law raises presumption in Alabama

1980Orton v. Gay, 285 Ala. 270 , 231 So.2d 305 (1970); Wolfe v. Thompson, 285 Ala. 745 , 235 So.2d 878 (1970); Jones v. Boothe, 270 Ala. 420 , 119 So.2d 203 (I960).” A fair reading of the trial court’s decree indicates that the court found the grantor’s children to be the dominant parties in their relationship.

1980Orton v. Gay, 285 Ala. 270 , 231 So.2d 305 (1970); Wolfe v. Thompson, 285 Ala. 745 , 235 So.2d 878 (1970); Jones v. Boothe, 270 Ala. 420 , 119 So.2d 203 (I960).” A fair reading of the trial court’s decree indicates that the court found the grantor’s children to be the dominant parties in their relationship.

1973“In transactions inter vivos, where the parties stand in confidential relations, and the grantee, who is the beneficiary, is the dominant spirit in the transaction, the law raises a presumption of undue influence and casts upon the opposite party the burden of repelling such presumption by satisfactory evidence whenever the transaction is assailed. * * * ” Jones v. Boothe, 270 Ala. 420 , 119 So.2d 203 , and cases there cited.

1973“In transactions inter vivos, where the parties stand in confidential relations, and the grantee, who is the beneficiary, is the dominant spirit in the transaction, the law raises a presumption of undue influence and casts upon the opposite party the burden of repelling such presumption by satisfactory evidence whenever the transaction is assailed. * * * ” Jones v. Boothe, 270 Ala. 420 , 119 So.2d 203 , and cases there cited.

1980Orton v. Gay, 285 Ala. 270 , 231 So.2d 305 (1970); Wolfe v. Thompson, 285 Ala. 745 , 235 So.2d 878 (1970); Jones v. Boothe, 270 Ala. 420 , 119 So.2d 203 (I960).” A fair reading of the trial court’s decree indicates that the court found the grantor’s children to be the dominant parties in their relationship.

1980Orton v. Gay, 285 Ala. 270 , 231 So.2d 305 (1970); Wolfe v. Thompson, 285 Ala. 745 , 235 So.2d 878 (1970); Jones v. Boothe, 270 Ala. 420 , 119 So.2d 203 (I960).” A fair reading of the trial court’s decree indicates that the court found the grantor’s children to be the dominant parties in their relationship.

1925Long v. McDougald, 23 Ala. 413 ; Walthall v. Goree, 36 Ala. 728 ; Whitlow v. Echols, 78 Ala. 206 ; McWhorter v. Cox, 209 Ala. 233 , 96 So. 71 .

1884Long v. McDougald, 23 Ala. 413 ; Walthall v. Goree, 36 Ala. 728 .

1925Long v. McDougald, 23 Ala. 413 ; Walthall v. Goree, 36 Ala. 728 ; Whitlow v. Echols, 78 Ala. 206 ; McWhorter v. Cox, 209 Ala. 233 , 96 So. 71 .

1884Long v. McDougald, 23 Ala. 413 ; Walthall v. Goree, 36 Ala. 728 .

1990As this Court stated in Hutcheson v. Bibb, 142 Ala. 586, 587 , 38 So. 754 , 754 (1905): “In transactions inter vivos, where confidential relations exist between the parties, the law raises up the presumption of undue influence, and puts upon the do-nee, when the dominant party in the transaction, the burden of repelling such presumption by competent and satisfactory evidence; and this is usually done by showing that the [donor] had the benefit of competent and independent advice of some disinterested third party.” In the instant case there were a number of depositions introduced that stated, i

1988Terry v. Terry, 336 So.2d 159 (Ala.1976).” Killough v. DeVaney, 374 So.2d 287 (Ala.1979).

1988Murphy v. State, 22 Ala.App. 163 , 113 So. 623 (1927) (overruling Crisp v. State, 21 Ala.App. 449 , 109 So. 282 (1926)): "The law raises no presumption either one way or the other as to the truth of the statements made by witnesses while testifying in a case.

1988Murphy v. State, 22 Ala.App. 163 , 113 So. 623 (1927) (overruling Crisp v. State, 21 Ala.App. 449 , 109 So. 282 (1926)): "The law raises no presumption either one way or the other as to the truth of the statements made by witnesses while testifying in a case.

1988Murphy v. State, 22 Ala.App. 163 , 113 So. 623 (1927) (overruling Crisp v. State, 21 Ala.App. 449 , 109 So. 282 (1926)): "The law raises no presumption either one way or the other as to the truth of the statements made by witnesses while testifying in a case.

1988Murphy v. State, 22 Ala.App. 163 , 113 So. 623 (1927) (overruling Crisp v. State, 21 Ala.App. 449 , 109 So. 282 (1926)): "The law raises no presumption either one way or the other as to the truth of the statements made by witnesses while testifying in a case.

1979Wolfe v. Thompson , 285 Ala. 745 , 235 So.2d 878 (1970); Taylor v. Godsey , supra. Undue influence is a species of constructive fraud (Wyatt v. Riley , supra; Knox v. Knox , 95 Ala. 495 , 11 So. 125 *Page 268 (1892)), and although difficult of direct proof, much latitude is allowed in the testimony.

1979Wolfe v. Thompson , 285 Ala. 745 , 235 So.2d 878 (1970); Taylor v. Godsey , supra. Undue influence is a species of constructive fraud (Wyatt v. Riley , supra; Knox v. Knox , 95 Ala. 495 , 11 So. 125 *Page 268 (1892)), and although difficult of direct proof, much latitude is allowed in the testimony.

1968We take cognizance of cases cited by appellee wherein, in Schoenith, Inc. v. Forrester, 260 Ala. 271 , 69 So.2d 454 (3), we said: “It is well established by our decisions that when a plaintiff in a damage suit for the negligent operation of an automobile proves that the car causing the damage was owned by the defendant, the law raises the presumption that the person who was operating the automobile at the time of the collision was operating it as the owner’s agent and was acting within the line and scope of his authority.

1968We take cognizance of cases cited by appellee wherein, in Schoenith, Inc. v. Forrester, 260 Ala. 271 , 69 So.2d 454 (3), we said: “It is well established by our decisions that when a plaintiff in a damage suit for the negligent operation of an automobile proves that the car causing the damage was owned by the defendant, the law raises the presumption that the person who was operating the automobile at the time of the collision was operating it as the owner’s agent and was acting within the line and scope of his authority.

1968(Cases cited.)” We also observed in Brown v. Southeastern Greyhound Lines, 255 Ala. 308 , 51 So.2d 524 (1), as follows: “Proof of the ownership of the car by intestate raised a presumption that Miss *156 Cantrell was operating it as the owner’s agent and was acting within the line and scope of her authority.

1968(Cases cited.)” We also observed in Brown v. Southeastern Greyhound Lines, 255 Ala. 308 , 51 So.2d 524 (1), as follows: “Proof of the ownership of the car by intestate raised a presumption that Miss *156 Cantrell was operating it as the owner’s agent and was acting within the line and scope of her authority.

1960Dillard v. Hovater, 254 Ala. 616 , 49 So.2d 151 ; Floyd v. Green, 238 Ala. 42 , 188 So. 867 .

1960Dillard v. Hovater, 254 Ala. 616 , 49 So.2d 151 ; Floyd v. Green, 238 Ala. 42 , 188 So. 867 .

1960Dillard v. Hovater, 254 Ala. 616 , 49 So.2d 151 ; Floyd v. Green, 238 Ala. 42 , 188 So. 867 .

1960Dillard v. Hovater, 254 Ala. 616 , 49 So.2d 151 ; Floyd v. Green, 238 Ala. 42 , 188 So. 867 .

1957This presumption is rebuttable and for a good statement of the law on this subject we quote from Cox v. Roberts, supra, where we said: “Under the recent decisions of this court, when the plaintiff in a damage suit for the negligent operation of an automobile proves that the car causing the damage was owned by the defendant, the law raises a presumption that the person who was operating the car at the time of the collision was operating it as the owner’s agent, and was acting within the line and scope of his authority. [Citing cases.] “As to the nature or character of this presumption, it is sa

1957This presumption is rebuttable and for a good statement of the law on this subject we quote from Cox v. Roberts, supra, where we said: “Under the recent decisions of this court, when the plaintiff in a damage suit for the negligent operation of an automobile proves that the car causing the damage was owned by the defendant, the law raises a presumption that the person who was operating the car at the time of the collision was operating it as the owner’s agent, and was acting within the line and scope of his authority. [Citing cases.] “As to the nature or character of this presumption, it is sa

1953Payton v. Madison, 251 Ala. 353 (4), 37 So.2d 588 .

1953Payton v. Madison, 251 Ala. 353 (4), 37 So.2d 588 .

1953Cox v. Roberts, supra, and cases cited there: Rogers v. Hughes, 252 Ala. 72 , 39 So.2d 578 .

1953Cox v. Roberts, supra, and cases cited there: Rogers v. Hughes, 252 Ala. 72 , 39 So.2d 578 .

1950McLeod et al. v. McLeod, 145 Ala. 269 , 40 So. 414 .

1950McLeod et al. v. McLeod, 145 Ala. 269 , 40 So. 414 .

1948Such is the rule as stated in Lindsey v. Lindsey, 229 Ala. 578 , 158 So. 522 .

1948Such is the rule as stated in Lindsey v. Lindsey, 229 Ala. 578 , 158 So. 522 .

1946Dowdell et al. v. Beasley; 205 Ala. 130 , 87 So. 18 ; Ætria Explosives Co. v. Schaeffer, 209 Ala. 77 , 95 So. 351 ; Massey v. Pentecost, 206 Ala. 411 , 90 So. 866 ; Ford v. Hankins, supra; Freeman v. So.

1946Dowdell et al. v. Beasley; 205 Ala. 130 , 87 So. 18 ; Ætria Explosives Co. v. Schaeffer, 209 Ala. 77 , 95 So. 351 ; Massey v. Pentecost, 206 Ala. 411 , 90 So. 866 ; Ford v. Hankins, supra; Freeman v. So.

1946Dowdell et al. v. Beasley; 205 Ala. 130 , 87 So. 18 ; Ætria Explosives Co. v. Schaeffer, 209 Ala. 77 , 95 So. 351 ; Massey v. Pentecost, 206 Ala. 411 , 90 So. 866 ; Ford v. Hankins, supra; Freeman v. So.

1946Dowdell et al. v. Beasley; 205 Ala. 130 , 87 So. 18 ; Ætria Explosives Co. v. Schaeffer, 209 Ala. 77 , 95 So. 351 ; Massey v. Pentecost, 206 Ala. 411 , 90 So. 866 ; Ford v. Hankins, supra; Freeman v. So.

1946Dowdell et al. v. Beasley; 205 Ala. 130 , 87 So. 18 ; Ætria Explosives Co. v. Schaeffer, 209 Ala. 77 , 95 So. 351 ; Massey v. Pentecost, 206 Ala. 411 , 90 So. 866 ; Ford v. Hankins, supra; Freeman v. So.

1946Dowdell et al. v. Beasley; 205 Ala. 130 , 87 So. 18 ; Ætria Explosives Co. v. Schaeffer, 209 Ala. 77 , 95 So. 351 ; Massey v. Pentecost, 206 Ala. 411 , 90 So. 866 ; Ford v. Hankins, supra; Freeman v. So.

1934Miller v. Irby’s Adm’r, 63 Ala. 477, 482 ; Cook v. Cook et al., Ex’rs, 69 Ala. 294 ; Wright v. Lang, 66 Ala. 389 ; Langley v. Langley et al., 121 Ala. 70 , 25 So. 707 ; Childress v. Childress, 3 Ala. 752 ; Lindsey v. Lindsey et al., supra. The mere fact that there is dispute as to the existence of an indebtedness, or the amount thereof, does not oust the jurisdiction of the court.

1934Miller v. Irby’s Adm’r, 63 Ala. 477, 482 ; Cook v. Cook et al., Ex’rs, 69 Ala. 294 ; Wright v. Lang, 66 Ala. 389 ; Langley v. Langley et al., 121 Ala. 70 , 25 So. 707 ; Childress v. Childress, 3 Ala. 752 ; Lindsey v. Lindsey et al., supra. The mere fact that there is dispute as to the existence of an indebtedness, or the amount thereof, does not oust the jurisdiction of the court.

1934Miller v. Irby’s Adm’r, 63 Ala. 477, 482 ; Cook v. Cook et al., Ex’rs, 69 Ala. 294 ; Wright v. Lang, 66 Ala. 389 ; Langley v. Langley et al., 121 Ala. 70 , 25 So. 707 ; Childress v. Childress, 3 Ala. 752 ; Lindsey v. Lindsey et al., supra. The mere fact that there is dispute as to the existence of an indebtedness, or the amount thereof, does not oust the jurisdiction of the court.