two prong test in Tennessee

2022Under the two- prong test established by Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984), a petitioner must prove that counsel’s performance was deficient and that the deficiency prejudiced the defense.

2022Under the two- prong test established by Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984), a petitioner must prove that counsel’s performance was deficient and that the deficiency prejudiced the defense.

2019See Burnett v. State, 92 S.W.3d 403, 408 (Tenn. 2002).

2019See Burnett v. State, 92 S.W.3d 403, 408 (Tenn. 2002).

2022See State v. Taylor, 968 S.W.2d 900, 905 (Tenn. Crim.

2022See State v. Taylor, 968 S.W.2d 900, 905 (Tenn. Crim.

2017Later, in State v. Dixon, 957 S.W.2d 532, 535 (Tenn. 1997), our supreme court modified the Anthony court’s “essentially incidental” analysis and established a two- prong test for determining whether a separate conviction for kidnapping violates due process.

2017Later, in State v. Dixon, 957 S.W.2d 532, 535 (Tenn. 1997), our supreme court modified the Anthony court’s “essentially incidental” analysis and established a two- prong test for determining whether a separate conviction for kidnapping violates due process.

2016Sufficiency of Affidavit Supporting the Search Warrant Defendants contend that the search warrant in this case was not supported by probable cause because the information set out in the affidavit does not meet the two- prong test set out in Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 , 89 S.Ct. 584 , 21 L.Ed.2d 637 (1969), and Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 , 84 S.Ct. 1509 , 12 L.Ed.2d 723 (1964) (“Aguilar–Spinelli ”), as adopted in State v. Jacumin, 778 S.W.2d 430, 437 (Tenn. 1989), concerning the proof of the reliability of a confidential informant.

2013In other words, Appellant argues that the information set out in the affidavit does not meet the two prong test set out in Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969) and Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964) (“Aguilar-Spinelli ”), as adopted in State v. Jacumin, 778 S.W.2d 430, 437 (Tenn. 1989), concerning the proof of the reliability of a confidential informant.

2011Trial courts are required to expressly (1) “analyze the relevance the impeaching conviction has to the issue of credibility,” as well as (2) “assess the similarity between the crime on trial and the crime underlying the impeaching conviction.” State v. Farmer, 841 S.W.2d 837, 839 (Tenn. Crim.

2009Trial courts are required to expressly (1) “analyze the relevance the impeaching conviction has to the issue of credibility,” as well as (2) “assess the similarity between the crime on trial and the crime underlying the impeaching conviction.” State v. Farmer, 841 S.W.2d 837, 839 (Tenn. Crim.

2012Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687 ; see also Carpenter v. State, 126 S.W.3d 879, 886 (Tenn. 2004) (“To determine whether appellate counsel was constitutionally effective, we use the two- prong test set forth in [Strickland] — the same test that is applied to claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel asserted under the Sixth Amendment to the United Constitution.”).

2010Carpenter v. State, 126 S.W.3d 879, 886 (Tenn. 2004); Porterfield v. State, 897 S.W.2d 672, 678 (Tenn. 1995); see also Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 535-36 , 106 S. Ct. 2661 (1986) (applying Strickland to a claim of attorney error on appeal).

2002Ed. 2d 674 , 104 S. Ct. 2052 (1984); Baxter v. Rose, 523 S.W.2d 930, 936 (Tenn. 1975).

1998Baxter v. Rose, 523 S.W.2d 930, 936 (Tenn. 1975).

2017Prior to State v. Jerry Lewis Tuttle, Tennessee courts determined whether information provided by a criminal informant gave rise to probable cause using the two- prong test adopted by the United States Supreme Court in Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964) and Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969).

2016Sufficiency of Affidavit Supporting the Search Warrant Defendants contend that the search warrant in this case was not supported by probable cause because the information set out in the affidavit does not meet the two- prong test set out in Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 , 89 S.Ct. 584 , 21 L.Ed.2d 637 (1969), and Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 , 84 S.Ct. 1509 , 12 L.Ed.2d 723 (1964) (“Aguilar–Spinelli ”), as adopted in State v. Jacumin, 778 S.W.2d 430, 437 (Tenn. 1989), concerning the proof of the reliability of a confidential informant.

2024The Court cautioned this was a “very high” bar and cautioned that tolling was reserved for situations where it would be “unconscionable to enforce the limitation period against the party and gross injustice would result.” Id. at 631-32 . - 12 - In rendering its decision, the Court focused on federal case law from which the two- prong standard originated, noting that the standard was based on principles of agency law, meaning that “the mistakes of counsel are constructively attributable to the client, at least in the post-conviction context,” but a “litigant cannot be held constructively respon

2013The Tennessee Supreme Court recently addressed this very issue and clarified the proper analysis to determine when due process requires tolling of the post-conviction statute of limitations based on attorney conduct: Henceforth, when a post-conviction petitioner argues that due process requires tolling the Post-Conviction Procedure Act’s statute of limitations based on the conduct of his or her lawyer, the two prong inquiry of [Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631 , 130 S. Ct. 2549 (2010)] and [Maples v. Thomas, 132 S. Ct. 912 (2012)] should guide the analysis.

2024The Court cautioned this was a “very high” bar and cautioned that tolling was reserved for situations where it would be “unconscionable to enforce the limitation period against the party and gross injustice would result.” Id. at 631-32 . - 12 - In rendering its decision, the Court focused on federal case law from which the two- prong standard originated, noting that the standard was based on principles of agency law, meaning that “the mistakes of counsel are constructively attributable to the client, at least in the post-conviction context,” but a “litigant cannot be held constructively respon

2024The Court cautioned this was a “very high” bar and cautioned that tolling was reserved for situations where it would be “unconscionable to enforce the limitation period against the party and gross injustice would result.” Id. at 631-32 . - 12 - In rendering its decision, the Court focused on federal case law from which the two- prong standard originated, noting that the standard was based on principles of agency law, meaning that “the mistakes of counsel are constructively attributable to the client, at least in the post-conviction context,” but a “litigant cannot be held constructively respon

2021In Katz, a two- prong test was established: “(1) whether the individual had an actual, subjective expectation of privacy and (2) whether society is willing to view the individual’s subjective expectation of privacy as reasonable and justifiable under the circumstances.” Munn, 56 S.W.3d at 494 (citing Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 (1979)).

2016“An affidavit may include hearsay information supplied by a confidential informant as a basis to establish probable cause[, but if] the hearsay information is supplied by a criminal informant or a person from a „criminal milieu,‟ we apply a two- prong test in determining the reliability of the information.” State v. Smotherman, 201 S.W.3d 657, 662 (Tenn. 2006) (citing State v. Williams, 193 S.W.3d 502, 507 (Tenn. 2006)).

2016“An affidavit may include hearsay information supplied by a confidential informant as a basis to establish probable cause[, but if] the hearsay information is supplied by a criminal informant or a person from a „criminal milieu,‟ we apply a two- prong test in determining the reliability of the information.” State v. Smotherman, 201 S.W.3d 657, 662 (Tenn. 2006) (citing State v. Williams, 193 S.W.3d 502, 507 (Tenn. 2006)).

2013As stated above, if an informant is from the criminal milieu, “‘[the officers] must be able to demonstrate that the informant (1) has a basis of knowledge and (2) is credible or his information is reliable.’” Id. (quoting State v. Lewis, 36 S.W.3d 88, 98 (Tenn. Crim.

2010See Atlantic Healthcare Benefits Trust v. Googins, 2 F.3d 1, 5 (2d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1043 (1994). 7 TBC does not contend that Tenn. Code Ann. 56-26-204 is inconsistent with ERISA within the meaning of 29 U.S.C. § 1144 (b)(6)(A)(ii). -5- In Kentucky Assoc. of Health Plans, Inc. v. Miller, 538 U.S. 329 (2003), the Supreme Court established a two prong test to determine whether a state law regulates insurance pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 1144 (b)(6)(A)(ii).

2010See Atlantic Healthcare Benefits Trust v. Googins, 2 F.3d 1, 5 (2d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1043 (1994). 7 TBC does not contend that Tenn. Code Ann. 56-26-204 is inconsistent with ERISA within the meaning of 29 U.S.C. § 1144 (b)(6)(A)(ii). -5- In Kentucky Assoc. of Health Plans, Inc. v. Miller, 538 U.S. 329 (2003), the Supreme Court established a two prong test to determine whether a state law regulates insurance pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 1144 (b)(6)(A)(ii).

2010See Atlantic Healthcare Benefits Trust v. Googins, 2 F.3d 1, 5 (2d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1043 (1994). 7 TBC does not contend that Tenn. Code Ann. 56-26-204 is inconsistent with ERISA within the meaning of 29 U.S.C. § 1144 (b)(6)(A)(ii). -5- In Kentucky Assoc. of Health Plans, Inc. v. Miller, 538 U.S. 329 (2003), the Supreme Court established a two prong test to determine whether a state law regulates insurance pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 1144 (b)(6)(A)(ii).

2010Carpenter v. State, 126 S.W.3d 879, 886 (Tenn. 2004); Porterfield v. State, 897 S.W.2d 672, 678 (Tenn. 1995); see also Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 535-36 , 106 S. Ct. 2661 (1986) (applying Strickland to a claim of attorney error on appeal).

2010Carpenter v. State, 126 S.W.3d 879, 886 (Tenn. 2004); Porterfield v. State, 897 S.W.2d 672, 678 (Tenn. 1995); see also Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 535-36 , 106 S. Ct. 2661 (1986) (applying Strickland to a claim of attorney error on appeal).

2010Carpenter v. State, 126 S.W.3d 879, 886 (Tenn. 2004); Porterfield v. State, 897 S.W.2d 672, 678 (Tenn. 1995); see also Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 535-36 , 106 S. Ct. 2661 (1986) (applying Strickland to a claim of attorney error on appeal).

2006First, the court “must find that the requirements of a permanency plan are ‘reasonable and related to remedying the conditions which necessitate foster care placement.’” In re Valentine, 79 S.W.3d 539, 547 (Tenn. 2002) (quoting T.C.A. § 37-2-403(a)(2)(C)).