Pac. 940 .

1929The second assignment of error is “in refusing to permit the defendants to show specific acts of immorality committed by the witness Cornell following a denial of such specific acts by the witness.” On the authority of State v. Gaffney, 151 Wash. 599 , 276 Pac. 873 , the ruling of the trial court is correct.

1929The second assignment of error is “in refusing to permit the defendants to show specific acts of immorality committed by the witness Cornell following a denial of such specific acts by the witness.” On the authority of State v. Gaffney, 151 Wash. 599 , 276 Pac. 873 , the ruling of the trial court is correct.

1927There seems to be respectable authority holding that where documentary evidence is shown to be beyond the jurisdiction of the court, secondary evidence of its contents may be received.- Jones on Evidence, vol. 2, § 828; Burton v. Driggs, 87 U. S. (20 Wall.) 125 ; Gordon v. Searing, 8 Cal. 50; Pullin v. McGee, 143 Ga. 184 , 84 S. E. 443 ; Dwyer v. Salt Lake City Copper Manuf’g Co., 14 Utah 339 , 47 Pac. 311 .

1927There seems to be respectable authority holding that where documentary evidence is shown to be beyond the jurisdiction of the court, secondary evidence of its contents may be received.- Jones on Evidence, vol. 2, § 828; Burton v. Driggs, 87 U. S. (20 Wall.) 125 ; Gordon v. Searing, 8 Cal. 50; Pullin v. McGee, 143 Ga. 184 , 84 S. E. 443 ; Dwyer v. Salt Lake City Copper Manuf’g Co., 14 Utah 339 , 47 Pac. 311 .

1927There seems to be respectable authority holding that where documentary evidence is shown to be beyond the jurisdiction of the court, secondary evidence of its contents may be received.- Jones on Evidence, vol. 2, § 828; Burton v. Driggs, 87 U. S. (20 Wall.) 125 ; Gordon v. Searing, 8 Cal. 50; Pullin v. McGee, 143 Ga. 184 , 84 S. E. 443 ; Dwyer v. Salt Lake City Copper Manuf’g Co., 14 Utah 339 , 47 Pac. 311 .

1927There seems to be respectable authority holding that where documentary evidence is shown to be beyond the jurisdiction of the court, secondary evidence of its contents may be received.- Jones on Evidence, vol. 2, § 828; Burton v. Driggs, 87 U. S. (20 Wall.) 125 ; Gordon v. Searing, 8 Cal. 50; Pullin v. McGee, 143 Ga. 184 , 84 S. E. 443 ; Dwyer v. Salt Lake City Copper Manuf’g Co., 14 Utah 339 , 47 Pac. 311 .

1927There seems to be respectable authority holding that where documentary evidence is shown to be beyond the jurisdiction of the court, secondary evidence of its contents may be received.- Jones on Evidence, vol. 2, § 828; Burton v. Driggs, 87 U. S. (20 Wall.) 125 ; Gordon v. Searing, 8 Cal. 50; Pullin v. McGee, 143 Ga. 184 , 84 S. E. 443 ; Dwyer v. Salt Lake City Copper Manuf’g Co., 14 Utah 339 , 47 Pac. 311 .