8 New Mexico opinions name it 2 courts 1971–2020 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New Mexico courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Castillogreen2 sentences2009See Plouse, 2003-NMCA-048, ¶ 27 ; 2 State v. Castillo, 110 N.M. 54, 57 , 791 P.2d 808, 811 (Ct. App. 1990) (“The question 3 of an intelligent waiver of the right to counsel turns not only on the state of the record 4 but on the circumstances of the case, including defendant’s age and education, 5 previous experience with criminal trials, and representation by counsel before trial.”). 6 {13} Defendant concedes, and we agree, that the district court made a proper inquiry 7 as to whether he understood the multitude of dangers inherent in self-representation 8 and into his understanding, backgroun 2009See Plouse, 2003-NMCA-048, ¶ 27 ; 2 State v. Castillo, 110 N.M. 54, 57 , 791 P.2d 808, 811 (Ct. App. 1990) (“The question 3 of an intelligent waiver of the right to counsel turns not only on the state of the record 4 but on the circumstances of the case, including defendant’s age and education, 5 previous experience with criminal trials, and representation by counsel before trial.”). 6 {13} Defendant concedes, and we agree, that the district court made a proper inquiry 7 as to whether he understood the multitude of dangers inherent in self-representation 8 and into his understanding, backgroun | 1 | 2 |
State v. Plousegreen1 sentence2009See Plouse, 2003-NMCA-048, ¶ 27 ; 2 State v. Castillo, 110 N.M. 54, 57 , 791 P.2d 808, 811 (Ct. App. 1990) (“The question 3 of an intelligent waiver of the right to counsel turns not only on the state of the record 4 but on the circumstances of the case, including defendant’s age and education, 5 previous experience with criminal trials, and representation by counsel before trial.”). 6 {13} Defendant concedes, and we agree, that the district court made a proper inquiry 7 as to whether he understood the multitude of dangers inherent in self-representation 8 and into his understanding, backgroun | 1 | 1 |
State v. Garciagreen2 sentences2007It is only where there has been a denial of the substance of fair trial that the validity of the proceeding may be attacked collaterally." 80 N.M. 21, 23 , 450 P.2d 621, 623 (1969). {28} These various pronouncements by this Court leave me in doubt concerning the scope of the principle and concept of fundamental error as it applies in habeas proceedings. 2007It is only where there has been a denial of the substance of fair trial that the validity of the proceeding may be attacked collaterally." 80 N.M. 21, 23 , 450 P.2d 621, 623 (1969). {28} These various pronouncements by this Court leave me in doubt concerning the scope of the principle and concept of fundamental error as it applies in habeas proceedings. | 1 | 1 |
Von Moltke v. Gilliesgreen2 sentences2005Further, in Castillo, we determined that the trial court must: (1) make “[a] showing on the record ... that a defendant ... has some sense of the magnitude of the undertaking and the hazards inherent in self-representation”; (2) “insure that [a] defendant has been informed of the nature of the charges, the statutory offenses included within them, the range of allowable punishments, possible defenses or mitigating factors that might be available to the defendant”; and (3) “admonish [a defendant] that [those who proceed pro se] will be expected to follow the rules of evidence and courtroom proce 2005Further, in Castillo, we determined that the trial court must: (1) make “[a] showing on the record ... that a defendant ... has some sense of the magnitude of the undertaking and the hazards inherent in self-representation”; (2) “insure that [a] defendant has been informed of the nature of the charges, the statutory offenses included within them, the range of allowable punishments, possible defenses or mitigating factors that might be available to the defendant”; and (3) “admonish [a defendant] that [those who proceed pro se] will be expected to follow the rules of evidence and courtroom proce | 1 | 1 |
State v. Rotibigreen2 sentences2005Rotibi, 117 N.M. at 110 , 869 P.2d at 298 . {9} To determine whether a defendant is making a voluntary, knowing, and intelligent waiver, “the court must inform itself regarding a defendant’s competency, understanding, background, education, training, experience, conduct and ability to observe the court’s procedures and protocol.” Chapman, 104 N.M. at 327 , 721 P.2d at 395 ; Castillo, 110 N.M. at 57 , 791 P.2d at 811 (citing authority for the proposition that the question of an intelligent waiver of the right to counsel turns not only on the state of the record but on the circumstances of the c 2005Rotibi, 117 N.M. at 110 , 869 P.2d at 298 . {9} To determine whether a defendant is making a voluntary, knowing, and intelligent waiver, “the court must inform itself regarding a defendant’s competency, understanding, background, education, training, experience, conduct and ability to observe the court’s procedures and protocol.” Chapman, 104 N.M. at 327 , 721 P.2d at 395 ; Castillo, 110 N.M. at 57 , 791 P.2d at 811 (citing authority for the proposition that the question of an intelligent waiver of the right to counsel turns not only on the state of the record but on the circumstances of the c | 1 | 1 |
Andrew A. Sanchez v. Eloy Mondragon, Warden, Southern N.M. Correction Facility Attorney General of the State of New Mexicogreen1 sentence2005Further, in Castillo, we determined that the trial court must: (1) make “[a] showing on the record ... that a defendant ... has some sense of the magnitude of the undertaking and the hazards inherent in self-representation”; (2) “insure that [a] defendant has been informed of the nature of the charges, the statutory offenses included within them, the range of allowable punishments, possible defenses or mitigating factors that might be available to the defendant”; and (3) “admonish [a defendant] that [those who proceed pro se] will be expected to follow the rules of evidence and courtroom proce | 1 | 1 |
State v. Barefieldgreen2 sentences1974Compare State v. Barefield, 80 N.M. 265 , 454 P.2d 279 (1969). 1974Compare State v. Barefield, 80 N.M. 265 , 454 P.2d 279 (1969). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New Mexico. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Johnson v. Zerbst
green
2 sentences2020“The determination of whether there has been an intelligent waiver of right to counsel must depend, in each case, upon the particular facts and circumstances surrounding that case, including the background, experience, and conduct of the accused.” Johnson, 304 U.S. at 464 . 2002“The determination of whether there has been an intelligent waiver of the right to counsel must depend, in each case, upon the particular facts and circumstances surrounding that case, including the background, experience, and conduct of the accused.” Id. | 2 | 2002–2020 |
State v. Barrera
green
2 sentences2020“Resolution of whether a valid waiver of counsel has occurred depends upon the totality of the circumstances.” State v. Barrera, 2001- NMSC-014, ¶ 28, 130 N.M. 227 , 22 P.3d 1177 (quoting State v. Boeglin, 1983-NMCA- 075, ¶ 22, 100 N.M. 127 , 666 P.2d 1274 ). 2020“Resolution of whether a valid waiver of counsel has occurred depends upon the totality of the circumstances.” State v. Barrera, 2001- NMSC-014, ¶ 28, 130 N.M. 227 , 22 P.3d 1177 (quoting State v. Boeglin, 1983-NMCA- 075, ¶ 22, 100 N.M. 127 , 666 P.2d 1274 ). | 2 | 2002–2020 |
State v. Boeglin
green
2 sentences2020“Resolution of whether a valid waiver of counsel has occurred depends upon the totality of the circumstances.” State v. Barrera, 2001- NMSC-014, ¶ 28, 130 N.M. 227 , 22 P.3d 1177 (quoting State v. Boeglin, 1983-NMCA- 075, ¶ 22, 100 N.M. 127 , 666 P.2d 1274 ). 2020“Resolution of whether a valid waiver of counsel has occurred depends upon the totality of the circumstances.” State v. Barrera, 2001- NMSC-014, ¶ 28, 130 N.M. 227 , 22 P.3d 1177 (quoting State v. Boeglin, 1983-NMCA- 075, ¶ 22, 100 N.M. 127 , 666 P.2d 1274 ). | 1 | 2020–2020 |
State v. Chapman
green
2 sentences2005Rotibi, 117 N.M. at 110 , 869 P.2d at 298 . {9} To determine whether a defendant is making a voluntary, knowing, and intelligent waiver, “the court must inform itself regarding a defendant’s competency, understanding, background, education, training, experience, conduct and ability to observe the court’s procedures and protocol.” Chapman, 104 N.M. at 327 , 721 P.2d at 395 ; Castillo, 110 N.M. at 57 , 791 P.2d at 811 (citing authority for the proposition that the question of an intelligent waiver of the right to counsel turns not only on the state of the record but on the circumstances of the c 2005Rotibi, 117 N.M. at 110 , 869 P.2d at 298 . {9} To determine whether a defendant is making a voluntary, knowing, and intelligent waiver, “the court must inform itself regarding a defendant’s competency, understanding, background, education, training, experience, conduct and ability to observe the court’s procedures and protocol.” Chapman, 104 N.M. at 327 , 721 P.2d at 395 ; Castillo, 110 N.M. at 57 , 791 P.2d at 811 (citing authority for the proposition that the question of an intelligent waiver of the right to counsel turns not only on the state of the record but on the circumstances of the c | 1 | 2005–2005 |
State v. Burk
green
2 sentences1978The standard for determining defendant’s mental capacity to make the statement is stated in State v. Chavez, 88 N.M. 451 , 541 P.2d 631 (Ct.App.1975); the standard for determining voluntariness and an intelligent waiver is discussed in State v. Burk, 82 N.M. 466 , 483 P.2d 940 (Ct.App.1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 955 , 92 S.Ct. 309 , 30 L.Ed.2d 271 (1971). 1978The standard for determining defendant’s mental capacity to make the statement is stated in State v. Chavez, 88 N.M. 451 , 541 P.2d 631 (Ct.App.1975); the standard for determining voluntariness and an intelligent waiver is discussed in State v. Burk, 82 N.M. 466 , 483 P.2d 940 (Ct.App.1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 955 , 92 S.Ct. 309 , 30 L.Ed.2d 271 (1971). | 1 | 1978–1978 |
State v. Chavez
green
2 sentences1978The standard for determining defendant’s mental capacity to make the statement is stated in State v. Chavez, 88 N.M. 451 , 541 P.2d 631 (Ct.App.1975); the standard for determining voluntariness and an intelligent waiver is discussed in State v. Burk, 82 N.M. 466 , 483 P.2d 940 (Ct.App.1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 955 , 92 S.Ct. 309 , 30 L.Ed.2d 271 (1971). 1978The standard for determining defendant’s mental capacity to make the statement is stated in State v. Chavez, 88 N.M. 451 , 541 P.2d 631 (Ct.App.1975); the standard for determining voluntariness and an intelligent waiver is discussed in State v. Burk, 82 N.M. 466 , 483 P.2d 940 (Ct.App.1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 955 , 92 S.Ct. 309 , 30 L.Ed.2d 271 (1971). | 1 | 1978–1978 |
Strait v. Laird
green
1 sentence1978The standard for determining defendant’s mental capacity to make the statement is stated in State v. Chavez, 88 N.M. 451 , 541 P.2d 631 (Ct.App.1975); the standard for determining voluntariness and an intelligent waiver is discussed in State v. Burk, 82 N.M. 466 , 483 P.2d 940 (Ct.App.1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 955 , 92 S.Ct. 309 , 30 L.Ed.2d 271 (1971). | 1 | 1978–1978 |
Brown Parler v. Kolb
green
1 sentence1978The standard for determining defendant’s mental capacity to make the statement is stated in State v. Chavez, 88 N.M. 451 , 541 P.2d 631 (Ct.App.1975); the standard for determining voluntariness and an intelligent waiver is discussed in State v. Burk, 82 N.M. 466 , 483 P.2d 940 (Ct.App.1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 955 , 92 S.Ct. 309 , 30 L.Ed.2d 271 (1971). | 1 | 1978–1978 |
State v. Smith
green
2 sentences1971United States v. Hayes, 385 F.2d 375 (4th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1006 , 88 S.Ct. 1250 , 20 L.Ed.2d 106 (1968), cited in State v. Smith, 80 N.M. 126 , 452 P.2d 195 (Ct.App.1969). 1971United States v. Hayes, 385 F.2d 375 (4th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1006 , 88 S.Ct. 1250 , 20 L.Ed.2d 106 (1968), cited in State v. Smith, 80 N.M. 126 , 452 P.2d 195 (Ct.App.1969). | 1 | 1971–1971 |
United States v. Maynard Francis Hayes
green
1 sentence1971United States v. Hayes, 385 F.2d 375 (4th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1006 , 88 S.Ct. 1250 , 20 L.Ed.2d 106 (1968), cited in State v. Smith, 80 N.M. 126 , 452 P.2d 195 (Ct.App.1969). | 1 | 1971–1971 |
Warren v. Waterville Urban Renewal Authority
green
1 sentence1971United States v. Hayes, 385 F.2d 375 (4th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1006 , 88 S.Ct. 1250 , 20 L.Ed.2d 106 (1968), cited in State v. Smith, 80 N.M. 126 , 452 P.2d 195 (Ct.App.1969). | 1 | 1971–1971 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.