exhaustion of remedies doctrine in District of Columbia

2006Admin., supra, 633 A.2d at 20 (citing Dano Resource Recovery, supra, 566 A.2d at 486 ) (recognizing as exception to the exhaustion of remedies doctrine “inadequate remedy, unavailable remedy, and futility”) (emphasis added).

1996FERREN, Associate Judge, concurring: I concur in Judge REID's opinion but write separately because I believe Part II.C., discussing "whether the exhaustion of remedies doctrine applies to Walton's third argument," ante at 1355, requires further elaboration: The question whether a plaintiff has exhausted administrative remedies before coming to court is not a jurisdictional inquiry, since "exhaustion of remedies is a `flexible doctrine' subject to `a number of interrelated exceptions.'" District of Columbia v. Group Insurance Administration, 633 A.2d 2, 20 (D.C.1993) (citation omitted); see Ten

2006The primary jurisdiction rule "[comes] into play whenever enforcement of the claim requires the resolution of issues which, under a regulatory scheme, have been placed within the special competence of an administrative body; in such a case the judicial process is suspended pending referral of such issues to the administrative body for its views.” Drayton v. Poretsky Mgmt., Inc. 462 A.2d 1115, 1118 (D.C.1983) (quoting Western Pac., supra, 352 U.S. at 63-64 , 77 S.Ct. 161 ). 6 .

1996FERREN, Associate Judge, concurring: I concur in Judge REID’s opinion but write separately because I believe Part II.C., discussing “whether the exhaustion of remedies doctrine applies to Walton’s third argument,” ante at 1355, requires further elaboration: The question whether a plaintiff has exhausted administrative remedies before coming to court is not a jurisdictional inquiry, since “exhaustion of remedies is a ‘flexible doctrine’ subject to ‘a number of interrelated exceptions.’ ” District of Columbia v. Group Insurance Administration, 633 A.2d 2, 20 (D.C.1993) (citation omitted); see Te

1996FERREN, Associate Judge, concurring: I concur in Judge REID's opinion but write separately because I believe Part II.C., discussing "whether the exhaustion of remedies doctrine applies to Walton's third argument," ante at 1355, requires further elaboration: The question whether a plaintiff has exhausted administrative remedies before coming to court is not a jurisdictional inquiry, since "exhaustion of remedies is a `flexible doctrine' subject to `a number of interrelated exceptions.'" District of Columbia v. Group Insurance Administration, 633 A.2d 2, 20 (D.C.1993) (citation omitted); see Ten

1985In making this determination, the intent of the claimant is the key factor; compare Jennings v. Gilbertson, 74 A.2d 839, 841 (D.C.1950) (failure to exhaust not excused where “petitioner offers no reason at all for his failure to seek a[n intra-agency] review”); McGee, supra note 7, 402 U.S. at 491, 91 S.Ct. at 1572 (failure to exhaust not excused where petitioner’s “failure to pursue his administrative remedies was deliberate and without excuse”).

1985In making this determination, the intent of the claimant is the key factor; compare Jennings v. Gilbertson, 74 A.2d 839, 841 (D.C. 1950) (failure to exhaust not excused where "petitioner offers no reason at all for his failure to seek a[n intra-agency] review"); McGee, supra note 7, 402 U.S. at 491, 91 S.Ct. at 1572 (failure to exhaust not excused where petitioner's "failure to pursue his administrative remedies was deliberate and without excuse").

1985See Donato v. United States, 302 F.2d 468, 469-70 (9th Cir.1962) (where claimant alleged that he was summoned to firefighting duty before he had chance to file intended appeal, court remands to district court for factfinding on “question whether, under all of the circumstances of this case, a relaxation of the exhaustion of remedies rule would be just and proper”), cert. denied, 374 U.S. 828 , 83 S.Ct. 1868 , 10 L.Ed.2d 1052 (1963).

1985See Donato v. United States, 302 F.2d 468, 469-70 (9th Cir.1962) (where claimant alleged that he was summoned to firefighting duty before he had *1163 chance to file intended appeal, court remands to district court for factfinding on "question whether, under all of the circumstances of this case, a relaxation of the exhaustion of remedies rule would be just and proper"), cert. denied, 374 U.S. 828 , 83 S.Ct. 1868 , 10 L.Ed.2d 1052 (1963).

1985See Donato v. United States, 302 F.2d 468, 469-70 (9th Cir.1962) (where claimant alleged that he was summoned to firefighting duty before he had chance to file intended appeal, court remands to district court for factfinding on “question whether, under all of the circumstances of this case, a relaxation of the exhaustion of remedies rule would be just and proper”), cert. denied, 374 U.S. 828 , 83 S.Ct. 1868 , 10 L.Ed.2d 1052 (1963).

1985See Donato v. United States, 302 F.2d 468, 469-70 (9th Cir.1962) (where claimant alleged that he was summoned to firefighting duty before he had *1163 chance to file intended appeal, court remands to district court for factfinding on "question whether, under all of the circumstances of this case, a relaxation of the exhaustion of remedies rule would be just and proper"), cert. denied, 374 U.S. 828 , 83 S.Ct. 1868 , 10 L.Ed.2d 1052 (1963).

1985See Donato v. United States, 302 F.2d 468, 469-70 (9th Cir.1962) (where claimant alleged that he was summoned to firefighting duty before he had chance to file intended appeal, court remands to district court for factfinding on “question whether, under all of the circumstances of this case, a relaxation of the exhaustion of remedies rule would be just and proper”), cert. denied, 374 U.S. 828 , 83 S.Ct. 1868 , 10 L.Ed.2d 1052 (1963).

1985See Donato v. United States, 302 F.2d 468, 469-70 (9th Cir.1962) (where claimant alleged that he was summoned to firefighting duty before he had *1163 chance to file intended appeal, court remands to district court for factfinding on "question whether, under all of the circumstances of this case, a relaxation of the exhaustion of remedies rule would be just and proper"), cert. denied, 374 U.S. 828 , 83 S.Ct. 1868 , 10 L.Ed.2d 1052 (1963).

1985See Donato v. United States, 302 F.2d 468, 469-70 (9th Cir.1962) (where claimant alleged that he was summoned to firefighting duty before he had chance to file intended appeal, court remands to district court for factfinding on “question whether, under all of the circumstances of this case, a relaxation of the exhaustion of remedies rule would be just and proper”), cert. denied, 374 U.S. 828 , 83 S.Ct. 1868 , 10 L.Ed.2d 1052 (1963).

1985See Donato v. United States, 302 F.2d 468, 469-70 (9th Cir.1962) (where claimant alleged that he was summoned to firefighting duty before he had *1163 chance to file intended appeal, court remands to district court for factfinding on "question whether, under all of the circumstances of this case, a relaxation of the exhaustion of remedies rule would be just and proper"), cert. denied, 374 U.S. 828 , 83 S.Ct. 1868 , 10 L.Ed.2d 1052 (1963).

1983Id. at 733. 4 Appellants also maintain that in this case Keyes does not require the filing of individual claims for refund by members of the class because the filing requirement — essentially an application of the doctrine of exhaustion of remedies — need not be met when resort to the administrative process would be futile.