post-trial waiver in Maryland

2002The court held that a post-trial hearing conducted by the trial court, like the one ordered in Remmer , was “sufficient to decide allegations of juror partiality....” Id. at 218, 102 S.Ct. 940 .

1988The Court held that, in the circumstances of that case, it would not be proper to impute bias in the verdict or to find a post-trial hearing inadequate as a remedy for the alleged due process violation. 455 U.S. *422 at 217, 102 S.Ct. at 946 .

2016In support of her argument, Ms. Berg relies primarily on Langston, supra, which she claims has an almost identical “procedural posture” as the case at hand, i.e., “an appeal from a judge’s final ruling from a post-trial hearing in a family law case.” Ms. Berg also relies on Dean v. State, 302 Md. 493 , *278 497, 489 A.2d 22 (1985), where the Court said that there is “no different standard” of appealability to a court in banc than from an appeal to the Court of Special Appeals.

2016In support of her argument, Ms. Berg relies primarily on Langston, supra, which she claims has an almost identical “procedural posture” as the case at hand, i.e., “an appeal from a judge’s final ruling from a post-trial hearing in a family law case.” Ms. Berg also relies on Dean v. State, 302 Md. 493 , *278 497, 489 A.2d 22 (1985), where the Court said that there is “no different standard” of appealability to a court in banc than from an appeal to the Court of Special Appeals.

2010Because the waiver colloquy was conducted at the close of the State's case and not at the conclusion of trial, the Valiton court determined that the "case does not present the precise concerns that are evident in a post-trial waiver situation." Id.

2010Because the waiver colloquy was conducted at the close of the State’s case and not at the conclusion of trial, the Valiton court determined that the “case does not present the precise concerns that are evident in a post-trial waiver situation.” Id.

2010Rejecting, on that basis, the applicability of Martinez v. State, supra; Mitchell v. State, 337 Md. 509 , 654 A.2d 1309 (1995), and United States v. Saadya, 750 F.2d 1419 (9th Cir.1985), on which Boulden relies, 414 Md. at 299-300 , 995 A.2d at 277 , it states: “[This case] is distinguishable] from Martinez because the post-trial inquiry process proposed in Martinez implicated the voluntariness of the defendant’s waiver, not simply a technical rule violation.

2010Rejecting, on that basis, the applicability of Martinez v. State, supra; Mitchell v. State, 337 Md. 509 , 654 A.2d 1309 (1995), and United States v. Saadya, 750 F.2d 1419 (9th Cir.1985), on which Boulden relies, 414 Md. at 299-300 , 995 A.2d at 277 , it states: “[This case] is distinguishable] from Martinez because the post-trial inquiry process proposed in Martinez implicated the voluntariness of the defendant’s waiver, not simply a technical rule violation.

2010Martinez dealt with whether the defendant’s waiver of jury trial was voluntary. 3 Martinez argued successfully to this Court that his waiver was not voluntary. 309 Md. at 134 , 522 A.2d at 955 .

2010Martinez dealt with whether the defendant’s waiver of jury trial was voluntary. 3 Martinez argued successfully to this Court that his waiver was not voluntary. 309 Md. at 134 , 522 A.2d at 955 .

2010Rejecting, on that basis, the applicability of Martinez v. State, supra; Mitchell v. State, 337 Md. 509 , 654 A.2d 1309 (1995), and United States v. Saadya, 750 F.2d 1419 (9th Cir.1985), on which Boulden relies, 414 Md. at 299-300 , 995 A.2d at 277 , it states: “[This case] is distinguishable] from Martinez because the post-trial inquiry process proposed in Martinez implicated the voluntariness of the defendant’s waiver, not simply a technical rule violation.

2010It explained: “In [United States v.] Reyes, [ 603 F.2d 69 (9th Cir.1979)] we said that a post-trial waiver was not sufficiently reliable and might be based on ‘subtle coercion [that] is difficult to detect in the appellate record.’ We also said that it was necessary for the waiver to occur on the record at the time the right was surrendered for two related reasons: one, so that the defendant would understand that his waiver was ‘an important step in the trial,’ and, two, so that the judge might question the defendant and evaluate his responses at the time the decision was made.” 750 F.2d at 14

2010Rejecting, on that basis, the applicability of Martinez v. State, supra; Mitchell v. State, 337 Md. 509 , 654 A.2d 1309 (1995), and United States v. Saadya, 750 F.2d 1419 (9th Cir.1985), on which Boulden relies, 414 Md. at 299-300 , 995 A.2d at 277 , it states: “[This case] is distinguishable] from Martinez because the post-trial inquiry process proposed in Martinez implicated the voluntariness of the defendant’s waiver, not simply a technical rule violation.

2010Rejecting, on that basis, the applicability of Martinez v. State, supra; Mitchell v. State, 337 Md. 509 , 654 A.2d 1309 (1995), and United States v. Saadya, 750 F.2d 1419 (9th Cir.1985), on which Boulden relies, 414 Md. at 299-300 , 995 A.2d at 277 , it states: “[This case] is distinguishable] from Martinez because the post-trial inquiry process proposed in Martinez implicated the voluntariness of the defendant’s waiver, not simply a technical rule violation.

2002Despite the holding in Smith , this Court in Eades “as-sumefd]” that the presumption of prejudice from contact with a juror during trial, under Remmer , remained the law. 75 Md.App. at 423 , 541 A.2d 1001 .

2002Despite the holding in Smith , this Court in Eades “as-sumefd]” that the presumption of prejudice from contact with a juror during trial, under Remmer , remained the law. 75 Md.App. at 423 , 541 A.2d 1001 .