exhaustion of remedies doctrine (California) · Go Syfert
← California issues

exhaustion of remedies doctrine in California

53 California opinions name it 3 courts 1960–2025 10 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (32)

CaseFollowedCited
Westlake Community Hospital v. Superior Courtgreen
cal · 1976 · cited in 7 California opinions naming this issue, 1987–2013
2 sentences

2005(Westlake Community Hosp. v. Superior Court, supra, 17 Cal.3d at pp. 472-473, 477-478.) On these facts, the Supreme Court concluded: “Inasmuch as the present affidavits do not indicate that Los Robles ever informed Dr. Kaiman that she had any right to contest the denial of membership privileges within the hospital’s own hierarchy, defendants cannot rely on plaintiff’s alleged failure to exhaust such remedies to bar her action.” (Id. at p. 478.) Los Robles then argued “that even if the doctrine of exhaustion of remedies does not bar plaintiff’s tort action with respect to the events at Los Robl

2003Accordingly, we conclude that the exhaustion of remedies doctrine fully applies to actions seeking damages for an allegedly wrongful termination of or exclusion from membership in a private association. [Citation.]." ( Id. at pp. 476-477, 131 Cal.Rptr. 90 , 551 P.2d 410 , fn. omitted.) Subsequently, in Rojo , we explained that, "[t]he `context' to which Westlake properly applies is where the party or entity whose `quasi-judicial' determination is challenged — be it hospital, voluntary private or professional association, or public entity — has provided an internal remedy. [Citations.] [¶] The

27
Morton v. Superior Courtgreen
calctapp · 1970 · cited in 5 California opinions naming this issue, 1982–2017
2 sentences

2017Ct. (1970) 9 Cal.App.3d 977 , 982, 88 Cal.Rptr. 533 .) "There are several reasons for the exhaustion of remedies doctrine. 'The basic purpose for the exhaustion doctrine is to lighten the burden of overworked courts in cases where administrative remedies are available and are as likely as the judicial remedy to provide the wanted relief.' [Citation.] Even where the administrative remedy may not resolve all issues or provide the precise relief requested by a plaintiff, the exhaustion doctrine is still viewed with favor 'because it facilitates the development of a complete record that draws on a

2017Ct. (1970) 9 Cal.App.3d 977 , 982, 88 Cal.Rptr. 533 .) "There are several reasons for the exhaustion of remedies doctrine. 'The basic purpose for the exhaustion doctrine is to lighten the burden of overworked courts in cases where administrative remedies are available and are as likely as the judicial remedy to provide the wanted relief.' [Citation.] Even where the administrative remedy may not resolve all issues or provide the precise relief requested by a plaintiff, the exhaustion doctrine is still viewed with favor 'because it facilitates the development of a complete record that draws on a

25
Rojo v. Kligergreen
cal · 1990 · cited in 4 California opinions naming this issue, 1993–2003
2 sentences

2003As we stated in Westlake, ‘From the earliest decisions reviewing actions of voluntary private associations, . . . our courts have recognized the applicability of the exhaustion of remedies doctrine in this context.’ [Citations.] fl[] The ‘context’ to which Westlake properly applies is where the party or entity whose ‘quasi-judicial’ determination is challenged—be it hospital, voluntary private or professional association, or public entity—has provided an internal remedy. [Citations, including City of Fresno v. Superior Court (1987) 188 Cal.App.3d 1484, 1490-1491 [ 234 Cal.Rptr. 136 ] (city); E

2003As we stated in Westlake , `From the earliest decisions reviewing actions of voluntary private associations, ... our courts have recognized the applicability of the exhaustion of remedies doctrine in this context.' [Citations.] [¶] The `context' to which Westlake properly applies is where the party or entity whose `quasi-judicial' determination is challenged—be it hospital, voluntary private or professional association, or public entity—has provided an internal remedy. [Citations, including City of Fresno v. Superior Court (1987) 188 Cal.App.3d 1484, 1490-1491 , 234 Cal. Rptr. 136 [city]; Edgr

24
Karlin v. Zaltagreen
calctapp · 1984 · cited in 3 California opinions naming this issue, 1986–1999
2 sentences

1999“There are several reasons for the exhaustion of remedies doctrine. ‘The basic purpose for the exhaustion doctrine is to lighten the burden of overworked courts in cases where administrative remedies are available and are as likely as the judicial remedy to provide the wanted relief.’ (Morton v. Superior Court [(1970)] 9 Cal.App.3d 977, 982 [ 88 Cal.Rptr. 533 ].) Even where the administrative remedy may not resolve all issues or provide the precise relief requested by a plaintiff, the exhaustion doctrine is still viewed with favor ‘because it facilitates the development of a complete record th

1999“There are several reasons for the exhaustion of remedies doctrine. ‘The basic purpose for the exhaustion doctrine is to lighten the burden of overworked courts in cases where administrative remedies are available and are as likely as the judicial remedy to provide the wanted relief.’ (Morton v. Superior Court [(1970)] 9 Cal.App.3d 977, 982 [ 88 Cal.Rptr. 533 ].) Even where the administrative remedy may not resolve all issues or provide the precise relief requested by a plaintiff, the exhaustion doctrine is still viewed with favor ‘because it facilitates the development of a complete record th

23
City of Fresno v. Superior Courtgreen
calctapp · 1987 · cited in 2 California opinions naming this issue, 1987–2003
2 sentences

2003As we stated in Westlake, ‘From the earliest decisions reviewing actions of voluntary private associations, . . . our courts have recognized the applicability of the exhaustion of remedies doctrine in this context.’ [Citations.] fl[] The ‘context’ to which Westlake properly applies is where the party or entity whose ‘quasi-judicial’ determination is challenged—be it hospital, voluntary private or professional association, or public entity—has provided an internal remedy. [Citations, including City of Fresno v. Superior Court (1987) 188 Cal.App.3d 1484, 1490-1491 [ 234 Cal.Rptr. 136 ] (city); E

2003As we stated in Westlake, ‘From the earliest decisions reviewing actions of voluntary private associations, . . . our courts have recognized the applicability of the exhaustion of remedies doctrine in this context.’ [Citations.] fl[] The ‘context’ to which Westlake properly applies is where the party or entity whose ‘quasi-judicial’ determination is challenged—be it hospital, voluntary private or professional association, or public entity—has provided an internal remedy. [Citations, including City of Fresno v. Superior Court (1987) 188 Cal.App.3d 1484, 1490-1491 [ 234 Cal.Rptr. 136 ] (city); E

22
Logan v. Southern California Rapid Transit Districtgreen
calctapp · 1982 · cited in 2 California opinions naming this issue, 1987–2003
2 sentences

2003As we stated in Westlake, ‘From the earliest decisions reviewing actions of voluntary private associations, . . . our courts have recognized the applicability of the exhaustion of remedies doctrine in this context.’ [Citations.] fl[] The ‘context’ to which Westlake properly applies is where the party or entity whose ‘quasi-judicial’ determination is challenged—be it hospital, voluntary private or professional association, or public entity—has provided an internal remedy. [Citations, including City of Fresno v. Superior Court (1987) 188 Cal.App.3d 1484, 1490-1491 [ 234 Cal.Rptr. 136 ] (city); E

2003As we stated in Westlake, ‘From the earliest decisions reviewing actions of voluntary private associations, . . . our courts have recognized the applicability of the exhaustion of remedies doctrine in this context.’ [Citations.] fl[] The ‘context’ to which Westlake properly applies is where the party or entity whose ‘quasi-judicial’ determination is challenged—be it hospital, voluntary private or professional association, or public entity—has provided an internal remedy. [Citations, including City of Fresno v. Superior Court (1987) 188 Cal.App.3d 1484, 1490-1491 [ 234 Cal.Rptr. 136 ] (city); E

22
Bozaich v. State of Californiagreen
calctapp · 1973 · cited in 2 California opinions naming this issue, 1986–1999
2 sentences

1999“There are several reasons for the exhaustion of remedies doctrine. ‘The basic purpose for the exhaustion doctrine is to lighten the burden of overworked courts in cases where administrative remedies are available and are as likely as the judicial remedy to provide the wanted relief.’ (Morton v. Superior Court [(1970)] 9 Cal.App.3d 977, 982 [ 88 Cal.Rptr. 533 ].) Even where the administrative remedy may not resolve all issues or provide the precise relief requested by a plaintiff, the exhaustion doctrine is still viewed with favor ‘because it facilitates the development of a complete record th

1999“There are several reasons for the exhaustion of remedies doctrine. ‘The basic purpose for the exhaustion doctrine is to lighten the burden of overworked courts in cases where administrative remedies are available and are as likely as the judicial remedy to provide the wanted relief.’ (Morton v. Superior Court [(1970)] 9 Cal.App.3d 977, 982 [ 88 Cal.Rptr. 533 ].) Even where the administrative remedy may not resolve all issues or provide the precise relief requested by a plaintiff, the exhaustion doctrine is still viewed with favor ‘because it facilitates the development of a complete record th

22
Robinson v. Templar Lodge, No. 17green
cal · 1897 · cited in 2 California opinions naming this issue, 1976–1990
2 sentences

1990As we stated in Westlake , "From the earliest decisions reviewing actions of voluntary private associations, ... our courts have recognized the applicability of the exhaustion of remedies doctrine in this context." ( 17 Cal.3d at p. 474 , citing, e.g., Levy v. Magnolia Lodge, I.O.O.F. (1895) 110 Cal. 297, 307-308 [ 42 P. 887 ], and Robinson v. Templar Lodge, I.O.O.F. (1897) 117 Cal. 370, 375-376 [ 49 P. 170 ], both cases disapproved on other grounds in Westlake, supra, at p. 479 .) The "context" to which Westlake properly applies is where the party or entity whose "quasi-judicial" determinatio

1990As we stated in Westlake , "From the earliest decisions reviewing actions of voluntary private associations, ... our courts have recognized the applicability of the exhaustion of remedies doctrine in this context." ( 17 Cal.3d at p. 474 , citing, e.g., Levy v. Magnolia Lodge, I.O.O.F. (1895) 110 Cal. 297, 307-308 [ 42 P. 887 ], and Robinson v. Templar Lodge, I.O.O.F. (1897) 117 Cal. 370, 375-376 [ 49 P. 170 ], both cases disapproved on other grounds in Westlake, supra, at p. 479 .) The "context" to which Westlake properly applies is where the party or entity whose "quasi-judicial" determinatio

22
Levy v. Magnolia Lodge, No. 29, I. O. O. F.green
cal · 1895 · cited in 2 California opinions naming this issue, 1976–1990
2 sentences

1990As we stated in Westlake , "From the earliest decisions reviewing actions of voluntary private associations, ... our courts have recognized the applicability of the exhaustion of remedies doctrine in this context." ( 17 Cal.3d at p. 474 , citing, e.g., Levy v. Magnolia Lodge, I.O.O.F. (1895) 110 Cal. 297, 307-308 [ 42 P. 887 ], and Robinson v. Templar Lodge, I.O.O.F. (1897) 117 Cal. 370, 375-376 [ 49 P. 170 ], both cases disapproved on other grounds in Westlake, supra, at p. 479 .) The "context" to which Westlake properly applies is where the party or entity whose "quasi-judicial" determinatio

1990As we stated in Westlake , "From the earliest decisions reviewing actions of voluntary private associations, ... our courts have recognized the applicability of the exhaustion of remedies doctrine in this context." ( 17 Cal.3d at p. 474 , citing, e.g., Levy v. Magnolia Lodge, I.O.O.F. (1895) 110 Cal. 297, 307-308 [ 42 P. 887 ], and Robinson v. Templar Lodge, I.O.O.F. (1897) 117 Cal. 370, 375-376 [ 49 P. 170 ], both cases disapproved on other grounds in Westlake, supra, at p. 479 .) The "context" to which Westlake properly applies is where the party or entity whose "quasi-judicial" determinatio

22
Yamaha Motor Corp. v. Superior Courtgreen
calctapp · 1986 · cited in 3 California opinions naming this issue, 1999–2017
2 sentences

2017Ct., supra , 185 Cal.App.3d at p. 1240 , 230 Cal.Rptr. 382 .) The doctrine of exhaustion of remedies is not solely a creature of our state law, but has been repeatedly recognized by federal courts in their disposition of closely related securities cases involving discipline imposed by SROs.

2017Ct., supra , 185 Cal.App.3d at p. 1240 , 230 Cal.Rptr. 382 .) The doctrine of exhaustion of remedies is not solely a creature of our state law, but has been repeatedly recognized by federal courts in their disposition of closely related securities cases involving discipline imposed by SROs.

13
Coachella Valley Mosquito & Vector Control District v. California Public Employment Relations Boardgreen
cal · 2005 · cited in 2 California opinions naming this issue, 2016–2025
2 sentences

2025“In general, a party must exhaust administrative remedies before resorting to the courts.” (Coachella Valley Mosquito & Vector Control Dist. v. California Public Employment Relations Bd. (2005) 35 Cal.4th 1072, 1080 .) The exhaustion doctrine “ ‘is principally grounded on concerns favoring administrative autonomy (i.e., courts should not interfere with an agency determination until the agency has reached a final decision) and judicial efficiency (i.e., overworked courts should decline to intervene in an administrative dispute unless absolutely necessary).’ ” (Ibid.) The doctrine “ ‘ “is not a

2016Under this exception, exhaustion of administrative remedies “may be excused when a party claims that ‘the agency lacks authority, statutory or otherwise, to resolve the underlying dispute between the parties.’ [Citations.]” (Coachella Valley Mosquito & Vector Control Dist. v. California Public Employment Relations Bd. (2005) 35 Cal.4th 1072, 1081-1082 [ 29 Cal.Rptr.3d 234 , 112 P.3d 623 ].) The administrative jurisdiction exception may apply even though the administrative agency has not yet made a final decision.

12
Kaiser Foundation Hospitals v. Superior Courtgreen
calctapp · 2005 · cited in 2 California opinions naming this issue, 2022–2025
2 sentences

2025(Kaiser Foundation Hospitals v. Superior Court (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 85, 100 ; Eight Unnamed Physicians, supra, 150 Cal.App.4th at p. 511 .) A physician “challenging the propriety of a hospital’s denial or withdrawal of staff privileges must pursue the internal remedies afforded by that hospital to a final decision on the merits before resorting to the courts for relief.” (Unnamed Physician, supra, 93 Cal.App.4th at p. 619 .) The exhaustion of remedies doctrine applies in both administrative and traditional mandate actions.

2025The exhaustion requirement will be excused “where its pursuit would be futile, idle or useless.” (Bollengier, supra, 222 Cal.App.3d at p. 1126 .) “However, the futility exception is very narrow and will not apply unless the petitioner can positively state that the administrative agency has declared what its ruling will be in a particular case.” (Ibid.; accord, Kaiser Foundation Hospitals v. Superior Court, supra, 128 Cal.App.4th 85, 101 .) The Petition in this case contains no indication that the peer review panel (or any other body) has declared what its ruling will be.

12
Sierra Club v. City of Orangegreen
calctapp · 2008 · cited in 2 California opinions naming this issue, 2016–2022
2 sentences

2022(Sierra Club v. City of Orange (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 523, 536 [“An appellate court employs a de novo standard of review when determining whether the exhaustion of remedies doctrine applies”]; Farahani v. San Diego Community College Dist. (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 1486, 1491 [“The interpretation of a statute is a legal issue subject to de novo review”].) In reviewing questions of law, we are not bound by the trial court’s stated reasons or rationales.

2016(Sierra Club v. City of Orange, supra, at p. 535 .) There is no indication in the record that appellant, or any other person, presented the specific contention in the administrative proceedings below that the project’s 22. approval was incompatible with goals Nos. 6.f. and 7.e. of the General Plan.12 Therefore, under the exhaustion doctrine, these issues were not preserved for purposes of the instant judicial challenge and will not be considered.

12
Ogo Associates v. City of Torrancegreen
calctapp · 1974 · cited in 2 California opinions naming this issue, 1987–2022
2 sentences

2022(See Ogo Associates v. City of Torrance, supra, 37 Cal.App.3d at p. 834 .) Accordingly, we decline to apply the exhaustion of remedies doctrine as a bar to Save the Hill’s no- project challenge.

1987(See, e.g., Ogo Associates v. City of Torrance (1974) 37 Cal.App.3d 830, 834 [ 112 Cal.Rptr. 761 ].) Santos *1492 argues that because the administrative process in this case could not afford him damages as a remedy, he should be excused from exhausting his administrative remedies.

12
Steinhart v. County of Los Angelesgreen
cal · 2010 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 2024–2024
1 sentence

2024(See Steinhart v. County of Los Angeles, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 1316, fn. 13 .) Garner’s description did not include details about the OED process, did not purport to discuss appellate rights, did not represent that Vangsness could appear before a faculty committee, and did not state the faculty committee would reconsider factual findings made by OED.

11
Farahani v. San Diego Community College Districtgreen
calctapp · 2009 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 2022–2022
1 sentence

2022(Sierra Club v. City of Orange (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 523, 536 [“An appellate court employs a de novo standard of review when determining whether the exhaustion of remedies doctrine applies”]; Farahani v. San Diego Community College Dist. (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 1486, 1491 [“The interpretation of a statute is a legal issue subject to de novo review”].) In reviewing questions of law, we are not bound by the trial court’s stated reasons or rationales.

11
Miller v. Superior Courtgreen
calctapp · 1996 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 2021–2021
2 sentences

2021(See City of Industry v. City of Fillmore (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 191, 211, fn. 14 [holding that the exhaustion doctrine did not apply, and that, because the primary jurisdiction doctrine had not been raised below, the “trial court in the first instance should decide whether this case should be stayed” under that doctrine]; Miller, supra, 50 Cal.App.4th at p. 1677 [remanding for the trial court to consider the primary jurisdiction issue where “the trial court’s stay of the action was not the result of an exercise of discretion under the primary jurisdiction doctrine, but of the belief that it h

2021(See City of Industry v. City of Fillmore (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 191, 211, fn. 14 [holding that the exhaustion doctrine did not apply, and that, because the primary jurisdiction doctrine had not been raised below, the “trial court in the first instance should decide whether this case should be stayed” under that doctrine]; Miller, supra, 50 Cal.App.4th at p. 1677 [remanding for the trial court to consider the primary jurisdiction issue where “the trial court’s stay of the action was not the result of an exercise of discretion under the primary jurisdiction doctrine, but of the belief that it h

11
City of Industry v. City of Fillmoregreen
calctapp · 2011 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 2021–2021
1 sentence

2021(See City of Industry v. City of Fillmore (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 191, 211, fn. 14 [holding that the exhaustion doctrine did not apply, and that, because the primary jurisdiction doctrine had not been raised below, the “trial court in the first instance should decide whether this case should be stayed” under that doctrine]; Miller, supra, 50 Cal.App.4th at p. 1677 [remanding for the trial court to consider the primary jurisdiction issue where “the trial court’s stay of the action was not the result of an exercise of discretion under the primary jurisdiction doctrine, but of the belief that it h

11
City of Coachella v. Riverside County Airport Land Use Commissiongreen
calctapp · 1989 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 2014–2014
11
Cone v. Union Oil Co.green
calctapp · 1954 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 2009–2009
11
California Correctional Peace Officers Ass'n. v. State Personnel Boardgreen
cal · 1995 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 2009–2009
11
Styne v. Stevensgreen
cal · 2001 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 2002–2002
11
California Aviation Council v. County of Amadorgreen
calctapp · 1988 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 1999–1999
11
Sherwyn v. Department of Social Servicesgreen
calctapp · 1985 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 1990–1990
11
I. E. Associates v. Safeco Title Insurancegreen
cal · 1985 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 1990–1990
11
Pacific Legal Foundation v. California Coastal Commissiongreen
cal · 1982 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 1990–1990
11
Jacobs v. Retail Clerks Union, Local 1222green
calctapp · 1975 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 1987–1987
11
People v. West Publishing Co.green
cal · 1950 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 1987–1987
11
Associated California Loggers, Inc. v. Kindergreen
calctapp · 1978 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 1982–1982
11
Bernstein v. Smutzgreen
calctapp · 1947 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 1982–1982
11
Rosenfield v. Malcolmgreen
cal · 1967 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 1977–1977
11
Neto v. Conselho Amor Da Sociedade No. 41green
calctapp · 1912 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 1976–1976
11

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

CaseNegativeCited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (48)

CaseCitedYears
Uniwill L.P. v. City of Los Angeles green
calctapp · 2004
2 sentences

2023“Generally speaking, ‘“mere silence on the part of a party will not create an estoppel unless he was under some obligation to speak, and a party invoking such estoppel must show that it was the duty of the other to speak, and that he has not only been induced to act by reason of such silence, but that the other had reasonable cause to believe that he would so act.”’” (Johnson v. Johnson (1960) 179 Cal.App.2d 326, 330 .) Appellant quotes the following excerpt from Asimow et al., Cal. Practice Guide: Administrative Law (The Rutter Group, Nov. 2022 update) ¶ 15.108: “‘An agency can be estopped fr

2023“Generally speaking, ‘“mere silence on the part of a party will not create an estoppel unless he was under some obligation to speak, and a party invoking such estoppel must show that it was the duty of the other to speak, and that he has not only been induced to act by reason of such silence, but that the other had reasonable cause to believe that he would so act.”’” (Johnson v. Johnson (1960) 179 Cal.App.2d 326, 330 .) Appellant quotes the following excerpt from Asimow et al., Cal. Practice Guide: Administrative Law (The Rutter Group, Nov. 2022 update) ¶ 15.108: “‘An agency can be estopped fr

22023–2023
Johnson v. Johnson green
calctapp · 1960
2 sentences

2023“Generally speaking, ‘“mere silence on the part of a party will not create an estoppel unless he was under some obligation to speak, and a party invoking such estoppel must show that it was the duty of the other to speak, and that he has not only been induced to act by reason of such silence, but that the other had reasonable cause to believe that he would so act.”’” (Johnson v. Johnson (1960) 179 Cal.App.2d 326, 330 .) Appellant quotes the following excerpt from Asimow et al., Cal. Practice Guide: Administrative Law (The Rutter Group, Nov. 2022 update) ¶ 15.108: “‘An agency can be estopped fr

2023“Generally speaking, ‘“mere silence on the part of a party will not create an estoppel unless he was under some obligation to speak, and a party invoking such estoppel must show that it was the duty of the other to speak, and that he has not only been induced to act by reason of such silence, but that the other had reasonable cause to believe that he would so act.”’” (Johnson v. Johnson (1960) 179 Cal.App.2d 326, 330 .) Appellant quotes the following excerpt from Asimow et al., Cal. Practice Guide: Administrative Law (The Rutter Group, Nov. 2022 update) ¶ 15.108: “‘An agency can be estopped fr

22023–2023
Okoli v. Lockheed Technical Operations Co. green
calctapp · 1995
2 sentences

2021(Okoli, supra, 36 Cal.App.4th at p. 1612 .) The employer appealed, arguing Okoli never mentioned retaliation in his DFEH complaint and the trial court lacked jurisdiction to hear the claim under the exhaustion of remedies doctrine.

2020(Okoli, supra, 36 Cal.App.4th at p. 1613 .) “Since Okoli’s complaint added claims that were neither like nor reasonably related to his DFEH claim and were not likely to be uncovered in the course of a DFEH investigation, his retaliation claim [was] barred by the exhaustion of remedies doctrine.” (Id. at p. 1617, italics added.) Similarly, in Martin, the plaintiff’s “theories of recovery other than age discrimination were vitiated by her failure to exhaust administrative remedies under California law.” (Martin, supra, 29 Cal.App.4th at p. 1723 .) The DFEH “never did learn of Martin’s assertion

22020–2021
Edgren v. Regents of University of California green
calctapp · 1984
2 sentences

2003As we stated in Westlake, ‘From the earliest decisions reviewing actions of voluntary private associations, . . . our courts have recognized the applicability of the exhaustion of remedies doctrine in this context.’ [Citations.] fl[] The ‘context’ to which Westlake properly applies is where the party or entity whose ‘quasi-judicial’ determination is challenged—be it hospital, voluntary private or professional association, or public entity—has provided an internal remedy. [Citations, including City of Fresno v. Superior Court (1987) 188 Cal.App.3d 1484, 1490-1491 [ 234 Cal.Rptr. 136 ] (city); E

2003As we stated in Westlake, ‘From the earliest decisions reviewing actions of voluntary private associations, . . . our courts have recognized the applicability of the exhaustion of remedies doctrine in this context.’ [Citations.] fl[] The ‘context’ to which Westlake properly applies is where the party or entity whose ‘quasi-judicial’ determination is challenged—be it hospital, voluntary private or professional association, or public entity—has provided an internal remedy. [Citations, including City of Fresno v. Superior Court (1987) 188 Cal.App.3d 1484, 1490-1491 [ 234 Cal.Rptr. 136 ] (city); E

21987–2003
Kopke v. Ranney green
wis · 1962
2 sentences

1977(See Kopke v. Ranney, supra, 16 Wis.2d 369 [ 114 N.W.2d 485 ].)” (Fns. omitted.) In applying the rationale and legal principles of Flores and Westlake, supra, we conclude that, by failing to exhaust his administrative remedies and preliminarily determining that board rules 1980 or 1990 were inapplicable to him, plaintiff must be deemed a trespasser for purposes of his cause of action for damages.

1977(See Kopke v. Ranney, supra, 16 Wis.2d 369 [ 114 N.W.2d 485 ].)” (Fns. omitted.) In applying the rationale and legal principles of Flores and Westlake, supra, we conclude that, by failing to exhaust his administrative remedies and preliminarily determining that board rules 1980 or 1990 were inapplicable to him, plaintiff must be deemed a trespasser for purposes of his cause of action for damages.

21976–1977
Bauer v. Samson Lodge green
ind · 1885
2 sentences

1977While early decisions in other jurisdictions frequently declined to apply the exhaustion doctrine to damage actions on the grounds that a private organization’s internal review procedures generally did not provide a damage *256 remedy (see, e.g., Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Barnhill (1926) 214 Ala. 565 [ 108 So. 456, 462 ]; Bauer v. Samson Lodge, K.P. (1885) 102 Ind. 262 [ 1 N.E. 571, 575-576 ]), contemporary out-of-state authorities have generally rejected this analysis and have refused to recognize an exception to the exhaustion requirement in the case of damage actions.

1977While early decisions in other jurisdictions frequently declined to apply the exhaustion doctrine to damage actions on the grounds that a private organization’s internal review procedures generally did not provide a damage *256 remedy (see, e.g., Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Barnhill (1926) 214 Ala. 565 [ 108 So. 456, 462 ]; Bauer v. Samson Lodge, K.P. (1885) 102 Ind. 262 [ 1 N.E. 571, 575-576 ]), contemporary out-of-state authorities have generally rejected this analysis and have refused to recognize an exception to the exhaustion requirement in the case of damage actions.

21976–1977
Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Barnhill green
ala · 1926
2 sentences

1977While early decisions in other jurisdictions frequently declined to apply the exhaustion doctrine to damage actions on the grounds that a private organization’s internal review procedures generally did not provide a damage *256 remedy (see, e.g., Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Barnhill (1926) 214 Ala. 565 [ 108 So. 456, 462 ]; Bauer v. Samson Lodge, K.P. (1885) 102 Ind. 262 [ 1 N.E. 571, 575-576 ]), contemporary out-of-state authorities have generally rejected this analysis and have refused to recognize an exception to the exhaustion requirement in the case of damage actions.

1977While early decisions in other jurisdictions frequently declined to apply the exhaustion doctrine to damage actions on the grounds that a private organization’s internal review procedures generally did not provide a damage *256 remedy (see, e.g., Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Barnhill (1926) 214 Ala. 565 [ 108 So. 456, 462 ]; Bauer v. Samson Lodge, K.P. (1885) 102 Ind. 262 [ 1 N.E. 571, 575-576 ]), contemporary out-of-state authorities have generally rejected this analysis and have refused to recognize an exception to the exhaustion requirement in the case of damage actions.

21976–1977
Eight Unnamed Physicians v. Medical Executive Committee green
calctapp · 2007
2 sentences

2025(Kaiser Foundation Hospitals v. Superior Court (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 85, 100 ; Eight Unnamed Physicians, supra, 150 Cal.App.4th at p. 511 .) A physician “challenging the propriety of a hospital’s denial or withdrawal of staff privileges must pursue the internal remedies afforded by that hospital to a final decision on the merits before resorting to the courts for relief.” (Unnamed Physician, supra, 93 Cal.App.4th at p. 619 .) The exhaustion of remedies doctrine applies in both administrative and traditional mandate actions.

2025(Eight Unnamed Physicians, supra, 150 Cal.App.4th at p. 511 .) “When seeking relief under traditional mandamus, the exhaustion requirement speaks to whether there exists an adequate legal remedy.

12025–2025
Unnamed Physician v. Board of Trustees of Saint Agnes Medical Center green
calctapp · 2001
1 sentence

2025(Kaiser Foundation Hospitals v. Superior Court (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 85, 100 ; Eight Unnamed Physicians, supra, 150 Cal.App.4th at p. 511 .) A physician “challenging the propriety of a hospital’s denial or withdrawal of staff privileges must pursue the internal remedies afforded by that hospital to a final decision on the merits before resorting to the courts for relief.” (Unnamed Physician, supra, 93 Cal.App.4th at p. 619 .) The exhaustion of remedies doctrine applies in both administrative and traditional mandate actions.

12025–2025
Bollengier v. Doctors Medical Center green
calctapp · 1990
1 sentence

2025The exhaustion requirement will be excused “where its pursuit would be futile, idle or useless.” (Bollengier, supra, 222 Cal.App.3d at p. 1126 .) “However, the futility exception is very narrow and will not apply unless the petitioner can positively state that the administrative agency has declared what its ruling will be in a particular case.” (Ibid.; accord, Kaiser Foundation Hospitals v. Superior Court, supra, 128 Cal.App.4th 85, 101 .) The Petition in this case contains no indication that the peer review panel (or any other body) has declared what its ruling will be.

12025–2025
Wills v. Superior Court green
calctapp · 2011
1 sentence

2025The question on this appeal is whether he can maintain his retaliation claim in spite of his failure to enumerate that claim in his charge before the DFEH.” (Id. at p. 1613.) The Okoli court concluded “the unlawful retaliation, which occurred after the filing of the DFEH charge, would not reasonably have been uncovered in an investigation of the charges that were made.” (Id. at p. 1617.) In sum, “Since Okoli’s complaint added claims that were neither like nor reasonably related to his DFEH claim and were not likely to be uncovered in the course of a DFEH investigation, his retaliation claim is

12025–2025
Knickerbocker v. City of Stockton green
calctapp · 1988
1 sentence

2024The Browns cite Knickerbocker v. City of Stockton (1988) 199 Cal.App.3d 235 (Knickerbocker), arguing they need not exhaust administrative remedies because they seek to enforce the outcome on the 2016 application, not challenge any decision by the City.

12024–2024
Martin v. Lockheed Missiles & Space Co. green
calctapp · 1994
12020–2020
Robert Rodriguez v. Airborne Express green
ca9 · 2001
12020–2020
McAllister v. County of Monterey green
calctapp · 2007
12018–2018
Tomlinson v. County of Alameda green
cal · 2012
12015–2015
Young v. Tri-City Healthcare District green
calctapp · 2012
12014–2014
Park Area Neighbors v. Town of Fairfax green
calctapp · 1994
12013–2013
Shahinian v. Cedars-Sinai Medical Center green
calctapp · 2011
12013–2013
Building Industry Ass'n v. County of Stanislaus green
calctapp · 2010
12013–2013
Smith v. Selma Community Hospital green
calctapp · 2008
12010–2010
CAT PARTNERSHIP v. County of Santa Cruz green
calctapp · 1998
12009–2009
Ilio`Ulaokalani Coalition v. Rumsfeld green
ca9 · 2006
12008–2008
Walker v. Munro green
calctapp · 1960
12004–2004
Preston v. State Board of Equalization green
cal · 2001
12003–2003
Ruiz v. Department of Corrections green
calctapp · 2000
12003–2003
County of Sauk v. Trager green
wis · 1984
12003–2003
Tahoe Vista Concerned Citizens v. County of Placer green
calctapp · 2000
12002–2002
Digital Biometrics, Inc. v. Anthony green
calctapp · 1993
11997–1997
State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Superior Court green
calctapp · 1996
11996–1996
Sandhu v. Lockheed Missiles & Space Co. green
calctapp · 1994
11995–1995
Steven OUBICHON, Appellant, v. NORTH AMERICAN ROCKWELL CORPORATION, Appellee green
ca9 · 1973
11995–1995
Ray Fladeboe Lincoln-Mercury, Inc. v. New Motor Vehicle Board green
calctapp · 1992
11993–1993
City of Susanville v. Lee C. Hess Co. green
cal · 1955
11992–1992
Scripps Memorial Hospital, Inc. v. California Employment Commission green
cal · 1944
11992–1992
Chicago Teachers Union, Local No. 1 v. Hudson green
scotus · 1986
11990–1990
Ellis v. Brotherhood of Railway, Airline & Steamship Clerks, Freight Handlers, Express & Station Employes green
scotus · 1984
11990–1990
American Society of Composers, Authors & Publishers v. Superior Court green
calctapp · 1962
11987–1987
Holderby v. International Union of Operating Engineers green
cal · 1955
11987–1987
Robinson v. Superior Court green
cal · 1950
11987–1987

Statutes the citing opinions construe

CA § Cal. Government Code § 12900 (8) CA § Cal. Government Code § 65009 (4) CA § Cal. Government Code § 12960 (3) USC § 42u.s.c.2000e (3)

Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.

Where else courts name it

IL 88 (1969–2025) TX 74 (1986–2025) CA 53 (1960–2025) AZ 30 (1975–2022) NJ 29 (1958–2026) NY 15 (1974–2025) IN 14 (1981–2026) PA 13 (1980–2019) WI 11 (1966–2026) WA 11 (1953–2015) CT 11 (1990–2008) AL 10 (1983–2015) AK 9 (1982–2024) OH 8 (1986–2025) TN 8 (1992–2025) RI 8 (1983–2010) MO 8 (1995–2025) CO 7 (1981–2017) OK 7 (1990–2021) ND 7 (1991–2024) NM 6 (1963–2015) UT 6 (1992–2011) DC 5 (1975–2006) MI 5 (1983–1997) MD 4 (1983–2005) KY 4 (2001–2014) OR 4 (1993–2013) AR 4 (1991–2000) WV 3 (1992–2000) SD 3 (1977–2000) GA 3 (2005–2013) IA 3 (1997–2026) MN 2 (1984–2015) FL 2 (2008–2012) MT 2 (1987–2022) KS 2 (2011–2011) LA 2 (1993–2004) HI 2 (2007–2012) NE 2 (2009–2017)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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