29 Mississippi opinions name it 2 courts 1955–2024 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Mississippi courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Croft v. Aldergreen2 sentences2024Thus, “where a confidential relation exists between a testator and a beneficiary under his will, and the beneficiary has been actively concerned in some way with the preparation or execution of it, the law raises a presumption that the beneficiary has exercised undue influence over the testator, and casts upon the beneficiary the burden of disproving undue influence by clear and convincing evidence.” Croft v. Alder, 237 Miss. 20 713, 722-23 , 115 So. 2d 683, 686 (1959) (emphasis added). 2018Thus, "where a confidential relation exists between a testator and a beneficiary under his will, and the beneficiary has been actively concerned in some way with the preparation or execution of it , the law raises a presumption that the beneficiary has exercised undue influence over the testator, and casts upon the beneficiary the burden of disproving undue influence by clear and convincing evidence." Croft v. Alder , 237 Miss. 713 , 722-23, 115 So.2d 683 , 686 (1959) (emphasis added). | 10 | 16 |
Ham v. Hamgreen2 sentences1975As the chancellor recognized, the relationship between the testatrix and Lelia was not a conventional fiduciary relationship in a strict sense but, as stated in Ham v. Ham, 146 Miss. 161, 173 , 110 So. 583, 584 (1926), quoting 2 Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence (4th ed.) § 956: It is settled by an overwhelming weight of authority that the principle extends to every possible case in which a fudiciary relation exists as a fact, in which there is confidence reposed on one side, and the resulting superiority and influence on the other. 1975As the chancellor recognized, the relationship between the testatrix and Lelia was not a conventional fiduciary relationship in a strict sense but, as stated in Ham v. Ham, 146 Miss. 161, 173 , 110 So. 583, 584 (1926), quoting 2 Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence (4th ed.) § 956: It is settled by an overwhelming weight of authority that the principle extends to every possible case in which a fudiciary relation exists as a fact, in which there is confidence reposed on one side, and the resulting superiority and influence on the other. | 2 | 3 |
Thornton v. Thorntongreen2 sentences2009Thornton, 922 So.2d at 852 (¶ 7). 2009Thornton, 922 So.2d at 852 (¶ 7). | 2 | 2 |
Hickey v. ANDERSONgreen2 sentences1977In Hickey v. Anderson, 210 Miss. 455 , 49 So.2d 713 (1951), the Court stated: "It is well established in Mississippi and elsewhere that where a confidential relationship is shown to exist between parties to the deed, and where the grantee, who *811 is the beneficiary, is the dominant spirit in the transaction, the law raises a presumption of undue influence... ." 210 Miss. at 462 , 49 So.2d at 716 . 1977In Hickey v. Anderson, 210 Miss. 455 , 49 So.2d 713 (1951), the Court stated: "It is well established in Mississippi and elsewhere that where a confidential relationship is shown to exist between parties to the deed, and where the grantee, who *811 is the beneficiary, is the dominant spirit in the transaction, the law raises a presumption of undue influence... ." 210 Miss. at 462 , 49 So.2d at 716 . | 1 | 5 |
Davion v. Williamsgreen2 sentences2024“The Supreme Court has also stated that the presumption of undue influence arises if the contestant proves a confidential relationship and suspicious circumstances in the execution of a [w]ill.” Davion v. Williams, 352 So. 2d 804, 805 (Miss. 1977). 2018The Supreme Court has also stated that the presumption of undue influence arises if the contestant proves "a confidential relationship and suspicious circumstances in the execution of a [ w ] ill ." Davion v. Williams , 352 So.2d 804 , 805 (Miss. 1977) (emphasis added). ¶ 40. | 1 | 2 |
In Re Estate of Sauciergreen1 sentence2006Saucier, 908 So.2d at 886 (¶ 6) (quoting Croft v. Alder, 237 Miss. 713, 722-23 , 115 So.2d 683, 686 (1959)). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Mississippi. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Morissette v. United States
green
2 sentences2014“It follows that the trial court may not withdraw or prejudge the issue by instruction that the law raises a presumption of intent from an act.” Id. (emphasis added). 2011“It follows that the trial court may not withdraw or prejudge the issue by instruction that the law raises a presumption of intent from an act.” Id. (emphasis added). | 2 | 2011–2014 |
In Re Estate of Dabney
green
2 sentences2001Dabney, 740 So.2d at 921 . ¶ 22. 1998Dabney, 740 So.2d at 921 . ¶22. | 2 | 1998–2001 |
McDowell v. Pennington
green
2 sentences1982In McDowell, supra, we again stated that in such a case the law raises a presumption that the beneficiary has exercised undue influence, and "... casts upon the beneficiary the burden of disproving undue influence by clear and convincing evidence. " 394 So.2d at 325 , quoting Croft v. Alder, 237 Miss. at 723 , 115 So.2d at 686 (emphasis added). 1982In McDowell, supra, we again stated that in such a case the law raises a presumption that the beneficiary has exercised undue influence, and "... casts upon the beneficiary the burden of disproving undue influence by clear and convincing evidence. " 394 So.2d at 325 , quoting Croft v. Alder, 237 Miss. at 723 , 115 So.2d at 686 (emphasis added). | 2 | 1981–1982 |
Meek v. Perry
green
2 sentences1981Citing from Meek v. Perry, 36 Miss. 190 (1858), the Alder Court further said: "[T]he law watches with the greatest jealousy transactions between persons in confidential relations and will not permit them to stand, unless the circumstances demonstrate the fullest deliberation on the part of the testator and the most abundant good faith on the part of the beneficiary. 1958Meek v. Perry, 36 Miss. 190 ; Hitt v. Terry, 92 Miss. 710 , 46 So. 829 .” In the case of Hickey v. Anderson, et al, 210 Miss. 455 , 49 So. 2d 713 , we held: “It is well-established in Mississippi and elsewhere that where a confidential relationship is shown to exist between parties to the deed, and where the grantee, who is the beneficiary, is the dominant spirit in the transaction, the law raises a presumption of undue influence, or, as is sometimes said, a deed is prima facie voidable in such cases. | 2 | 1958–1981 |
Burnett v. Smith
green
2 sentences1958S., Deeds, p. 749, Section 58, it is said: “Deeds between persons sustaining a fiduciary or confidential relationship will be closely scrutinized for fraud or imposition, and where the dominant person takes advantage of such relationship and by fraud, fraudulent misrepresentation, or concealment procures the execution of a deed by the latter, the instrument may be set aside.” In Hickey v. Anderson, 210 Miss. 455 , 49 So. 2d 713 , the Court said: “It is well established in Mississippi and elsewhere that where a confidential relationship is shown to exist between parties to the deed, and where t 1958S., Deeds, p. 749, Section 58, it is said: “Deeds between persons sustaining a fiduciary or confidential relationship will be closely scrutinized for fraud or imposition, and where the dominant person takes advantage of such relationship and by fraud, fraudulent misrepresentation, or concealment procures the execution of a deed by the latter, the instrument may be set aside.” In Hickey v. Anderson, 210 Miss. 455 , 49 So. 2d 713 , the Court said: “It is well established in Mississippi and elsewhere that where a confidential relationship is shown to exist between parties to the deed, and where t | 2 | 1958–1977 |
Walker v. Matthews
green
2 sentences1967Under these circumstances they contend that the law raises a presumption of a ceremonial marriage, citing Walker v. Matthews, 191 Miss. 489 , 3 So.2d 820 (1941). 1967Under these circumstances they contend that the law raises a presumption of a ceremonial marriage, citing Walker v. Matthews, 191 Miss. 489 , 3 So.2d 820 (1941). | 1 | 1967–1967 |
Hitt v. Terry
green
1 sentence1958Meek v. Perry, 36 Miss. 190 ; Hitt v. Terry, 92 Miss. 710 , 46 So. 829 .” In the case of Hickey v. Anderson, et al, 210 Miss. 455 , 49 So. 2d 713 , we held: “It is well-established in Mississippi and elsewhere that where a confidential relationship is shown to exist between parties to the deed, and where the grantee, who is the beneficiary, is the dominant spirit in the transaction, the law raises a presumption of undue influence, or, as is sometimes said, a deed is prima facie voidable in such cases. | 1 | 1958–1958 |
Gillis v. Smith
green
2 sentences1958S., Deeds, p. 749, Section 58, it is said: “Deeds between persons sustaining a fiduciary or confidential relationship will be closely scrutinized for fraud or imposition, and where the dominant person takes advantage of such relationship and by fraud, fraudulent misrepresentation, or concealment procures the execution of a deed by the latter, the instrument may be set aside.” In Hickey v. Anderson, 210 Miss. 455 , 49 So. 2d 713 , the Court said: “It is well established in Mississippi and elsewhere that where a confidential relationship is shown to exist between parties to the deed, and where t 1958S., Deeds, p. 749, Section 58, it is said: “Deeds between persons sustaining a fiduciary or confidential relationship will be closely scrutinized for fraud or imposition, and where the dominant person takes advantage of such relationship and by fraud, fraudulent misrepresentation, or concealment procures the execution of a deed by the latter, the instrument may be set aside.” In Hickey v. Anderson, 210 Miss. 455 , 49 So. 2d 713 , the Court said: “It is well established in Mississippi and elsewhere that where a confidential relationship is shown to exist between parties to the deed, and where t | 1 | 1958–1958 |
Tullos v. State
neutral
1 sentence1955Tullos v. State (Miss.) 75 So. 2d 257 , and cases therein cited. *172 We think the form of this instruction is objectionable in that it used the words, “is in law, evidence of malice.” The law raises a presumption of malice from the deliberate use of a deadly weapon in a killing or difficulty. | 1 | 1955–1955 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.