law raises presumption in New York

1930Matter of Biersack ( 96 Misc. 161 ; affd., 179 App. Div. 916 ) at page 178, quotes with approval the language of Chancery v. Whinnery (147 Pac. [Okla.] 1036) as follows: “When a marriage has been shown in evidence, whethér regular or irregular, and whatever the form of the proofs, the law raises a presumption of its legality, not only casting the burden of proof on the party objecting, but requiring him throughout and in every particular plainly to make the fact appear, against the constant pressure of this presumption, that it is illegal and void.” To like effect see Tracy v. Frey ( 95 App. D

1930In Matter of Biersack ( 96 Misc. 161 ; affd., 179 App. Div. 916 ) the court quotes with approval the following rule: “ When a marriage has been shown in evidence, whether regular or irregular, and whatever the form of the proofs, the law raises a presumption of its legality, not only casting the burden of proof on the party objecting, but requiring him throughout and in every particular plainly to make the fact appear, against the constant pressure of this presumption, that it is illegal and void ” (p. 178).

1930Matter of Biersack ( 96 Misc. 161 ; affd., 179 App. Div. 916 ) at page 178, quotes with approval the language of Chancery v. Whinnery (147 Pac. [Okla.] 1036) as follows: “When a marriage has been shown in evidence, whethér regular or irregular, and whatever the form of the proofs, the law raises a presumption of its legality, not only casting the burden of proof on the party objecting, but requiring him throughout and in every particular plainly to make the fact appear, against the constant pressure of this presumption, that it is illegal and void.” To like effect see Tracy v. Frey ( 95 App. D

1930In Matter of Biersack ( 96 Misc. 161 ; affd., 179 App. Div. 916 ) the court quotes with approval the following rule: “ When a marriage has been shown in evidence, whether regular or irregular, and whatever the form of the proofs, the law raises a presumption of its legality, not only casting the burden of proof on the party objecting, but requiring him throughout and in every particular plainly to make the fact appear, against the constant pressure of this presumption, that it is illegal and void ” (p. 178).

1980Citing Morissette v United States ( 342 US 246 ), the court stated that where the intent of the accused is an ingredient of the crime charged, its existence is a jury issue, and "[i]t follows that the trial court may not withdraw or prejudge the issue by instruction that the law raises a presumption of intent from an act.” (Sandstrom v Montana, supra, p 522.) The Sandstrom jurors were told not that they had a choice or that they might infer the conclusion that "the law presumes that a person intends the ordinary consequences of his voluntary acts,” but were told only that the law presumed it.

1980The Supreme Court therefore did not rule upon the effect of such qualifying instructions, other than, perhaps, "whether a defendant has been accorded his constitutional rights depends upon the way in which a reasonable juror could have interpreted the instructions.” (Sandstrom v Montana, supra, p 514.) Our Court of Appeals in People v Getch and People v Marr ( 50 NY2d 456 ) has indicated that the charge will be read as a whole, and if qualifying instructions were given and made clear that the burden of proof was not shifted to the defendant, that the so-called "presumption” was permissive, and

1961(Mooney v. Byrne, supra, pp. 94-95 .) “ He cannot escape by offering to pay what he has received on selling the lands but must pay the value at the time of the trial ” (Mooney v. Byrne, supra, p. 97 ).

1961(Mooney v. Byrne, supra, pp. 94-95 .) “ He cannot escape by offering to pay what he has received on selling the lands but must pay the value at the time of the trial ” (Mooney v. Byrne, supra, p. 97 ).

1923Gray, J., in Riker v. Cornwell, 113 N. Y. 115, 127 , states the rule plainly, as follows: “ I think the doctrine is firmly established, by the reported cases and by the text-books, that where the residuary bequest is not circumscribed by clear expressions in the instrument and the title of the residuary legatee is not narrowed by special words of unmistakable import, he will take whatever may fall into the residue, whether by lapse, invalid dispositions or other accident.” I am, therefore, of the opinion that the rents and profits we have been considering should be paid to the residuary legate

1912An agreement to take each other for husband and wife was deemed sufficient, and when a marriage is proved by competent evidence the law raises a presumption in favor of its legality, upon which the party can rely until its illegality is proved (Erwin v. English, 61 Conn. 502, 510 ), unless it is brought clearly within some prohibitory or invalidating statute or rule of law (Hayden v. Allyn, 55 Conn. 280, 289 ).

1912An agreement to take each other for husband and wife was deemed sufficient, and when a marriage is proved by competent evidence the law raises a presumption in favor of its legality, upon which the party can rely until its illegality is proved (Erwin v. English, 61 Conn. 502, 510 ), unless it is brought clearly within some prohibitory or invalidating statute or rule of law (Hayden v. Allyn, 55 Conn. 280, 289 ).

1897(Jorgensen v. Squires, 144 N. Y. 280 .) It is contended that the relator is not within the rule which requires that, before a peremptory writ will issue, it must be made to appear that he has a clear legal right to the thing demanded.' The thing demanded in this case is a permit to .take up sidewalks and open vaults for the purpose of repairing both.