exhaustion of remedies requirement in Texas

2008Id. at *14-15 (citing Kerrville State Hosp. v. Fernandez, 28 S.W.3d 1, 2-4 (Tex. 2000); Baptist Mem’l Healthcare Sys. v. Casanova, 2 S.W.3d 306, 308-09 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1999, no pet.)).2 Like our sister court, we can discern no intent on the part of the legislature to require a plaintiff to exhaust administrative remedies before filing suit for retaliatory discharge.

2008Id. at *14-15 (citing Kerrville State Hosp. v. Fernandez , 28 S.W.3d 1, 2-4 (Tex. 2000); Baptist Mem'l Healthcare Sys. v. Casanova , 2 S.W.3d 306, 308-09 (Tex. App.--San Antonio 1999, no pet.)). (2) Like our sister court, we can discern no intent on the part of the legislature to require a plaintiff to exhaust administrative remedies before filing suit for retaliatory discharge.

2014Leachman v. Dretke, 261 S.W.3d 297 , 310–11 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2008, no pet.); see also Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81 , 83–84 (2006).

2012Leachman v. Dretke, 261 S.W.3d 297 , 310–11 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2008, no pet.) (following Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81 , 83–84 (2006)).

2008Id. at *14-15 (citing Kerrville State Hosp. v. Fernandez, 28 S.W.3d 1, 2-4 (Tex. 2000); Baptist Mem’l Healthcare Sys. v. Casanova, 2 S.W.3d 306, 308-09 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1999, no pet.)).2 Like our sister court, we can discern no intent on the part of the legislature to require a plaintiff to exhaust administrative remedies before filing suit for retaliatory discharge.

2008Id. at *14-15 (citing Kerrville State Hosp. v. Fernandez , 28 S.W.3d 1, 2-4 (Tex. 2000); Baptist Mem'l Healthcare Sys. v. Casanova , 2 S.W.3d 306, 308-09 (Tex. App.--San Antonio 1999, no pet.)). (2) Like our sister court, we can discern no intent on the part of the legislature to require a plaintiff to exhaust administrative remedies before filing suit for retaliatory discharge.

2007Id. (citing Schroeder v. Texas Iron Works, Inc., 813 S.W.2d 483, 485-88 (Tex. 1991)).

2007Id. (citing Schroeder v. Texas Iron Works, Inc. , 813 S.W.2d 483, 485-88 (Tex. 1991)).

2015See City of Houston v. Williams, 99 S.W.3d 709, 717 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, no pet; Mag-T, L.P., 161 S.W.3d at 625. 10.

2015See City of Houston v. Williams, 99 S.W.3d 709, 717 (Tex. App.— 16 Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, no pet); Mag-T, L.P. v. Travis Central App. Dist., 161 S.W.3d 617, 625 (Tex. App.—Austin, 2005, pet denied).

2003Comm’n , 643 S.W.2d 681, 683 (Tex. 1983); North Alamo Water Supply Corp. v. Texas Dep’t of Health 839 S.W.2d 455, 458 (Tex. App.—Austin 1992, writ denied); but see Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp. , 303 U.S. 41, 51 (1938) (noting that the exhaustion of remedies doctrine has “been repeatedly acted on in cases where . . . the contention is made that the administrative body lacked power over the subject matter.”); Turner v. Bennett , 108 S.W.2d 967, 971 (Tex. Civ .

2003Comm’n, 643 S.W.2d 681, 683 (Tex.1983); North Alamo Water Supply Corp. v. Texas Dep’t of Health 839 S.W.2d 455, 458 (Tex.App.-Austin 1992, writ denied); but see Myers v. Bethlehem Ship-building Corp., 303 U.S. 41, 51 , 58 S.Ct. 459 , 82 L.Ed. 638 (1938) (noting that the exhaustion of remedies doctrine has "been repeatedly acted on in cases where ... the contention is made that the administrative body lacked power over the subject matter.”); Turner v. Bennett, 108 S.W.2d 967, 971 (Tex.Civ.App.-Beaumont 1937, no writ) (disapproving of an equitable measure which "perpetually enjoins, not a judgme

2008See Schutz, 101 S.W.3d at 518-520, 521-522 (observing that the family code provisions governing investigations of “foster homes” incorporated chapter 42 of the human resources code, which contained an exhaustion-of-remedies requirement).

2008See Schultz, 101 S.W.3d at 518-20, 21-22 (observing that the family code provisions governing investigations of “foster homes” incorporated chapter 42 of the human resources code, which contained an exhaustion-of-remedies requirement).

2003See Butnaru v. Ford, 84 S.W.3d 198, 207-08 (Tex. 2002); see also Texas State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Walgreen Tex. Co., 520 S.W.2d (Tex. App.—Austin 1975, writ ref’d n.r.e).

2003See Butnaru v. Ford, 84 S.W.3d 198, 207-08 (Tex.2002); see also Texas State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Walgreen Tex. Co., 520 S.W.2d 845 (Tex.App.-Austin 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e).

2003Id. §§ 410.255, .301; see Functional Restoration Assocs., 19 S.W.3d at 398 (stating that section 410.251 provides the right of judicial review; sections 410.255 and 410.301 provide the manner of judicial review).

2003Id. §§ 410.255, .301; see Functional Restoration Assocs. , 19 S.W.3d at 398 (stating that section 410.251 provides the right of judicial review; sections 410.255 and 410.301 provide the manner of judicial review).

2023See Marquez, 487 S.W.3d at 545 (“Regarding disputes that arise within the education system, the [l]egislature has provided that, with limited statutory exceptions not at issue here, a person” must exhaust his or her administrative remedies).

2019Dist. v. Marquez, 487 S.W.3d 538, 546 (Tex. 2016) (noting that the exhaustion-of-remedies requirement “applies only to complaints that the Legislature has authorized the Commissioner to resolve”).

2013Cf. GAB Business Services, Inc. v. Moore, 829 S.W.2d 345, 350 (Tex.App.--Texarkana 1992, no writ) (holding evidence did not clearly establish private insurance adjuster handling workers’ compensation claims for Texas Municipal League Intergovernmental Risk Pool was agent of risk pool entitled to governmental immunity; rather, evidence showed adjuster was an independent contractor acting on its own authority and not entitled to immunity); Campbell v. Tex. Employers’ Ins.

2013Cf. GAB Business Services, Inc. v. Moore, 829 S.W.2d 345, 350 (Tex.App.--Texarkana 1992, no writ) (holding evidence did not clearly establish private insurance adjuster handling workers' compensation claims for Texas Municipal League Intergovernmental Risk Pool was agent of risk pool entitled to governmental immunity; rather, evidence showed adjuster was an independent contractor acting on its own authority and not entitled to immunity); Campbell v. Tex. Employers' Ins.

2010The City relies on City of Waco v. Lopez . 259 S.W.3d 147, 149-50 (Tex. 2008).

2010The City relies on City of Waco v. Lopez. 259 S.W.3d 147, 149-50 (Tex. 2008).

2007See Stmyhom v. Raytheon E-Sys., 101 S.W.3d 558, 572 (Tex.App.Austin 2003, pet. denied).

2007See Strayhorn v. Raytheon E-Sys. , 101 S.W.3d 558, 572 (Tex. App.--Austin 2003, pet. denied).

2005New Caney ISD v. Burnham AutoCountry, Inc. , 30 S.W.3d 534, 537 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2000, pet. denied).

2005New Caney ISD v. Burnham AutoCountry, Inc. , 30 S.W.3d 534, 537 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2000, pet. denied).

2003Comm’n , 643 S.W.2d 681, 683 (Tex. 1983); North Alamo Water Supply Corp. v. Texas Dep’t of Health 839 S.W.2d 455, 458 (Tex. App.—Austin 1992, writ denied); but see Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp. , 303 U.S. 41, 51 (1938) (noting that the exhaustion of remedies doctrine has “been repeatedly acted on in cases where . . . the contention is made that the administrative body lacked power over the subject matter.”); Turner v. Bennett , 108 S.W.2d 967, 971 (Tex. Civ .

2003Comm’n, 643 S.W.2d 681, 683 (Tex.1983); North Alamo Water Supply Corp. v. Texas Dep’t of Health 839 S.W.2d 455, 458 (Tex.App.-Austin 1992, writ denied); but see Myers v. Bethlehem Ship-building Corp., 303 U.S. 41, 51 , 58 S.Ct. 459 , 82 L.Ed. 638 (1938) (noting that the exhaustion of remedies doctrine has "been repeatedly acted on in cases where ... the contention is made that the administrative body lacked power over the subject matter.”); Turner v. Bennett, 108 S.W.2d 967, 971 (Tex.Civ.App.-Beaumont 1937, no writ) (disapproving of an equitable measure which "perpetually enjoins, not a judgme

2003Comm’n , 643 S.W.2d 681, 683 (Tex. 1983); North Alamo Water Supply Corp. v. Texas Dep’t of Health 839 S.W.2d 455, 458 (Tex. App.—Austin 1992, writ denied); but see Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp. , 303 U.S. 41, 51 (1938) (noting that the exhaustion of remedies doctrine has “been repeatedly acted on in cases where . . . the contention is made that the administrative body lacked power over the subject matter.”); Turner v. Bennett , 108 S.W.2d 967, 971 (Tex. Civ .

2003Comm’n, 643 S.W.2d 681, 683 (Tex.1983); North Alamo Water Supply Corp. v. Texas Dep’t of Health 839 S.W.2d 455, 458 (Tex.App.-Austin 1992, writ denied); but see Myers v. Bethlehem Ship-building Corp., 303 U.S. 41, 51 , 58 S.Ct. 459 , 82 L.Ed. 638 (1938) (noting that the exhaustion of remedies doctrine has "been repeatedly acted on in cases where ... the contention is made that the administrative body lacked power over the subject matter.”); Turner v. Bennett, 108 S.W.2d 967, 971 (Tex.Civ.App.-Beaumont 1937, no writ) (disapproving of an equitable measure which "perpetually enjoins, not a judgme

2008“In such a case, the purposes underlying the exhaustion of remedies rule are not applicable, judicial and administrative efficacy are not served, and agency polices and expertise are irrelevant if the agency’s final action will be a nullity.” MAG-T, L.P., 161 S.W.3d at 625 .

2008A In such a case, the purposes underlying the exhaustion of remedies rule are not applicable, judicial and administrative efficacy are not served, and agency polices and expertise are irrelevant if the agency = s final action will be a nullity. @ MAG-T, L.P. , 161 S.W.3d at 625 .

2015The case did not involve an underlying administrative proceeding, the doctrine of exhaustion of remedies, or 9 Audi also cites Heinrich for the principle that, “[w]here the evidence raises a fact issue, the court must send the dispute to the fact finder.” (Audi’s Br. at p. 9.) In Heinrich, however, there was a factual dispute – created by affidavits and documentary evidence – regarding whether or not the plaintiff was entitled to 100% of her husband’s pension or a lesser amount. 284 S.W.3d at 379-380 .

2014“To fall within this ultra vires exception, a suit must not complain of a government officer’s exercise of discretion, but rather must allege, and ultimately prove, that the officer acted without legal authority or failed to perform a purely ministerial act.” Id. at 372 ; see Creedmoor-Maha Water Supply Corp, 307 S.W.3d at 517–18 (holding that “allegations that [the commission] reached an incorrect or wrong result when exercising its delegated authority” do not invoke “the district court’s inherent jurisdiction to remedy ultra vires agency actions”). 16 Appellees also urge that Sabine was not

2014Essenburg v. Dallas Cnty., 988 S.W.2d 188, 189 (Tex. 1998).

2014Essenburg v. Dallas Cnty., 988 S.W.2d 188, 189 (Tex.1998).

2011Consequently, the State Defendants further reasoned, the Plaintiffs’ sole conceivable remedy with respect to their rule-invalidity complaint would have been through TCEQ’s contested-case hearing process and judicial review, subject to the exhaustion-of-remedies and error- judicial review of an administrative order unless a statute provides a right or unless the order adversely affects a vested property right or otherwise violates a constitutional right.”) (citing Stone v. Texas Liquor Control Bd., 417 S.W.2d 385, 385-86 (Tex. 1967)). 17 See also Texas Logos, L.P. v. Texas Dep’t of Transp., 241

2003Id. '' 410.255, .301; see Functional Restoration Assocs., 19 S.W.3d at 398 (stating that section 410.251 provides the right of judicial review; sections 410.255 and 410.301 provide the manner of judicial review).

2025See, e.g., Kilgore ISD v. Axberg, 535 S.W.3d 21, 34 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2017, no pet.) (noting that “there are exceptions to the exhaustion-of-remedies doctrine,” including “when an administrative agency purports to act outside its statutory powers”); Brennan v. City of Willow Park, 376 S.W.3d 910, 921-22 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2012, pet. 37 denied) (parties were not required to pursue any type of protest procedure where they alleged agency acted outside its statutory powers); Smith v. Abbott, 311 S.W.3d 62, 80 (Tex. App.—Austin 2010, pet. denied) (noting that “administrative exhaustion is not

2025See, e.g., Kilgore ISD v. Axberg, 535 S.W.3d 21, 34 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2017, no pet.) (noting that “there are exceptions to the exhaustion-of-remedies doctrine,” including “when an administrative agency purports to act outside its statutory powers”); Brennan v. City of Willow Park, 376 S.W.3d 910, 921-22 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2012, pet. 37 denied) (parties were not required to pursue any type of protest procedure where they alleged agency acted outside its statutory powers); Smith v. Abbott, 311 S.W.3d 62, 80 (Tex. App.—Austin 2010, pet. denied) (noting that “administrative exhaustion is not

2025Id. at 221–22; Henry v. Dillard Dep’t Stores, Inc., 70 S.W.3d 808, 809 (Tex. 2002). 12 The exhaustion of remedies doctrine is sometimes confused with the doctrine of primary jurisdiction.

2025See Subaru of America, Inc. v. David McDavid Nissan, Inc., 84 S.W.3d 212, 220 (Tex. 2002).

2025See, e.g., Kilgore ISD v. Axberg, 535 S.W.3d 21, 34 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2017, no pet.) (noting that “there are exceptions to the exhaustion-of-remedies doctrine,” including “when an administrative agency purports to act outside its statutory powers”); Brennan v. City of Willow Park, 376 S.W.3d 910, 921-22 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2012, pet. 37 denied) (parties were not required to pursue any type of protest procedure where they alleged agency acted outside its statutory powers); Smith v. Abbott, 311 S.W.3d 62, 80 (Tex. App.—Austin 2010, pet. denied) (noting that “administrative exhaustion is not

2025See 692 S.W.3d at 198. 18 Even if exhaustion were required here (which it is not), “[f]utility is a recognized exception to the exhaustion of administrative remedies.” Ogletree v. Glen Rose ISD, 314 S.W.3d 450, 454 (Tex. App.—Waco 2010, pet. denied).