7 Hawaii opinions name it 2 courts 1993–2013 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Hawaii courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Tachibana v. Stategreen2 sentences2007In rejecting the “demand” rule, this court “de-elinefd] to adopt a rule which places ... burdens on the exercise of a fundamental constitutional right[,]” inasmuch as “[cjourts using the demand rule will not entertain a post-trial challenge based on the right to testify.” 79 Hawai'i at 233-34 , 900 P.2d at 1300-01 . 2007In rejecting the "demand" rule, this court "decline[d] to adopt a rule which places . . . burdens on the exercise of a fundamental constitutional right[,]" inasmuch as "[c]ourts using the demand rule will not entertain a post-trial challenge based on the right to testify." 79 Hawai`i at 233-34, 900 P.2d at 1300-01 . | 1 | 3 |
Boyd v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2000In adopting the colloquy approach in Ta-chibana, this court’s majority rejected both the “demand” rule, under which “ ‘a defendant who fails to complain about the right to testify during trial is conclusively presumed to have waived that right[,]’ ” 79 Hawai'i at 233 , 900 P.2d at 1300 (quoting Boyd, 586 A.2d at 676 ), and the post-trial challenge approach where “ ‘a tidal judge need not sm sponte question the defendant during the trial, but the defendant is free to bring a post-conviction challenge based on a denial of the right to testify.’ ” Id. (quoting Boyd, 586 A.2d at 677 ). 2000In adopting the colloquy approach in Ta-chibana, this court’s majority rejected both the “demand” rule, under which “ ‘a defendant who fails to complain about the right to testify during trial is conclusively presumed to have waived that right[,]’ ” 79 Hawai'i at 233 , 900 P.2d at 1300 (quoting Boyd, 586 A.2d at 676 ), and the post-trial challenge approach where “ ‘a tidal judge need not sm sponte question the defendant during the trial, but the defendant is free to bring a post-conviction challenge based on a denial of the right to testify.’ ” Id. (quoting Boyd, 586 A.2d at 677 ). | 1 | 2 |
In re Gamayagreen2 sentences2003However, habeas relief is a collateral attack on the original judgment and is thus available, not as a method of appealing the decision of the court, but only when "persons are unlawfully _ restrained of their liberty!.] ” HRS § 660-3 (1993) (emphasis added.) See In re Gamaya, 25 Haw. 414, 417 (1920) ("It is well settled that a writ of habeas corpus will not be permitted to perform the functions of a writ of error or appeal for the purpose of reviewing errors or irregularities in proceedings of a court having jurisdiction over the person and the subject-matter.”) . 2003However, habeas relief is a collateral attack on the original judgment and is thus available, not as a method of appealing the decision of the court, but only when "persons are unlawfully restrained of their liberty[.]" HRS § 660-3 (1993) (emphasis added.) See In re Gamaya, 25 Haw. 414, 417 (1920) ("It is well settled that a writ of habeas corpus will not be permitted to perform the functions of a writ of error or appeal for the purpose of reviewing errors or irregularities in proceedings of a court having jurisdiction over the person and the subject-matter.") [13] If the defendant is committe | 1 | 1 |
Thompson v. Yuengreen2 sentences2003See also Thompson v. Yuen, 63 Haw. 186 , 623 P.2d 881 (1981) (reviewing commitment of the petitioner pursuant to HRS § 704-411(1)(a) after a post-trial hearing, on constitutional and admissibility of hearsay evidence grounds). 2003See also Thompson v. Yuen, 63 Haw. 186 , 623 P.2d 881 (1981) (reviewing commitment of the petitioner pursuant to HRS § 704-411(1)(a) after a post-trial hearing, on constitutional and admissibility of hearsay evidence grounds). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Hawaii. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Barcai v. Betwee
green
1 sentence2013Id. | 1 | 2013–2013 |
State v. Murray
green
1 sentence2007Tachibana , however, is inapposite insofar as the "three primary approaches" discussed by the majority, majority opinion at ___ - ___, 169 P.3d at 963-64 , are approaches "that courts throughout the country have taken when defendants have claimed that their attorneys deprived them of their right to testify. " [1] 79 Hawai`i at 233, 900 P.2d at 1300 (block format and citation omitted) (emphasis added). | 1 | 2007–2007 |
United States v. Robert Martinez
green
2 sentences1995Relying primarily upon Martinez, supra, the State urges us to adopt the demand rule. 1995Relying primarily upon Martinez, supra, the State urges us to adopt the demand rule. | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Meyer v. City of Des Moines
green
1 sentence1993App. 3d 1066 , 484 N.E.2d 795 (1985); Meyer v. City of Des Moines, 475 N.W.2d 181 (Iowa 1991). 9 See Law v. Superior Court, 157 Ariz. 147 , 755 P.2d 1135 (1988). 10 See HRS § 291-11.6 (1992). 11 HAR 25(A) defines “prevailing party” as “the party [in a trial de novo] who has (1) appealed and improved upon the arbitration award by 15% or more, or (2) has not appealed and the opposing party has appealed and failed to improve upon the arbitration award by 15% or more.” Under HAR 25(A)(1), Kealoha is the prevailing parly. 12 At the post-trial hearing on this and other issues concerning the final ju | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Law v. Superior Court of State of Ariz.
green
2 sentences1993App. 3d 1066 , 484 N.E.2d 795 (1985); Meyer v. City of Des Moines, 475 N.W.2d 181 (Iowa 1991). 9 See Law v. Superior Court, 157 Ariz. 147 , 755 P.2d 1135 (1988). 10 See HRS § 291-11.6 (1992). 11 HAR 25(A) defines “prevailing party” as “the party [in a trial de novo] who has (1) appealed and improved upon the arbitration award by 15% or more, or (2) has not appealed and the opposing party has appealed and failed to improve upon the arbitration award by 15% or more.” Under HAR 25(A)(1), Kealoha is the prevailing parly. 12 At the post-trial hearing on this and other issues concerning the final ju 1993App. 3d 1066 , 484 N.E.2d 795 (1985); Meyer v. City of Des Moines, 475 N.W.2d 181 (Iowa 1991). 9 See Law v. Superior Court, 157 Ariz. 147 , 755 P.2d 1135 (1988). 10 See HRS § 291-11.6 (1992). 11 HAR 25(A) defines “prevailing party” as “the party [in a trial de novo] who has (1) appealed and improved upon the arbitration award by 15% or more, or (2) has not appealed and the opposing party has appealed and failed to improve upon the arbitration award by 15% or more.” Under HAR 25(A)(1), Kealoha is the prevailing parly. 12 At the post-trial hearing on this and other issues concerning the final ju | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.