two prong test in Florida

1991In Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 , 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), the Supreme Court established a two prong test to determine the ineffectiveness of counsel.

1991In Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 , 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), the Supreme Court established a two prong test to determine the ineffectiveness of counsel.

2016New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 , 105 S.Ct. 733 , 83 L.Ed.2d 720 (1985).

2016New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 , 105 S.Ct. 733 , 83 L.Ed.2d 720 (1985).

2013State v. Smith, 641 So.2d 849, 851 (Fla.1994) (citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360 , 88 S.Ct. 507 , 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring)).

2013State v. Smith, 641 So.2d 849, 851 (Fla.1994) (citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360 , 88 S.Ct. 507 , 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring)).

2013Standard of Review In Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58-59 , 106 S.Ct. 366 , 88 L.Ed.2d 208 (1985), the United States Supreme Court established a two prong test for determining claims of ineffective assistance of counsel relating to guilty pleas.

2013Standard of Review In Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58-59 , 106 S.Ct. 366 , 88 L.Ed.2d 208 (1985), the United States Supreme Court established a two prong test for determining claims of ineffective assistance of counsel relating to guilty pleas.

2025First, the evidence must not have been known by the trial court, the party, or counsel at the time of trial, and it must appear that the defendant or defense counsel could not have known of it by the use of 2 Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). 3 In these consolidated appeals, Milton also challenges the denial of his motion for reconsideration of an order denying his motion to compel the so- called “newly discovered Brady material.” For the same reasons set forth in this opinion, we find the trial court properly summarily denied this motion. 2 diligence.

2025Id. at 272 .

2024Menendez, 35 So. 3d at 877 .

2023Second, the sum stipulated to be forfeited must not be so grossly disproportionate to any damages that might reasonably be expected to follow from a breach as to show that the parties could have intended only to induce full performance, rather than to liquidate their damages.”) (citing Hyman v. Cohen, 73 So. 2d 393 , 398- 99 (Fla. 1954)).

2022“The first step in determining whether there was ineffective assistance of counsel where defendant claims he [or she] would have testified is to determine whether the defendant voluntarily agreed with counsel not to take the stand.” Simon, 47 So. 3d at 885 .

1997Magic Pan International, Inc. v. Colonial Promenade, 605 So.2d 563 (Fla. 5th DCA 1992).

1994Venetian Salami Co. v. Parthenais, 554 So.2d 499 (Fla. 1989); Citicorp Ins.

1993The state asserts that the trial court erred in entering a downward departure sentence because appellee could not pass the two prong test enunciated in Herrin v. State, 568 So.2d 920 (Fla.1990).

1991Co. v. Department of Environmental Regulation, 406 So.2d 478 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981), rev. denied, 415 So.2d 1359 (1982), the court developed a two prong test to determine the standing of a party in a proceeding under 120.57.

1991Likewise, in O'Steen v. State, 547 So.2d 235 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989) the court applied a two prong test to determine whether restitution could be awarded: (1) was the damage or loss for which restitution is ordered caused directly or indirectly by the defendant's offense, (2) was there a significant relationship between the damage to the victim and the crime proved.

1991The Dilyerd court applied the two prong test used in Michigan v. Long to evaluate the validity of the “Terry” 3 detention and search of the vehicle: (1) was the stop itself justified and, (2) did the deputy possess a reasonable belief based on specific and articulable facts, along with rational inferences, which justified his belief that the occupants of the car were dangerous and might gain control of weapons within the car. 467 So.2d at 304 .

1990I would hold that the statute passes the two prong test of State v. Saiez, 489 So.2d 1125 (Fla.1986).

1990Smith, supra, analyzed the relationship of section 4214(c) to the old two prong test and stated "The ‘reasonable time' requirement of Morrissey v. Brewer became a statutorily mandated 90-days.” The second query, prejudice, was not affected by the enactment of section 4214(c).