post-trial hearing in West Virginia

2026Id.

2024Importantly, the circuit court held in that order that punitive damages would be addressed following a post-trial hearing in accordance with Perrine v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 225 W.

2024Va. 482 , 694 S.E.2d 815 (2010) (simplifying the factors in Garnes v. Fleming Landfill, Inc., Syl.

2017In syllabus point five of Alkire, we held as follows: Under our punitive damage jurisprudence, it is imperative that the amount of the punitive damage award be reviewed in the first instance by the trial court by applying the model specified in Syllabus Points 3 and 4 of Garnes v. Fleming Landfill, Inc., 186 W.Va. 656 , 413 S.E.2d 897 (1991), and Syllabus Point 15 of TXO Production Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 187 W.Va. 457 , 419 S.E.2d 870 (1992), aff’d, 509 U.S. 443 , 113 S.Ct. 2711 , 125 L.Ed.2d 366 (1993).

2017In syllabus point five of Alkire, we held as follows: Under our punitive damage jurisprudence, it is imperative that the amount of the punitive damage award be reviewed in the first instance by the trial court by applying the model specified in Syllabus Points 3 and 4 of Garnes v. Fleming Landfill, Inc., 186 W.Va. 656 , 413 S.E.2d 897 (1991), and Syllabus Point 15 of TXO Production Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 187 W.Va. 457 , 419 S.E.2d 870 (1992), aff’d, 509 U.S. 443 , 113 S.Ct. 2711 , 125 L.Ed.2d 366 (1993).

2017In syllabus point five of Alkire, we held as follows: Under our punitive damage jurisprudence, it is imperative that the amount of the punitive damage award be reviewed in the first instance by the trial court by applying the model specified in Syllabus Points 3 and 4 of Garnes v. Fleming Landfill, Inc., 186 W.Va. 656 , 413 S.E.2d 897 (1991), and Syllabus Point 15 of TXO Production Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 187 W.Va. 457 , 419 S.E.2d 870 (1992), aff’d, 509 U.S. 443 , 113 S.Ct. 2711 , 125 L.Ed.2d 366 (1993).

2017In syllabus point five of Alkire, we held as follows: Under our punitive damage jurisprudence, it is imperative that the amount of the punitive damage award be reviewed in the first instance by the trial court by applying the model specified in Syllabus Points 3 and 4 of Garnes v. Fleming Landfill, Inc., 186 W.Va. 656 , 413 S.E.2d 897 (1991), and Syllabus Point 15 of TXO Production Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 187 W.Va. 457 , 419 S.E.2d 870 (1992), aff’d, 509 U.S. 443 , 113 S.Ct. 2711 , 125 L.Ed.2d 366 (1993).

2017In syllabus point five of Alkire, we held as follows: Under our punitive damage jurisprudence, it is imperative that the amount of the punitive damage award be reviewed in the first instance by the trial court by applying the model specified in Syllabus Points 3 and 4 of Garnes v. Fleming Landfill, Inc., 186 W.Va. 656 , 413 S.E.2d 897 (1991), and Syllabus Point 15 of TXO Production Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 187 W.Va. 457 , 419 S.E.2d 870 (1992), aff’d, 509 U.S. 443 , 113 S.Ct. 2711 , 125 L.Ed.2d 366 (1993).

2017In syllabus point five of Alkire, we held as follows: Under our punitive damage jurisprudence, it is imperative that the amount of the punitive damage award be reviewed in the first instance by the trial court by applying the model specified in Syllabus Points 3 and 4 of Garnes v. Fleming Landfill, Inc., 186 W.Va. 656 , 413 S.E.2d 897 (1991), and Syllabus Point 15 of TXO Production Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 187 W.Va. 457 , 419 S.E.2d 870 (1992), aff’d, 509 U.S. 443 , 113 S.Ct. 2711 , 125 L.Ed.2d 366 (1993).

2015United States v. Brantley, 733 F.2d 1429 (11th Cir.1984), is instructive.

2007Pt. 6, Helmick v. Potomac Edison Co., 185 W.Va. 269 , 406 S.E.2d 700 (1991). *64 On the issue of cumulative expert testimony in the present case, the lower court stated at the post-trial hearing that: I probably could have legally limited the experts on both sides a little bit more than I did, but I wanted to give everybody the opportunity to present their case. . . .

2007Pt. 6, Helmick v. Potomac Edison Co., 185 W.Va. 269 , 406 S.E.2d 700 (1991). *64 On the issue of cumulative expert testimony in the present case, the lower court stated at the post-trial hearing that: I probably could have legally limited the experts on both sides a little bit more than I did, but I wanted to give everybody the opportunity to present their case. . . .

2007The United States Supreme Court has made clear that "the effective impeachment of one eyewitness can call for a new trial even though the attack does not extend directly to others[.]" Kyles, 514 U.S. at 445 , 115 S.Ct. at 1571 .

2007The United States Supreme Court has made clear that "the effective impeachment of one eyewitness can call for a new trial even though the attack does not extend directly to others[.]" Kyles, 514 U.S. at 445 , 115 S.Ct. at 1571 .

1993Nix, 475 U.S. at 162 , 106 S.Ct. at 992 , 89 L.Ed.2d at 131-32 .

1993Nix, 475 U.S. at 162 , 106 S.Ct. at 992 , 89 L.Ed.2d at 131-32 .

1987In State v. Scotchel, 168 W.Va. 545 , 285 S.E.2d 384 (1981), we stated, at syllabus point 4: “The general rule is that statements relative to intimidation or coercion by fellow jurors cannot ordinarily be received to impeach the verdict.” Here there was no evidence.of any extrinsic influence or misconduct which would warrant further inquiry into the allegations presented.

1987In State v. Scotchel, 168 W.Va. 545 , 285 S.E.2d 384 (1981), we stated, at syllabus point 4: “The general rule is that statements relative to intimidation or coercion by fellow jurors cannot ordinarily be received to impeach the verdict.” Here there was no evidence.of any extrinsic influence or misconduct which would warrant further inquiry into the allegations presented.

1983In State v. Dye, 167 W.Va. 652 , 280 S.E.2d 323 (1981), we applied West to a juror who was a member of a city police force. 5 .

1983In State v. Dye, 167 W.Va. 652 , 280 S.E.2d 323 (1981), we applied West to a juror who was a member of a city police force. 5 .

1983In Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209 , 102 S.Ct. 940 , 71 L.Ed.2d 78 (1982), the Supreme Court concluded that a juror's submission of a job application to the prosecutor's office during the trial of the case, and the failure of the prosecution to disclose this fact during trial was not violative of due process where the defendant was permitted in a post-trial hearing to prove the juror’s actual bias. 4 .

1983In Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209 , 102 S.Ct. 940 , 71 L.Ed.2d 78 (1982), the Supreme Court concluded that a juror's submission of a job application to the prosecutor's office during the trial of the case, and the failure of the prosecution to disclose this fact during trial was not violative of due process where the defendant was permitted in a post-trial hearing to prove the juror’s actual bias. 4 .