53 California opinions name it 3 courts 1960–2025 10 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Westlake Community Hospital v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences2005(Westlake Community Hosp. v. Superior Court, supra, 17 Cal.3d at pp. 472-473, 477-478.) On these facts, the Supreme Court concluded: “Inasmuch as the present affidavits do not indicate that Los Robles ever informed Dr. Kaiman that she had any right to contest the denial of membership privileges within the hospital’s own hierarchy, defendants cannot rely on plaintiff’s alleged failure to exhaust such remedies to bar her action.” (Id. at p. 478.) Los Robles then argued “that even if the doctrine of exhaustion of remedies does not bar plaintiff’s tort action with respect to the events at Los Robl 2003Accordingly, we conclude that the exhaustion of remedies doctrine fully applies to actions seeking damages for an allegedly wrongful termination of or exclusion from membership in a private association. [Citation.]." ( Id. at pp. 476-477, 131 Cal.Rptr. 90 , 551 P.2d 410 , fn. omitted.) Subsequently, in Rojo , we explained that, "[t]he `context' to which Westlake properly applies is where the party or entity whose `quasi-judicial' determination is challenged be it hospital, voluntary private or professional association, or public entity has provided an internal remedy. [Citations.] [¶] The | 2 | 7 |
Morton v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences2017Ct. (1970) 9 Cal.App.3d 977 , 982, 88 Cal.Rptr. 533 .) "There are several reasons for the exhaustion of remedies doctrine. 'The basic purpose for the exhaustion doctrine is to lighten the burden of overworked courts in cases where administrative remedies are available and are as likely as the judicial remedy to provide the wanted relief.' [Citation.] Even where the administrative remedy may not resolve all issues or provide the precise relief requested by a plaintiff, the exhaustion doctrine is still viewed with favor 'because it facilitates the development of a complete record that draws on a 2017Ct. (1970) 9 Cal.App.3d 977 , 982, 88 Cal.Rptr. 533 .) "There are several reasons for the exhaustion of remedies doctrine. 'The basic purpose for the exhaustion doctrine is to lighten the burden of overworked courts in cases where administrative remedies are available and are as likely as the judicial remedy to provide the wanted relief.' [Citation.] Even where the administrative remedy may not resolve all issues or provide the precise relief requested by a plaintiff, the exhaustion doctrine is still viewed with favor 'because it facilitates the development of a complete record that draws on a | 2 | 5 |
Rojo v. Kligergreen2 sentences2003As we stated in Westlake, ‘From the earliest decisions reviewing actions of voluntary private associations, . . . our courts have recognized the applicability of the exhaustion of remedies doctrine in this context.’ [Citations.] fl[] The ‘context’ to which Westlake properly applies is where the party or entity whose ‘quasi-judicial’ determination is challenged—be it hospital, voluntary private or professional association, or public entity—has provided an internal remedy. [Citations, including City of Fresno v. Superior Court (1987) 188 Cal.App.3d 1484, 1490-1491 [ 234 Cal.Rptr. 136 ] (city); E 2003As we stated in Westlake , `From the earliest decisions reviewing actions of voluntary private associations, ... our courts have recognized the applicability of the exhaustion of remedies doctrine in this context.' [Citations.] [¶] The `context' to which Westlake properly applies is where the party or entity whose `quasi-judicial' determination is challengedbe it hospital, voluntary private or professional association, or public entityhas provided an internal remedy. [Citations, including City of Fresno v. Superior Court (1987) 188 Cal.App.3d 1484, 1490-1491 , 234 Cal. Rptr. 136 [city]; Edgr | 2 | 4 |
Karlin v. Zaltagreen2 sentences1999“There are several reasons for the exhaustion of remedies doctrine. ‘The basic purpose for the exhaustion doctrine is to lighten the burden of overworked courts in cases where administrative remedies are available and are as likely as the judicial remedy to provide the wanted relief.’ (Morton v. Superior Court [(1970)] 9 Cal.App.3d 977, 982 [ 88 Cal.Rptr. 533 ].) Even where the administrative remedy may not resolve all issues or provide the precise relief requested by a plaintiff, the exhaustion doctrine is still viewed with favor ‘because it facilitates the development of a complete record th 1999“There are several reasons for the exhaustion of remedies doctrine. ‘The basic purpose for the exhaustion doctrine is to lighten the burden of overworked courts in cases where administrative remedies are available and are as likely as the judicial remedy to provide the wanted relief.’ (Morton v. Superior Court [(1970)] 9 Cal.App.3d 977, 982 [ 88 Cal.Rptr. 533 ].) Even where the administrative remedy may not resolve all issues or provide the precise relief requested by a plaintiff, the exhaustion doctrine is still viewed with favor ‘because it facilitates the development of a complete record th | 2 | 3 |
City of Fresno v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences2003As we stated in Westlake, ‘From the earliest decisions reviewing actions of voluntary private associations, . . . our courts have recognized the applicability of the exhaustion of remedies doctrine in this context.’ [Citations.] fl[] The ‘context’ to which Westlake properly applies is where the party or entity whose ‘quasi-judicial’ determination is challenged—be it hospital, voluntary private or professional association, or public entity—has provided an internal remedy. [Citations, including City of Fresno v. Superior Court (1987) 188 Cal.App.3d 1484, 1490-1491 [ 234 Cal.Rptr. 136 ] (city); E 2003As we stated in Westlake, ‘From the earliest decisions reviewing actions of voluntary private associations, . . . our courts have recognized the applicability of the exhaustion of remedies doctrine in this context.’ [Citations.] fl[] The ‘context’ to which Westlake properly applies is where the party or entity whose ‘quasi-judicial’ determination is challenged—be it hospital, voluntary private or professional association, or public entity—has provided an internal remedy. [Citations, including City of Fresno v. Superior Court (1987) 188 Cal.App.3d 1484, 1490-1491 [ 234 Cal.Rptr. 136 ] (city); E | 2 | 2 |
Logan v. Southern California Rapid Transit Districtgreen2 sentences2003As we stated in Westlake, ‘From the earliest decisions reviewing actions of voluntary private associations, . . . our courts have recognized the applicability of the exhaustion of remedies doctrine in this context.’ [Citations.] fl[] The ‘context’ to which Westlake properly applies is where the party or entity whose ‘quasi-judicial’ determination is challenged—be it hospital, voluntary private or professional association, or public entity—has provided an internal remedy. [Citations, including City of Fresno v. Superior Court (1987) 188 Cal.App.3d 1484, 1490-1491 [ 234 Cal.Rptr. 136 ] (city); E 2003As we stated in Westlake, ‘From the earliest decisions reviewing actions of voluntary private associations, . . . our courts have recognized the applicability of the exhaustion of remedies doctrine in this context.’ [Citations.] fl[] The ‘context’ to which Westlake properly applies is where the party or entity whose ‘quasi-judicial’ determination is challenged—be it hospital, voluntary private or professional association, or public entity—has provided an internal remedy. [Citations, including City of Fresno v. Superior Court (1987) 188 Cal.App.3d 1484, 1490-1491 [ 234 Cal.Rptr. 136 ] (city); E | 2 | 2 |
Bozaich v. State of Californiagreen2 sentences1999“There are several reasons for the exhaustion of remedies doctrine. ‘The basic purpose for the exhaustion doctrine is to lighten the burden of overworked courts in cases where administrative remedies are available and are as likely as the judicial remedy to provide the wanted relief.’ (Morton v. Superior Court [(1970)] 9 Cal.App.3d 977, 982 [ 88 Cal.Rptr. 533 ].) Even where the administrative remedy may not resolve all issues or provide the precise relief requested by a plaintiff, the exhaustion doctrine is still viewed with favor ‘because it facilitates the development of a complete record th 1999“There are several reasons for the exhaustion of remedies doctrine. ‘The basic purpose for the exhaustion doctrine is to lighten the burden of overworked courts in cases where administrative remedies are available and are as likely as the judicial remedy to provide the wanted relief.’ (Morton v. Superior Court [(1970)] 9 Cal.App.3d 977, 982 [ 88 Cal.Rptr. 533 ].) Even where the administrative remedy may not resolve all issues or provide the precise relief requested by a plaintiff, the exhaustion doctrine is still viewed with favor ‘because it facilitates the development of a complete record th | 2 | 2 |
Robinson v. Templar Lodge, No. 17green2 sentences1990As we stated in Westlake , "From the earliest decisions reviewing actions of voluntary private associations, ... our courts have recognized the applicability of the exhaustion of remedies doctrine in this context." ( 17 Cal.3d at p. 474 , citing, e.g., Levy v. Magnolia Lodge, I.O.O.F. (1895) 110 Cal. 297, 307-308 [ 42 P. 887 ], and Robinson v. Templar Lodge, I.O.O.F. (1897) 117 Cal. 370, 375-376 [ 49 P. 170 ], both cases disapproved on other grounds in Westlake, supra, at p. 479 .) The "context" to which Westlake properly applies is where the party or entity whose "quasi-judicial" determinatio 1990As we stated in Westlake , "From the earliest decisions reviewing actions of voluntary private associations, ... our courts have recognized the applicability of the exhaustion of remedies doctrine in this context." ( 17 Cal.3d at p. 474 , citing, e.g., Levy v. Magnolia Lodge, I.O.O.F. (1895) 110 Cal. 297, 307-308 [ 42 P. 887 ], and Robinson v. Templar Lodge, I.O.O.F. (1897) 117 Cal. 370, 375-376 [ 49 P. 170 ], both cases disapproved on other grounds in Westlake, supra, at p. 479 .) The "context" to which Westlake properly applies is where the party or entity whose "quasi-judicial" determinatio | 2 | 2 |
Levy v. Magnolia Lodge, No. 29, I. O. O. F.green2 sentences1990As we stated in Westlake , "From the earliest decisions reviewing actions of voluntary private associations, ... our courts have recognized the applicability of the exhaustion of remedies doctrine in this context." ( 17 Cal.3d at p. 474 , citing, e.g., Levy v. Magnolia Lodge, I.O.O.F. (1895) 110 Cal. 297, 307-308 [ 42 P. 887 ], and Robinson v. Templar Lodge, I.O.O.F. (1897) 117 Cal. 370, 375-376 [ 49 P. 170 ], both cases disapproved on other grounds in Westlake, supra, at p. 479 .) The "context" to which Westlake properly applies is where the party or entity whose "quasi-judicial" determinatio 1990As we stated in Westlake , "From the earliest decisions reviewing actions of voluntary private associations, ... our courts have recognized the applicability of the exhaustion of remedies doctrine in this context." ( 17 Cal.3d at p. 474 , citing, e.g., Levy v. Magnolia Lodge, I.O.O.F. (1895) 110 Cal. 297, 307-308 [ 42 P. 887 ], and Robinson v. Templar Lodge, I.O.O.F. (1897) 117 Cal. 370, 375-376 [ 49 P. 170 ], both cases disapproved on other grounds in Westlake, supra, at p. 479 .) The "context" to which Westlake properly applies is where the party or entity whose "quasi-judicial" determinatio | 2 | 2 |
Yamaha Motor Corp. v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences2017Ct., supra , 185 Cal.App.3d at p. 1240 , 230 Cal.Rptr. 382 .) The doctrine of exhaustion of remedies is not solely a creature of our state law, but has been repeatedly recognized by federal courts in their disposition of closely related securities cases involving discipline imposed by SROs. 2017Ct., supra , 185 Cal.App.3d at p. 1240 , 230 Cal.Rptr. 382 .) The doctrine of exhaustion of remedies is not solely a creature of our state law, but has been repeatedly recognized by federal courts in their disposition of closely related securities cases involving discipline imposed by SROs. | 1 | 3 |
Coachella Valley Mosquito & Vector Control District v. California Public Employment Relations Boardgreen2 sentences2025“In general, a party must exhaust administrative remedies before resorting to the courts.” (Coachella Valley Mosquito & Vector Control Dist. v. California Public Employment Relations Bd. (2005) 35 Cal.4th 1072, 1080 .) The exhaustion doctrine “ ‘is principally grounded on concerns favoring administrative autonomy (i.e., courts should not interfere with an agency determination until the agency has reached a final decision) and judicial efficiency (i.e., overworked courts should decline to intervene in an administrative dispute unless absolutely necessary).’ ” (Ibid.) The doctrine “ ‘ “is not a 2016Under this exception, exhaustion of administrative remedies “may be excused when a party claims that ‘the agency lacks authority, statutory or otherwise, to resolve the underlying dispute between the parties.’ [Citations.]” (Coachella Valley Mosquito & Vector Control Dist. v. California Public Employment Relations Bd. (2005) 35 Cal.4th 1072, 1081-1082 [ 29 Cal.Rptr.3d 234 , 112 P.3d 623 ].) The administrative jurisdiction exception may apply even though the administrative agency has not yet made a final decision. | 1 | 2 |
Kaiser Foundation Hospitals v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences2025(Kaiser Foundation Hospitals v. Superior Court (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 85, 100 ; Eight Unnamed Physicians, supra, 150 Cal.App.4th at p. 511 .) A physician “challenging the propriety of a hospital’s denial or withdrawal of staff privileges must pursue the internal remedies afforded by that hospital to a final decision on the merits before resorting to the courts for relief.” (Unnamed Physician, supra, 93 Cal.App.4th at p. 619 .) The exhaustion of remedies doctrine applies in both administrative and traditional mandate actions. 2025The exhaustion requirement will be excused “where its pursuit would be futile, idle or useless.” (Bollengier, supra, 222 Cal.App.3d at p. 1126 .) “However, the futility exception is very narrow and will not apply unless the petitioner can positively state that the administrative agency has declared what its ruling will be in a particular case.” (Ibid.; accord, Kaiser Foundation Hospitals v. Superior Court, supra, 128 Cal.App.4th 85, 101 .) The Petition in this case contains no indication that the peer review panel (or any other body) has declared what its ruling will be. | 1 | 2 |
Sierra Club v. City of Orangegreen2 sentences2022(Sierra Club v. City of Orange (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 523, 536 [“An appellate court employs a de novo standard of review when determining whether the exhaustion of remedies doctrine applies”]; Farahani v. San Diego Community College Dist. (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 1486, 1491 [“The interpretation of a statute is a legal issue subject to de novo review”].) In reviewing questions of law, we are not bound by the trial court’s stated reasons or rationales. 2016(Sierra Club v. City of Orange, supra, at p. 535 .) There is no indication in the record that appellant, or any other person, presented the specific contention in the administrative proceedings below that the project’s 22. approval was incompatible with goals Nos. 6.f. and 7.e. of the General Plan.12 Therefore, under the exhaustion doctrine, these issues were not preserved for purposes of the instant judicial challenge and will not be considered. | 1 | 2 |
Ogo Associates v. City of Torrancegreen2 sentences2022(See Ogo Associates v. City of Torrance, supra, 37 Cal.App.3d at p. 834 .) Accordingly, we decline to apply the exhaustion of remedies doctrine as a bar to Save the Hill’s no- project challenge. 1987(See, e.g., Ogo Associates v. City of Torrance (1974) 37 Cal.App.3d 830, 834 [ 112 Cal.Rptr. 761 ].) Santos *1492 argues that because the administrative process in this case could not afford him damages as a remedy, he should be excused from exhausting his administrative remedies. | 1 | 2 |
Steinhart v. County of Los Angelesgreen1 sentence2024(See Steinhart v. County of Los Angeles, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 1316, fn. 13 .) Garner’s description did not include details about the OED process, did not purport to discuss appellate rights, did not represent that Vangsness could appear before a faculty committee, and did not state the faculty committee would reconsider factual findings made by OED. | 1 | 1 |
Farahani v. San Diego Community College Districtgreen1 sentence2022(Sierra Club v. City of Orange (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 523, 536 [“An appellate court employs a de novo standard of review when determining whether the exhaustion of remedies doctrine applies”]; Farahani v. San Diego Community College Dist. (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 1486, 1491 [“The interpretation of a statute is a legal issue subject to de novo review”].) In reviewing questions of law, we are not bound by the trial court’s stated reasons or rationales. | 1 | 1 |
Miller v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences2021(See City of Industry v. City of Fillmore (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 191, 211, fn. 14 [holding that the exhaustion doctrine did not apply, and that, because the primary jurisdiction doctrine had not been raised below, the “trial court in the first instance should decide whether this case should be stayed” under that doctrine]; Miller, supra, 50 Cal.App.4th at p. 1677 [remanding for the trial court to consider the primary jurisdiction issue where “the trial court’s stay of the action was not the result of an exercise of discretion under the primary jurisdiction doctrine, but of the belief that it h 2021(See City of Industry v. City of Fillmore (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 191, 211, fn. 14 [holding that the exhaustion doctrine did not apply, and that, because the primary jurisdiction doctrine had not been raised below, the “trial court in the first instance should decide whether this case should be stayed” under that doctrine]; Miller, supra, 50 Cal.App.4th at p. 1677 [remanding for the trial court to consider the primary jurisdiction issue where “the trial court’s stay of the action was not the result of an exercise of discretion under the primary jurisdiction doctrine, but of the belief that it h | 1 | 1 |
City of Industry v. City of Fillmoregreen1 sentence2021(See City of Industry v. City of Fillmore (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 191, 211, fn. 14 [holding that the exhaustion doctrine did not apply, and that, because the primary jurisdiction doctrine had not been raised below, the “trial court in the first instance should decide whether this case should be stayed” under that doctrine]; Miller, supra, 50 Cal.App.4th at p. 1677 [remanding for the trial court to consider the primary jurisdiction issue where “the trial court’s stay of the action was not the result of an exercise of discretion under the primary jurisdiction doctrine, but of the belief that it h | 1 | 1 |
| City of Coachella v. Riverside County Airport Land Use Commissiongreen | 1 | 1 |
| Cone v. Union Oil Co.green | 1 | 1 |
| California Correctional Peace Officers Ass'n. v. State Personnel Boardgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Styne v. Stevensgreen | 1 | 1 |
| California Aviation Council v. County of Amadorgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Sherwyn v. Department of Social Servicesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| I. E. Associates v. Safeco Title Insurancegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Pacific Legal Foundation v. California Coastal Commissiongreen | 1 | 1 |
| Jacobs v. Retail Clerks Union, Local 1222green | 1 | 1 |
| People v. West Publishing Co.green | 1 | 1 |
| Associated California Loggers, Inc. v. Kindergreen | 1 | 1 |
| Bernstein v. Smutzgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Rosenfield v. Malcolmgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Neto v. Conselho Amor Da Sociedade No. 41green | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Uniwill L.P. v. City of Los Angeles
green
2 sentences2023“Generally speaking, ‘“mere silence on the part of a party will not create an estoppel unless he was under some obligation to speak, and a party invoking such estoppel must show that it was the duty of the other to speak, and that he has not only been induced to act by reason of such silence, but that the other had reasonable cause to believe that he would so act.”’” (Johnson v. Johnson (1960) 179 Cal.App.2d 326, 330 .) Appellant quotes the following excerpt from Asimow et al., Cal. Practice Guide: Administrative Law (The Rutter Group, Nov. 2022 update) ¶ 15.108: “‘An agency can be estopped fr 2023“Generally speaking, ‘“mere silence on the part of a party will not create an estoppel unless he was under some obligation to speak, and a party invoking such estoppel must show that it was the duty of the other to speak, and that he has not only been induced to act by reason of such silence, but that the other had reasonable cause to believe that he would so act.”’” (Johnson v. Johnson (1960) 179 Cal.App.2d 326, 330 .) Appellant quotes the following excerpt from Asimow et al., Cal. Practice Guide: Administrative Law (The Rutter Group, Nov. 2022 update) ¶ 15.108: “‘An agency can be estopped fr | 2 | 2023–2023 |
Johnson v. Johnson
green
2 sentences2023“Generally speaking, ‘“mere silence on the part of a party will not create an estoppel unless he was under some obligation to speak, and a party invoking such estoppel must show that it was the duty of the other to speak, and that he has not only been induced to act by reason of such silence, but that the other had reasonable cause to believe that he would so act.”’” (Johnson v. Johnson (1960) 179 Cal.App.2d 326, 330 .) Appellant quotes the following excerpt from Asimow et al., Cal. Practice Guide: Administrative Law (The Rutter Group, Nov. 2022 update) ¶ 15.108: “‘An agency can be estopped fr 2023“Generally speaking, ‘“mere silence on the part of a party will not create an estoppel unless he was under some obligation to speak, and a party invoking such estoppel must show that it was the duty of the other to speak, and that he has not only been induced to act by reason of such silence, but that the other had reasonable cause to believe that he would so act.”’” (Johnson v. Johnson (1960) 179 Cal.App.2d 326, 330 .) Appellant quotes the following excerpt from Asimow et al., Cal. Practice Guide: Administrative Law (The Rutter Group, Nov. 2022 update) ¶ 15.108: “‘An agency can be estopped fr | 2 | 2023–2023 |
Okoli v. Lockheed Technical Operations Co.
green
2 sentences2021(Okoli, supra, 36 Cal.App.4th at p. 1612 .) The employer appealed, arguing Okoli never mentioned retaliation in his DFEH complaint and the trial court lacked jurisdiction to hear the claim under the exhaustion of remedies doctrine. 2020(Okoli, supra, 36 Cal.App.4th at p. 1613 .) “Since Okoli’s complaint added claims that were neither like nor reasonably related to his DFEH claim and were not likely to be uncovered in the course of a DFEH investigation, his retaliation claim [was] barred by the exhaustion of remedies doctrine.” (Id. at p. 1617, italics added.) Similarly, in Martin, the plaintiff’s “theories of recovery other than age discrimination were vitiated by her failure to exhaust administrative remedies under California law.” (Martin, supra, 29 Cal.App.4th at p. 1723 .) The DFEH “never did learn of Martin’s assertion | 2 | 2020–2021 |
Edgren v. Regents of University of California
green
2 sentences2003As we stated in Westlake, ‘From the earliest decisions reviewing actions of voluntary private associations, . . . our courts have recognized the applicability of the exhaustion of remedies doctrine in this context.’ [Citations.] fl[] The ‘context’ to which Westlake properly applies is where the party or entity whose ‘quasi-judicial’ determination is challenged—be it hospital, voluntary private or professional association, or public entity—has provided an internal remedy. [Citations, including City of Fresno v. Superior Court (1987) 188 Cal.App.3d 1484, 1490-1491 [ 234 Cal.Rptr. 136 ] (city); E 2003As we stated in Westlake, ‘From the earliest decisions reviewing actions of voluntary private associations, . . . our courts have recognized the applicability of the exhaustion of remedies doctrine in this context.’ [Citations.] fl[] The ‘context’ to which Westlake properly applies is where the party or entity whose ‘quasi-judicial’ determination is challenged—be it hospital, voluntary private or professional association, or public entity—has provided an internal remedy. [Citations, including City of Fresno v. Superior Court (1987) 188 Cal.App.3d 1484, 1490-1491 [ 234 Cal.Rptr. 136 ] (city); E | 2 | 1987–2003 |
Kopke v. Ranney
green
2 sentences1977(See Kopke v. Ranney, supra, 16 Wis.2d 369 [ 114 N.W.2d 485 ].)” (Fns. omitted.) In applying the rationale and legal principles of Flores and Westlake, supra, we conclude that, by failing to exhaust his administrative remedies and preliminarily determining that board rules 1980 or 1990 were inapplicable to him, plaintiff must be deemed a trespasser for purposes of his cause of action for damages. 1977(See Kopke v. Ranney, supra, 16 Wis.2d 369 [ 114 N.W.2d 485 ].)” (Fns. omitted.) In applying the rationale and legal principles of Flores and Westlake, supra, we conclude that, by failing to exhaust his administrative remedies and preliminarily determining that board rules 1980 or 1990 were inapplicable to him, plaintiff must be deemed a trespasser for purposes of his cause of action for damages. | 2 | 1976–1977 |
Bauer v. Samson Lodge
green
2 sentences1977While early decisions in other jurisdictions frequently declined to apply the exhaustion doctrine to damage actions on the grounds that a private organization’s internal review procedures generally did not provide a damage *256 remedy (see, e.g., Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Barnhill (1926) 214 Ala. 565 [ 108 So. 456, 462 ]; Bauer v. Samson Lodge, K.P. (1885) 102 Ind. 262 [ 1 N.E. 571, 575-576 ]), contemporary out-of-state authorities have generally rejected this analysis and have refused to recognize an exception to the exhaustion requirement in the case of damage actions. 1977While early decisions in other jurisdictions frequently declined to apply the exhaustion doctrine to damage actions on the grounds that a private organization’s internal review procedures generally did not provide a damage *256 remedy (see, e.g., Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Barnhill (1926) 214 Ala. 565 [ 108 So. 456, 462 ]; Bauer v. Samson Lodge, K.P. (1885) 102 Ind. 262 [ 1 N.E. 571, 575-576 ]), contemporary out-of-state authorities have generally rejected this analysis and have refused to recognize an exception to the exhaustion requirement in the case of damage actions. | 2 | 1976–1977 |
Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Barnhill
green
2 sentences1977While early decisions in other jurisdictions frequently declined to apply the exhaustion doctrine to damage actions on the grounds that a private organization’s internal review procedures generally did not provide a damage *256 remedy (see, e.g., Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Barnhill (1926) 214 Ala. 565 [ 108 So. 456, 462 ]; Bauer v. Samson Lodge, K.P. (1885) 102 Ind. 262 [ 1 N.E. 571, 575-576 ]), contemporary out-of-state authorities have generally rejected this analysis and have refused to recognize an exception to the exhaustion requirement in the case of damage actions. 1977While early decisions in other jurisdictions frequently declined to apply the exhaustion doctrine to damage actions on the grounds that a private organization’s internal review procedures generally did not provide a damage *256 remedy (see, e.g., Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Barnhill (1926) 214 Ala. 565 [ 108 So. 456, 462 ]; Bauer v. Samson Lodge, K.P. (1885) 102 Ind. 262 [ 1 N.E. 571, 575-576 ]), contemporary out-of-state authorities have generally rejected this analysis and have refused to recognize an exception to the exhaustion requirement in the case of damage actions. | 2 | 1976–1977 |
Eight Unnamed Physicians v. Medical Executive Committee
green
2 sentences2025(Kaiser Foundation Hospitals v. Superior Court (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 85, 100 ; Eight Unnamed Physicians, supra, 150 Cal.App.4th at p. 511 .) A physician “challenging the propriety of a hospital’s denial or withdrawal of staff privileges must pursue the internal remedies afforded by that hospital to a final decision on the merits before resorting to the courts for relief.” (Unnamed Physician, supra, 93 Cal.App.4th at p. 619 .) The exhaustion of remedies doctrine applies in both administrative and traditional mandate actions. 2025(Eight Unnamed Physicians, supra, 150 Cal.App.4th at p. 511 .) “When seeking relief under traditional mandamus, the exhaustion requirement speaks to whether there exists an adequate legal remedy. | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Unnamed Physician v. Board of Trustees of Saint Agnes Medical Center
green
1 sentence2025(Kaiser Foundation Hospitals v. Superior Court (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 85, 100 ; Eight Unnamed Physicians, supra, 150 Cal.App.4th at p. 511 .) A physician “challenging the propriety of a hospital’s denial or withdrawal of staff privileges must pursue the internal remedies afforded by that hospital to a final decision on the merits before resorting to the courts for relief.” (Unnamed Physician, supra, 93 Cal.App.4th at p. 619 .) The exhaustion of remedies doctrine applies in both administrative and traditional mandate actions. | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Bollengier v. Doctors Medical Center
green
1 sentence2025The exhaustion requirement will be excused “where its pursuit would be futile, idle or useless.” (Bollengier, supra, 222 Cal.App.3d at p. 1126 .) “However, the futility exception is very narrow and will not apply unless the petitioner can positively state that the administrative agency has declared what its ruling will be in a particular case.” (Ibid.; accord, Kaiser Foundation Hospitals v. Superior Court, supra, 128 Cal.App.4th 85, 101 .) The Petition in this case contains no indication that the peer review panel (or any other body) has declared what its ruling will be. | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Wills v. Superior Court
green
1 sentence2025The question on this appeal is whether he can maintain his retaliation claim in spite of his failure to enumerate that claim in his charge before the DFEH.” (Id. at p. 1613.) The Okoli court concluded “the unlawful retaliation, which occurred after the filing of the DFEH charge, would not reasonably have been uncovered in an investigation of the charges that were made.” (Id. at p. 1617.) In sum, “Since Okoli’s complaint added claims that were neither like nor reasonably related to his DFEH claim and were not likely to be uncovered in the course of a DFEH investigation, his retaliation claim is | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Knickerbocker v. City of Stockton
green
1 sentence2024The Browns cite Knickerbocker v. City of Stockton (1988) 199 Cal.App.3d 235 (Knickerbocker), arguing they need not exhaust administrative remedies because they seek to enforce the outcome on the 2016 application, not challenge any decision by the City. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
| Martin v. Lockheed Missiles & Space Co. green | 1 | 2020–2020 |
| Robert Rodriguez v. Airborne Express green | 1 | 2020–2020 |
| McAllister v. County of Monterey green | 1 | 2018–2018 |
| Tomlinson v. County of Alameda green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| Young v. Tri-City Healthcare District green | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| Park Area Neighbors v. Town of Fairfax green | 1 | 2013–2013 |
| Shahinian v. Cedars-Sinai Medical Center green | 1 | 2013–2013 |
| Building Industry Ass'n v. County of Stanislaus green | 1 | 2013–2013 |
| Smith v. Selma Community Hospital green | 1 | 2010–2010 |
| CAT PARTNERSHIP v. County of Santa Cruz green | 1 | 2009–2009 |
| Ilio`Ulaokalani Coalition v. Rumsfeld green | 1 | 2008–2008 |
| Walker v. Munro green | 1 | 2004–2004 |
| Preston v. State Board of Equalization green | 1 | 2003–2003 |
| Ruiz v. Department of Corrections green | 1 | 2003–2003 |
| County of Sauk v. Trager green | 1 | 2003–2003 |
| Tahoe Vista Concerned Citizens v. County of Placer green | 1 | 2002–2002 |
| Digital Biometrics, Inc. v. Anthony green | 1 | 1997–1997 |
| State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Superior Court green | 1 | 1996–1996 |
| Sandhu v. Lockheed Missiles & Space Co. green | 1 | 1995–1995 |
| Steven OUBICHON, Appellant, v. NORTH AMERICAN ROCKWELL CORPORATION, Appellee green | 1 | 1995–1995 |
| Ray Fladeboe Lincoln-Mercury, Inc. v. New Motor Vehicle Board green | 1 | 1993–1993 |
| City of Susanville v. Lee C. Hess Co. green | 1 | 1992–1992 |
| Scripps Memorial Hospital, Inc. v. California Employment Commission green | 1 | 1992–1992 |
| Chicago Teachers Union, Local No. 1 v. Hudson green | 1 | 1990–1990 |
| Ellis v. Brotherhood of Railway, Airline & Steamship Clerks, Freight Handlers, Express & Station Employes green | 1 | 1990–1990 |
| American Society of Composers, Authors & Publishers v. Superior Court green | 1 | 1987–1987 |
| Holderby v. International Union of Operating Engineers green | 1 | 1987–1987 |
| Robinson v. Superior Court green | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.