law raises presumption in Illinois

1930Jr. 25; 4 id. 732 ; 15 id. 509.) The law raises a presumption in favor of the residuary legatee against every one except the particular legatee.” ’ In Mills v. Newberry, 112 Ill. 123 , and in Woman’s Union Missionary Society v. Mead, 131 Ill. 338 , this court recognized and approved this rule.” It should be observed that, while Myra Johnson and Alice 0.

1899Jr. 25; 4 id. 732; 15 id. 509.) The law raises a presumption in favor of the residuary legatee against every one except the particular legatee. ’ ” In Mills v. Newberry, 112 Ill. 123 , and in Woman’s Union Missionary Society v. Mead, 131 id. 338, this court recognized and approved this rule.

1930Jr. 25; 4 id. 732 ; 15 id. 509.) The law raises a presumption in favor of the residuary legatee against every one except the particular legatee.” ’ In Mills v. Newberry, 112 Ill. 123 , and in Woman’s Union Missionary Society v. Mead, 131 Ill. 338 , this court recognized and approved this rule.” It should be observed that, while Myra Johnson and Alice 0.

1899Society v. Mead, 131 Ill. 338 ; and Crerar et al. v. Williams et al., supra. In all of the cases above referred to, wills were being construed with reference to a general residuary clause therein; and in each case it was held that a lapsed legacy or gift of personal property fell into the residuum fund and passed to the residuary legatee as testate estate, for the reason that by putting a general residuary clause in his will, the testator thereby conclusively manifested his intention not to die intestate as to any of his personal estate.

1902(Gillett v. Sweat, 1 Glim. 475; Reed v. Kemp, 16 Ill. 445 ; Catlin Coal Co. v. Lloyd, 180 id. 398.) The contestant attacked the will on the ground of undue influence, and under the terms of the instruction the burden of proof was also cast upon the proponent on that question, by requiring her to prove that the instrument was the will of the testatrix.

1872Reed v. Kemp, 16 Ill. 445 , and the authorities there cited.

1960Flynn v. Troesch, 373 Ill. 275 , as to marriage; Lucas v. Westray, 408 Ill. 243 , as to deeds; and Shevlin v. Jackson, 5 Ill.2d 43 , as to wills. ■It is likewise recognized by counsel for both sides that where a marriage is shown the law raises a presumption of its validity, and the burden is upon the objecting party to prove its invalidity, (Flynn v. Troesch, 373 Ill. 275 ,) and also that the presumption is that the grantor of a deed was of sound mind, and the burden of showing that he was mentally incapable is upon the complaining party.

1960Johnson v. Lane, 369 Ill. 135 .

1960Flynn v. Troesch, 373 Ill. 275 , as to marriage; Lucas v. Westray, 408 Ill. 243 , as to deeds; and Shevlin v. Jackson, 5 Ill.2d 43 , as to wills. ■It is likewise recognized by counsel for both sides that where a marriage is shown the law raises a presumption of its validity, and the burden is upon the objecting party to prove its invalidity, (Flynn v. Troesch, 373 Ill. 275 ,) and also that the presumption is that the grantor of a deed was of sound mind, and the burden of showing that he was mentally incapable is upon the complaining party.

1960Flynn v. Troesch, 373 Ill. 275 , as to marriage; Lucas v. Westray, 408 Ill. 243 , as to deeds; and Shevlin v. Jackson, 5 Ill.2d 43 , as to wills. ■It is likewise recognized by counsel for both sides that where a marriage is shown the law raises a presumption of its validity, and the burden is upon the objecting party to prove its invalidity, (Flynn v. Troesch, 373 Ill. 275 ,) and also that the presumption is that the grantor of a deed was of sound mind, and the burden of showing that he was mentally incapable is upon the complaining party.

1960Flynn v. Troesch, 373 Ill. 275 , as to marriage; Lucas v. Westray, 408 Ill. 243 , as to deeds; and Shevlin v. Jackson, 5 Ill.2d 43 , as to wills. ■It is likewise recognized by counsel for both sides that where a marriage is shown the law raises a presumption of its validity, and the burden is upon the objecting party to prove its invalidity, (Flynn v. Troesch, 373 Ill. 275 ,) and also that the presumption is that the grantor of a deed was of sound mind, and the burden of showing that he was mentally incapable is upon the complaining party.

1944(Rexroth v. Schein, 206 Ill. 80 ; Dorsey v. Brigham, 177 Ill. 250 ; Behrensmeyer v. Kreits, 135 Ill. 591 .) The charge also involves the imputation that the county clerk before whom they registered, was derelict in official duty in permitting their registration.

1944(Rexroth v. Schein, 206 Ill. 80 ; Dorsey v. Brigham, 177 Ill. 250 ; Behrensmeyer v. Kreits, 135 Ill. 591 .) The charge also involves the imputation that the county clerk before whom they registered, was derelict in official duty in permitting their registration.

1944(Rexroth v. Schein, 206 Ill. 80 ; Dorsey v. Brigham, 177 Ill. 250 ; Behrensmeyer v. Kreits, 135 Ill. 591 .) The charge also involves the imputation that the county clerk before whom they registered, was derelict in official duty in permitting their registration.

1931In Robinson v. Ruprecht, 191 Ill. 424 , it is said: “The law raises the presumption that Gottlieb, the legal husband of said Johannah, was the father of her children.

1926Maciejewska v. Jarzombek, 243 Ill. 136 .

1925(Wright v. Wright, 242 Ill. 71 ; Crawford v. Hurst, 307 id. 243; Lutyens v. Ahlrich, 308 id. 11.) The conditions necessary to create a resulting trust may be proved by parol, but that must be proved by clear and satisfactory evidence, beyond reasonable doubt.

1925In Blackhurst v. James, 293 Ill. 11 , the court said: “While undue influence may be established by circumstantial evidence, such evidence must show that the influence was operative at the time of the transaction sought to be impeached and was such as to destroy the freedom of the testator’s mind.

1923Hennies v. People, 70 Ill. 100 .

1919(McCoy v. Morrow, 18 Ill. 519 .) This court has quoted with approval, after a review of authorities, the following doctrine: “Independently of the Statute of Limitations, the law raises a presumption, in the absence of explanatory evidence, that a debt which has been due and unclaimed and without recognition or payment of interest for twenty years has been paid.” (Fagan v. Bach, 253 Ill. 588 .) That case is also found in 26 Ann.

1919(McCoy v. Morrow, 18 Ill. 519 .) This court has quoted with approval, after a review of authorities, the following doctrine: “Independently of the Statute of Limitations, the law raises a presumption, in the absence of explanatory evidence, that a debt which has been due and unclaimed and without recognition or payment of interest for twenty years has been paid.” (Fagan v. Bach, 253 Ill. 588 .) That case is also found in 26 Ann.

1916Reed v. Kemp, 16 Ill. 145 , and the authorities there cited.

1907The law raises no presumption that a witness has testified to the truth, (Hauser v. People, 210 Ill. 253 ,) but it never presumes willful and corrupt perjury.

1906Jefferson County v. Ferguson, 13 Ill. 33 ; Chicago, Burlington and Quincy Railroad Co. v. Chamberlain, 84 id. 333; Cassell v. Joseph, 184 id. 378.

1892These are questions of fact to be found by the jury; and in determining these questions the jury should look at the instrument itself, as well as to all the circumstances in evidence, for an explanation, and thus determine whether the alteration was made before or after the execution of the instrument, and whether such alteration ivas made with or without the consent of the defendant.” The instruction is the law as announced by our Supreme Court in Milliken v. Marlin, 66 Ill. 13 .