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16 Georgia opinions name it 2 courts 1904–1985 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Georgia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Chenall v. Palmer Brick Co.green2 sentences1985The burden is on the plaintiff to show that the defendant was negligent.” Chenall v. Palmer Brick Co., 117 Ga. 106, 108 ( 43 SE 443 ) (1903). 1985The burden is on the plaintiff to show that the defendant was negligent.” Chenall v. Palmer Brick Co., 117 Ga. 106, 108 ( 43 SE 443 ) (1903). | 3 | 3 |
Cook v. Stategreen2 sentences1947“The law raises no presumption; it simply permits the jury to infer guilt from the fact of recent possession, unaccounted for.” Lewis v. State, 120 Ga. 508 ( 48 S. E. 227 ); McCoy v. State, 18 Ga. App. 698 ( 90 S. E. 355 ); Morris v. State, 47 Ga. App. 792 ( 171 S. E. 555 ); Cook v. State, 49 Ga. App. 86, 88 ( 174 S. E. 195 ); Jordan v. State, 119 Ga. 443 ( 46 S. E. 679 ). 1947“The law raises no presumption; it simply permits the jury to infer guilt from the fact of recent possession, unaccounted for.” Lewis v. State, 120 Ga. 508 ( 48 S. E. 227 ); McCoy v. State, 18 Ga. App. 698 ( 90 S. E. 355 ); Morris v. State, 47 Ga. App. 792 ( 171 S. E. 555 ); Cook v. State, 49 Ga. App. 86, 88 ( 174 S. E. 195 ); Jordan v. State, 119 Ga. 443 ( 46 S. E. 679 ). | 2 | 2 |
Deming v. Williamsgreen2 sentences1921See Denning v. Williams, 26 Conn. 226 , 68 Am. 1904See Denning v. Williams, 26 Conn. 226 , 68 Am. | 2 | 2 |
Griffin v. Stategreen2 sentences1934In connection with this ground, it may not be amiss to state that in Lewis v. State, 120 Ga. 508 ( 48 S. E. 227), the court held the following charge did require the grant of a new trial: “Where a burglary has been committed, and money, goods, or other property which was in the house at the time of the burglary is soon thereafter found in the possession of a person who is unable to account for his possession; it raises a presumption of his guilt, and the jury would be authorized to find a verdict of guilty.” Some confusion has arisen, even among the lawyers, from the use by the court of the ex 1934In connection with this ground, it may not be amiss to state that in Lewis v. State, 120 Ga. 508 ( 48 S. E. 227), the court held the following charge did require the grant of a new trial: “Where a burglary has been committed, and money, goods, or other property which was in the house at the time of the burglary is soon thereafter found in the possession of a person who is unable to account for his possession; it raises a presumption of his guilt, and the jury would be authorized to find a verdict of guilty.” Some confusion has arisen, even among the lawyers, from the use by the court of the ex | 1 | 3 |
Hudgins v. Coca Cola Bottling Co.green2 sentences1940We therefore think it would be clearer to the jury if the judge avoided the word presumption in this latter connection and used some such expression as “the law permits the jury to infer guilt from the fact of recent possession unaccounted for,” thus bringing out the idea that such possession authorizes a verdict of guilty but does not require it.’ Cook v. State, supra. I think this form of charge in the instant case is unfortunate and is likely to unwittingly do the defendant an injustice.” To paraphrase the language used in Hudgins v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 122 Ga. 695, 699 ( 50 S. E. 974 ) 1940We therefore think it would be clearer to the jury if the judge avoided the word presumption in this latter connection and used some such expression as “the law permits the jury to infer guilt from the fact of recent possession unaccounted for,” thus bringing out the idea that such possession authorizes a verdict of guilty but does not require it.’ Cook v. State, supra. I think this form of charge in the instant case is unfortunate and is likely to unwittingly do the defendant an injustice.” To paraphrase the language used in Hudgins v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 122 Ga. 695, 699 ( 50 S. E. 974 ) | 1 | 1 |
Blocker v. Stategreen2 sentences1940Of all of this, however, the jury will be the judge.” (Italics ours.) The writer, speaking for himself, feels it is his duty to reiterate what he said in Blocker v. State, 57 Ga. App. 330, 331 ( 195 S. E. 451 ): “Such a charge is likely to confuse the jury, for they are likely to construe it as conveying the idea that the law raises a presumption of guilt from the recent possession, that the defendant committed the offense of simple larceny. ‘The law raises no presumption; it simply permits the jury to infer guilt from the fact of recent possession, unaccounted for.’ Lewis v. State, 120 Ga. 50 1940Of all of this, however, the jury will be the judge.” (Italics ours.) The writer, speaking for himself, feels it is his duty to reiterate what he said in Blocker v. State, 57 Ga. App. 330, 331 ( 195 S. E. 451 ): “Such a charge is likely to confuse the jury, for they are likely to construe it as conveying the idea that the law raises a presumption of guilt from the recent possession, that the defendant committed the offense of simple larceny. ‘The law raises no presumption; it simply permits the jury to infer guilt from the fact of recent possession, unaccounted for.’ Lewis v. State, 120 Ga. 50 | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Georgia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Graham v. State
neutral
2 sentences1969"The law raises no presumption; it simply permits the jury to infer guilt from the fact of recent possession unaccounted for." Lewis v. State, 120 Ga. 508 ( 48 SE 227 ). 1969“The law raises no presumption; it simply permits the jury to infer guilt from the fact of recent possession unaccounted for.” Lewis v. State, 120 Ga. 508 ( 48 SE 227 ). | 5 | 1934–1969 |
Lewis v. State
neutral
2 sentences1969"The law raises no presumption; it simply permits the jury to infer guilt from the fact of recent possession unaccounted for." Lewis v. State, 120 Ga. 508 ( 48 SE 227 ). 1969“The law raises no presumption; it simply permits the jury to infer guilt from the fact of recent possession unaccounted for.” Lewis v. State, 120 Ga. 508 ( 48 SE 227 ). | 5 | 1934–1969 |
Holliday v. State
green
2 sentences1934Holliday v. State, 23 Ga. App. 400 ( 98 S. E. 386 ). 1932As was pointed out by Mr. Justice Lewis in Gravitt’s case, it is a presumption of fact and not of law.' It authorizes a verdict of guilty, but does not require it.” In this connection see Holliday v. State, 23 Ga. App. 400 ( 98 S. E. 386 ), and the numerous authorities there cited. | 2 | 1932–1934 |
Savannah Electric Co. v. Kaupf
green
2 sentences1934Holliday v. State, 23 Ga. App. 400 ( 98 S. E. 386 ). 1932As was pointed out by Mr. Justice Lewis in Gravitt’s case, it is a presumption of fact and not of law.' It authorizes a verdict of guilty, but does not require it.” In this connection see Holliday v. State, 23 Ga. App. 400 ( 98 S. E. 386 ), and the numerous authorities there cited. | 2 | 1932–1934 |
Tucker v. State
neutral
2 sentences1969In the present case, there was no language in the charge to the jury indicating merely that they were authorized to convict under the circumstances (see in this connection Tucker v. State, 57 Ga. 503, 505 ). 1969In the present case, there was no language in the charge to the jury indicating merely that they were authorized to convict under the circumstances (see in this connection Tucker v. State, 57 Ga. 503, 505 ). | 1 | 1969–1969 |
Jordan v. State
green
2 sentences1947“The law raises no presumption; it simply permits the jury to infer guilt from the fact of recent possession, unaccounted for.” Lewis v. State, 120 Ga. 508 ( 48 S. E. 227 ); McCoy v. State, 18 Ga. App. 698 ( 90 S. E. 355 ); Morris v. State, 47 Ga. App. 792 ( 171 S. E. 555 ); Cook v. State, 49 Ga. App. 86, 88 ( 174 S. E. 195 ); Jordan v. State, 119 Ga. 443 ( 46 S. E. 679 ). 1947“The law raises no presumption; it simply permits the jury to infer guilt from the fact of recent possession, unaccounted for.” Lewis v. State, 120 Ga. 508 ( 48 S. E. 227 ); McCoy v. State, 18 Ga. App. 698 ( 90 S. E. 355 ); Morris v. State, 47 Ga. App. 792 ( 171 S. E. 555 ); Cook v. State, 49 Ga. App. 86, 88 ( 174 S. E. 195 ); Jordan v. State, 119 Ga. 443 ( 46 S. E. 679 ). | 1 | 1947–1947 |
McCoy v. State
neutral
1 sentence1947“The law raises no presumption; it simply permits the jury to infer guilt from the fact of recent possession, unaccounted for.” Lewis v. State, 120 Ga. 508 ( 48 S. E. 227 ); McCoy v. State, 18 Ga. App. 698 ( 90 S. E. 355 ); Morris v. State, 47 Ga. App. 792 ( 171 S. E. 555 ); Cook v. State, 49 Ga. App. 86, 88 ( 174 S. E. 195 ); Jordan v. State, 119 Ga. 443 ( 46 S. E. 679 ). | 1 | 1947–1947 |
Johnson v. State
neutral
1 sentence1947“The law raises no presumption; it simply permits the jury to infer guilt from the fact of recent possession, unaccounted for.” Lewis v. State, 120 Ga. 508 ( 48 S. E. 227 ); McCoy v. State, 18 Ga. App. 698 ( 90 S. E. 355 ); Morris v. State, 47 Ga. App. 792 ( 171 S. E. 555 ); Cook v. State, 49 Ga. App. 86, 88 ( 174 S. E. 195 ); Jordan v. State, 119 Ga. 443 ( 46 S. E. 679 ). | 1 | 1947–1947 |
Morris v. State
green
2 sentences1947“The law raises no presumption; it simply permits the jury to infer guilt from the fact of recent possession, unaccounted for.” Lewis v. State, 120 Ga. 508 ( 48 S. E. 227 ); McCoy v. State, 18 Ga. App. 698 ( 90 S. E. 355 ); Morris v. State, 47 Ga. App. 792 ( 171 S. E. 555 ); Cook v. State, 49 Ga. App. 86, 88 ( 174 S. E. 195 ); Jordan v. State, 119 Ga. 443 ( 46 S. E. 679 ). 1947“The law raises no presumption; it simply permits the jury to infer guilt from the fact of recent possession, unaccounted for.” Lewis v. State, 120 Ga. 508 ( 48 S. E. 227 ); McCoy v. State, 18 Ga. App. 698 ( 90 S. E. 355 ); Morris v. State, 47 Ga. App. 792 ( 171 S. E. 555 ); Cook v. State, 49 Ga. App. 86, 88 ( 174 S. E. 195 ); Jordan v. State, 119 Ga. 443 ( 46 S. E. 679 ). | 1 | 1947–1947 |
Davis v. State
green
1 sentence1933The attorneys for the State contend that the charge in the instant case is sustained by the charge in Davis v. State, 76 Ga. 16, 17 , wherein the court said: “The whole charge and the part excepted to is free from any exception. | 1 | 1933–1933 |
State v. Worthingham
green
1 sentence1931It is one of the strongest known to the law: Jones v. Gilbert, 135 Ill. 27 , 25 N. E. 566 ; State v. Worthingham, 23 Minn. 528 ; Johnson v. Johnson, 30 Mo. 72 , 77 Am. | 1 | 1931–1931 |
Johnson v. Johnson's Administrator
green
1 sentence1931It is one of the strongest known to the law: Jones v. Gilbert, 135 Ill. 27 , 25 N. E. 566 ; State v. Worthingham, 23 Minn. 528 ; Johnson v. Johnson, 30 Mo. 72 , 77 Am. | 1 | 1931–1931 |
Jones v. Gilbert
neutral
2 sentences1931It is one of the strongest known to the law: Jones v. Gilbert, 135 Ill. 27 , 25 N. E. 566 ; State v. Worthingham, 23 Minn. 528 ; Johnson v. Johnson, 30 Mo. 72 , 77 Am. 1931It is one of the strongest known to the law: Jones v. Gilbert, 135 Ill. 27 , 25 N. E. 566 ; State v. Worthingham, 23 Minn. 528 ; Johnson v. Johnson, 30 Mo. 72 , 77 Am. | 1 | 1931–1931 |
Kimbrough v. Kimbrough
neutral
2 sentences1923Jackson v. Jackson, 150 Ga. 544 ( 104 S. E. 236 ); Kimbrough v. Kimbrough, 99 Ga. 134 ( 25 S. E. 176 ). 1923Jackson v. Jackson, 150 Ga. 544 ( 104 S. E. 236 ); Kimbrough v. Kimbrough, 99 Ga. 134 ( 25 S. E. 176 ). | 1 | 1923–1923 |
Jackson v. Jackson
green
2 sentences1923Jackson v. Jackson, 150 Ga. 544 ( 104 S. E. 236 ); Kimbrough v. Kimbrough, 99 Ga. 134 ( 25 S. E. 176 ). 1923Jackson v. Jackson, 150 Ga. 544 ( 104 S. E. 236 ); Kimbrough v. Kimbrough, 99 Ga. 134 ( 25 S. E. 176 ). | 1 | 1923–1923 |
Gould v. Glass
green
1 sentence1921Barnett, to rebut the presumption which thus arises, by a preponderance of the evidence,” In the ease of Gould v. Glass, 120 Ga. 50 -57 ( 47 S. E. 505 ), it was decided: “The general rule is that when a husband conveys property to his wife, or directs or permits the title to be taken in the name of his wife to property purchased with his money, or to which he would have a right to demand that title be made to him, the law raises a presumption of a gift, and this presumption remains until it is shown affirmatively that there was no intention to give on tl\e part of the husband. | 1 | 1921–1921 |
Addis v. State
green
1 sentence1921Barnett, to rebut the presumption which thus arises, by a preponderance of the evidence,” In the ease of Gould v. Glass, 120 Ga. 50 -57 ( 47 S. E. 505 ), it was decided: “The general rule is that when a husband conveys property to his wife, or directs or permits the title to be taken in the name of his wife to property purchased with his money, or to which he would have a right to demand that title be made to him, the law raises a presumption of a gift, and this presumption remains until it is shown affirmatively that there was no intention to give on tl\e part of the husband. | 1 | 1921–1921 |
New England Jewelry Co. v. Oxford Book & Bible Co.
neutral
1 sentence1916The court charged the jury “that where a burning is shown, the law raises the presumption that it is an accidental burning, or burning from accidental causes, rather than an intentional, or wilful and malicious burning.” “In the absence of a written request, the failure of the judge to charge the jury that ‘the law presumes every fire to be accidental, until the contrary appears, where a man is charged with the offense of arson,’ is not reversible error.” Randall v. State, 3 Ga. App. 653 ( 60 S. E. 328 ). ’3. | 1 | 1916–1916 |
Randall v. State
neutral
1 sentence1916The court charged the jury “that where a burning is shown, the law raises the presumption that it is an accidental burning, or burning from accidental causes, rather than an intentional, or wilful and malicious burning.” “In the absence of a written request, the failure of the judge to charge the jury that ‘the law presumes every fire to be accidental, until the contrary appears, where a man is charged with the offense of arson,’ is not reversible error.” Randall v. State, 3 Ga. App. 653 ( 60 S. E. 328 ). ’3. | 1 | 1916–1916 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.