exhaustion of remedies doctrine (Ohio) · Go Syfert
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exhaustion of remedies doctrine in Ohio

8 Ohio opinions name it 2 courts 1986–2025 2 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by Ohio courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (2)

CaseFollowedCited
Horvath v. Barberton Bd. of Bldg. & Zoning Appealsgreen
ohioctapp · 2022 · cited in 1 Ohio opinions naming this issue, 2025–2025
1 sentence

2025However, the Taxpayers’ interpretation of the futility exception does not fall within the definition established by the Ohio Supreme Court. {¶24} As we explained in Horvath v. Barberton, 2022-Ohio-1302, ¶ 13 (9th Dist.), The Supreme Court of Ohio has described the futility exception as not requiring a litigant to take a vain act before initiating a judicial action.

11
Roll v. Edwardsgreen
ohioctapp · 2004 · cited in 1 Ohio opinions naming this issue, 2005–2005
2 sentences

2005Ricketts v. Lightcap (C.A.3, 1977), 567 F.2d 1226 , 1232 ; Mercado v. Perez Vega (D.Puerto Rico 1993), 853 F.Supp. 42 , 45 ; see, also, Roll v. Edwards, 156 Ohio App.3d 227 , 2004-Ohio-767 , at ¶ 27 (applying the ripeness doctrine, not the exhaustion of remedies doctrine, as the issue applicable to the facts and circumstances presented). {¶ 28} The exhaustion of administrative remedies doctrine requires a person to exhaust available statutory administrative remedies before seeking redress from the judicial system.

2005Ricketts v. Lightcap (C.A.3, 1977), 567 F.2d 1226 , 1232 ; Mercado v. Perez Vega (D.Puerto Rico 1993), 853 F.Supp. 42 , 45 ; see, also, Roll v. Edwards, 156 Ohio App.3d 227 , 2004-Ohio-767 , at ¶ 27 (applying the ripeness doctrine, not the exhaustion of remedies doctrine, as the issue applicable to the facts and circumstances presented). {¶ 28} The exhaustion of administrative remedies doctrine requires a person to exhaust available statutory administrative remedies before seeking redress from the judicial system.

11

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

CaseNegativeCited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Ohio. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (7)

CaseCitedYears
Kaufman v. Village of Newburgh Heights green
ohio · 1971
2 sentences

2002No. L-00-1098, quoting Kaufman v. Newburgh Heights (1971), 26 Ohio St.2d 217 , syllabus.

2000There is, however, a broader connotation to the term "vain act." A lack of authority to grant relief is a subset of the greater concept that the doctrine of exhaustion of remedies will apply only, "* * * if there is a remedy which is effectual to afford the relief sought." Kaufman v. Newburgh Heights (1971), 26 Ohio St.2d 217 , syllabus.

22000–2002
Karches v. City of Cincinnati green
ohio · 1988
1 sentence

2022Mr. Horvath does not contest that his letter to the BZBA appealing the Violation Notice on August 26, 2020, was beyond the ten-day period to file an appeal. {¶13} Rather, under his single assignment of error, Mr. Horvath makes numerous arguments that appear to fall under the first exception to the exhaustion of remedies doctrine: “there is no administrative remedy available which can provide the relief sought” or “resort to administrative remedies would be wholly futile[.]” See Karches, 38 Ohio St.3d at 17 .

12022–2022
Mercado v. Perez Vega green
prd · 1993
1 sentence

2005Ricketts v. Lightcap (C.A.3, 1977), 567 F.2d 1226 , 1232 ; Mercado v. Perez Vega (D.Puerto Rico 1993), 853 F.Supp. 42 , 45 ; see, also, Roll v. Edwards, 156 Ohio App.3d 227 , 2004-Ohio-767 , at ¶ 27 (applying the ripeness doctrine, not the exhaustion of remedies doctrine, as the issue applicable to the facts and circumstances presented). {¶ 28} The exhaustion of administrative remedies doctrine requires a person to exhaust available statutory administrative remedies before seeking redress from the judicial system.

12005–2005
United States v. Lightcap green
ca3 · 1977
1 sentence

2005Ricketts v. Lightcap (C.A.3, 1977), 567 F.2d 1226 , 1232 ; Mercado v. Perez Vega (D.Puerto Rico 1993), 853 F.Supp. 42 , 45 ; see, also, Roll v. Edwards, 156 Ohio App.3d 227 , 2004-Ohio-767 , at ¶ 27 (applying the ripeness doctrine, not the exhaustion of remedies doctrine, as the issue applicable to the facts and circumstances presented). {¶ 28} The exhaustion of administrative remedies doctrine requires a person to exhaust available statutory administrative remedies before seeking redress from the judicial system.

12005–2005
Van Fossen v. Babcock & Wilcox Co. green
ohio · 1988
2 sentences

1993Van Fossen v. Babcock & Wilcox Co. (1988), 36 Ohio St.3d 100 , 522 N.E.2d 489 .

1993Van Fossen v. Babcock & Wilcox Co. (1988), 36 Ohio St.3d 100 , 522 N.E.2d 489 .

11993–1993
Felder v. Casey green
scotus · 1988
2 sentences

1988Id. at _, 101 L.

1988Id. at _, 101 L.

11988–1988
Abood v. Detroit Board of Education red
scotus · 1977
2 sentences

1986In Abood, supra, at 242 , the United States Supreme Court observed: “* * * In view of the newly adopted Union internal remedy, it may be appropriate under Michigan law, even if not strictly required by any doctrine of exhaustion of remedies, to defer further judicial proceedings pending the voluntary utilization by the parties of that internal remedy as a possible means of settling the dispute.* * *” Toledo Federation of Teachers v. Gibney (Feb. 3, 1984), Lucas App. No. L-83-303, unreported, citing Abood, supra, also required dissenting teachers to first resort to the rebate procedure before s

1986In Abood, supra, at 242 , the United States Supreme Court observed: “* * * In view of the newly adopted Union internal remedy, it may be appropriate under Michigan law, even if not strictly required by any doctrine of exhaustion of remedies, to defer further judicial proceedings pending the voluntary utilization by the parties of that internal remedy as a possible means of settling the dispute.* * *” Toledo Federation of Teachers v. Gibney (Feb. 3, 1984), Lucas App. No. L-83-303, unreported, citing Abood, supra, also required dissenting teachers to first resort to the rebate procedure before s

11986–1986

Where else courts name it

IL 88 (1969–2025) TX 74 (1986–2025) CA 53 (1960–2025) AZ 30 (1975–2022) NJ 29 (1958–2026) NY 15 (1974–2025) IN 14 (1981–2026) PA 13 (1980–2019) WI 11 (1966–2026) WA 11 (1953–2015) CT 11 (1990–2008) AL 10 (1983–2015) AK 9 (1982–2024) OH 8 (1986–2025) TN 8 (1992–2025) RI 8 (1983–2010) MO 8 (1995–2025) CO 7 (1981–2017) OK 7 (1990–2021) ND 7 (1991–2024) NM 6 (1963–2015) UT 6 (1992–2011) DC 5 (1975–2006) MI 5 (1983–1997) MD 4 (1983–2005) KY 4 (2001–2014) OR 4 (1993–2013) AR 4 (1991–2000) WV 3 (1992–2000) SD 3 (1977–2000) GA 3 (2005–2013) IA 3 (1997–2026) MN 2 (1984–2015) FL 2 (2008–2012) MT 2 (1987–2022) KS 2 (2011–2011) LA 2 (1993–2004) HI 2 (2007–2012) NE 2 (2009–2017)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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