29 Mississippi opinions name it 2 courts 1991–2023 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Mississippi courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Rushen v. Spaingreen2 sentences2009No Mississippi caselaw was found on whether this constitutes per se reversible error. 1 However, in Rushen v. Spain, 464 U.S. 114, 119 , 104 S.Ct. 453, 456 , 78 L.Ed.2d 267 (1983), the Supreme Court, in a per curiam opinion, held that an unrecorded ex parte communication between the trial judge and a juror can be harmless error, if the prejudicial effect can be adequately determined by a post-trial hearing, so as “to mitigate constitutional error, if any, that has occurred.” Rushen, 464 U.S. at 119-20 , 104 S.Ct. 453 (citations omitted). 2009No Mississippi caselaw was found on whether this constitutes per se reversible error. 1 However, in Rushen v. Spain, 464 U.S. 114, 119 , 104 S.Ct. 453, 456 , 78 L.Ed.2d 267 (1983), the Supreme Court, in a per curiam opinion, held that an unrecorded ex parte communication between the trial judge and a juror can be harmless error, if the prejudicial effect can be adequately determined by a post-trial hearing, so as “to mitigate constitutional error, if any, that has occurred.” Rushen, 464 U.S. at 119-20 , 104 S.Ct. 453 (citations omitted). | 1 | 2 |
Porter v. Stategreen1 sentence2014As our caselaw acknowledges, however, "the Mississippi Supreme Court [has] adopted the United States Supreme Court’s position that .the Fifth Amendment only prohibited the compelled production of evidence, not evidence which identifies physical characteristics of the defendant." Hubbert v. State, 759 So.2d 504, 507 (¶ 10) (Miss.Ct.App.2000) (citing Porter v. State, 519 So.2d 1230, 1232 (Miss.1988)). . | 1 | 1 |
Hubbert v. Stategreen1 sentence2014As our caselaw acknowledges, however, "the Mississippi Supreme Court [has] adopted the United States Supreme Court’s position that .the Fifth Amendment only prohibited the compelled production of evidence, not evidence which identifies physical characteristics of the defendant." Hubbert v. State, 759 So.2d 504, 507 (¶ 10) (Miss.Ct.App.2000) (citing Porter v. State, 519 So.2d 1230, 1232 (Miss.1988)). . | 1 | 1 |
Williams v. Stategreen1 sentence2011Id. at 635 (¶ 19). | 1 | 1 |
Mississippi Power & Light Co. v. Lumpkingreen1 sentence2011Though Aaron argues the chancellor excluded the photographs as a discovery sanction without first applying the four-factor test from Mississippi Power & Light Co. v. Lumpkin, 725 So.2d 721, 733-34 (¶ 60) (Miss.1998), we find the chancellor was not bound by that test at the post-trial hearing. ¶ 33. | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Matthew Ianniellogreen1 sentence1993This same standard for review was cited by the Eleventh Circuit in Tejada v. Dugger, 941 F.2d 1551, 1561 (11th Cir.1991), and United States v. Cuthel, 903 F.2d 1381, 1382 (11th Cir.1990) [quoting United States v. Ianniello, 866 F.2d 540, 543 (2d Cir.1989)]. | 1 | 1 |
United States v. William James Cuthel, Dade Frank Sokoloff, Wilbur Harwood Hoover, Jay William Mardengreen1 sentence1993This same standard for review was cited by the Eleventh Circuit in Tejada v. Dugger, 941 F.2d 1551, 1561 (11th Cir.1991), and United States v. Cuthel, 903 F.2d 1381, 1382 (11th Cir.1990) [quoting United States v. Ianniello, 866 F.2d 540, 543 (2d Cir.1989)]. | 1 | 1 |
Hugo Tejada v. Richard L. Dugger, Secretary, Department of Correctionsgreen1 sentence1993This same standard for review was cited by the Eleventh Circuit in Tejada v. Dugger, 941 F.2d 1551, 1561 (11th Cir.1991), and United States v. Cuthel, 903 F.2d 1381, 1382 (11th Cir.1990) [quoting United States v. Ianniello, 866 F.2d 540, 543 (2d Cir.1989)]. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Mississippi. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Gladney v. Clarksdale Beverage Co., Inc.
green
2 sentences2022Further, “[i]f the trial judge has ‘good cause to believe’ there was improper influence on the jury, the court should conduct a post-trial hearing.” Id. (quoting Gladney, 625 So. 2d at 419 ). 2022Further, “[i]f the trial judge has ‘good cause to believe’ there was improper influence on the jury, the court should conduct a post-trial hearing.” Id. (quoting Gladney, 625 So. 2d at 419 ). | 15 | 1996–2023 |
Avery v. State
green
2 sentences2013Avery, 119 So.3d 329, at 336 . 2010Avery, 2012 WL 2304715, at *5 . | 2 | 2010–2013 |
Ali v. State
green
2 sentences2011In Jay, 25 So.3d at 264 , there was evidence that the defendant was not mentally competent, and therefore, “[wjhether or not Jay’s absence at trial was a result of willful, voluntary, and deliberate actions turned on whether or not he was mentally competent at the time of trial.” In Ali, 928 So.2d at 240 , the defendant’s testimony at a post-trial hearing on his motion for a new trial established that he did not understand when his trial was being held. 2010In Jay, 25 So. 3d at 264 , there was evidence that the 6 defendant was not mentally competent, and therefore, “[w]hether or not Jay’s absence at trial was a result of willful, voluntary, and deliberate actions turned on whether or not he was mentally competent at the time of trial.” In Ali, 928 So. 2d at 240 , the defendant’s testimony at a post-trial hearing on his motion for a new trial established that he did not understand when his trial was being held. | 2 | 2010–2011 |
Jay v. State
green
2 sentences2011In Jay, 25 So.3d at 264 , there was evidence that the defendant was not mentally competent, and therefore, “[wjhether or not Jay’s absence at trial was a result of willful, voluntary, and deliberate actions turned on whether or not he was mentally competent at the time of trial.” In Ali, 928 So.2d at 240 , the defendant’s testimony at a post-trial hearing on his motion for a new trial established that he did not understand when his trial was being held. 2010In Jay, 25 So. 3d at 264 , there was evidence that the 6 defendant was not mentally competent, and therefore, “[w]hether or not Jay’s absence at trial was a result of willful, voluntary, and deliberate actions turned on whether or not he was mentally competent at the time of trial.” In Ali, 928 So. 2d at 240 , the defendant’s testimony at a post-trial hearing on his motion for a new trial established that he did not understand when his trial was being held. | 2 | 2010–2011 |
Williams v. State
green
2 sentences1997Brown argues that in Scott , this Court refused to utilize the procedure outlined in Williams v. State, 507 So.2d 50 (Miss. 1987), whereby a hearing is conducted for the judge to determine whether racial discrimination occurred in the use of peremptory challenges. 1991Brown argues that in Scott, this Court refused to utilize the procedure outlined in Williams v. State, 507 So. 2d 50 (Miss. 1987), whereby a hearing is conducted for the judge to determine whether racial discrimination occurred in the use of peremptory challenges. | 2 | 1991–1997 |
United States v. Fred Scott, Raymond Peacock and Lawrence Catha
green
1 sentence2023Id. | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Anthony Murry v. State of Mississippi
green
1 sentence2023Thus, when a trial court finds “good cause to believe there was improper influence on the jury, the court should conduct a post-trial hearing” and “determine whether the communication was made and the nature of the communication.” Id. | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Odom v. State
green
1 sentence2012Id. | 1 | 2012–2012 |
United States v. Sun Myung Moon and Takeru Kamiyama
green
1 sentence1993In addition, the court concluded that under Rule 606(b), a post-trial hearing is mandated only upon a litigant's showing with "clear, strong, substantial, and incontrovertible evidence ... that a specific, non-speculative impropriety has occurred[.]" Infelise, 813 F. Supp. at 605 ; Moon, 718 F.2d at 1234 . | 1 | 1993–1993 |
United States v. Infelise
green
1 sentence1993In addition, the court concluded that under Rule 606(b), a post-trial hearing is mandated only upon a litigant's showing with "clear, strong, substantial, and incontrovertible evidence ... that a specific, non-speculative impropriety has occurred[.]" Infelise, 813 F. Supp. at 605 ; Moon, 718 F.2d at 1234 . | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.