two prong test in Connecticut

1996The Connecticut Supreme Court has adopted the two prong test set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) to determine if counsel's assistance was ineffective.

1996Our Supreme Court has adopted the two prong analysis of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) to determine if counsel's assistance was ineffective.

1996Johnson v. Commissioner of Correction, 36 Conn. App. 695 , 701 (1995).

1996Johnson v. Commissioner of Correction, 36 Conn. App. 695 , 701 (1995).

2014The analysis under § 52-184c (c) does not end with subdivi- sion (1), because the test has two prongs, and § 52- 184c (c) (2) expressly requires ‘‘certif[ication] by the appropriate American board in the same specialty . . . .’’ (Emphasis added.) This is where I believe that the majority’s analysis falters, because the ‘‘ ‘conjunctive ‘‘and’’ meaning ‘‘in addition to’’ is employed between the parts of the two prong test,’ ’’ meaning that ‘‘ ‘both tests must be met.’ ’’ Pantlin & Chananie Development Corp. v. Hartford Cement & Building Supply Co., 196 Conn. 233, 240 , 492 A.2d 159 (1985).

2014The analysis under § 52-184c (c) does not end with subdivi- sion (1), because the test has two prongs, and § 52- 184c (c) (2) expressly requires ‘‘certif[ication] by the appropriate American board in the same specialty . . . .’’ (Emphasis added.) This is where I believe that the majority’s analysis falters, because the ‘‘ ‘conjunctive ‘‘and’’ meaning ‘‘in addition to’’ is employed between the parts of the two prong test,’ ’’ meaning that ‘‘ ‘both tests must be met.’ ’’ Pantlin & Chananie Development Corp. v. Hartford Cement & Building Supply Co., 196 Conn. 233, 240 , 492 A.2d 159 (1985).

2002First it must be determined "(t)hat no parent-child relationship exists, and second, the court must look into the future and determine whether it would be detrimental to the child's best interest to allow time for such a relationship to develop." In re Savanna M ., 55 Conn. App. 807 , 815 (1999), C.G.S. § 17a-112 (j)(3)(D).

2002First it must determine "(t)hat no parental-child relationship exists, and second, the court must look into the future and determine whether it would be detrimental to the child's best interest to allow time for such a relationship to develop." In re Savanna M. , 55 Conn. App. 807 , 815 (1999); C.G.S. § 17a-112 (j)(3)(D).

2016"Since the conjunctive 'and' meaning 'in addition to' is employed between the parts of the two prong test, both tests must be met." Costello v. Hartford Institute of Accounting, Inc., 193 Conn. 160 , 167, 475 A.2d 310 (1984).

2016"Since the conjunctive 'and' meaning 'in addition to' is employed between the parts of the two prong test, both tests must be met." Costello v. Hartford Institute of Accounting, Inc., 193 Conn. 160 , 167, 475 A.2d 310 (1984).

2024Since the conjunctive and meaning in addition to is employed between the parts of the two prong test, both tests must be met.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Ilyssa G., 105 Conn. App. 41 , 45–46, 936 A.2d 674 (2007), cert. denied, 285 Conn. 918 , 943 A.2d 475 (2008). ‘‘The mani- fest purpose of a motion to open . . . is to provide a mechanism by which a defaulted party has an opportu- nity to be heard.’’ In re Skylar F., 191 Conn. App. 200 , 208, 215 A.3d 750 (2019); see id. (concluding that respon- dent father had opportunity to be heard in connection with court’

2024Since the conjunctive and meaning in addition to is employed between the parts of the two prong test, both tests must be met.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Ilyssa G., 105 Conn. App. 41 , 45–46, 936 A.2d 674 (2007), cert. denied, 285 Conn. 918 , 943 A.2d 475 (2008). ‘‘The mani- fest purpose of a motion to open . . . is to provide a mechanism by which a defaulted party has an opportu- nity to be heard.’’ In re Skylar F., 191 Conn. App. 200 , 208, 215 A.3d 750 (2019); see id. (concluding that respon- dent father had opportunity to be heard in connection with court’

2024Since the conjunctive and meaning in addition to is employed between the parts of the two prong test, both tests must be met.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Ilyssa G., 105 Conn. App. 41 , 45–46, 936 A.2d 674 (2007), cert. denied, 285 Conn. 918 , 943 A.2d 475 (2008). ‘‘The mani- fest purpose of a motion to open . . . is to provide a mechanism by which a defaulted party has an opportu- nity to be heard.’’ In re Skylar F., 191 Conn. App. 200 , 208, 215 A.3d 750 (2019); see id. (concluding that respon- dent father had opportunity to be heard in connection with court’

2024Since the conjunctive and meaning in addition to is employed between the parts of the two prong test, both tests must be met.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Ilyssa G., 105 Conn. App. 41 , 45–46, 936 A.2d 674 (2007), cert. denied, 285 Conn. 918 , 943 A.2d 475 (2008). ‘‘The mani- fest purpose of a motion to open . . . is to provide a mechanism by which a defaulted party has an opportu- nity to be heard.’’ In re Skylar F., 191 Conn. App. 200 , 208, 215 A.3d 750 (2019); see id. (concluding that respon- dent father had opportunity to be heard in connection with court’

2002First, the alleged deprivation must be, in objective terms, "sufficiently serious." Hathaway v. Coughlin , 37 F.3d 63 (2d Cir. 1994); Wilson v. Seiter , 501 U.S. 294 , 298 , 111 S.Ct. 2321 , 2324 , 115 L.Ed.2d 271 (1991).

2001First, the alleged deprivation must be, in objective terms, "sufficiently serious." CT Page 15211 Hathaway v. Coughlin , 37 F.3d 63 (2d Cir. 1994); Wilson v. Seiter , 501 U.S. 294 , 298 , 111 S.Ct. 2321 , 2324 , 115 L.Ed.2d 271 (1991).

2002State v. Biggs , 13 Conn. App. 12 , 17 , 534 A.2d 1217 (1987), cert. denied, 207 Conn. 801 , 540 A.2d 73 (1988)." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Streater , 36 Conn. App. 345 , 362 , 650 A.2d 632 (1994), cert. denied, 232 Conn. 908 , 653 A.2d 195 (1995); see also State v. Gagnon , 18 Conn. App. 694 , 701 , 561 A.2d 129 , cert. denied, 213 Conn. 805 , 567 A.2d 835 (1989) For the court to determine whether a pretrial identification procedure violated a defendant's due process rights, the court must review it on a case by case basis in light of the following two prong test: "[f]irst,

2002State v. Biggs , 13 Conn. App. 12 , 17 , 534 A.2d 1217 (1987), cert. denied, 207 Conn. 801 , 540 A.2d 73 (1988)." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Streater , 36 Conn. App. 345 , 362 , 650 A.2d 632 (1994), cert. denied, 232 Conn. 908 , 653 A.2d 195 (1995); see also State v. Gagnon , 18 Conn. App. 694 , 701 , 561 A.2d 129 , cert. denied, 213 Conn. 805 , 567 A.2d 835 (1989) For the court to determine whether a pretrial identification procedure violated a defendant's due process rights, the court must review it on a case by case basis in light of the following two prong test: "[f]irst,

2002State v. Biggs , 13 Conn. App. 12 , 17 , 534 A.2d 1217 (1987), cert. denied, 207 Conn. 801 , 540 A.2d 73 (1988)." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Streater , 36 Conn. App. 345 , 362 , 650 A.2d 632 (1994), cert. denied, 232 Conn. 908 , 653 A.2d 195 (1995); see also State v. Gagnon , 18 Conn. App. 694 , 701 , 561 A.2d 129 , cert. denied, 213 Conn. 805 , 567 A.2d 835 (1989) For the court to determine whether a pretrial identification procedure violated a defendant's due process rights, the court must review it on a case by case basis in light of the following two prong test: "[f]irst,

2000For the court to determine whether a pretrial identification procedure violated a defendant's due process rights, the court must review on a case by case basis in light of the following two prong test: "First, it must be determined whether the identification procedure was unnecessarily suggestive; and second, if it is found to have been so, it must be determined whether the identification was nevertheless reliable based upon an examination of the totality of the circumstances." State v. Ortiz, 252 Conn. 533 , 553 , ___ A.2d ___ (2000); State v. Streater, supra, 36 Conn. App. 362 , quoting Stat

2002First, the alleged deprivation must be, in objective terms, "sufficiently serious." Hathaway v. Coughlin , 37 F.3d 63 (2d Cir. 1994); Wilson v. Seiter , 501 U.S. 294 , 298 , 111 S.Ct. 2321 , 2324 , 115 L.Ed.2d 271 (1991).

2002First, the alleged deprivation must be, in objective terms, "sufficiently serious." Hathaway v. Coughlin , 37 F.3d 63 (2d Cir. 1994); Wilson v. Seiter , 501 U.S. 294 , 298 , 111 S.Ct. 2321 , 2324 , 115 L.Ed.2d 271 (1991).

2002The record and the testimony do not substantiate that the petitioner, Copeland, has medical needs that rise to the level of"a condition of urgency, one that may produce death, degeneration or extreme pain." See Nance v. Kelly, 912 F.2d 605 , 607 (2d Cir. 1990) (Pratt, J. dissenting).

2001The record and the testimony does not substantiate that the petitioner DiNoto has medical needs that rise to the level of "a condition of urgency, one that may produce death, degeneration or extreme pain." See Nance v. Kelly , 912 F.2d 605 , 607 (2d Cir. 1990) (Pratt, J. dissenting).

2000The Supreme Court has stated that the test for determining the existence of a legal duty of care involves a two prong inquiry: "(1) a determination of whether an ordinary person in the defendant's position, knowing what the defendant knew or should have known, would anticipate that harm of the general nature of that suffered was likely to result, and (2) a determination, on the basis of a public policy analysis, of whether the defendant's responsibility for its negligent conduct should extend to the particular consequences or particular plaintiff in the case." Lodge v. Arett Sales Corp., 246 C

2000The Supreme Court has stated that the test for determining the existence of a legal duty of care involves a two prong inquiry: "(1) a determination of whether an ordinary person in the defendant's position, knowing what the defendant knew or should have known, would anticipate that harm of the general nature of that suffered was likely to result, and (2) a determination, on the basis of a public policy analysis, of whether the defendant's responsibility for its negligent conduct should extend to the particular consequences or particular plaintiff in the case." Lodge v. Arett Sales Corp., 246 C

2024There must be a showing (1) that a good cause of action, the nature of which must be set forth, existed at the time judgment was rendered, and (2) that the plaintiff was prevented from prosecuting the action because of mistake, acci- dent or other reasonable cause.’ . . . ‘Since the con- junctive ‘‘and’’ meaning ‘‘in addition to’’ is employed between the parts of the two prong test, both [prongs] must be met.’ ’’ (Citations omitted.) Estela v. Bristol Hospital, Inc., 165 Conn. App. 100, 108 , 138 A.3d 1042 , cert. denied, 323 Conn. 904 , 150 A.3d 681 (2016).

2024There must be a showing (1) that a good cause of action, the nature of which must be set forth, existed at the time judgment was rendered, and (2) that the plaintiff was prevented from prosecuting the action because of mistake, acci- dent or other reasonable cause.’ . . . ‘Since the con- junctive ‘‘and’’ meaning ‘‘in addition to’’ is employed between the parts of the two prong test, both [prongs] must be met.’ ’’ (Citations omitted.) Estela v. Bristol Hospital, Inc., 165 Conn. App. 100, 108 , 138 A.3d 1042 , cert. denied, 323 Conn. 904 , 150 A.3d 681 (2016).

2024There must be a showing (1) that a good cause of action, the nature of which must be set forth, existed at the time judgment was rendered, and (2) that the plaintiff was prevented from prosecuting the action because of mistake, acci- dent or other reasonable cause.’ . . . ‘Since the con- junctive ‘‘and’’ meaning ‘‘in addition to’’ is employed between the parts of the two prong test, both [prongs] must be met.’ ’’ (Citations omitted.) Estela v. Bristol Hospital, Inc., 165 Conn. App. 100, 108 , 138 A.3d 1042 , cert. denied, 323 Conn. 904 , 150 A.3d 681 (2016).

2024There must be a showing (1) that a good cause of action, the nature of which must be set forth, existed at the time judgment was rendered, and (2) that the plaintiff was prevented from prosecuting the action because of mistake, acci- dent or other reasonable cause.’ . . . ‘Since the con- junctive ‘‘and’’ meaning ‘‘in addition to’’ is employed between the parts of the two prong test, both [prongs] must be met.’ ’’ (Citations omitted.) Estela v. Bristol Hospital, Inc., 165 Conn. App. 100, 108 , 138 A.3d 1042 , cert. denied, 323 Conn. 904 , 150 A.3d 681 (2016).

2018As an interlocutory order, this order would be immediately appealable only if it met at least one prong of the two prong test articulated by our Supreme Court in State v. Curcio , 191 Conn. 27 , 31, 463 A.2d 566 (1983).

2018As an interlocutory order, this order would be immediately appealable only if it met at least one prong of the two prong test articulated by our Supreme Court in State v. Curcio , 191 Conn. 27 , 31, 463 A.2d 566 (1983).

2016The plaintiff's appellate brief does not challenge the court's finding that the plaintiff failed to make the second of these required showings. "[W]here alternative grounds found by the reviewing court and unchallenged on appeal would support the trial court's judgment, independent of some challenged ground, the challenged ground that forms the basis of the appeal is moot because the court on appeal could grant no practical relief to the complainant." Green v. Yankee Gas Corp., 120 Conn.App. 804 , 805, 993 A.2d 982 (2010) ; see also State v. Abushaqra, 151 Conn.App. 319 , 325-26, 96 A.3d 559 (

2016The plaintiff's appellate brief does not challenge the court's finding that the plaintiff failed to make the second of these required showings. "[W]here alternative grounds found by the reviewing court and unchallenged on appeal would support the trial court's judgment, independent of some challenged ground, the challenged ground that forms the basis of the appeal is moot because the court on appeal could grant no practical relief to the complainant." Green v. Yankee Gas Corp., 120 Conn.App. 804 , 805, 993 A.2d 982 (2010) ; see also State v. Abushaqra, 151 Conn.App. 319 , 325-26, 96 A.3d 559 (

2002State v. Findlay , 198 Conn. 328 , 337-38 , 502 A.2d 921 , cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1159 , 106 S.Ct. 2279 , 90 L.Ed.2d 721 (1986)." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Gagnon , supra, 18 Conn. App. 702 , quoting State v. Arroyo , 13 Conn. App. 687 , 690 , 539 A.2d 581 , cert. denied, 208 Conn. 8051 545 A.2d 1103 (1988).

2002State v. Findlay , 198 Conn. 328 , 337-38 , 502 A.2d 921 , cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1159 , 106 S.Ct. 2279 , 90 L.Ed.2d 721 (1986)." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Gagnon , supra, 18 Conn. App. 702 , quoting State v. Arroyo , 13 Conn. App. 687 , 690 , 539 A.2d 581 , cert. denied, 208 Conn. 8051 545 A.2d 1103 (1988).

2002State v. Biggs , 13 Conn. App. 12 , 17 , 534 A.2d 1217 (1987), cert. denied, 207 Conn. 801 , 540 A.2d 73 (1988)." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Streater , 36 Conn. App. 345 , 362 , 650 A.2d 632 (1994), cert. denied, 232 Conn. 908 , 653 A.2d 195 (1995); see also State v. Gagnon , 18 Conn. App. 694 , 701 , 561 A.2d 129 , cert. denied, 213 Conn. 805 , 567 A.2d 835 (1989) For the court to determine whether a pretrial identification procedure violated a defendant's due process rights, the court must review it on a case by case basis in light of the following two prong test: "[f]irst,

2002State v. Findlay , 198 Conn. 328 , 337-38 , 502 A.2d 921 , cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1159 , 106 S.Ct. 2279 , 90 L.Ed.2d 721 (1986)." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Gagnon , supra, 18 Conn. App. 702 , quoting State v. Arroyo , 13 Conn. App. 687 , 690 , 539 A.2d 581 , cert. denied, 208 Conn. 8051 545 A.2d 1103 (1988).

2002State v. Biggs , 13 Conn. App. 12 , 17 , 534 A.2d 1217 (1987), cert. denied, 207 Conn. 801 , 540 A.2d 73 (1988)." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Streater , 36 Conn. App. 345 , 362 , 650 A.2d 632 (1994), cert. denied, 232 Conn. 908 , 653 A.2d 195 (1995); see also State v. Gagnon , 18 Conn. App. 694 , 701 , 561 A.2d 129 , cert. denied, 213 Conn. 805 , 567 A.2d 835 (1989) For the court to determine whether a pretrial identification procedure violated a defendant's due process rights, the court must review it on a case by case basis in light of the following two prong test: "[f]irst,

2002The claimant must show that, "(1) the person, compared with others similarly situated, was selectively treated; and (2) . . . such selective treatment was based on impermissible considerations such as race, religion, intent to inhibit or punish the CT Page 5337 exercise of constitutional rights, or malicious or bad faith intent to injure a person." Thomas v. West Haven, 249 Conn. 385 , 393 , 734 A.2d 535 , cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1187 , 120 S.Ct. 1239 , 146 L.Ed.2d 99 (1999).

2002The claimant must show that, "(1) the person, compared with others similarly situated, was selectively treated; and (2) . . . such selective treatment was based on impermissible considerations such as race, religion, intent to inhibit or punish the CT Page 5337 exercise of constitutional rights, or malicious or bad faith intent to injure a person." Thomas v. West Haven, 249 Conn. 385 , 393 , 734 A.2d 535 , cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1187 , 120 S.Ct. 1239 , 146 L.Ed.2d 99 (1999).

2002State v. Findlay , 198 Conn. 328 , 337-38 , 502 A.2d 921 , cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1159 , 106 S.Ct. 2279 , 90 L.Ed.2d 721 (1986)." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Gagnon , supra, 18 Conn. App. 702 , quoting State v. Arroyo , 13 Conn. App. 687 , 690 , 539 A.2d 581 , cert. denied, 208 Conn. 8051 545 A.2d 1103 (1988).

2002State v. Findlay , 198 Conn. 328 , 337-38 , 502 A.2d 921 , cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1159 , 106 S.Ct. 2279 , 90 L.Ed.2d 721 (1986)." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Gagnon , supra, 18 Conn. App. 702 , quoting State v. Arroyo , 13 Conn. App. 687 , 690 , 539 A.2d 581 , cert. denied, 208 Conn. 8051 545 A.2d 1103 (1988).

2002State v. Biggs , 13 Conn. App. 12 , 17 , 534 A.2d 1217 (1987), cert. denied, 207 Conn. 801 , 540 A.2d 73 (1988)." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Streater , 36 Conn. App. 345 , 362 , 650 A.2d 632 (1994), cert. denied, 232 Conn. 908 , 653 A.2d 195 (1995); see also State v. Gagnon , 18 Conn. App. 694 , 701 , 561 A.2d 129 , cert. denied, 213 Conn. 805 , 567 A.2d 835 (1989) For the court to determine whether a pretrial identification procedure violated a defendant's due process rights, the court must review it on a case by case basis in light of the following two prong test: "[f]irst,

2002State v. Biggs , 13 Conn. App. 12 , 17 , 534 A.2d 1217 (1987), cert. denied, 207 Conn. 801 , 540 A.2d 73 (1988)." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Streater , 36 Conn. App. 345 , 362 , 650 A.2d 632 (1994), cert. denied, 232 Conn. 908 , 653 A.2d 195 (1995); see also State v. Gagnon , 18 Conn. App. 694 , 701 , 561 A.2d 129 , cert. denied, 213 Conn. 805 , 567 A.2d 835 (1989) For the court to determine whether a pretrial identification procedure violated a defendant's due process rights, the court must review it on a case by case basis in light of the following two prong test: "[f]irst,

2002The claimant must show that, "(1) the person, compared with others similarly situated, was selectively treated; and (2) . . . such selective treatment was based on impermissible considerations such as race, religion, intent to inhibit or punish the CT Page 5337 exercise of constitutional rights, or malicious or bad faith intent to injure a person." Thomas v. West Haven, 249 Conn. 385 , 393 , 734 A.2d 535 , cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1187 , 120 S.Ct. 1239 , 146 L.Ed.2d 99 (1999).

2002The claimant must show that, "(1) the person, compared with others similarly situated, was selectively treated; and (2) . . . such selective treatment was based on impermissible considerations such as race, religion, intent to inhibit or punish the CT Page 5337 exercise of constitutional rights, or malicious or bad faith intent to injure a person." Thomas v. West Haven, 249 Conn. 385 , 393 , 734 A.2d 535 , cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1187 , 120 S.Ct. 1239 , 146 L.Ed.2d 99 (1999).

2002State v. Findlay , 198 Conn. 328 , 337-38 , 502 A.2d 921 , cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1159 , 106 S.Ct. 2279 , 90 L.Ed.2d 721 (1986)." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Gagnon , supra, 18 Conn. App. 702 , quoting State v. Arroyo , 13 Conn. App. 687 , 690 , 539 A.2d 581 , cert. denied, 208 Conn. 8051 545 A.2d 1103 (1988).

2002State v. Findlay , 198 Conn. 328 , 337-38 , 502 A.2d 921 , cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1159 , 106 S.Ct. 2279 , 90 L.Ed.2d 721 (1986)." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Gagnon , supra, 18 Conn. App. 702 , quoting State v. Arroyo , 13 Conn. App. 687 , 690 , 539 A.2d 581 , cert. denied, 208 Conn. 8051 545 A.2d 1103 (1988).