11 Massachusetts opinions name it 4 courts 1971–2010 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Massachusetts courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Miranda v. Arizonagreen2 sentences2010Similarly, an intelligent waiver of the right includes knowledge of the “consequences of forgoing it,” because “[i]t is only through an awareness of these consequences that there can be any assurance of real understanding and intelligent exercise [or waiver] of the privilege.” Id. at 469 . 2010Similarly, an intelligent waiver of the right includes knowledge of the "consequences of forgoing it," because "[i]t is only through an awareness of these consequences that there can be any assurance of real understanding and intelligent exercise [or waiver] of the privilege." Id. at 469 . | 1 | 2 |
Commonwealth v. Garciagreen2 sentences2010See Commonwealth v. Garcia, 379 Mass. 422, 429 (1980) (“A confession can be voluntary in the legal sense only if the suspect actually understands the import of each Miranda warning”). 2010See Commonwealth v. Garcia, 379 Mass. 422, 429 (1980) ("A confession can be voluntary in the legal sense only if the suspect actually understands the import of each Miranda warning"). | 1 | 1 |
Leroy J. Peterson v. Charles W. Gaughan, Superintendent, Massachusetts Correctional Institution at Bridgewatergreen1 sentence2003Peterson v. Gaughan, 404 F.2d 1375, 1379 (1968), citing Johnson v. Zerbst, 301 U.S. 458, 464 (1938). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Amazeengreen1 sentence1999“Our cases do not require that a defendant must have information regarding the crime about which he will be questioned or about police suspicions before making a valid waiver of his Miranda rights.” Commonwealth v. Raymond, 424 Mass. 382, 393 (1997) (court found unpersuasive defendant’s argument that he did not make a knowing and intelligent waiver of his rights because the police had not informed him that he was a central suspect of the crime or that [a co-defendant] had confessed so that he did not understand the implications of the waiver), citing Commonwealth v. Amazeen, 375 Mass. 73, 78 ( | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Raymondgreen1 sentence1999“Our cases do not require that a defendant must have information regarding the crime about which he will be questioned or about police suspicions before making a valid waiver of his Miranda rights.” Commonwealth v. Raymond, 424 Mass. 382, 393 (1997) (court found unpersuasive defendant’s argument that he did not make a knowing and intelligent waiver of his rights because the police had not informed him that he was a central suspect of the crime or that [a co-defendant] had confessed so that he did not understand the implications of the waiver), citing Commonwealth v. Amazeen, 375 Mass. 73, 78 ( | 1 | 1 |
Pennsylvania v. Brudergreen1 sentence1997In Pennsylvania v. Bruder, 488 U.S. 9, 10 (1988), the United States Supreme Court explained why routine traffic stops do not raise Miranda issues as follows: “In Berkemer v. McCarty, [ 468 U.S. 420 (1984)] . . . the Court concluded that the ‘noncoercive aspect of ordinary traffic stops prompts us to hold that persons temporarily detained pursuant to such stops are not “in custody” for the purposes of Miranda.’ Id. at 440 . | 1 | 1 |
Ronald Maynard v. Larry Meachumgreen1 sentence1995The father’s educational level and his various statements and writings in the record convince us that he had the capacity to make an intelligent waiver. 4 See Maynard v. Meachum, supra at 279 (“[a]n intelligent waiver does not require that the accused have the skill or knowledge of a lawyer”). 2. | 1 | 1 |
Adams v. United States Ex Rel. McCanngreen1 sentence1981McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 275 (1942) (permitting an accused in federal court to waive right to jury trial “in the exercise of a free and intelligent choice”). | 1 | 1 |
Rufus Chalk v. Dr. George J. Beto, Director, Texas Department of Correctionsgreen1 sentence1981Cf. Chalk v. Beto, 429 F.2d 225, 227-28 (5th Cir. 1970) (granting habeas corpus relief from state court conviction in part because petitioner did not “make an intelligent waiver of his right to trial by jury”) See also, Adams v. U.S. ex rel. | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Danielsgreen2 sentences1975Commonwealth v. Daniels, 366 Mass. 601, 606-607 (1975). 1975Cf. Commonwealth v. Daniels, 366 Mass. 601, 608 (1975). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Guillorygreen1 sentence1972See Commonwealth v. Guillory, 356 Mass. 591, 593 . | 1 | 1 |
Gilbert v. Californiagreen1 sentence1971See Gilbert v. California, 388 U. S. 263 . | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Massachusetts. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Berkemer v. McCarty
green
2 sentences1997In Pennsylvania v. Bruder, 488 U.S. 9, 10 (1988), the United States Supreme Court explained why routine traffic stops do not raise Miranda issues as follows: “In Berkemer v. McCarty, [ 468 U.S. 420 (1984)] . . . the Court concluded that the ‘noncoercive aspect of ordinary traffic stops prompts us to hold that persons temporarily detained pursuant to such stops are not “in custody” for the purposes of Miranda.’ Id. at 440 . 1997In Pennsylvania v. Bruder, 488 U.S. 9, 10 (1988), the United States Supreme Court explained why routine traffic stops do not raise Miranda issues as follows: “In Berkemer v. McCarty, [ 468 U.S. 420 (1984)] . . . the Court concluded that the ‘noncoercive aspect of ordinary traffic stops prompts us to hold that persons temporarily detained pursuant to such stops are not “in custody” for the purposes of Miranda.’ Id. at 440 . | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Commonwealth v. Connor
green
1 sentence1983Id. at 513-514 . [3] This information may be imparted to the defendant by his counsel and may be impressed on the record at the time of the waiver by appropriate questions either to counsel or the defendant about the content of counsel's explanation of the jury right. [4] We perceive no restraint which prohibits an appellate court from examining the record outside the colloquy for indications that the defendant in fact had the knowledge requisite to an intelligent waiver, thereby permitting the application of a "harmless error" analysis to any deficiency in the colloquy. | 1 | 1983–1983 |
Charles F. Cooper v. Philip J. Picard, Superintendent, Massachusetts Correctional Institution, Norfolk
green
1 sentence1975The insufficiency of the evidence distinguishes this case from Commonwealth v. Tempesta, 361 Mass. 191 (1972), Commonwealth v. Murphy, 362 Mass. 542 (1972), and Commonwealth v. Brown, 364 Mass. 471 (1973), which we remanded for such findings following the decisions *575 in Cooper v. Picard, 428 F. 2d 1351 (1st Cir. 1970), and Cooper v. Picard, 316 F. Supp. 856 (D. | 1 | 1975–1975 |
Commonwealth v. Brown
green
1 sentence1975The insufficiency of the evidence distinguishes this case from Commonwealth v. Tempesta, 361 Mass. 191 (1972), Commonwealth v. Murphy, 362 Mass. 542 (1972), and Commonwealth v. Brown, 364 Mass. 471 (1973), which we remanded for such findings following the decisions *575 in Cooper v. Picard, 428 F. 2d 1351 (1st Cir. 1970), and Cooper v. Picard, 316 F. Supp. 856 (D. | 1 | 1975–1975 |
Commonwealth v. Murphy
green
1 sentence1975The insufficiency of the evidence distinguishes this case from Commonwealth v. Tempesta, 361 Mass. 191 (1972), Commonwealth v. Murphy, 362 Mass. 542 (1972), and Commonwealth v. Brown, 364 Mass. 471 (1973), which we remanded for such findings following the decisions *575 in Cooper v. Picard, 428 F. 2d 1351 (1st Cir. 1970), and Cooper v. Picard, 316 F. Supp. 856 (D. | 1 | 1975–1975 |
Cooper v. Picard
green
1 sentence1975The insufficiency of the evidence distinguishes this case from Commonwealth v. Tempesta, 361 Mass. 191 (1972), Commonwealth v. Murphy, 362 Mass. 542 (1972), and Commonwealth v. Brown, 364 Mass. 471 (1973), which we remanded for such findings following the decisions *575 in Cooper v. Picard, 428 F. 2d 1351 (1st Cir. 1970), and Cooper v. Picard, 316 F. Supp. 856 (D. | 1 | 1975–1975 |
Commonwealth v. Cain
green
1 sentence1975Under these circumstances, when the defendant responded to a suggestion of waiver with “right on, man, let’s talk about it,” that response does not seem to us to evince “with sufficient clarity an understanding by the defendant of his fundamental rights and an intelligent waiver of those rights.” Commonwealth v. Cain, supra, at 228 . | 1 | 1975–1975 |
Commonwealth v. Tempesta
green
1 sentence1975The insufficiency of the evidence distinguishes this case from Commonwealth v. Tempesta, 361 Mass. 191 (1972), Commonwealth v. Murphy, 362 Mass. 542 (1972), and Commonwealth v. Brown, 364 Mass. 471 (1973), which we remanded for such findings following the decisions *575 in Cooper v. Picard, 428 F. 2d 1351 (1st Cir. 1970), and Cooper v. Picard, 316 F. Supp. 856 (D. | 1 | 1975–1975 |
United States v. Wade
green
1 sentence1971In United States v. Wade, 388 U. S. 218, 237 , the Supreme Court held that the presence of defendant’s counsel was a requirement for the conduct of a lineup, absent an intelligent waiver. | 1 | 1971–1971 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.