law raises presumption in Indiana

22 Indiana opinions name it 2 courts 1894–2018 0 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by Indiana courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (6)

Case	Followed	Cited
Reiss v. Reissgreen ind · 1987 · cited in 3 Indiana opinions naming this issue, 2002–2018 2 sentences 2018Reiss v. Reiss, 516 N.E.2d 7, 8 (Ind. 1987). 2002In re Estate of Wade, 768 N.E.2d 957, 961-62 (Ind.Ct.App.2002), trans. denied; see *1147 also Matter of Good, 632 N.E.2d 719, 721 (Ind.1994) (“Transactions entered into during the existence of a fiduciary relationship are presumptively invalid as the product of undue influence.”); Reiss v. Reiss, 516 N.E.2d 7, 8 (Ind.1987) (holding that in certain relationships, including principal and agent, the law raises a presumption of influence upon the subordinate party by the dominant party); Clarkson v. Whitaker, 657 N.E.2d 139, 144 (Ind.Ct.App.1995), trans. denied (“The law presumes fraud when a pers	3	3
Givens v. Rosegreen indctapp · 1978 · cited in 2 Indiana opinions naming this issue, 1992–1992 2 sentences 1992Givens v. Rose (1978), Ind.App., 178 Ind.App. 590 , 383 N.E.2d 448, 453 (citing Hunter v. Hunter (1972), 152 Ind.App. 365 , 283 N.E.2d 775 . 1992Givens v. Rose (1978), Ind.App., 178 Ind.App. 590 , 383 N.E.2d 448, 453 (citing Hunter v. Hunter (1972), 152 Ind.App. 365 , 283 N.E.2d 775 .	2	2
Hunter v. Milhousgreen indctapp · 1973 · cited in 1 Indiana opinions naming this issue, 2018–2018 2 sentences 2018The Court has stated: “Undue influence is the exercise of sufficient control over the person, the validity of whose act is brought into question, to destroy his free agency and constrain him to do what he would not have done if such control had not been exercised.” Hunter v. Milhous, 159 Ind. App. 105, 123 , 305 N.E.2d 448, 459 (Ind. Ct. App. 1973). [25] In certain relationships, the law raises a presumption of influence upon the subordinate party by the dominant party. 2018The Court has stated: “Undue influence is the exercise of sufficient control over the person, the validity of whose act is brought into question, to destroy his free agency and constrain him to do what he would not have done if such control had not been exercised.” Hunter v. Milhous, 159 Ind. App. 105, 123 , 305 N.E.2d 448, 459 (Ind. Ct. App. 1973). [25] In certain relationships, the law raises a presumption of influence upon the subordinate party by the dominant party.	1	1
Grub v. Estate of Wadegreen indctapp · 2002 · cited in 1 Indiana opinions naming this issue, 2002–2002 1 sentence 2002In re Estate of Wade, 768 N.E.2d 957, 961-62 (Ind.Ct.App.2002), trans. denied; see *1147 also Matter of Good, 632 N.E.2d 719, 721 (Ind.1994) (“Transactions entered into during the existence of a fiduciary relationship are presumptively invalid as the product of undue influence.”); Reiss v. Reiss, 516 N.E.2d 7, 8 (Ind.1987) (holding that in certain relationships, including principal and agent, the law raises a presumption of influence upon the subordinate party by the dominant party); Clarkson v. Whitaker, 657 N.E.2d 139, 144 (Ind.Ct.App.1995), trans. denied (“The law presumes fraud when a pers	1	1
Matter of Goodgreen ind · 1994 · cited in 1 Indiana opinions naming this issue, 2002–2002 1 sentence 2002In re Estate of Wade, 768 N.E.2d 957, 961-62 (Ind.Ct.App.2002), trans. denied; see *1147 also Matter of Good, 632 N.E.2d 719, 721 (Ind.1994) (“Transactions entered into during the existence of a fiduciary relationship are presumptively invalid as the product of undue influence.”); Reiss v. Reiss, 516 N.E.2d 7, 8 (Ind.1987) (holding that in certain relationships, including principal and agent, the law raises a presumption of influence upon the subordinate party by the dominant party); Clarkson v. Whitaker, 657 N.E.2d 139, 144 (Ind.Ct.App.1995), trans. denied (“The law presumes fraud when a pers	1	1
Clarkson v. Whitakergreen indctapp · 1995 · cited in 1 Indiana opinions naming this issue, 2002–2002 1 sentence 2002In re Estate of Wade, 768 N.E.2d 957, 961-62 (Ind.Ct.App.2002), trans. denied; see *1147 also Matter of Good, 632 N.E.2d 719, 721 (Ind.1994) (“Transactions entered into during the existence of a fiduciary relationship are presumptively invalid as the product of undue influence.”); Reiss v. Reiss, 516 N.E.2d 7, 8 (Ind.1987) (holding that in certain relationships, including principal and agent, the law raises a presumption of influence upon the subordinate party by the dominant party); Clarkson v. Whitaker, 657 N.E.2d 139, 144 (Ind.Ct.App.1995), trans. denied (“The law presumes fraud when a pers	1	1

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

Case	Negative	Cited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Indiana. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (22)

Case	Cited	Years
Westphal v. Heckman green ind · 1916 2 sentences 1991In Westphal v. Heckman (1916), 185 Ind. 88 , 113 N.E. 299 , this Court stated: There are certain legal and domestic relations in respect to which the law raises a presumption of trust and confidence on one side and a corresponding influence on the other. 1991In Westphal v. Heckman (1916), 185 Ind. 88 , 113 N.E. 299 , this Court stated: There are certain legal and domestic relations in respect to which the law raises a presumption of trust and confidence on one side and a corresponding influence on the other.	5	1947–1991
Keys v. McDowell green · 1913 2 sentences 1985Our supreme court addressed this subject in Travelers Indemnity Co. v. Armstrong, (1982) Ind., 442 N.E.2d 349 as follows: "[Allthough there are certain legal and domestic relationships in which the law raises a presumption of trust and confidence on one side and a corresponding influence on the other, such as the relationship of attorney and client, guardian and ward, parent and child, as well as others, Keys v. McDowell, (1913) 54 Ind.App. 263, 269 , 100 N.E. 385 , we are aware of no instance where it has been held or even urged that the relationship between an insuror and the insured entitle 1985Our supreme court addressed this subject in Travelers Indemnity Co. v. Armstrong, (1982) Ind., 442 N.E.2d 349 as follows: "[Allthough there are certain legal and domestic relationships in which the law raises a presumption of trust and confidence on one side and a corresponding influence on the other, such as the relationship of attorney and client, guardian and ward, parent and child, as well as others, Keys v. McDowell, (1913) 54 Ind.App. 263, 269 , 100 N.E. 385 , we are aware of no instance where it has been held or even urged that the relationship between an insuror and the insured entitle	4	1924–1985
Hunter v. Hunter green indctapp · 1972 2 sentences 1992Givens v. Rose (1978), Ind.App., 178 Ind.App. 590 , 383 N.E.2d 448, 453 (citing Hunter v. Hunter (1972), 152 Ind.App. 365 , 283 N.E.2d 775 . 1992Givens v. Rose (1978), Ind.App., 178 Ind.App. 590 , 383 N.E.2d 448, 453 (citing Hunter v. Hunter (1972), 152 Ind.App. 365 , 283 N.E.2d 775 .	2	1992–1992
Travelers Indemnity Co. v. Armstrong green ind · 1982 1 sentence 1985Our supreme court addressed this subject in Travelers Indemnity Co. v. Armstrong, (1982) Ind., 442 N.E.2d 349 as follows: "[Allthough there are certain legal and domestic relationships in which the law raises a presumption of trust and confidence on one side and a corresponding influence on the other, such as the relationship of attorney and client, guardian and ward, parent and child, as well as others, Keys v. McDowell, (1913) 54 Ind.App. 263, 269 , 100 N.E. 385 , we are aware of no instance where it has been held or even urged that the relationship between an insuror and the insured entitle	1	1985–1985
Bennett v. City of Indianapolis neutral indctapp · 1934 1 sentence 1984We make the following observations regarding this issue: "Where the relation of husband and wife exists, the law raises a presumption of trust and confidence." Kratli v. Booth (1934), 99 Ind.App. 178, 182 , 191 N.E. 180 .	1	1984–1984
Kratli v. Booth neutral indctapp · 1934 1 sentence 1984We make the following observations regarding this issue: "Where the relation of husband and wife exists, the law raises a presumption of trust and confidence." Kratli v. Booth (1934), 99 Ind.App. 178, 182 , 191 N.E. 180 .	1	1984–1984
Evans v. State green ind · 1946 2 sentences 1964It is the exclusive province of the jury to indulge in a presumption of guilt.” It is further stated in Mims et al. v. State (1957), 236 Ind. 439, 444 , 140 N. E. 2d 878, 880 , as follows: “Exclusive possession of property shown to have been stolen, shortly after the larceny, unquestionably is a circumstance to be considered by the jury, and if proof is made that such larceny was recently committed and there is no evidence to explain the possession of the defendants, a larceny conviction based upon such evidence will be sustained on appeal.” 309 To the same effect are the cases of Gilley et a 1964It is the exclusive province of the jury to indulge in a presumption of guilt.” It is further stated in Mims et al. v. State (1957), 236 Ind. 439, 444 , 140 N. E. 2d 878, 880 , as follows: “Exclusive possession of property shown to have been stolen, shortly after the larceny, unquestionably is a circumstance to be considered by the jury, and if proof is made that such larceny was recently committed and there is no evidence to explain the possession of the defendants, a larceny conviction based upon such evidence will be sustained on appeal.” 309 To the same effect are the cases of Gilley et a	1	1964–1964
Vaughn v. State green ind · 1939 2 sentences 1964It is stated in Vaughn v. State (1939), 215 Ind. 142, 149 , 19 N. E. 2d 239 , 242: “Possession of stolen goods may be evidence of guilt, but the law raises no presumption of guilt upon the proof of any evidentiary fact. 1964It is stated in Vaughn v. State (1939), 215 Ind. 142, 149 , 19 N. E. 2d 239 , 242: “Possession of stolen goods may be evidence of guilt, but the law raises no presumption of guilt upon the proof of any evidentiary fact.	1	1964–1964
Gilley v. State green ind · 1949 2 sentences 1964It is the exclusive province of the jury to indulge in a presumption of guilt.” It is further stated in Mims et al. v. State (1957), 236 Ind. 439, 444 , 140 N. E. 2d 878, 880 , as follows: “Exclusive possession of property shown to have been stolen, shortly after the larceny, unquestionably is a circumstance to be considered by the jury, and if proof is made that such larceny was recently committed and there is no evidence to explain the possession of the defendants, a larceny conviction based upon such evidence will be sustained on appeal.” 309 To the same effect are the cases of Gilley et a 1964It is the exclusive province of the jury to indulge in a presumption of guilt.” It is further stated in Mims et al. v. State (1957), 236 Ind. 439, 444 , 140 N. E. 2d 878, 880 , as follows: “Exclusive possession of property shown to have been stolen, shortly after the larceny, unquestionably is a circumstance to be considered by the jury, and if proof is made that such larceny was recently committed and there is no evidence to explain the possession of the defendants, a larceny conviction based upon such evidence will be sustained on appeal.” 309 To the same effect are the cases of Gilley et a	1	1964–1964
MIMS v. State green ind · 1957 2 sentences 1964It is the exclusive province of the jury to indulge in a presumption of guilt.” It is further stated in Mims et al. v. State (1957), 236 Ind. 439, 444 , 140 N. E. 2d 878, 880 , as follows: “Exclusive possession of property shown to have been stolen, shortly after the larceny, unquestionably is a circumstance to be considered by the jury, and if proof is made that such larceny was recently committed and there is no evidence to explain the possession of the defendants, a larceny conviction based upon such evidence will be sustained on appeal.” 309 To the same effect are the cases of Gilley et a 1964It is the exclusive province of the jury to indulge in a presumption of guilt.” It is further stated in Mims et al. v. State (1957), 236 Ind. 439, 444 , 140 N. E. 2d 878, 880 , as follows: “Exclusive possession of property shown to have been stolen, shortly after the larceny, unquestionably is a circumstance to be considered by the jury, and if proof is made that such larceny was recently committed and there is no evidence to explain the possession of the defendants, a larceny conviction based upon such evidence will be sustained on appeal.” 309 To the same effect are the cases of Gilley et a	1	1964–1964
Sherrin v. Flinn neutral ind · 1900 2 sentences 1950McCord v. Bright (1909), 44 Ind. App. 275 , 87 N. E. 654 , Huffman v. Huffman (1905), 35 Ind. App. 643 , 73 N. E. 1096 ; Hancock v. Hancock (1916), 63 Ind. App. 173 , 111 N. E. 336 ; Sherrin v. Flinn (1900), 155 Ind. 422 , 58 N. E. 549 . 1950McCord v. Bright (1909), 44 Ind. App. 275 , 87 N. E. 654 , Huffman v. Huffman (1905), 35 Ind. App. 643 , 73 N. E. 1096 ; Hancock v. Hancock (1916), 63 Ind. App. 173 , 111 N. E. 336 ; Sherrin v. Flinn (1900), 155 Ind. 422 , 58 N. E. 549 .	1	1950–1950
Southern Indiana Railway Co. v. Hoggatt neutral indctapp · 1905 1 sentence 1950McCord v. Bright (1909), 44 Ind. App. 275 , 87 N. E. 654 , Huffman v. Huffman (1905), 35 Ind. App. 643 , 73 N. E. 1096 ; Hancock v. Hancock (1916), 63 Ind. App. 173 , 111 N. E. 336 ; Sherrin v. Flinn (1900), 155 Ind. 422 , 58 N. E. 549 .	1	1950–1950
Huffman v. Huffman neutral indctapp · 1905 1 sentence 1950McCord v. Bright (1909), 44 Ind. App. 275 , 87 N. E. 654 , Huffman v. Huffman (1905), 35 Ind. App. 643 , 73 N. E. 1096 ; Hancock v. Hancock (1916), 63 Ind. App. 173 , 111 N. E. 336 ; Sherrin v. Flinn (1900), 155 Ind. 422 , 58 N. E. 549 .	1	1950–1950
McCord v. Bright green indctapp · 1909 2 sentences 1950McCord v. Bright (1909), 44 Ind. App. 275 , 87 N. E. 654 , Huffman v. Huffman (1905), 35 Ind. App. 643 , 73 N. E. 1096 ; Hancock v. Hancock (1916), 63 Ind. App. 173 , 111 N. E. 336 ; Sherrin v. Flinn (1900), 155 Ind. 422 , 58 N. E. 549 . 1950McCord v. Bright (1909), 44 Ind. App. 275 , 87 N. E. 654 , Huffman v. Huffman (1905), 35 Ind. App. 643 , 73 N. E. 1096 ; Hancock v. Hancock (1916), 63 Ind. App. 173 , 111 N. E. 336 ; Sherrin v. Flinn (1900), 155 Ind. 422 , 58 N. E. 549 .	1	1950–1950
Hancock v. Hancock neutral indctapp · 1916 2 sentences 1950McCord v. Bright (1909), 44 Ind. App. 275 , 87 N. E. 654 , Huffman v. Huffman (1905), 35 Ind. App. 643 , 73 N. E. 1096 ; Hancock v. Hancock (1916), 63 Ind. App. 173 , 111 N. E. 336 ; Sherrin v. Flinn (1900), 155 Ind. 422 , 58 N. E. 549 . 1950McCord v. Bright (1909), 44 Ind. App. 275 , 87 N. E. 654 , Huffman v. Huffman (1905), 35 Ind. App. 643 , 73 N. E. 1096 ; Hancock v. Hancock (1916), 63 Ind. App. 173 , 111 N. E. 336 ; Sherrin v. Flinn (1900), 155 Ind. 422 , 58 N. E. 549 .	1	1950–1950
Cooper v. Cooper neutral ind · 1882 1 sentence 1942Cooper v. Cooper (1882), 86 Ind. 75 ; Equitable, etc., Society v. James (1920), 73 Ind. App. 186 , 127 N. E. 11 .	1	1942–1942
Equitable Life Assurance Society of the United States v. James green indctapp · 1920 2 sentences 1942Cooper v. Cooper (1882), 86 Ind. 75 ; Equitable, etc., Society v. James (1920), 73 Ind. App. 186 , 127 N. E. 11 . 1942Cooper v. Cooper (1882), 86 Ind. 75 ; Equitable, etc., Society v. James (1920), 73 Ind. App. 186 , 127 N. E. 11 .	1	1942–1942
Dedrick v. State green ind · 1936 1 sentence 1939Parks was robbed of the property described in the affidavit and if you further find beyond a reasonable doubt that the property described in the affidavit or any portion of it was found in the exclusive possession of the defendant after the robbery was committed, such possession imposes upon the defendant the duty and burden of explaining his possession of said property, and if the defendant fails to satisfactorily account as to how he came by said property, or if in attempting to explain his possession of said property he gives a false account of how he came into possession of said property,	1	1939–1939
Hoef v. Hoef neutral ill · 1926 2 sentences 1926Hoef v. Hoef (1926), 323 Ill. 170 , 153 N. E. 658 . 1926Hoef v. Hoef (1926), 323 Ill. 170 , 153 N. E. 658 .	1	1926–1926
Ewing v. Sills neutral ind · 1848 1 sentence 1902Ewing v. Sills, 1 Ind. 125 ; Bates v. Prickelt, 5 Ind. 22 , 61 Am.	1	1902–1902
Bates v. Pricket neutral ind · 1854 1 sentence 1902Ewing v. Sills, 1 Ind. 125 ; Bates v. Prickelt, 5 Ind. 22 , 61 Am.	1	1902–1902
Pennsylvania Co. v. Whitcomb green · 1887 1 sentence 1894Pennsylvania Co. v. Whitcomb, Admr., 111 Ind. 212 ; Hard v. Vermont, etc., R.	1	1894–1894

Where else courts name it

AL 32 (1884–2007) MS 29 (1955–2024) TX 23 (1878–2012) IN 22 (1894–2018) IL 18 (1872–1960) GA 16 (1904–1985) NC 15 (1889–1980) OK 15 (1915–2011) NJ 8 (1964–2001) NY 8 (1897–1980) MO 6 (1902–1980) IA 6 (1891–2017) VT 6 (1909–1988) WV 4 (1896–1954) MN 4 (1879–2007) KS 4 (1993–2020) PA 4 (1916–1965) MI 4 (1930–1977) CA 3 (1880–1897) AR 3 (1910–1936) KY 3 (1930–1974) SD 2 (1899–1945) MT 2 (1890–1946) OR 2 (1948–1950) ND 2 (1891–1901) TN 2 (1993–1997) AZ 2 (1947–1967)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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