post-trial hearing in Texas

2010Id. . 464 U.S. 548, 556-57 , 104 S.Ct. 845 , 78 L.Ed.2d 663 (1984) (Blackmun, J., joined by Stevens and O’Connor, JJ., concurring) ("it remains within a trial court's option, in determining whether a jury was biased, to order a post-trial hearing at which the movant has the opportunity to demonstrate actual bias or, in exceptional circumstances, that the facts are such that bias is to be inferred.”); id. at 558 , 104 S.Ct. 845 (Brennan, J., joined by Marshall, J., concurring) ("for a court to determine properly whether bias exists, it must consider at least two questions: are there any facts i

2010Id. . 464 U.S. 548, 556-57 , 104 S.Ct. 845 , 78 L.Ed.2d 663 (1984) (Blackmun, J., joined by Stevens and O’Connor, JJ., concurring) ("it remains within a trial court's option, in determining whether a jury was biased, to order a post-trial hearing at which the movant has the opportunity to demonstrate actual bias or, in exceptional circumstances, that the facts are such that bias is to be inferred.”); id. at 558 , 104 S.Ct. 845 (Brennan, J., joined by Marshall, J., concurring) ("for a court to determine properly whether bias exists, it must consider at least two questions: are there any facts i

2010App.2008). [2] 455 U.S. 209 , 102 S.Ct. 940 , 71 L.Ed.2d 78 (1982). [3] Id. at 694-96 (footnotes from the original Morales opinion will be reproduced here, in the margin, in footnotes four through twelve, post ). [4] Smith v. Phillips, supra, at 221 , 102 S.Ct. 940 . [5] Id. at 222 , 102 S.Ct. 940 . [6] Id. [7] 464 U.S. 548, 556-57 , 104 S.Ct. 845 , 78 L.Ed.2d 663 (1984) (Blackmun, J., joined by Stevens and O'Connor, JJ., concurring) ("it remains within a trial court's option, in determining whether a jury was biased, to order a post-trial hearing at which the movant has the opportunity to dem

2010App.2008). [2] 455 U.S. 209 , 102 S.Ct. 940 , 71 L.Ed.2d 78 (1982). [3] Id. at 694-96 (footnotes from the original Morales opinion will be reproduced here, in the margin, in footnotes four through twelve, post ). [4] Smith v. Phillips, supra, at 221 , 102 S.Ct. 940 . [5] Id. at 222 , 102 S.Ct. 940 . [6] Id. [7] 464 U.S. 548, 556-57 , 104 S.Ct. 845 , 78 L.Ed.2d 663 (1984) (Blackmun, J., joined by Stevens and O'Connor, JJ., concurring) ("it remains within a trial court's option, in determining whether a jury was biased, to order a post-trial hearing at which the movant has the opportunity to dem

2008See In the Interest of A.S., 239 S.W.3d 390, 393 (Tex.App.-Beaumont 2007, no pet.).

2008See, e.g., In the Interest of A.S., 239 S.W.3d 390, 392-93 (Tex.App.-Beaumont 2007, no pet.) (Appeal decided on record of post-trial hearing in which trial court’s findings that an appeal would be frivolous were supported by evidence described by the parties during the hearing); see also In the Interest of A.F., 259 S.W.3d 303 (Tex.App.-Beaumont, 2008, no pet.); In the Interest of J.B., 259 S.W.3d 383 (Tex.App.-Beaumont, 2008, no pet. h.); see Tex. Fam.Code Ann. § 263.405(g) (Vernon Supp.2008) (“The appellate court shall render appropriate orders after reviewing the records and appellate brief

2008See, e.g., In the Interest of A.S., 239 S.W.3d 390, 392-93 (Tex.App.-Beaumont 2007, no pet.) (Appeal decided on record of post-trial hearing in which trial court’s findings that an appeal would be frivolous were supported by evidence described by the parties during the hearing); see also In the Interest of A.F., 259 S.W.3d 303 (Tex.App.-Beaumont, 2008, no pet.); In the Interest of J.B., 259 S.W.3d 383 (Tex.App.-Beaumont, 2008, no pet. h.); see Tex. Fam.Code Ann. § 263.405(g) (Vernon Supp.2008) (“The appellate court shall render appropriate orders after reviewing the records and appellate brief

2008See, e.g., In the Interest of A.S., 239 S.W.3d 390, 392-93 (Tex.App.-Beaumont 2007, no pet.) (Appeal decided on record of post-trial hearing in which trial court's findings that an appeal would be frivolous were supported by evidence described by the parties during the hearing); see also In the Interest of A.F., 259 S.W.3d 303 (Tex.App.-Beaumont, 2008, no pet.); In the Interest of J.B., 259 S.W.3d 383 (Tex.App.-Beaumont, 2008, no pet. h.); see TEX.

2007Compare Sessums , 129 S.W.3d 242 , and Miller , 757 S.W.2d 880 , with Garcia , 712 S.W.2d 249 .

2007Compare Sessums, 129 S.W.3d 242 , and Miller, 757 S.W.2d 880 , with Garcia, 712 S.W.2d 249 .

2007Compare Sessums , 129 S.W.3d 242 , and Miller , 757 S.W.2d 880 , with Garcia , 712 S.W.2d 249 .

2007Compare Sessums, 129 S.W.3d 242 , and Miller, 757 S.W.2d 880 , with Garcia, 712 S.W.2d 249 .

2007Compare Sessums , 129 S.W.3d 242 , and Miller , 757 S.W.2d 880 , with Garcia , 712 S.W.2d 249 .

2007Compare Sessums, 129 S.W.3d 242 , and Miller, 757 S.W.2d 880 , with Garcia, 712 S.W.2d 249 .

2008See, e.g., In the Interest of A.S., 239 S.W.3d 390, 392-93 (Tex.App.-Beaumont 2007, no pet.) (Appeal decided on record of post-trial hearing in which trial court’s findings that an appeal would be frivolous were supported by evidence described by the parties during the hearing); see also In the Interest of A.F., 259 S.W.3d 303 (Tex.App.-Beaumont, 2008, no pet.); In the Interest of J.B., 259 S.W.3d 383 (Tex.App.-Beaumont, 2008, no pet. h.); see Tex. Fam.Code Ann. § 263.405(g) (Vernon Supp.2008) (“The appellate court shall render appropriate orders after reviewing the records and appellate brief

2008See, e.g., In the Interest of A.S., 239 S.W.3d 390, 392-93 (Tex.App.-Beaumont 2007, no pet.) (Appeal decided on record of post-trial hearing in which trial court's findings that an appeal would be frivolous were supported by evidence described by the parties during the hearing); see also In the Interest of A.F., 259 S.W.3d 303 (Tex.App.-Beaumont, 2008, no pet.); In the Interest of J.B., 259 S.W.3d 383 (Tex.App.-Beaumont, 2008, no pet. h.); see TEX.

2015App. 2006) (“A court of appeals, while having jurisdiction to ascertain whether an appellant who plea-bargained is permitted to appeal by Rule 25.2(a)(2), must dismiss a prohibited appeal without further action, regardless of the basis for the appeal.”); Cooper v. State, 45 S.W.3d 77, 77 (Tex. Crim.

2015App. 2006) (“A court of appeals, while having jurisdiction to ascertain whether an appellant who plea-bargained is permitted to appeal by Rule 25.2(a)(2), must dismiss a prohibited appeal without further action, regardless of the basis for the appeal.”); Cooper v. State, 45 S.W.3d 77, 77 (Tex. Crim.

2015Also, at a post-trial hearing, the trial court stated that it has not and would not grant appellant permission to appeal this case. 3 the State and agreed upon by the defendant); Chavez v. State, 183 S.W.3d 675, 680 (Tex. Crim.

2015Also, at a post-trial hearing, the trial court stated that it has not and would not grant appellant permission to appeal this case. 3 the State and agreed upon by the defendant); Chavez v. State, 183 S.W.3d 675, 680 (Tex. Crim.

2011See Smith v. State, 17 S.W.3d 660, 661-63 (Tex. Crim.

2011See Smith v. State , 17 S.W.3d 660, 661-63 (Tex. Crim.

2010See White v. State , 181 S.W.3d 514, 517 (Tex. App-Texarkana 2005), aff'd , 225 S.W.3d 571 ("[T]he record from the post-trial hearing must demonstrate the defendant's alleged substantial harm is directly attributable to the service of the objectionable jurors."); Ristoff v. State , 985 S.W.2d 623, 624 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1999, no pet.) (concluding that although the "[a]ppellant filed a motion for new trial asserting the juror was absolutely disqualified from jury service by virtue of her indictment[,]" the appellant failed to meet his burden because "at the hearing on appellant's mo

2010See White v. State , 181 S.W.3d 514, 517 (Tex. App-Texarkana 2005) aff'd , 225 S.W.3d 571 ("[T]he record from the post-trial hearing must demonstrate the defendant's alleged substantial harm is directly attributable to the service of the objectionable jurors."); Ristoff v. State , 985 S.W.2d 623, 624 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1999, no pet.) (concluding that although the "[a]ppellant filed a motion for new trial asserting the juror was absolutely disqualified from jury service by virtue of her indictment[,]" the appellant failed to meet his burden because "at the hearing on appellant's mot

2010See White v. State , 181 S.W.3d 514, 517 (Tex. App-Texarkana 2005), aff'd , 225 S.W.3d 571 ("[T]he record from the post-trial hearing must demonstrate the defendant's alleged substantial harm is directly attributable to the service of the objectionable jurors."); Ristoff v. State , 985 S.W.2d 623, 624 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1999, no pet.) (concluding that although the "[a]ppellant filed a motion for new trial asserting the juror was absolutely disqualified from jury service by virtue of her indictment[,]" the appellant failed to meet his burden because "at the hearing on appellant's mo

2010See White v. State , 181 S.W.3d 514, 517 (Tex. App-Texarkana 2005) aff'd , 225 S.W.3d 571 ("[T]he record from the post-trial hearing must demonstrate the defendant's alleged substantial harm is directly attributable to the service of the objectionable jurors."); Ristoff v. State , 985 S.W.2d 623, 624 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1999, no pet.) (concluding that although the "[a]ppellant filed a motion for new trial asserting the juror was absolutely disqualified from jury service by virtue of her indictment[,]" the appellant failed to meet his burden because "at the hearing on appellant's mot

2010See White v. State , 181 S.W.3d 514, 517 (Tex. App-Texarkana 2005), aff'd , 225 S.W.3d 571 ("[T]he record from the post-trial hearing must demonstrate the defendant's alleged substantial harm is directly attributable to the service of the objectionable jurors."); Ristoff v. State , 985 S.W.2d 623, 624 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1999, no pet.) (concluding that although the "[a]ppellant filed a motion for new trial asserting the juror was absolutely disqualified from jury service by virtue of her indictment[,]" the appellant failed to meet his burden because "at the hearing on appellant's mo

2010See White v. State , 181 S.W.3d 514, 517 (Tex. App-Texarkana 2005) aff'd , 225 S.W.3d 571 ("[T]he record from the post-trial hearing must demonstrate the defendant's alleged substantial harm is directly attributable to the service of the objectionable jurors."); Ristoff v. State , 985 S.W.2d 623, 624 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1999, no pet.) (concluding that although the "[a]ppellant filed a motion for new trial asserting the juror was absolutely disqualified from jury service by virtue of her indictment[,]" the appellant failed to meet his burden because "at the hearing on appellant's mot

2010See Franklin v. State, 138 S.W.3d 351, 363-64 (Tex. Crim.

2010See Franklin v. State, 138 S.W.3d 351, 363-64 (Tex.Crim.App. 2004) (Cochran, J., dissenting). [9] See United States v. Haynes, 398 F.2d 980, 983-984 (2nd Cir.1968), citing United States v. Burr, 25 Fed.Cas. 49 (C.C.Va. 1807).

2008The majority reasonably takes his absence as “some indication that there was no record of ineffectiveness to develop.” See, e.g., In re M.S., 115 S.W.3d at 546 (To complain of ineffectiveness of counsel in failing to secure a complete record, there must be a showing of harm.).

2008The majority reasonably takes his absence as "some indication that there was no record of ineffectiveness to develop." See, e.g., In re M.S., 115 S.W.3d at 546 (To complain of ineffectiveness of counsel in failing to secure a complete record, there must be a showing of harm.).

2023See Phillips, 455 U.S. at 221 (holding that the prosecution’s failure to turn over information about a juror “requir[ed] a post-trial hearing on juror bias”); Remmer, 347 U.S. at 230 (ordering a post- trial hearing to determine whether “the incident complained of” prejudiced the defendant); United States v. Jordan, 958 F.3d 331, 336 (5th Cir. 2020) (concluding that on a motion for new trial, federal district courts may not deny a claim of improper jury influence without first holding a hearing).

2010Id. . 464 U.S. 548, 556-57 , 104 S.Ct. 845 , 78 L.Ed.2d 663 (1984) (Blackmun, J., joined by Stevens and O’Connor, JJ., concurring) ("it remains within a trial court's option, in determining whether a jury was biased, to order a post-trial hearing at which the movant has the opportunity to demonstrate actual bias or, in exceptional circumstances, that the facts are such that bias is to be inferred.”); id. at 558 , 104 S.Ct. 845 (Brennan, J., joined by Marshall, J., concurring) ("for a court to determine properly whether bias exists, it must consider at least two questions: are there any facts i

2025The record shows the trial court did not conduct a hearing on Hodge’s Motion for New Trial to allow the State an opportunity to respond to the Motion, which was overruled by operation of law. “[P]ost-trial motions [] are not self-proving and any allegations made in support of them by way of affidavit or otherwise must be offered into evidence at a hearing.” Rouse v. State, 300 S.W.3d 754, 762 (Tex. Crim.

2023See Phillips, 455 U.S. at 221 (holding that the prosecution’s failure to turn over information about a juror “requir[ed] a post-trial hearing on juror bias”); Remmer, 347 U.S. at 230 (ordering a post- trial hearing to determine whether “the incident complained of” prejudiced the defendant); United States v. Jordan, 958 F.3d 331, 336 (5th Cir. 2020) (concluding that on a motion for new trial, federal district courts may not deny a claim of improper jury influence without first holding a hearing).

2023See Phillips, 455 U.S. at 221 (holding that the prosecution’s failure to turn over information about a juror “requir[ed] a post-trial hearing on juror bias”); Remmer, 347 U.S. at 230 (ordering a post- trial hearing to determine whether “the incident complained of” prejudiced the defendant); United States v. Jordan, 958 F.3d 331, 336 (5th Cir. 2020) (concluding that on a motion for new trial, federal district courts may not deny a claim of improper jury influence without first holding a hearing).

2023See Phillips, 455 U.S. at 221 (holding that the prosecution’s failure to turn over information about a juror “requir[ed] a post-trial hearing on juror bias”); Remmer, 347 U.S. at 230 (ordering a post- trial hearing to determine whether “the incident complained of” prejudiced the defendant); United States v. Jordan, 958 F.3d 331, 336 (5th Cir. 2020) (concluding that on a motion for new trial, federal district courts may not deny a claim of improper jury influence without first holding a hearing).

2023See Phillips, 455 U.S. at 221 (holding that the prosecution’s failure to turn over information about a juror “requir[ed] a post-trial hearing on juror bias”); Remmer, 347 U.S. at 230 (ordering a post- trial hearing to determine whether “the incident complained of” prejudiced the defendant); United States v. Jordan, 958 F.3d 331, 336 (5th Cir. 2020) (concluding that on a motion for new trial, federal district courts may not deny a claim of improper jury influence without first holding a hearing).

2018Proc. art. 44.01(a)(3) (providing that State may appeal order granting new trial). 9 DISCUSSION At the post-trial hearing, the trial court stated that it was “declaring a mistrial in this case without prejudice.” However, “[a] mistrial is a device used to halt trial proceedings when error is so prejudicial that expenditure of further time and expense would be wasteful and futile.” Young v. State, 283 S.W.3d 854, 878 (Tex. Crim.

2018App. 2009) (quoting Ladd v. State, 3 S.W.3d 547, 567 (Tex. Crim.

2015See Colyer, 428 S.W.3d at 119 .

2010See Charles , 146 S.W.3d at 208 .