two prong test in Illinois

2026People v. Peterson, 2017 IL 120331 , ¶ 79.

2020People v. Peterson, 2017 IL 120331, ¶ 79 , 106 N.E.3d 944 .

2022Hodges, 234 Ill. 2d at 17 . ¶ 32 Defendant fails to cite Strickland or the two prong test to evaluate ineffective assistance of counsel.

2020Id. at 9 . ¶ 14 Ineffective assistance of counsel claims are judged under the two prong standard set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).

2019Buffer, 2019 IL 122327 , ¶ 27.

2019Buffer, 2019 IL 122327 , ¶ 27.

2025Accordingly, “[a] judge’s factual findings and credibility determinations made at a third-stage evidentiary hearing of a postconviction proceeding should be disturbed only if manifestly erroneous, that is, only if the court committed an error that is clearly evident, plain, and indisputable.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) People v. Eubanks, 2021 IL 126271, ¶ 47 . ¶ 82 A defendant who raises an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim must satisfy the two- prong test promulgated in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984).

2024“If the court makes a finding of parental unfitness under section 1(D) of the Adoption Act, the court then considers the best interests of the child in determining whether parental rights should be terminated.” In re D.T., 2017 IL App (3d) 170120 , ¶ 16 (citing 705 ILCS 405/2029(2) (West 2014)). ¶ 26 Parents in termination of parental rights cases have the right to the effective assistance of counsel, and whether counsel has provided ineffective assistance is evaluated under the same two- prong analysis applied in criminal cases.

2024In re A.P.-M., 2018 IL App (4th) 180208, ¶ 39 .

2024To succeed on an ineffective-assistance-of-appellate-counsel claim at the [summary dismissal] stage of postconviction proceedings, a defendant must establish that it is arguable that (1) his appellate counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and (2) there is a reasonable probability that, but for appellate counsel’s errors, the appeal would have been successful.” People v. Delgado, 2022 IL App (2d) 210008, ¶ 26 .

2023People v. Rodriguez, 2018 IL App (1st) 160030, ¶ 48 ; see also People v. Colon, 225 Ill. 2d 125, 135 (2007) (citing People v. Albanese, 104 Ill. 2d 504 (1984) (adopting Strickland)).

2019Ordinarily claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are evaluated under the two- prong test set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688, 694 (1984), which requires a showing that counsel’s performance “fell below an objective standard of reasonableness” and that the deficient performance was prejudicial in that “there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” However, pursuant to United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 659 (1984), and People v. Hattery, 109 Ill. 2d 449, 461 (1985), prejudic

2019Defendant notes, however, that the Holt court expressly limited its holding, stating, “Where, as here, the evidence clearly indicates that defendant is unfit to stand trial, but a defendant contends that he or she is fit, -5- defense counsel is not obligated to adopt the defendant’s position and argue for a finding of fitness.” (Emphases added.) Holt, 2014 IL 116989, ¶ 56 .

2014Haynes outlined how the test applies to claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel: “A defendant who contends that appellate counsel rendered ineffective assistance, e.g., by failing to argue an issue, must show that the failure to raise that issue - 19 - 2014 IL App (2d) 121169 reasons, the trial court did not violate defendant’s right to confront D.C., because the record shows that she was available as a witness at trial.

2013Ocasek, 153 Ill.

2013Martin, 2012 IL 113270, ¶ 27 .

2011Our supreme court, in People v. Friedman, 79 Ill. 2d 341 (1980), established a two- prong test to determine whether a statement is an inadmissible plea-related statement.

1993In Johnson, the court relied on the two prong test of Aguilar v. Texas, (1964), 378 U.S. *1148 108, 84 S.Ct. 1509 , 12 L.Ed.2d 723 , as well as the standard set forth in Spinelli v. United States (1969), 393 U.S. 410 , 89 S.Ct. 584 , 21 L.Ed.2d 637 in its determination that there were insufficient facts corroborating the informant's tip that the defendant in that case committed the crime.

1993In Johnson, the court relied on the two prong test of Aguilar v. Texas, (1964), 378 U.S. *1148 108, 84 S.Ct. 1509 , 12 L.Ed.2d 723 , as well as the standard set forth in Spinelli v. United States (1969), 393 U.S. 410 , 89 S.Ct. 584 , 21 L.Ed.2d 637 in its determination that there were insufficient facts corroborating the informant's tip that the defendant in that case committed the crime.