intelligent waiver in Maryland

28 Maryland opinions name it 2 courts 1964–2008 0 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by Maryland courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (12)

Case	Followed	Cited
Johnson v. Zerbstgreen scotus · 1938 · cited in 11 Maryland opinions naming this issue, 1976–2006 2 sentences 2006See e.g., Curtis v. State, 284 Md. at 143 , 395 A.2d at 470 (“The determination of whether there has been an intelligent waiver of right to counsel must depend, in each case, upon the particular facts and circumstances surrounding that case, including the background, experience, and conduct of the accused.”) (quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. at 464 , 58 S.Ct. at 1023 , 82 L.Ed. at 1466 ); 11 State v. Priet, 289 Md. 267, 290 , 424 A.2d 349, 360-61 (1981) (holding guilty pleas knowingly and voluntarily entered when trial judge questioned each defendant at length as to voluntariness of plea, a 2006See e.g., Curtis v. State, 284 Md. at 143 , 395 A.2d at 470 (“The determination of whether there has been an intelligent waiver of right to counsel must depend, in each case, upon the particular facts and circumstances surrounding that case, including the background, experience, and conduct of the accused.”) (quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. at 464 , 58 S.Ct. at 1023 , 82 L.Ed. at 1466 ); 11 State v. Priet, 289 Md. 267, 290 , 424 A.2d 349, 360-61 (1981) (holding guilty pleas knowingly and voluntarily entered when trial judge questioned each defendant at length as to voluntariness of plea, a	5	11
Curtis v. Stategreen md · 1979 · cited in 3 Maryland opinions naming this issue, 1979–2006 2 sentences 2006See e.g., Curtis v. State, 284 Md. at 143 , 395 A.2d at 470 (“The determination of whether there has been an intelligent waiver of right to counsel must depend, in each case, upon the particular facts and circumstances surrounding that case, including the background, experience, and conduct of the accused.”) (quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. at 464 , 58 S.Ct. at 1023 , 82 L.Ed. at 1466 ); 11 State v. Priet, 289 Md. 267, 290 , 424 A.2d 349, 360-61 (1981) (holding guilty pleas knowingly and voluntarily entered when trial judge questioned each defendant at length as to voluntariness of plea, a 2006See e.g., Curtis v. State, 284 Md. at 143 , 395 A.2d at 470 (“The determination of whether there has been an intelligent waiver of right to counsel must depend, in each case, upon the particular facts and circumstances surrounding that case, including the background, experience, and conduct of the accused.”) (quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. at 464 , 58 S.Ct. at 1023 , 82 L.Ed. at 1466 ); 11 State v. Priet, 289 Md. 267, 290 , 424 A.2d 349, 360-61 (1981) (holding guilty pleas knowingly and voluntarily entered when trial judge questioned each defendant at length as to voluntariness of plea, a	3	3
Martinez v. Stategreen md · 1987 · cited in 5 Maryland opinions naming this issue, 1990–2008 2 sentences 2008Stewart, supra, 319 Md. at 90, 570 A.2d at 1234; Martinez, supra, 309 Md. at 134 , 522 A.2d [at 955]; Dortch v. State, 290 Md. 229 , [235,] 428 A.2d 1220 [, 1223] (1981). 1990“Whether there is an intelligent waiver must depend on the unique facts and circumstances of each case.” Martinez at 134, 522 A.2d 950 . *91 This appeal turns on the voluntariness of the waiver of Stewart’s right to a jury trial.	2	5
Tibbs v. Stategreen md · 1991 · cited in 3 Maryland opinions naming this issue, 1995–2005 2 sentences 2005See Tibbs v. State, 323 Md. 28 , 590 A.2d 550 (1991); State v. Hall, 321 Md. 178 , 582 A.2d 507 (1990); Martinez v. State, supra; Kang v. State, 163 Md.App. 22 , 877 A.2d 173 (2005). 2005See Tibbs v. State, 323 Md. 28 , 590 A.2d 550 (1991); State v. Hall, 321 Md. 178 , 582 A.2d 507 (1990); Martinez v. State, supra; Kang v. State, 163 Md.App. 22 , 877 A.2d 173 (2005).	1	3
State v. Prietgreen md · 1981 · cited in 2 Maryland opinions naming this issue, 1986–2006 2 sentences 2006See e.g., Curtis v. State, 284 Md. at 143 , 395 A.2d at 470 (“The determination of whether there has been an intelligent waiver of right to counsel must depend, in each case, upon the particular facts and circumstances surrounding that case, including the background, experience, and conduct of the accused.”) (quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. at 464 , 58 S.Ct. at 1023 , 82 L.Ed. at 1466 ); 11 State v. Priet, 289 Md. 267, 290 , 424 A.2d 349, 360-61 (1981) (holding guilty pleas knowingly and voluntarily entered when trial judge questioned each defendant at length as to voluntariness of plea, a 2006See e.g., Curtis v. State, 284 Md. at 143 , 395 A.2d at 470 (“The determination of whether there has been an intelligent waiver of right to counsel must depend, in each case, upon the particular facts and circumstances surrounding that case, including the background, experience, and conduct of the accused.”) (quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. at 464 , 58 S.Ct. at 1023 , 82 L.Ed. at 1466 ); 11 State v. Priet, 289 Md. 267, 290 , 424 A.2d 349, 360-61 (1981) (holding guilty pleas knowingly and voluntarily entered when trial judge questioned each defendant at length as to voluntariness of plea, a	1	2
Countess v. Stategreen md · 1979 · cited in 2 Maryland opinions naming this issue, 2003–2006 2 sentences 2006See e.g., Curtis v. State, 284 Md. at 143 , 395 A.2d at 470 (“The determination of whether there has been an intelligent waiver of right to counsel must depend, in each case, upon the particular facts and circumstances surrounding that case, including the background, experience, and conduct of the accused.”) (quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. at 464 , 58 S.Ct. at 1023 , 82 L.Ed. at 1466 ); 11 State v. Priet, 289 Md. 267, 290 , 424 A.2d 349, 360-61 (1981) (holding guilty pleas knowingly and voluntarily entered when trial judge questioned each defendant at length as to voluntariness of plea, a 2006See e.g., Curtis v. State, 284 Md. at 143 , 395 A.2d at 470 (“The determination of whether there has been an intelligent waiver of right to counsel must depend, in each case, upon the particular facts and circumstances surrounding that case, including the background, experience, and conduct of the accused.”) (quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. at 464 , 58 S.Ct. at 1023 , 82 L.Ed. at 1466 ); 11 State v. Priet, 289 Md. 267, 290 , 424 A.2d 349, 360-61 (1981) (holding guilty pleas knowingly and voluntarily entered when trial judge questioned each defendant at length as to voluntariness of plea, a	1	2
Doe v. City of New Yorkgreen ca2 · 1994 · cited in 1 Maryland opinions naming this issue, 2007–2007 1 sentence 2007The type of medical records and nature of their contents are essential starting points for an intelligent analysis *121 of the government need versus patient privacy question because “[t]he [federal constitutional] interest in the privacy of medical information will vary with the [patient’s] condition.” Powell, supra, 175 F.3d at 111 (holding that HIV positive transsexual had a fundamental constitutional privacy right in keeping private her HIV status and her transsexualism, caused by gender identity disorder, a “profound psychiatric” condition); City of New York, supra, 15 F.3d at 267 (holdin	1	1
Wayne Powell, as of the Estate of Dana Kimberly Devilla v. Sunny Schriver, Superintendent Thomas A. Coughlin, III C.O. Lynch C.O. Crowleygreen ca2 · 1999 · cited in 1 Maryland opinions naming this issue, 2007–2007 2 sentences 2007The type of medical records and nature of their contents are essential starting points for an intelligent analysis 121 of the government need versus patient privacy question because “[t]he [federal constitutional] interest in the privacy of medical information will vary with the [patient’s] condition.” Powell, supra, 175 F.3d at 111 (holding that HIV positive transsexual had a fundamental constitutional privacy right in keeping private her HIV status and her transsexualism, caused by gender identity disorder, a “profound psychiatric” condition); City of New York, supra, 15 F.3d at 267 (holdin 2007The type of medical records and nature of their contents are essential starting points for an intelligent analysis 121 of the government need versus patient privacy question because “[t]he [federal constitutional] interest in the privacy of medical information will vary with the [patient’s] condition.” Powell, supra, 175 F.3d at 111 (holding that HIV positive transsexual had a fundamental constitutional privacy right in keeping private her HIV status and her transsexualism, caused by gender identity disorder, a “profound psychiatric” condition); City of New York, supra, 15 F.3d at 267 (holdin	1	1
State v. Bellgreen md · 1998 · cited in 1 Maryland opinions naming this issue, 2003–2003 2 sentences 2003See State v. Bell, 351 Md. 709 , 720 A.2d 311 (1998); Tibbs v. State, 323 Md. 28 , 590 A.2d 550 (1991); Stewart v. State, 319 Md. 81 , 570 A.2d 1229 (1990); Martinez, supra, 309 Md. at 134 , 522 A.2d at 955 ; Dortch v. State, 290 Md. 229 , 428 A.2d 1220 (1981); Countess v. State, 286 Md. 444 , 408 A.2d 1302 (1979). 2003See State v. Bell, 351 Md. 709 , 720 A.2d 311 (1998); Tibbs v. State, 323 Md. 28 , 590 A.2d 550 (1991); Stewart v. State, 319 Md. 81 , 570 A.2d 1229 (1990); Martinez, supra, 309 Md. at 134 , 522 A.2d at 955 ; Dortch v. State, 290 Md. 229 , 428 A.2d 1220 (1981); Countess v. State, 286 Md. 444 , 408 A.2d 1302 (1979).	1	1
Hodges v. Eastongreen scotus · 1882 · cited in 1 Maryland opinions naming this issue, 1999–1999 2 sentences 1999Johnson, 304 U.S. at 464 , 58 S.Ct. at 1023 , 82 L.Ed. at 1466 (quoting in part from Hodges v. Easton, 106 U.S. 408, 412 , 1 S.Ct. 307, 311 , 27 L.Ed. 169, 171 (1882), and Ohio Bell Telephone Co. v. Public Utilities Commission, 301 U.S. 292, 307 , 57 S.Ct. 724, 731 , 81 L.Ed. 1093, 1103 (1937)). 1999Johnson, 304 U.S. at 464 , 58 S.Ct. at 1023 , 82 L.Ed. at 1466 (quoting in part from Hodges v. Easton, 106 U.S. 408, 412 , 1 S.Ct. 307, 311 , 27 L.Ed. 169, 171 (1882), and Ohio Bell Telephone Co. v. Public Utilities Commission, 301 U.S. 292, 307 , 57 S.Ct. 724, 731 , 81 L.Ed. 1093, 1103 (1937)).	1	1
Ohio Bell Telephone Co. v. Public Utilities Commissiongreen scotus · 1937 · cited in 1 Maryland opinions naming this issue, 1999–1999 2 sentences 1999Johnson, 304 U.S. at 464 , 58 S.Ct. at 1023 , 82 L.Ed. at 1466 (quoting in part from Hodges v. Easton, 106 U.S. 408, 412 , 1 S.Ct. 307, 311 , 27 L.Ed. 169, 171 (1882), and Ohio Bell Telephone Co. v. Public Utilities Commission, 301 U.S. 292, 307 , 57 S.Ct. 724, 731 , 81 L.Ed. 1093, 1103 (1937)). 1999Johnson, 304 U.S. at 464 , 58 S.Ct. at 1023 , 82 L.Ed. at 1466 (quoting in part from Hodges v. Easton, 106 U.S. 408, 412 , 1 S.Ct. 307, 311 , 27 L.Ed. 169, 171 (1882), and Ohio Bell Telephone Co. v. Public Utilities Commission, 301 U.S. 292, 307 , 57 S.Ct. 724, 731 , 81 L.Ed. 1093, 1103 (1937)).	1	1
Logan v. Stategreen md · 1981 · cited in 1 Maryland opinions naming this issue, 1985–1985 2 sentences 1985The determination of whether there has been an intelligent waiver[, e.g.,] of the right to counsel must depend, in each case, upon the particular facts and circumstances surrounding that case____ See, e.g., Logan, supra, 289 Md. at 474, 425 A.2d at 639 . 1985The determination of whether there has been an intelligent waiver[, e.g.,] of the right to counsel must depend, in each case, upon the particular facts and circumstances surrounding that case____ See, e.g., Logan, supra, 289 Md. at 474, 425 A.2d at 639 .	1	1

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

Case	Negative	Cited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Maryland. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (15)

Case	Cited	Years
Dortch v. State green md · 1981 2 sentences 2008Stewart, supra, 319 Md. at 90, 570 A.2d at 1234; Martinez, supra, 309 Md. at 134 , 522 A.2d [at 955]; Dortch v. State, 290 Md. 229 , [235,] 428 A.2d 1220 [, 1223] (1981). 2008Stewart, supra, 319 Md. at 90, 570 A.2d at 1234; Martinez, supra, 309 Md. at 134 , 522 A.2d [at 955]; Dortch v. State, 290 Md. 229 , [235,] 428 A.2d 1220 [, 1223] (1981).	5	1990–2008
State v. Hall green md · 1990 2 sentences 1998In Hall, 321 Md. at 182-83 , 582 A.2d at 509 , we stated: Our cases hold that whether there has been an intelligent waiver of the jury trial right depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case. 1998In Hall, 321 Md. at 182-83 , 582 A.2d at 509 , we stated: Our cases hold that whether there has been an intelligent waiver of the jury trial right depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case.	3	1991–2005
Stewart v. State green md · 1990 2 sentences 2003See State v. Bell, 351 Md. 709 , 720 A.2d 311 (1998); Tibbs v. State, 323 Md. 28 , 590 A.2d 550 (1991); Stewart v. State, 319 Md. 81 , 570 A.2d 1229 (1990); Martinez, supra, 309 Md. at 134 , 522 A.2d at 955 ; Dortch v. State, 290 Md. 229 , 428 A.2d 1220 (1981); Countess v. State, 286 Md. 444 , 408 A.2d 1302 (1979). 2003See State v. Bell, 351 Md. 709 , 720 A.2d 311 (1998); Tibbs v. State, 323 Md. 28 , 590 A.2d 550 (1991); Stewart v. State, 319 Md. 81 , 570 A.2d 1229 (1990); Martinez, supra, 309 Md. at 134 , 522 A.2d at 955 ; Dortch v. State, 290 Md. 229 , 428 A.2d 1220 (1981); Countess v. State, 286 Md. 444 , 408 A.2d 1302 (1979).	2	1990–2003
Mlb v. Slj green scotus · 1996 2 sentences 2006Based upon this body of law, Ms. H. contends that, because CINA proceedings can be likened to criminal and quasi-criminal proceedings, as expressed by the Supreme Court in M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102 , 117 S.Ct. 555 , 136 L.Ed.2d 473 (1996), due process requires application of the more stringent standard of waiver in CINA adjudicatory proceedings. 2006Based upon this body of law, Ms. H. contends that, because CINA proceedings can be likened to criminal and quasi-criminal proceedings, as expressed by the Supreme Court in M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102 , 117 S.Ct. 555 , 136 L.Ed.2d 473 (1996), due process requires application of the more stringent standard of waiver in CINA adjudicatory proceedings.	1	2006–2006
Kang v. State green mdctspecapp · 2005 2 sentences 2005See Tibbs v. State, 323 Md. 28 , 590 A.2d 550 (1991); State v. Hall, 321 Md. 178 , 582 A.2d 507 (1990); Martinez v. State, supra; Kang v. State, 163 Md.App. 22 , 877 A.2d 173 (2005). 2005See Tibbs v. State, 323 Md. 28 , 590 A.2d 550 (1991); State v. Hall, 321 Md. 178 , 582 A.2d 507 (1990); Martinez v. State, supra; Kang v. State, 163 Md.App. 22 , 877 A.2d 173 (2005).	1	2005–2005
Dedo v. State green mdctspecapp · 1995 1 sentence 2005Finally, “whether there has been an intelligent waiver of [the right to] *344 a jury trial is to be decided by the facts and circumstances of each case.” Id.	1	2005–2005
Fay v. Noia red scotus · 1963 1 sentence 1997The determination of whether there has been an intelligent waiver ... must depend, in each case, upon the particular facts and circumstances surrounding that case, including the background, experience, and conduct of the accused.'" Id. at 143 , 395 A.2d at 470 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Johnson, 304 U.S. at 464 , 58 S.Ct. at 1023 , 82 L.Ed. at 1466 ).	1	1997–1997
Parke v. Raley green scotus · 1993 1 sentence 1993As Justice O’Connor pointed out in Parke v. Raley, supra, — U.S. at -, 113 S.Ct. at 524: At the time the prior conviction at issue in Burgett was entered, state criminal defendants’ federal constitutional right to counsel had not yet been recognized, and so it was reasonable to presume that the defendant had not waived a right he did not possess.	1	1993–1993
Cassidy v. Baltimore County Board of Appeals green md · 1958 1 sentence 1983The requirements for adequate notice were discussed by the Court of Appeals in Cassidy, supra, where the Court, considering 2 Merrill, Notice, Section 796, concluded that for notice to be sufficient, it must: (1) clearly apprise those interested to defend their interests without creating the impression that a final decision already had been achieved rendering their appearance futile; (2) state the authority of the agency and the facts which give it jurisdiction; and (3) describe the character of the action proposed and the basis upon which it rests sufficiently to permit preparation of an inte	1	1983–1983
North Carolina v. Butler red scotus · 1979 2 sentences 1981In further commenting on this same subject, the Supreme Court has more recently stated that there exists a presumption "that a defendant did not waive his rights; the prosecution’s burden is great; but in at least some cases waiver can be clearly inferred from the actions and words of the person interrogated.” North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 373 , 99 S. Ct. 1755 , 60 L. 1981In further commenting on this same subject, the Supreme Court has more recently stated that there exists a presumption "that a defendant did not waive his rights; the prosecution’s burden is great; but in at least some cases waiver can be clearly inferred from the actions and words of the person interrogated.” North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 373 , 99 S. Ct. 1755 , 60 L.	1	1981–1981
Adams v. United States Ex Rel. McCann green scotus · 1943 2 sentences 1979In Adams v. United States, 317 U. S. 269 , 63 S. Ct. 236 , 87 L. 1979In Adams v. United States, 317 U. S. 269 , 63 S. Ct. 236 , 87 L.	1	1979–1979
Carnley v. Cochran green scotus · 1962 2 sentences 1979The determination of whether there has been an intelligent waiver of the right to counsel must depend, in each case, upon the particular facts and circumstances surrounding that case, including the background, experience, and conduct of the accused.” The strictness of the Johnson v. Zerbst standard was underscored by the Court in Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U. S. 506, 516 , 82 S. Ct. 884 , 8 L.Ed.2d 70 (1962), where it was declared: “Presuming waiver [of the right to counsel] from a silent record is impermissible.” This high standard has been applied regarding the waiver of the right to trial by j 1979The determination of whether there has been an intelligent waiver of the right to counsel must depend, in each case, upon the particular facts and circumstances surrounding that case, including the background, experience, and conduct of the accused.” The strictness of the Johnson v. Zerbst standard was underscored by the Court in Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U. S. 506, 516 , 82 S. Ct. 884 , 8 L.Ed.2d 70 (1962), where it was declared: “Presuming waiver [of the right to counsel] from a silent record is impermissible.” This high standard has been applied regarding the waiver of the right to trial by j	1	1979–1979
State v. Zimmerman green md · 1971 1 sentence 1971It is now argued that it was incumbent upon appellant’s counsel or the trial judge to have ascertained whether appellant intelligently understood his right to a jury trial and that “the record being silent on this point it must be resolved in favor of appellant.” We think this issue is controlled by the recent decision of the Court of Appeals in State v. Zimmerman, 261 Md. 11 .	1	1971–1971
Trafficante v. State green fla · 1957 1 sentence 1967Palacorolle v. State, supra; McMahon v. Mayo, 92 So. 2d 806 (Fla. 1957).	1	1967–1967
Hutson v. State green md · 1953 2 sentences 1964It appears rather generally to be accepted that a variance in names, between that alleged and that proven, is not fatal where it does not mislead the defendant so that he cannot make an intelligent defense, or expose him to double jeopardy. 1 Underhill, Criminal Evidence (5th Ed.), Sec. 86; 2 Wharton, Criminal Evidence (12th Ed.), Sec. 653; cf. Hutson v. State, 202 Md. 333, 338-339 , 96 A. 2d 593 (1953). 1964It appears rather generally to be accepted that a variance in names, between that alleged and that proven, is not fatal where it does not mislead the defendant so that he cannot make an intelligent defense, or expose him to double jeopardy. 1 Underhill, Criminal Evidence (5th Ed.), Sec. 86; 2 Wharton, Criminal Evidence (12th Ed.), Sec. 653; cf. Hutson v. State, 202 Md. 333, 338-339 , 96 A. 2d 593 (1953).	1	1964–1964

Where else courts name it

CA 179 (1947–2026) LA 87 (1942–2019) IL 85 (1948–2026) GA 48 (1971–2026) OH 41 (1944–2026) AR 36 (1956–2021) TX 33 (1968–2025) CT 32 (1968–2016) IN 30 (1969–2020) MD 28 (1964–2008) NY 28 (1955–2018) AL 21 (1965–2018) PA 20 (1941–2021) WA 19 (1963–2022) FL 19 (1964–2014) AZ 18 (1965–2021) SC 18 (1974–2024) WV 18 (1965–2021) MO 14 (1896–2023) CO 13 (1967–2021) MN 13 (1959–2024) RI 12 (1964–2011) NH 11 (1965–2019) MI 11 (1967–2023) MA 11 (1971–2010) NJ 10 (1945–2026) AK 10 (1980–2023) NC 9 (1964–2022) OR 9 (1966–1983) DC 8 (1959–2010) OK 8 (1939–1979) NM 8 (1971–2020) WI 7 (1968–2003) ND 7 (1965–2025) TN 6 (1951–2024) VA 6 (1979–2023) KS 6 (1949–1982) IA 6 (1966–2022) KY 6 (1981–2022) VT 5 (1960–2016) MS 5 (1988–2019) SD 5 (1943–2006) NV 5 (1970–1984) NE 4 (1976–2019) ID 4 (1967–1986) ME 4 (1980–2014) WY 4 (1984–1992) DE 2 (1985–2015) UT 2 (1990–2001) MT 2 (1963–2013)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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