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19 Virginia opinions name it 4 courts 1989–2025 4 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Virginia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Gray v. Stuartgreen2 sentences2025See Gray v. Stuart & Palmer, 74 Va. (33 Gratt.) 351, 358 (1880) (treating a joint judgment against three parties as a judgment only against two parties because it was void as to a third). 2025See Gray v. Stuart & Palmer, 74 Va. (33 Gratt.) 351, 358 (1880) (treating a joint judgment against three parties as a judgment only against two parties because it was void as to a third). | 2 | 2 |
Green v. Commonwealthgreen2 sentences2011Thus, his objection was not timely.” Id. 6 Also instructive is this Court’s holding in Green v. Commonwealth, 26 Va.App. 394, 402-03 , 494 S.E.2d 888, 891 (1998), a *679 case involving a post-trial challenge to a juror’s alleged impartiality, which was brought to counsel’s attention during the voir dire portion of the trial. 2011Thus, his objection was not timely.” Id. 6 Also instructive is this Court’s holding in Green v. Commonwealth, 26 Va.App. 394, 402-03 , 494 S.E.2d 888, 891 (1998), a *679 case involving a post-trial challenge to a juror’s alleged impartiality, which was brought to counsel’s attention during the voir dire portion of the trial. | 2 | 2 |
Smith v. Phillipsgreen2 sentences2004See Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 215 (1982). 2003Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 215 , 102 S.Ct. 940, 945 , 71 L.Ed.2d 78 (1982) (recognizing “that the remedy for allegations of juror partiality is a hearing in which the defendant has the opportunity to prove actual bias”). | 1 | 2 |
Richard Douglas Thomas, Jr. v. Commonwealth of Virginiagreen1 sentence2023See generally Thomas v. Commonwealth, 62 Va. App. 104, 109 (2013) (noting that decisions to reopen the record are typically within the purview of the circuit court). - 18 - Indeed, they have not asked this Court to order that the record be reopened on remand. | 1 | 1 |
Manns v. Commonwealthgreen1 sentence2020At the post-trial hearing on May 6, 2019, husband conceded that “[t]here are no credits in the evidence” due to counsel’s strategic decision to “get [husband] off the stand as fast as possible.” We have stated that “[n]o litigant . . . will be permitted to approbate and reprobate – to invite error . . . and then to take advantage of the situation created by his own wrong.” Manns v. Commonwealth, 13 Va. App. 677, 680 (1992) (quoting Fisher v. Commonwealth, 236 Va. 403, 417 (1988)). | 1 | 1 |
Fisher v. Commonwealthgreen1 sentence2020At the post-trial hearing on May 6, 2019, husband conceded that “[t]here are no credits in the evidence” due to counsel’s strategic decision to “get [husband] off the stand as fast as possible.” We have stated that “[n]o litigant . . . will be permitted to approbate and reprobate – to invite error . . . and then to take advantage of the situation created by his own wrong.” Manns v. Commonwealth, 13 Va. App. 677, 680 (1992) (quoting Fisher v. Commonwealth, 236 Va. 403, 417 (1988)). | 1 | 1 |
Williams v. Commonwealthgreen2 sentences2013See Williams, 12 Va. App. at 919 , 407 S.E.2d at 324 ; Bowman, 11 Va. App. 266 , 397 S.E.2d at 890 . 2013See Williams, 12 Va. App. at 919 , 407 S.E.2d at 324 ; Bowman, 11 Va. App. 266 , 397 S.E.2d at 890 . | 1 | 1 |
Yeatts v. Commonwealthgreen2 sentences2011However, the Supreme Court of Virginia has “repeatedly held that if a defendant wishes to take advantage on appeal of some incident he regards as objectionable enough to warrant a mistrial, he must make his motion timely or else be deemed to have waived his objection.” Yeatts v. Commonwealth, 242 Va. 121, 137 , 410 S.E.2d 254, 264 (1991) (citing Russo v. Commonwealth, 207 Va. 251, 257 , 148 S.E.2d 820, 825 (1966); Cheng v. Commonwealth, 240 Va. 26, 38-39 , 393 S.E.2d 599, 605-06 (1990); Price v. Commonwealth, 213 Va. 113, 121 , 189 S.E.2d 324, 330 (1972); Brown v. Commonwealth, 208 Va. 512, 51 2011However, the Supreme Court of Virginia has “repeatedly held that if a defendant wishes to take advantage on appeal of some incident he regards as objectionable enough to warrant a mistrial, he must make his motion timely or else be deemed to have waived his objection.” Yeatts v. Commonwealth, 242 Va. 121, 137 , 410 S.E.2d 254, 264 (1991) (citing Russo v. Commonwealth, 207 Va. 251, 257 , 148 S.E.2d 820, 825 (1966); Cheng v. Commonwealth, 240 Va. 26, 38-39 , 393 S.E.2d 599, 605-06 (1990); Price v. Commonwealth, 213 Va. 113, 121 , 189 S.E.2d 324, 330 (1972); Brown v. Commonwealth, 208 Va. 512, 51 | 1 | 1 |
Cheng v. Commonwealthgreen2 sentences2011However, the Supreme Court of Virginia has “repeatedly held that if a defendant wishes to take advantage on appeal of some incident he regards as objectionable enough to warrant a mistrial, he must make his motion timely or else be deemed to have waived his objection.” Yeatts v. Commonwealth, 242 Va. 121, 137 , 410 S.E.2d 254, 264 (1991) (citing Russo v. Commonwealth, 207 Va. 251, 257 , 148 S.E.2d 820, 825 (1966); Cheng v. Commonwealth, 240 Va. 26, 38-39 , 393 S.E.2d 599, 605-06 (1990); Price v. Commonwealth, 213 Va. 113, 121 , 189 S.E.2d 324, 330 (1972); Brown v. Commonwealth, 208 Va. 512, 51 2011However, the Supreme Court of Virginia has “repeatedly held that if a defendant wishes to take advantage on appeal of some incident he regards as objectionable enough to warrant a mistrial, he must make his motion timely or else be deemed to have waived his objection.” Yeatts v. Commonwealth, 242 Va. 121, 137 , 410 S.E.2d 254, 264 (1991) (citing Russo v. Commonwealth, 207 Va. 251, 257 , 148 S.E.2d 820, 825 (1966); Cheng v. Commonwealth, 240 Va. 26, 38-39 , 393 S.E.2d 599, 605-06 (1990); Price v. Commonwealth, 213 Va. 113, 121 , 189 S.E.2d 324, 330 (1972); Brown v. Commonwealth, 208 Va. 512, 51 | 1 | 1 |
Brown v. Commonwealthgreen2 sentences2011However, the Supreme Court of Virginia has “repeatedly held that if a defendant wishes to take advantage on appeal of some incident he regards as objectionable enough to warrant a mistrial, he must make his motion timely or else be deemed to have waived his objection.” Yeatts v. Commonwealth, 242 Va. 121, 137 , 410 S.E.2d 254, 264 (1991) (citing Russo v. Commonwealth, 207 Va. 251, 257 , 148 S.E.2d 820, 825 (1966); Cheng v. Commonwealth, 240 Va. 26, 38-39 , 393 S.E.2d 599, 605-06 (1990); Price v. Commonwealth, 213 Va. 113, 121 , 189 S.E.2d 324, 330 (1972); Brown v. Commonwealth, 208 Va. 512, 51 2011However, the Supreme Court of Virginia has “repeatedly held that if a defendant wishes to take advantage on appeal of some incident he regards as objectionable enough to warrant a mistrial, he must make his motion timely or else be deemed to have waived his objection.” Yeatts v. Commonwealth, 242 Va. 121, 137 , 410 S.E.2d 254, 264 (1991) (citing Russo v. Commonwealth, 207 Va. 251, 257 , 148 S.E.2d 820, 825 (1966); Cheng v. Commonwealth, 240 Va. 26, 38-39 , 393 S.E.2d 599, 605-06 (1990); Price v. Commonwealth, 213 Va. 113, 121 , 189 S.E.2d 324, 330 (1972); Brown v. Commonwealth, 208 Va. 512, 51 | 1 | 1 |
Price v. Commonwealthgreen2 sentences2011However, the Supreme Court of Virginia has “repeatedly held that if a defendant wishes to take advantage on appeal of some incident he regards as objectionable enough to warrant a mistrial, he must make his motion timely or else be deemed to have waived his objection.” Yeatts v. Commonwealth, 242 Va. 121, 137 , 410 S.E.2d 254, 264 (1991) (citing Russo v. Commonwealth, 207 Va. 251, 257 , 148 S.E.2d 820, 825 (1966); Cheng v. Commonwealth, 240 Va. 26, 38-39 , 393 S.E.2d 599, 605-06 (1990); Price v. Commonwealth, 213 Va. 113, 121 , 189 S.E.2d 324, 330 (1972); Brown v. Commonwealth, 208 Va. 512, 51 2011However, the Supreme Court of Virginia has “repeatedly held that if a defendant wishes to take advantage on appeal of some incident he regards as objectionable enough to warrant a mistrial, he must make his motion timely or else be deemed to have waived his objection.” Yeatts v. Commonwealth, 242 Va. 121, 137 , 410 S.E.2d 254, 264 (1991) (citing Russo v. Commonwealth, 207 Va. 251, 257 , 148 S.E.2d 820, 825 (1966); Cheng v. Commonwealth, 240 Va. 26, 38-39 , 393 S.E.2d 599, 605-06 (1990); Price v. Commonwealth, 213 Va. 113, 121 , 189 S.E.2d 324, 330 (1972); Brown v. Commonwealth, 208 Va. 512, 51 | 1 | 1 |
Russo v. Commonwealthgreen2 sentences2011However, the Supreme Court of Virginia has “repeatedly held that if a defendant wishes to take advantage on appeal of some incident he regards as objectionable enough to warrant a mistrial, he must make his motion timely or else be deemed to have waived his objection.” Yeatts v. Commonwealth, 242 Va. 121, 137 , 410 S.E.2d 254, 264 (1991) (citing Russo v. Commonwealth, 207 Va. 251, 257 , 148 S.E.2d 820, 825 (1966); Cheng v. Commonwealth, 240 Va. 26, 38-39 , 393 S.E.2d 599, 605-06 (1990); Price v. Commonwealth, 213 Va. 113, 121 , 189 S.E.2d 324, 330 (1972); Brown v. Commonwealth, 208 Va. 512, 51 2011However, the Supreme Court of Virginia has “repeatedly held that if a defendant wishes to take advantage on appeal of some incident he regards as objectionable enough to warrant a mistrial, he must make his motion timely or else be deemed to have waived his objection.” Yeatts v. Commonwealth, 242 Va. 121, 137 , 410 S.E.2d 254, 264 (1991) (citing Russo v. Commonwealth, 207 Va. 251, 257 , 148 S.E.2d 820, 825 (1966); Cheng v. Commonwealth, 240 Va. 26, 38-39 , 393 S.E.2d 599, 605-06 (1990); Price v. Commonwealth, 213 Va. 113, 121 , 189 S.E.2d 324, 330 (1972); Brown v. Commonwealth, 208 Va. 512, 51 | 1 | 1 |
Neeley v. Commonwealthgreen2 sentences2004The trial judge considered the report in camera and disclosed that James’s scores on the report indi cate “mildly retarded intellectual functioning,” but the judge concluded this was not “exculpatory.” “Combined, the rights to compulsory process, confrontation and due process give the defendant a constitutional right to present relevant evidence.” Neeley v. Commonwealth, 17 Va.App. 349, 356 , 437 S.E.2d 721, 725 (1993). 2004The trial judge considered the report in camera and disclosed that James’s scores on the report indi cate “mildly retarded intellectual functioning,” but the judge concluded this was not “exculpatory.” “Combined, the rights to compulsory process, confrontation and due process give the defendant a constitutional right to present relevant evidence.” Neeley v. Commonwealth, 17 Va.App. 349, 356 , 437 S.E.2d 721, 725 (1993). | 1 | 1 |
Scott v. Commonwealthgreen2 sentences1992“The court’s duty, in the exercise of its discretion, is to empanel jurors who are free from bias or prejudice against the parties and who ‘stand indifferent in the cause.’” Scott v. Commonwealth, 1 Va. App. 447, 451 , 339 S.E.2d 899, 901 (1986) (quoting Breeden v. Commonwealth, 217 Va. 297, 298 , 227 S.E.2d 734, 735 (1976)), aff’d, 233 Va. 5 , 353 S.E.2d 460 (1987). 1992“The court’s duty, in the exercise of its discretion, is to empanel jurors who are free from bias or prejudice against the parties and who ‘stand indifferent in the cause.’” Scott v. Commonwealth, 1 Va. App. 447, 451 , 339 S.E.2d 899, 901 (1986) (quoting Breeden v. Commonwealth, 217 Va. 297, 298 , 227 S.E.2d 734, 735 (1976)), aff’d, 233 Va. 5 , 353 S.E.2d 460 (1987). | 1 | 1 |
Breeden v. Commonwealthgreen2 sentences1992“The court’s duty, in the exercise of its discretion, is to empanel jurors who are free from bias or prejudice against the parties and who ‘stand indifferent in the cause.’” Scott v. Commonwealth, 1 Va. App. 447, 451 , 339 S.E.2d 899, 901 (1986) (quoting Breeden v. Commonwealth, 217 Va. 297, 298 , 227 S.E.2d 734, 735 (1976)), aff’d, 233 Va. 5 , 353 S.E.2d 460 (1987). 1992“The court’s duty, in the exercise of its discretion, is to empanel jurors who are free from bias or prejudice against the parties and who ‘stand indifferent in the cause.’” Scott v. Commonwealth, 1 Va. App. 447, 451 , 339 S.E.2d 899, 901 (1986) (quoting Breeden v. Commonwealth, 217 Va. 297, 298 , 227 S.E.2d 734, 735 (1976)), aff’d, 233 Va. 5 , 353 S.E.2d 460 (1987). | 1 | 1 |
Cohens v. United Statesgreen1 sentence1990See Bellfield v. Commonwealth, 215 Va. 303, 307 , 208 S.E.2d 771, 774 (1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 965 (1975) (defense not permitted to impeach victim with police notes not shown to be accurate verbatim transcripts). | 1 | 1 |
Bellfield v. Commonwealthgreen2 sentences1990See Bellfield v. Commonwealth, 215 Va. 303, 307 , 208 S.E.2d 771, 774 (1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 965 (1975) (defense not permitted to impeach victim with police notes not shown to be accurate verbatim transcripts). 1990See Bellfield v. Commonwealth, 215 Va. 303, 307 , 208 S.E.2d 771, 774 (1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 965 (1975) (defense not permitted to impeach victim with police notes not shown to be accurate verbatim transcripts). | 1 | 1 |
Payne v. Commonwealthgreen2 sentences1989Furthermore, when this Court in Payne v. Commonwealth, 5 Va.App. 498, 504 , 364 S.E.2d 765, 768 (1987), recently addressed the issue of review of the record on direct appeal to determine whether counsel has been ineffective, we neither intimated that the trial judge was required in all circumstances to conduct a post-trial hearing whenever a defendant raised a post-trial claim that his counsel was ineffective, nor suggested that the trial judge was barred from conducting such a hearing. 1989Furthermore, when this Court in Payne v. Commonwealth, 5 Va.App. 498, 504 , 364 S.E.2d 765, 768 (1987), recently addressed the issue of review of the record on direct appeal to determine whether counsel has been ineffective, we neither intimated that the trial judge was required in all circumstances to conduct a post-trial hearing whenever a defendant raised a post-trial claim that his counsel was ineffective, nor suggested that the trial judge was barred from conducting such a hearing. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Virginia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Manneh Vay v. Commonwealth of Virginia
green
1 sentence2024Id. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Victoria Elizabeth Dufresne v. Commonwealth of Virginia
green
1 sentence2018Id. at 650, 791 S.E.2d at 338 . | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Bowman v. Commonwealth
green
1 sentence2013See Williams, 12 Va. App. at 919 , 407 S.E.2d at 324 ; Bowman, 11 Va. App. 266 , 397 S.E.2d at 890 . | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Mayo v. Commonwealth
green
1 sentence2011Thus, his objection was not timely.” Id. 6 Also instructive is this Court’s holding in Green v. Commonwealth, 26 Va.App. 394, 402-03 , 494 S.E.2d 888, 891 (1998), a *679 case involving a post-trial challenge to a juror’s alleged impartiality, which was brought to counsel’s attention during the voir dire portion of the trial. | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Lee v. Mulford
green
2 sentences2010Post-Trial Hearing Relying on Lee v. Mulford, 269 Va. 562, 611 S.E.2d 349 (2005), Shen Valley next argues that Thor is not entitled to have a post-trial hearing on attorney’s fees because there was no agreement between the parties that was approved by the Court to bifurcate the fact-finding process. 2010Post-Trial Hearing Relying on Lee v. Mulford, 269 Va. 562, 611 S.E.2d 349 (2005), Shen Valley next argues that Thor is not entitled to have a post-trial hearing on attorney’s fees because there was no agreement between the parties that was approved by the Court to bifurcate the fact-finding process. | 1 | 2010–2010 |
United States v. Agurs
green
2 sentences2007Even assuming that the prosecutor knew of the alleged false testimony, there is no "reasonable likelihood" that Investigator Whitfield's testimony on the reason for interviewing Moore "could have affected the judgment of the jury." Agurs, 427 U.S. at 103 , 96 S.Ct. 2392 . 2007Even assuming that the prosecutor knew of the alleged false testimony, there is no "reasonable likelihood" that Investigator Whitfield's testimony on the reason for interviewing Moore "could have affected the judgment of the jury." Agurs, 427 U.S. at 103 , 96 S.Ct. 2392 . | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Strickland v. Washington
green
1 sentence2004Id. | 1 | 2004–2004 |
cluster 590248
green
1 sentence1995The assignment of a general partnership interest in a limited partnership does not make the assignee a general partner of the limited partnership. 3 At the post-trial hearing considering Thornton’s motion to set aside the verdict, Thornton argued that imposition of personal liability for the debts of a corporation could be imposed only if all the conditions set out in Instruction Nos. 12, 13, and 14 were satisfied, citing Perpetual Real Estate Services, Inc. v. Michaelson Properties, Inc., 974 F.2d 545 (4th Cir. 1992). | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Scott v. Commonwealth of Virginia
green
2 sentences1992“The court’s duty, in the exercise of its discretion, is to empanel jurors who are free from bias or prejudice against the parties and who ‘stand indifferent in the cause.’” Scott v. Commonwealth, 1 Va. App. 447, 451 , 339 S.E.2d 899, 901 (1986) (quoting Breeden v. Commonwealth, 217 Va. 297, 298 , 227 S.E.2d 734, 735 (1976)), aff’d, 233 Va. 5 , 353 S.E.2d 460 (1987). 1992“The court’s duty, in the exercise of its discretion, is to empanel jurors who are free from bias or prejudice against the parties and who ‘stand indifferent in the cause.’” Scott v. Commonwealth, 1 Va. App. 447, 451 , 339 S.E.2d 899, 901 (1986) (quoting Breeden v. Commonwealth, 217 Va. 297, 298 , 227 S.E.2d 734, 735 (1976)), aff’d, 233 Va. 5 , 353 S.E.2d 460 (1987). | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.