two prong test in Georgia

2014In light of all the attendant circumstances here, we find that Perkins’ trial counsel’s strategic decision in regards to Perkins’ tattoos was not so patently unreasonable that no reasonable attorney would have taken this course of action.10 And because counsel did not render deficient performance by failing to attempt to conceal Perkins’s facial tattoos from the jury, it is unnecessary for us to consider the second prong of Strickland.11 E.g., White v. State, 293 Ga. 825, 826 (2) ( 750 SE2d 165 ) (2013) (“If a defendant fails to meet his burden on one prong of the two prong test, then the othe

2014In light of all the attendant circumstances here, we find that Perkins’ trial counsel’s strategic decision in regards to Perkins’ tattoos was not so patently unreasonable that no reasonable attorney would have taken this course of action.10 And because counsel did not render deficient performance by failing to attempt to conceal Perkins’s facial tattoos from the jury, it is unnecessary for us to consider the second prong of Strickland.11 E.g., White v. State, 293 Ga. 825, 826 (2) ( 750 SE2d 165 ) (2013) (“If a defendant fails to meet his burden on one prong of the two prong test, then the othe

2011Mandamus is an extraordinary legal remedy that issues to compel the performance of an official duty (OCGA § 9-6-20), and “[t]he right to the extraordinary writ of mandamus exists only upon meeting a two prong test: (1) the applicant must demonstrate a clear legal right to the relief sought, and (2) there must be no other adequate remedy.” Carnes v. Crawford, 246 Ga. 677, 678 ( 272 SE2d 690 ) (1980).

2011Mandamus is an extraordinary legal remedy that issues to compel the performance of an official duty (OCGA § 9-6-20), and “[t]he right to the extraordinary writ of mandamus exists only upon meeting a two prong test: (1) the applicant must demonstrate a clear legal right to the relief sought, and (2) there must be no other adequate remedy.” Carnes v. Crawford, 246 Ga. 677, 678 ( 272 SE2d 690 ) (1980).

2017We therefore evaluate these claims pursuant to the two- prong test as required in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U. S. 668 ( 104 SCt 2052 , 80 LE2d 674) (1984).

2017We therefore evaluate these claims pursuant to the two- prong test as required in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U. S. 668 ( 104 SCt 2052 , 80 LE2d 674) (1984).

2021“Although the trial court failed to make any specific factual findings regarding [Lane’s] claim[] of ineffectiveness, remand is not mandated if we can determine from the record that the defendant cannot establish ineffective assistance of counsel under the two- prong test set forth in Strickland.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Burrell v. State, 301 Ga. 21, 24 (2) (799 SE2d 181) (2017).

2021“Although the trial court failed to make any specific factual findings regarding [Lane’s] claim[] of ineffectiveness, remand is not mandated if we can determine from the record that the defendant cannot establish ineffective assistance of counsel under the two- prong test set forth in Strickland.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Burrell v. State, 301 Ga. 21, 24 (2) (799 SE2d 181) (2017).

2017See Charleston v. State, 292 Ga. 678, 682-683 (4) (a) ( 743 SE2d 1 ) (2013).

2017See Charleston v. State, 292 Ga. 678, 682-683 (4) (a) ( 743 SE2d 1 ) (2013).

2017Although the trial court failed to make any specific factual findings regarding Burrell’s claims of ineffectiveness, “remand is not mandated if we can determine from the record that the defendant cannot establish ineffective assistance of counsel under the two- prong test set forth in Strickland.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) McClendon v. State, 299 Ga. 611, 613-614 (2) ( 791 SE2d 69 ) (2016).

2017Although the trial court failed to make any specific factual findings regarding Burrell’s claims of ineffectiveness, “remand is not mandated if we can determine from the record that the defendant cannot establish ineffective assistance of counsel under the two- prong test set forth in Strickland.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) McClendon v. State, 299 Ga. 611, 613-614 (2) ( 791 SE2d 69 ) (2016).

2014Moreover, “[i]f a defendant fails to meet his burden on one prong of the two- prong test, then the other prong need not be reviewed by the Court.” Barge v. State, 294 Ga. 567, 569 (2) ( 755 SE2d 166 ) (2014).

2014Moreover, “[i]f a defendant fails to meet his burden on one prong of the two- prong test, then the other prong need not be reviewed by the Court.” Barge v. State, 294 Ga. 567, 569 (2) ( 755 SE2d 166 ) (2014).

2013Consequently, the order denying the motion, as amended, . . . was timely appealed.”33 29 Supra. 30 Supra (holding that Deleon-Alvarez lacked standing to seek suppression on the ground that the wiretapping was unlawful). 31 See Chapman v. State, 290 Ga. 631, 634 (2) (b), n. 2 ( 724 SE2d 391 ) (2012) (“The failure to pursue a futile motion does not constitute ineffective assistance.”); see also Lewis v. State, 291 Ga. 273, 282 (7) ( 731 SE2d 51 ) (2012) (reiterating that a remand to the trial court for an evidentiary hearing on an ineffectiveness claim is not necessary where “we can determine fr

2013Consequently, the order denying the motion, as amended, . . . was timely appealed.”33 29 Supra. 30 Supra (holding that Deleon-Alvarez lacked standing to seek suppression on the ground that the wiretapping was unlawful). 31 See Chapman v. State, 290 Ga. 631, 634 (2) (b), n. 2 ( 724 SE2d 391 ) (2012) (“The failure to pursue a futile motion does not constitute ineffective assistance.”); see also Lewis v. State, 291 Ga. 273, 282 (7) ( 731 SE2d 51 ) (2012) (reiterating that a remand to the trial court for an evidentiary hearing on an ineffectiveness claim is not necessary where “we can determine fr

2013Consequently, the order denying the motion, as amended, . . . was timely appealed.”33 29 Supra. 30 Supra (holding that Deleon-Alvarez lacked standing to seek suppression on the ground that the wiretapping was unlawful). 31 See Chapman v. State, 290 Ga. 631, 634 (2) (b), n. 2 ( 724 SE2d 391 ) (2012) (“The failure to pursue a futile motion does not constitute ineffective assistance.”); see also Lewis v. State, 291 Ga. 273, 282 (7) ( 731 SE2d 51 ) (2012) (reiterating that a remand to the trial court for an evidentiary hearing on an ineffectiveness claim is not necessary where “we can determine fr

2013Consequently, the order denying the motion, as amended, . . . was timely appealed.”33 29 Supra. 30 Supra (holding that Deleon-Alvarez lacked standing to seek suppression on the ground that the wiretapping was unlawful). 31 See Chapman v. State, 290 Ga. 631, 634 (2) (b), n. 2 ( 724 SE2d 391 ) (2012) (“The failure to pursue a futile motion does not constitute ineffective assistance.”); see also Lewis v. State, 291 Ga. 273, 282 (7) ( 731 SE2d 51 ) (2012) (reiterating that a remand to the trial court for an evidentiary hearing on an ineffectiveness claim is not necessary where “we can determine fr

2013Consequently, the order denying the motion, as amended, . . . was timely appealed.”33 29 Supra. 30 Supra (holding that Deleon-Alvarez lacked standing to seek suppression on the ground that the wiretapping was unlawful). 31 See Chapman v. State, 290 Ga. 631, 634 (2) (b), n. 2 ( 724 SE2d 391 ) (2012) (“The failure to pursue a futile motion does not constitute ineffective assistance.”); see also Lewis v. State, 291 Ga. 273, 282 (7) ( 731 SE2d 51 ) (2012) (reiterating that a remand to the trial court for an evidentiary hearing on an ineffectiveness claim is not necessary where “we can determine fr

2013Consequently, the order denying the motion, as amended, . . . was timely appealed.”33 29 Supra. 30 Supra (holding that Deleon-Alvarez lacked standing to seek suppression on the ground that the wiretapping was unlawful). 31 See Chapman v. State, 290 Ga. 631, 634 (2) (b), n. 2 ( 724 SE2d 391 ) (2012) (“The failure to pursue a futile motion does not constitute ineffective assistance.”); see also Lewis v. State, 291 Ga. 273, 282 (7) ( 731 SE2d 51 ) (2012) (reiterating that a remand to the trial court for an evidentiary hearing on an ineffectiveness claim is not necessary where “we can determine fr

2009Battles, supra at 704 (1) (a).

2005First, he must show that “though [Lombard] produced the documents [Wallace] requested after [the] lawsuit was filed,” the appellees “violated the [ORA] by not producing them before the suit was filed.” GMSAir Conditioning v. Dept. of Human Resources, 201 Ga. App. 136, 138-139 ( 410 SE2d 341 ) (1991).

2005First, he must show that “though [Lombard] produced the documents [Wallace] requested after [the] lawsuit was filed,” the appellees “violated the [ORA] by not producing them before the suit was filed.” GMSAir Conditioning v. Dept. of Human Resources, 201 Ga. App. 136, 138-139 ( 410 SE2d 341 ) (1991).

1980Hatcher v. Hancock County Commrs., 239 Ga. 229, 231 ( 236 SE2d 577 ) (1977); Ungar v. Mayor &c. of Savannah, 224 Ga. 613, 614 ( 163 SE2d 814 ) (1968); State Highway Dept. v. Reed, 211 Ga. 197 (3) ( 84 SE2d 561 ) (1954); Wofford Oil Co. v. City of Calhoun, 183 Ga. 511, 513 ( 189 SE 5 ) (1936); Lindsey v. Board of Commrs., 169 Ga. 368 ( 150 SE 261 ) (1929); Code § 64-101.

1980Hatcher v. Hancock County Commrs., 239 Ga. 229, 231 ( 236 SE2d 577 ) (1977); Ungar v. Mayor &c. of Savannah, 224 Ga. 613, 614 ( 163 SE2d 814 ) (1968); State Highway Dept. v. Reed, 211 Ga. 197 (3) ( 84 SE2d 561 ) (1954); Wofford Oil Co. v. City of Calhoun, 183 Ga. 511, 513 ( 189 SE 5 ) (1936); Lindsey v. Board of Commrs., 169 Ga. 368 ( 150 SE 261 ) (1929); Code § 64-101.

1980Hatcher v. Hancock County Commrs., 239 Ga. 229, 231 ( 236 SE2d 577 ) (1977); Ungar v. Mayor &c. of Savannah, 224 Ga. 613, 614 ( 163 SE2d 814 ) (1968); State Highway Dept. v. Reed, 211 Ga. 197 (3) ( 84 SE2d 561 ) (1954); Wofford Oil Co. v. City of Calhoun, 183 Ga. 511, 513 ( 189 SE 5 ) (1936); Lindsey v. Board of Commrs., 169 Ga. 368 ( 150 SE 261 ) (1929); Code § 64-101.

1980Hatcher v. Hancock County Commrs., 239 Ga. 229, 231 ( 236 SE2d 577 ) (1977); Ungar v. Mayor &c. of Savannah, 224 Ga. 613, 614 ( 163 SE2d 814 ) (1968); State Highway Dept. v. Reed, 211 Ga. 197 (3) ( 84 SE2d 561 ) (1954); Wofford Oil Co. v. City of Calhoun, 183 Ga. 511, 513 ( 189 SE 5 ) (1936); Lindsey v. Board of Commrs., 169 Ga. 368 ( 150 SE 261 ) (1929); Code § 64-101.

1980Hatcher v. Hancock County Commrs., 239 Ga. 229, 231 ( 236 SE2d 577 ) (1977); Ungar v. Mayor &c. of Savannah, 224 Ga. 613, 614 ( 163 SE2d 814 ) (1968); State Highway Dept. v. Reed, 211 Ga. 197 (3) ( 84 SE2d 561 ) (1954); Wofford Oil Co. v. City of Calhoun, 183 Ga. 511, 513 ( 189 SE 5 ) (1936); Lindsey v. Board of Commrs., 169 Ga. 368 ( 150 SE 261 ) (1929); Code § 64-101.

1980Hatcher v. Hancock County Commrs., 239 Ga. 229, 231 ( 236 SE2d 577 ) (1977); Ungar v. Mayor &c. of Savannah, 224 Ga. 613, 614 ( 163 SE2d 814 ) (1968); State Highway Dept. v. Reed, 211 Ga. 197 (3) ( 84 SE2d 561 ) (1954); Wofford Oil Co. v. City of Calhoun, 183 Ga. 511, 513 ( 189 SE 5 ) (1936); Lindsey v. Board of Commrs., 169 Ga. 368 ( 150 SE 261 ) (1929); Code § 64-101.