second assignment error in Oklahoma

1978In Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 , 92 S.Ct. 2182 , 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972), the United States Supreme Court suggested a balancing test be used in evaluating speedy trial questions.

1978In Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 , 92 S.Ct. 2182 , 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972), the United States Supreme Court suggested a balancing test be used in evaluating speedy trial questions.

2022They argued plaintiffs were required by Martin v. Phillips , 2018 OK 56 422 P.3d 143 ¶16 The second assignment of error challenged the trial court's construction of the Open Meeting Act, and the appellate court reversed the judgment of the District Court.

2022They argued plaintiffs were required by Martin v. Phillips , 2018 OK 56 422 P.3d 143 ¶16 The second assignment of error challenged the trial court's construction of the Open Meeting Act, and the appellate court reversed the judgment of the District Court.

2022They argued plaintiffs were required by Martin v. Phillips , 2018 OK 56 422 P.3d 143 ¶16 The second assignment of error challenged the trial court's construction of the Open Meeting Act, and the appellate court reversed the judgment of the District Court.

2022They argued plaintiffs were required by Martin v. Phillips , 2018 OK 56 422 P.3d 143 ¶16 The second assignment of error challenged the trial court's construction of the Open Meeting Act, and the appellate court reversed the judgment of the District Court.

1987In Spuehler v. State, 709 P.2d 202, 203 (Okl.Cr.1985), this Court recited, In Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 , 99 S.Ct. 2781 , 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979), the United States Supreme Court held that due process requires a reviewing court to determine “whether after reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt.” It has long been held that it is the exclusive province of the jury to weigh the evidence, to resolve conflicts, and to reconcile the testimony conside

1987In Spuehler v. State, 709 P.2d 202, 203 (Okl.Cr.1985), this Court recited, In Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 , 99 S.Ct. 2781 , 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979), the United States Supreme Court held that due process requires a reviewing court to determine “whether after reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt.” It has long been held that it is the exclusive province of the jury to weigh the evidence, to resolve conflicts, and to reconcile the testimony conside

1981As his third and final assignment of error, appellant contends that the state used a prior conviction void under Edwards v. State, 591 P.2d 313 (Okl.Cr.1979) to support the habitual offender charge.

1979Nichols v. State, Okl.Cr., 564 P.2d 667 (1977); McCoy v. State, Okl.Cr., 536 P.2d 1309 (1975). *691 The defendants’ second assignment of error is that the trial court erred in refusing to give requested instruction number 8.

1979The appellant next complains under this assignment that the instructions given to the jury did not properly incorporate the factors required by State v. Combs, supra. But compare the requirement of Combs quoted above under the first assignment of error, with the fourth instruction given by the trial court, which defined "obscene" as follows: "1.

1979The appellant next complains under this assignment that the instructions given to the jury did not properly incorporate the factors required by State v. Combs, supra. But compare the requirement of Combs quoted above under the first assignment of error, with the fourth instruction given by the trial court, which defined “obscene” as follows: “1.

1979The defendant argues that the pretrial lineup at the police station was so suggestive as to create a substantial likelihood of a misidentification; citing as authority Stovall v. Deno, 388 U.S. 293 , 87 S.Ct. 1967 , 18 L.Ed.2d 1199 (1967); Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188 , 93 S.Ct. 375 , 34 L.Ed.2d 401 (1972); Foster v. California, 394 U.S. 440 , 89 S.Ct. 1127 , 22 L.Ed.2d 402 (1969) and McDaniel v. State, Okl.Cr., 576 P.2d 307 (1978).

1979The defendant argues that the pretrial lineup at the police station was so suggestive as to create a substantial likelihood of a misidentification; citing as authority Stovall v. Deno, 388 U.S. 293 , 87 S.Ct. 1967 , 18 L.Ed.2d 1199 (1967); Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188 , 93 S.Ct. 375 , 34 L.Ed.2d 401 (1972); Foster v. California, 394 U.S. 440 , 89 S.Ct. 1127 , 22 L.Ed.2d 402 (1969) and McDaniel v. State, Okl.Cr., 576 P.2d 307 (1978).

1979The defendant argues that the pretrial lineup at the police station was so suggestive as to create a substantial likelihood of a misidentification; citing as authority Stovall v. Deno, 388 U.S. 293 , 87 S.Ct. 1967 , 18 L.Ed.2d 1199 (1967); Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188 , 93 S.Ct. 375 , 34 L.Ed.2d 401 (1972); Foster v. California, 394 U.S. 440 , 89 S.Ct. 1127 , 22 L.Ed.2d 402 (1969) and McDaniel v. State, Okl.Cr., 576 P.2d 307 (1978).

1979The defendant argues that the pretrial lineup at the police station was so suggestive as to create a substantial likelihood of a misidentification; citing as authority Stovall v. Deno, 388 U.S. 293 , 87 S.Ct. 1967 , 18 L.Ed.2d 1199 (1967); Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188 , 93 S.Ct. 375 , 34 L.Ed.2d 401 (1972); Foster v. California, 394 U.S. 440 , 89 S.Ct. 1127 , 22 L.Ed.2d 402 (1969) and McDaniel v. State, Okl.Cr., 576 P.2d 307 (1978).

1979To extend the protection of the rule to every possible implication which might be conceived by defense counsel is to extend the rule too far.” The second assignment of error is without merit. 568 P.2d at 324 .

1979The defendant argues that the pretrial lineup at the police station was so suggestive as to create a substantial likelihood of a misidentification; citing as authority Stovall v. Deno, 388 U.S. 293 , 87 S.Ct. 1967 , 18 L.Ed.2d 1199 (1967); Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188 , 93 S.Ct. 375 , 34 L.Ed.2d 401 (1972); Foster v. California, 394 U.S. 440 , 89 S.Ct. 1127 , 22 L.Ed.2d 402 (1969) and McDaniel v. State, Okl.Cr., 576 P.2d 307 (1978).

1979The defendant argues that the pretrial lineup at the police station was so suggestive as to create a substantial likelihood of a misidentification; citing as authority Stovall v. Deno, 388 U.S. 293 , 87 S.Ct. 1967 , 18 L.Ed.2d 1199 (1967); Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188 , 93 S.Ct. 375 , 34 L.Ed.2d 401 (1972); Foster v. California, 394 U.S. 440 , 89 S.Ct. 1127 , 22 L.Ed.2d 402 (1969) and McDaniel v. State, Okl.Cr., 576 P.2d 307 (1978).

1979The defendant argues that the pretrial lineup at the police station was so suggestive as to create a substantial likelihood of a misidentification; citing as authority Stovall v. Deno, 388 U.S. 293 , 87 S.Ct. 1967 , 18 L.Ed.2d 1199 (1967); Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188 , 93 S.Ct. 375 , 34 L.Ed.2d 401 (1972); Foster v. California, 394 U.S. 440 , 89 S.Ct. 1127 , 22 L.Ed.2d 402 (1969) and McDaniel v. State, Okl.Cr., 576 P.2d 307 (1978).

1979Defendant cites as authority Bryant v. State, Okl.Cr., 585 P.2d 377 (1978), wherein this Court held impermissible evidence of totally unrelated crimes to show that defendant had a propensity to commit crimes.

1979Nichols v. State, Okl.Cr., 564 P.2d 667 (1977); McCoy v. State, Okl.Cr., 536 P.2d 1309 (1975). *691 The defendants’ second assignment of error is that the trial court erred in refusing to give requested instruction number 8.

1978The defendant's second assignment of error is that the trial court erred in instructing the jury, "The `concealing' as hereinabove used in these instructions does not require an actual hiding or secreting of the property and includes anything done to prevent the owner's recovering it." This is not error in that this Court in Walls v. State, Okl.Cr., 491 P.2d 320 (1971), said, concerning the charge of knowingly concealing stolen property: "...

1978The defendant’s second assignment of error is that the trial court erred in instructing the jury, “The ‘concealing’ as hereinabove used in these instructions does not require an actual hiding or secreting of the property and includes anything done to prevent the owner’s recovering it.” This is not error in that this Court in Walls v. State, Okl.Cr., 491 P.2d 320 (1971), said, concerning the charge of knowingly concealing stolen property: “. . .

1978This proposition was also expressly rejected in the quote from Thrasher, supra. The appellant contends that the legislative scheme of putting the sale of products of dental laboratories and dental technicians under the control of dentists constitutes a “tying agreement,” in violation of the antitrust laws.

1977As stated in Butler v. Page, Okl.Cr., 421 P.2d 276 , it is well settled that an accused may waive his constitutional right to a trial by jury.

1977Cr., 493 P.2d 449 (1972), we stated: “. . . [I]t is not necessary to charge the offense was committed in any particular place; it is only necessary to allege and prove that an offense was committed in the county as alleged in the information. . . . ” Defendant contends, in the second assignment of error, that the trial court erred in overruling his Motion for Continuance because he had been subpoenaed to appear to testify in Federal District Court on the same day of his trial.

1977The second assignment of error that the revocation proceedings in this case did not comply with the constitutional guidelines set out by the United States Supreme Court in Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 , 92 S.Ct. 2593 , 33 L.Ed.2d 484 (1972) and Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 , 93 S.Ct. 1756 , 38 L.Ed.2d 656 (1973) is not reached herein in view of our disposition of defendant’s first assignment of error which requires reversal.

1977The second assignment of error that the revocation proceedings in this case did not comply with the constitutional guidelines set out by the United States Supreme Court in Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 , 92 S.Ct. 2593 , 33 L.Ed.2d 484 (1972) and Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 , 93 S.Ct. 1756 , 38 L.Ed.2d 656 (1973) is not reached herein in view of our disposition of defendant’s first assignment of error which requires reversal.

1977Our conclusion in Riggs, supra, was that the Supreme Court’s decisions prohibited only the imposition of the death penalty in those cases where the jury had no discretion in the rendering of that sentence. . . .” Defendant Simmons asserts, in the second assignment of error, that the trial court erred in instructing the jury on the offense of Murder in the First Degree in that it was based upon law contained in an unconstitutional statute.