exhaustion of remedies doctrine in New Jersey

2015Rule 4:69-5 imposes a duty to exhaust administrative remedies before initiating actions at law “[ejxcept where it is manifest that the interest of justice requires otherwise.” As previously explained, “the exhaustion of remedies requirement is a rule of practice designed to allow administrative bodies to perform their statutory functions in an orderly manner without preliminary interference from the courts.” Brunetti v. Borough of New Milford, 68 N.J. 576, 588 , 350 A.2d 19 (1975).

2015Rule 4:69-5 imposes a duty to exhaust administrative remedies before initiating actions at law “[ejxcept where it is manifest that the interest of justice requires otherwise.” As previously explained, “the exhaustion of remedies requirement is a rule of practice designed to allow administrative bodies to perform their statutory functions in an orderly manner without preliminary interference from the courts.” Brunetti v. Borough of New Milford, 68 N.J. 576, 588 , 350 A.2d 19 (1975).

2021City v. Laezza, 80 N.J. 255 , 265 (1979).] "It is axiomatic that the exhaustion of remedies requirement is neither jurisdictional nor absolute." 21st Century Amusements, 257 N.J.

1993Atlantic City v. Laezza, 80 N.J. 255 , 265, 403 A.2d 465 (1979).

2001Ibid.

2001Ibid.

1992Matawan Borough v. Monmouth County Bd. of Taxation, 51 N.J. 291, 296 , 240 A. 2d 8 (1968).

1985In general, in cases “involving only legal questions, the doctrine of exhaustion of remedies does not apply.” New Jersey Civil Service Ass’n, 88 N.J. at 613 (citing Farmingdale Realty Co. v. Borough of Farmingdale, 55 N.J. 103,112 (1969); Borough of Matawan, 51 N.J. at 296 ).

1975Ward v. Keenan, supra, 3 N.J. at 302 .

1958For example, the doctrine has not been applied where the disposition of the matter depends solely on the decision of a question of law, Nolan v. Fitzpatrick, 9 N.J. 477 (1952); or where the jurisdiction of the administrative tribunal is doubtful, or where the charges asserted are so palpably defective as to make the jurisdiction of the tribunal merely colorable, Ward v. Keenan, 3 N.J. 298 (1949); or where the administrative remedies are futile, illusory or vain.

2021City v. Laezza, 80 N.J. 255 , 265 (1979).] "It is axiomatic that the exhaustion of remedies requirement is neither jurisdictional nor absolute." 21st Century Amusements, 257 N.J.

2016Ibid.

2011Roadway Express, Inc. v. Kingsley, 37 N.J. 136, 139 , 179 A.2d 729 (1962).

2011Roadway Express, Inc. v. Kingsley, 37 N.J. 136, 139 , 179 A.2d 729 (1962).

1995Id. at 560-561 , 401 A. 2d 533 .

1995Id. at 560-561 , 401 A. 2d 533 .

1987Accordingly, “the doctrine of exhaustion of remedies should be applied to prevent circumvention of the established procedures.” First Jersey Sec., Inc. v. Bergen, 605 F. 2d 690 at 695 (3d Cir.1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1074 , 100 S.Ct. 1020 , 62 L.Ed.2d 756 (1980).

1987Accordingly, “the doctrine of exhaustion of remedies should be applied to prevent circumvention of the established procedures.” First Jersey Sec., Inc. v. Bergen, 605 F. 2d 690 at 695 (3d Cir.1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1074 , 100 S.Ct. 1020 , 62 L.Ed.2d 756 (1980).

1987Accordingly, “the doctrine of exhaustion of remedies should be applied to prevent circumvention of the established procedures.” First Jersey Sec., Inc. v. Bergen, 605 F. 2d 690 at 695 (3d Cir.1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1074 , 100 S.Ct. 1020 , 62 L.Ed.2d 756 (1980).

1986We granted plaintiffs’ petition for certification, 101 N.J. 515 (1985).

1985Thereafter we held, in an opinion by Justice Burling (Gibraltar Corrugated Paper Co. v. North Bergen Twp. [ 20 N.J. 213 , 119 A.2d 135 (1955) ] supra), that the Division of Tax Appeals has the statutory power and duty to remedy a discriminatory assessment by reducing it to the common level of assessment below true value.

1985Thereafter we held, in an opinion by Justice Burling (Gibraltar Corrugated Paper Co. v. North Bergen Twp. [ 20 N.J. 213 , 119 A.2d 135 (1955) ] supra), that the Division of Tax Appeals has the statutory power and duty to remedy a discriminatory assessment by reducing it to the common level of assessment below true value.

1985In general, in cases “involving only legal questions, the doctrine of exhaustion of remedies does not apply.” New Jersey Civil Service Ass’n, 88 N.J. at 613 (citing Farmingdale Realty Co. v. Borough of Farmingdale, 55 N.J. 103,112 (1969); Borough of Matawan, 51 N.J. at 296 ).

1985A limited exception to this rule may be appropriate where the court perceives the agency to be in a special position to interpret its enabling legislation, see Paterson Redevelopment Agency v. Schulman, 78 N.J. 378, 387 (1979), cert, denied 444 U.S. 900 , 100 S.Ct. 210 , 62 L.Ed.2d 136 (1979); but where the agency cannot definitively or conclusively resolve the issues, and further, cannot provide any relief for plaintiffs, any delay in confronting the merits will work an injustice, Boss v. Rockland Electric Co., 95 N.J. 33, 40 (1983).

1985A limited exception to this rule may be appropriate where the court perceives the agency to be in a special position to interpret its enabling legislation, see Paterson Redevelopment Agency v. Schulman, 78 N.J. 378, 387 (1979), cert, denied 444 U.S. 900 , 100 S.Ct. 210 , 62 L.Ed.2d 136 (1979); but where the agency cannot definitively or conclusively resolve the issues, and further, cannot provide any relief for plaintiffs, any delay in confronting the merits will work an injustice, Boss v. Rockland Electric Co., 95 N.J. 33, 40 (1983).

1985A limited exception to this rule may be appropriate where the court perceives the agency to be in a special position to interpret its enabling legislation, see Paterson Redevelopment Agency v. Schulman, 78 N.J. 378, 387 (1979), cert, denied 444 U.S. 900 , 100 S.Ct. 210 , 62 L.Ed.2d 136 (1979); but where the agency cannot definitively or conclusively resolve the issues, and further, cannot provide any relief for plaintiffs, any delay in confronting the merits will work an injustice, Boss v. Rockland Electric Co., 95 N.J. 33, 40 (1983).

1978Such notice is important to defendants since they argue that the doctrine of exhaustion of remedies, as applied in Pennsylvania, would have precluded them from a right to be heard on the merits within the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, and cite the case of Philadelphia v. Kenny, supra .