post-trial hearing in Georgia

1989Moreover, in reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress, “this court can consider all relevant evidence introduced at a pretrial hearing, an appropriate post-trial hearing, or at trial.” Bonds v. State, 188 Ga. App. 135 ( 372 SE2d 448 ) (1988), citing Sanders v. State, 235 Ga. 425, 431-2 ( 219 SE2d 768 ) (1975).

1989Moreover, in reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress, “this court can consider all relevant evidence introduced at a pretrial hearing, an appropriate post-trial hearing, or at trial.” Bonds v. State, 188 Ga. App. 135 ( 372 SE2d 448 ) (1988), citing Sanders v. State, 235 Ga. 425, 431-2 ( 219 SE2d 768 ) (1975).

1994Here, as in Thornton v. State, 238 Ga. 160, 165 (2) ( 231 SE2d 729 ) (1977), the error can be cured by a post-trial hearing before the judge in the trial court.

1994Here, as in Thornton v. State, 238 Ga. 160, 165 (2) ( 231 SE2d 729 ) (1977), the error can be cured by a post-trial hearing before the judge in the trial court.

2013See Pittman v. State, 286 Ga. App. 415, 416 ( 650 SE2d 302 ) (2007); see also Bonds v. State, 188 Ga. App. 135 ( 372 SE2d 448 ) (1988) (providing that we may consider all relevant evidence introduced at a pretrial hearing, an appropriate post-trial hearing, or at trial when reviewing the denial of motion to suppress).

2013See Pittman v. State, 286 Ga. App. 415, 416 ( 650 SE2d 302 ) (2007); see also Bonds v. State, 188 Ga. App. 135 ( 372 SE2d 448 ) (1988) (providing that we may consider all relevant evidence introduced at a pretrial hearing, an appropriate post-trial hearing, or at trial when reviewing the denial of motion to suppress).

2019See Dickey v. Clipper Petroleum, Inc. , 280 Ga. App. 475 , 478-479 (2), 634 S.E.2d 425 (2006) ("It is the obligation of a party to make a specific tender of evidence which they contend is improperly excluded, and the failure to do so precludes our review of this contention." (citation and punctuation omitted)).

2019See Dickey v. Clipper Petroleum, Inc. , 280 Ga. App. 475 , 478-479 (2), 634 S.E.2d 425 (2006) ("It is the obligation of a party to make a specific tender of evidence which they contend is improperly excluded, and the failure to do so precludes our review of this contention." (citation and punctuation omitted)).

2018See also Weems v. State, 262 Ga. 101, 102 ( 416 SE2d 84 ) (1992) (remanding for the trial court to determine at a post-trial hearing whether peremptory strikes were racially motivated). 5 After hearing testimony from potential jurors who were struck and the appellants’ arguments against the prosecutor’s proffered reasons for striking the challenged jurors, the trial court expressly found that the district attorney’s reasons for the peremptory strikes were “legitimate” and “in no way racially motivated.” This finding, like most Batson decisions, turned largely on an evaluation of the credibilit

2018See also Weems v. State, 262 Ga. 101, 102 ( 416 SE2d 84 ) (1992) (remanding for the trial court to determine at a post-trial hearing whether peremptory strikes were racially motivated). 5 After hearing testimony from potential jurors who were struck and the appellants’ arguments against the prosecutor’s proffered reasons for striking the challenged jurors, the trial court expressly found that the district attorney’s reasons for the peremptory strikes were “legitimate” and “in no way racially motivated.” This finding, like most Batson decisions, turned largely on an evaluation of the credibilit

2018See also Snyder v. Louisiana, 552 U. S. 472, 477 ( 128 SCt 1203 , 170 LE2d 175) (2008) (“The trial court has a pivotal role in evaluating Batson claims.

2018See also Snyder v. Louisiana, 552 U. S. 472, 477 ( 128 SCt 1203 , 170 LE2d 175) (2008) (“The trial court has a pivotal role in evaluating Batson claims.

2018See also Weems v. State, 262 Ga. 101, 102 ( 416 SE2d 84 ) (1992) (remanding for the trial court to determine at a post-trial hearing whether peremptory strikes were racially motivated).5 After 5 It is certainly preferable, however, for the trial court to respond to a Batson challenge by clearly following the three-step analysis when the challenge is raised at trial and “‘clearly stat[ing] on the record its reasoning and conclusions as to each step of the inquiry.’” Coleman, 301 Ga. at 13 hearing testimony from potential jurors who were struck and the appellants’ arguments against the prosecuto

2018See also Weems v. State, 262 Ga. 101, 102 ( 416 SE2d 84 ) (1992) (remanding for the trial court to determine at a post-trial hearing whether peremptory strikes were racially motivated). 5 After hearing testimony from potential jurors who were struck and the appellants’ arguments against the prosecutor’s proffered reasons for striking the challenged jurors, the trial court expressly found that the district attorney’s reasons for the peremptory strikes were “legitimate” and “in no way racially motivated.” This finding, like most Batson decisions, turned largely on an evaluation of the credibilit

2018See also Weems v. State, 262 Ga. 101, 102 ( 416 SE2d 84 ) (1992) (remanding for the trial court to determine at a post-trial hearing whether peremptory strikes were racially motivated). 5 After hearing testimony from potential jurors who were struck and the appellants’ arguments against the prosecutor’s proffered reasons for striking the challenged jurors, the trial court expressly found that the district attorney’s reasons for the peremptory strikes were “legitimate” and “in no way racially motivated.” This finding, like most Batson decisions, turned largely on an evaluation of the credibilit

2018See also Weems v. State, 262 Ga. 101, 102 ( 416 SE2d 84 ) (1992) (remanding for the trial court to determine at a post-trial hearing whether peremptory strikes were racially motivated). 5 After hearing testimony from potential jurors who were struck and the appellants’ arguments against the prosecutor’s proffered reasons for striking the challenged jurors, the trial court expressly found that the district attorney’s reasons for the peremptory strikes were “legitimate” and “in no way racially motivated.” This finding, like most Batson decisions, turned largely on an evaluation of the credibilit

2018See Staples v. State, 209 Ga. App. 802, 802-803 ( 434 SE2d 757 ) (1993) (explaining that the trial court’s error in not completing the third step at trial “may be cured by a post-trial hearing on the Batson challenge”).

2018See Staples v. State, 209 Ga. App. 802, 802-803 ( 434 SE2d 757 ) (1993) (explaining that the trial court’s error in not completing the third step at trial “may be cured by a post-trial hearing on the Batson challenge”).

2014See Betancourt v. State, 322 Ga. App. 201, 211 (4) (a) (i), n. 37 ( 744 SE2d 419 ) (2013) (post-trial hearing cured any alleged error in pretrial hearing); Brown v. State, 307 Ga. App. 99, 103 (2) (b) ( 704 SE2d 227 ) (2010) (providing that trial court may conduct a post-trial similar transaction hearing).

2014See Betancourt v. State, 322 Ga. App. 201, 211 (4) (a) (i), n. 37 ( 744 SE2d 419 ) (2013) (post-trial hearing cured any alleged error in pretrial hearing); Brown v. State, 307 Ga. App. 99, 103 (2) (b) ( 704 SE2d 227 ) (2010) (providing that trial court may conduct a post-trial similar transaction hearing).

2013See Ware v. State, 307 Ga. App. 782, 787-88 (2) (b) ( 706 SE2d 143 ) (2011) (“[A] trial court’s error in refusing to conduct a hearing [on a defendant’s motion for appointment of new counsel] can be cured by a post-trial hearing before the judge in the trial court.” (punctuation omitted)).

2013See Ware v. State, 307 Ga. App. 782, 787-88 (2) (b) ( 706 SE2d 143 ) (2011) (“[A] trial court’s error in refusing to conduct a hearing [on a defendant’s motion for appointment of new counsel] can be cured by a post-trial hearing before the judge in the trial court.” (punctuation omitted)).

2013See Pittman v. State, 286 Ga. App. 415, 416 ( 650 SE2d 302 ) (2007); see also Bonds v. State, 188 Ga. App. 135 ( 372 SE2d 448 ) (1988) (providing that we may consider all relevant evidence introduced at a pretrial hearing, an appropriate post-trial hearing, or at trial when reviewing the denial of motion to suppress).

2013See Pittman v. State, 286 Ga. App. 415, 416 ( 650 SE2d 302 ) (2007); see also Bonds v. State, 188 Ga. App. 135 ( 372 SE2d 448 ) (1988) (providing that we may consider all relevant evidence introduced at a pretrial hearing, an appropriate post-trial hearing, or at trial when reviewing the denial of motion to suppress).

1992Appellant repeated this argument in his motion for new trial, and the trial court responded by conducting a post-trial hearing pursuant to Shelton v. State, 196 Ga. App. 163, 164 (4) ( 395 SE2d 618 ) (1990) to determine whether there existed a reasonable probability of a false allegation.

1992Appellant repeated this argument in his motion for new trial, and the trial court responded by conducting a post-trial hearing pursuant to Shelton v. State, 196 Ga. App. 163, 164 (4) ( 395 SE2d 618 ) (1990) to determine whether there existed a reasonable probability of a false allegation.

2019Consequently, Mays "has failed to show that the [evidence] would have benefitted [her] or that its rejection was sufficiently prejudicial to warrant a reversal of the convictions." Fulton v. State , 205 Ga. App. 353 , 354 (2), 422 S.E.2d 257 (1992) (citation and punctuation omitted).

2019Consequently, Mays "has failed to show that the [evidence] would have benefitted [her] or that its rejection was sufficiently prejudicial to warrant a reversal of the convictions." Fulton v. State , 205 Ga. App. 353 , 354 (2), 422 S.E.2d 257 (1992) (citation and punctuation omitted).

2026Cf. Scott v. Battle, 249 Ga. App. 618, 622 (2001) (rejecting the plaintiff’s argument that the defendant waived the right to seek a reduction in punitive damages pursuant to OCGA § 51-12-5.1(g) by, among other things, not raising the “issue until a post-trial hearing on a motion for new trial,” because an exception to the cap-exceeding verdict “is timely if raised before the entry of judgment or in any timely post-judgment motion”). 2.

2023Compare Giles, 290 Ga. at 651 - 652 (1) and Smith v. Mitchell County, 334 Ga. App. 374, 378 (2) ( 779 SE2d 410 ) (2015) (“In an action to quiet title brought under OCGA § 23-3-60 et seq., the findings of the special master which are adopted by the trial court will be upheld unless clearly erroneous.

2023Compare Giles, 290 Ga. at 651 - 652 (1) and Smith v. Mitchell County, 334 Ga. App. 374, 378 (2) ( 779 SE2d 410 ) (2015) (“In an action to quiet title brought under OCGA § 23-3-60 et seq., the findings of the special master which are adopted by the trial court will be upheld unless clearly erroneous.

2023Compare Giles, 290 Ga. at 651 - 652 (1) and Smith v. Mitchell County, 334 Ga. App. 374, 378 (2) ( 779 SE2d 410 ) (2015) (“In an action to quiet title brought under OCGA § 23-3-60 et seq., the findings of the special master which are adopted by the trial court will be upheld unless clearly erroneous.

2021See generally Sanders v. State, 235 Ga. 425, 432 (II) ( 219 SE2d 768 ) (1975) (per curiam) (noting that “testimony adduced at a post-conviction hearing can be utilized to show whether or not there was probable cause for arrest”), superseded in part by statute on 10 other grounds as noted in State v. Dempsey, 290 Ga. 763, 765 (1) ( 727 SE2d 670 ) (2012).

2021See generally Sanders v. State, 235 Ga. 425, 432 (II) ( 219 SE2d 768 ) (1975) (per curiam) (noting that “testimony adduced at a post-conviction hearing can be utilized to show whether or not there was probable cause for arrest”), superseded in part by statute on 10 other grounds as noted in State v. Dempsey, 290 Ga. 763, 765 (1) ( 727 SE2d 670 ) (2012).

2021Indeed, the State acknowledges Durrence v. State, 319 Ga. App. 866, 867 (1) ( 738 SE2d 692 ) (2013), for the proposition that a reviewing court may consider all relevant evidence of record, including evidence presented at a pretrial hearing, at trial, or an appropriate post-trial hearing.

2021Indeed, the State acknowledges Durrence v. State, 319 Ga. App. 866, 867 (1) ( 738 SE2d 692 ) (2013), for the proposition that a reviewing court may consider all relevant evidence of record, including evidence presented at a pretrial hearing, at trial, or an appropriate post-trial hearing.

2018See also Weems v. State, 262 Ga. 101, 102 ( 416 SE2d 84 ) (1992) (remanding for the trial court to determine at a post-trial hearing whether peremptory strikes were racially motivated).5 After 5 It is certainly preferable, however, for the trial court to respond to a Batson challenge by clearly following the three-step analysis when the challenge is raised at trial and “‘clearly stat[ing] on the record its reasoning and conclusions as to each step of the inquiry.’” Coleman, 301 Ga. at 13 hearing testimony from potential jurors who were struck and the appellants’ arguments against the prosecuto

2018See also Weems v. State, 262 Ga. 101, 102 ( 416 SE2d 84 ) (1992) (remanding for the trial court to determine at a post-trial hearing whether peremptory strikes were racially motivated).5 After 5 It is certainly preferable, however, for the trial court to respond to a Batson challenge by clearly following the three-step analysis when the challenge is raised at trial and “‘clearly stat[ing] on the record its reasoning and conclusions as to each step of the inquiry.’” Coleman, 301 Ga. at 13 hearing testimony from potential jurors who were struck and the appellants’ arguments against the prosecuto

2016Spears v. State, 296 Ga. 598, 604 (4) ( 769 SE2d 337 ) (2015).

2016Spears v. State, 296 Ga. 598, 604 (4) ( 769 SE2d 337 ) (2015).

2015See Chapel v. State, 264 Ga. 267, 270 (3) (c) ( 443 SE2d 271 ) (1994) (“Furthermore, this court has held that when faced with a ‘serious potential for a post-trial claim of ineffectiveness’ a trial court properly refused to allow the defendant to be represented by counsel of his choice.” (citation omitted)).

2015See Chapel v. State, 264 Ga. 267, 270 (3) (c) ( 443 SE2d 271 ) (1994) (“Furthermore, this court has held that when faced with a ‘serious potential for a post-trial claim of ineffectiveness’ a trial court properly refused to allow the defendant to be represented by counsel of his choice.” (citation omitted)).

2014See Betancourt v. State, 322 Ga. App. 201, 211 (4) (a) (i), n. 37 ( 744 SE2d 419 ) (2013) (post-trial hearing cured any alleged error in pretrial hearing); Brown v. State, 307 Ga. App. 99, 103 (2) (b) ( 704 SE2d 227 ) (2010) (providing that trial court may conduct a post-trial similar transaction hearing).

2014See Betancourt v. State, 322 Ga. App. 201, 211 (4) (a) (i), n. 37 ( 744 SE2d 419 ) (2013) (post-trial hearing cured any alleged error in pretrial hearing); Brown v. State, 307 Ga. App. 99, 103 (2) (b) ( 704 SE2d 227 ) (2010) (providing that trial court may conduct a post-trial similar transaction hearing).

2013Daniels v. State, 296 Ga. App. 795, 799 (5) (a) ( 676 SE2d 13 ) (2009) (punctuation omitted); King v. State, 287 Ga. App. 375, 378 (2) (b) ( 651 SE2d 496 ) (2007) (“The complaint of insufficient meetings with trial counsel is not dispositive, as there exists no magic amount of time which counsel must spend in actual conference with his client.” (punctuation omitted)).

2013Daniels v. State, 296 Ga. App. 795, 799 (5) (a) ( 676 SE2d 13 ) (2009) (punctuation omitted); King v. State, 287 Ga. App. 375, 378 (2) (b) ( 651 SE2d 496 ) (2007) (“The complaint of insufficient meetings with trial counsel is not dispositive, as there exists no magic amount of time which counsel must spend in actual conference with his client.” (punctuation omitted)).

2013Daniels v. State, 296 Ga. App. 795, 799 (5) (a) ( 676 SE2d 13 ) (2009) (punctuation omitted); King v. State, 287 Ga. App. 375, 378 (2) (b) ( 651 SE2d 496 ) (2007) (“The complaint of insufficient meetings with trial counsel is not dispositive, as there exists no magic amount of time which counsel must spend in actual conference with his client.” (punctuation omitted)).

2013Daniels v. State, 296 Ga. App. 795, 799 (5) (a) ( 676 SE2d 13 ) (2009) (punctuation omitted); King v. State, 287 Ga. App. 375, 378 (2) (b) ( 651 SE2d 496 ) (2007) (“The complaint of insufficient meetings with trial counsel is not dispositive, as there exists no magic amount of time which counsel must spend in actual conference with his client.” (punctuation omitted)).

2012See Watkins, 289 Ga. at 362 .

2010See Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U. S. at 174-176 ; Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U. S. 335, 350 (100 SC 1708, 64 LE2d 333) (1980). 6 This Court has also found a Sixth Amendment actual conflict to occur when the attorney’s duty of loyalty to his client conflicts with the attorney’s duty to the attorney’s employer.

2010See Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U. S. at 174-176 ; Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U. S. 335, 350 (100 SC 1708, 64 LE2d 333) (1980). 6 This Court has also found a Sixth Amendment actual conflict to occur when the attorney’s duty of loyalty to his client conflicts with the attorney’s duty to the attorney’s employer.