intelligent waiver in Michigan

2020The determination of whether there has been an intelligent waiver of right to counsel must depend, in each case, upon the particular facts and circumstances surrounding that case, including the background, experience, and conduct of the accused.” Id., 304 US at 464 .

2004ANALYSIS The United States Supreme Court has held that the right to self-representation is guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution, Faretta v California, 422 US 806, 819-820 ; 95 S Ct 2525 ; 45 L Ed 2d 562 (1975), and that a defendant may waive his right to counsel, provided he do so “competently and intelligently.” Johnson, supra at 468 . [W]hether there has been an intelligent waiver of the right to counsel must depend, in each case, upon the particular facts and circumstances surrounding that case, including the background, experience, and conduct of the accused.

2021People v Russell, 471 Mich 182, 191 ; 684 NW2d 745 (2004). “[W]hether there has been an intelligent waiver of the right to counsel must depend, in each case, upon the particular facts and circumstances surrounding that case, including the background, experience, and conduct of the accused.” Id. at 201 .

2021People v Russell, 471 Mich 182, 191 ; 684 NW2d 745 (2004). “[W]hether there has been an intelligent waiver of the right to counsel must depend, in each case, upon the particular facts and circumstances surrounding that case, including the background, experience, and conduct of the accused.” Id. at 201 .

1975In speaking of waiver of counsel, the United States Supreme Court stated in Johnson v Zerbst, 304 US 458 ; 58 S Ct 1019 ; 82 L Ed 1461 (1938): "The determination of whether, there has been an intelligent waiver of the right to counsel must depend, in each case, upon the particular facts and circumstances surrounding that case, including the background, experience, and conduct of the accused.” Defendant replied negatively to the court’s inquiry as to whether he wished counsel in Moore v Michigan, 355 US 155 ; 78 S Ct 191 ; 2 L Ed 2d 167 (1957).

1975In speaking of waiver of counsel, the United States Supreme Court stated in Johnson v Zerbst, 304 US 458 ; 58 S Ct 1019 ; 82 L Ed 1461 (1938): "The determination of whether, there has been an intelligent waiver of the right to counsel must depend, in each case, upon the particular facts and circumstances surrounding that case, including the background, experience, and conduct of the accused.” Defendant replied negatively to the court’s inquiry as to whether he wished counsel in Moore v Michigan, 355 US 155 ; 78 S Ct 191 ; 2 L Ed 2d 167 (1957).

2023People v Abraham, 234 Mich App 640, 647 ; 599 NW2d 736 (1999).

2023People v Abraham, 234 Mich App 640, 647 ; 599 NW2d 736 (1999).

2020The determination of whether there has been an intelligent waiver of right to counsel must depend, in each case, upon the particular facts and circumstances surrounding that case, including the background, experience, and conduct of the accused.” Id., 304 US at 464 .

2015People v Russell, 471 Mich 182, 191 ; 684 NW2d 745 (2004). “[W]hether there has been an intelligent waiver of the right to counsel must depend, in each case, upon the particular facts and circumstances surrounding that case, including the background, experience, and conduct of the accused.” Id. at 201 . 1 People v Cobbs, 443 Mich 276 ; 505 NW2d 208 (1993). -2- Of these requirements, defendant asserts only that he did not receive adequate warning of the risks of self-representation, and therefore that his waiver was not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily made.

2015People v Russell, 471 Mich 182, 191 ; 684 NW2d 745 (2004). “[W]hether there has been an intelligent waiver of the right to counsel must depend, in each case, upon the particular facts and circumstances surrounding that case, including the background, experience, and conduct of the accused.” Id. at 201 . 1 People v Cobbs, 443 Mich 276 ; 505 NW2d 208 (1993). -2- Of these requirements, defendant asserts only that he did not receive adequate warning of the risks of self-representation, and therefore that his waiver was not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily made.

2004In Michigan, the right to self-representation is secured by both the state constitution and statute. 4 However, this Court has stated that a trial court may only permit a defendant to represent himself if the following requirements have been satisfied: (1) the defendant’s request to represent himself has been unequivocal; (2) the defendant has asserted his right of self-representation “knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily”; (3) the trial court has been satisfied that the defendant, in representing himself, “will not disrupt, unduly inconvenience and burden the court and the administration

2004In Michigan, the right to self-representation is secured by both the state constitution and statute. 4 However, this Court has stated that a trial court may only permit a defendant to represent himself if the following requirements have been satisfied: (1) the defendant’s request to represent himself has been unequivocal; (2) the defendant has asserted his right of self-representation “knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily”; (3) the trial court has been satisfied that the defendant, in representing himself, “will not disrupt, unduly inconvenience and burden the court and the administration

2004ANALYSIS The United States Supreme Court has held that the right to self-representation is guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution, Faretta v California, 422 US 806, 819-820 ; 95 S Ct 2525 ; 45 L Ed 2d 562 (1975), and that a defendant may waive his right to counsel, provided he do so “competently and intelligently.” Johnson, supra at 468 . [W]hether there has been an intelligent waiver of the right to counsel must depend, in each case, upon the particular facts and circumstances surrounding that case, including the background, experience, and conduct of the accused.

2004ANALYSIS The United States Supreme Court has held that the right to self-representation is guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution, Faretta v California, 422 US 806, 819-820 ; 95 S Ct 2525 ; 45 L Ed 2d 562 (1975), and that a defendant may waive his right to counsel, provided he do so “competently and intelligently.” Johnson, supra at 468 . [W]hether there has been an intelligent waiver of the right to counsel must depend, in each case, upon the particular facts and circumstances surrounding that case, including the background, experience, and conduct of the accused.

1985The determination of whether there has been an intelligent waiver of the right to counsel must depend, in each case, upon the particular facts and circumstances surrounding that case, including the background, experience, and conduct of the accused.” This basic test was reaffirmed in Brewer v Williams, 430 US 387, 404 ; 97 S Ct 1232 ; 51 L Ed 2d 424 (1977): "[I]t was incumbent upon the State to prove 'an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.’ Johnson v Zerbst, 304 US at 464 . "[C]ourts indulge in every reasonable presumption against waiver, e.g., Brookhart v

1985The determination of whether there has been an intelligent waiver of the right to counsel must depend, in each case, upon the particular facts and circumstances surrounding that case, including the background, experience, and conduct of the accused.” This basic test was reaffirmed in Brewer v Williams, 430 US 387, 404 ; 97 S Ct 1232 ; 51 L Ed 2d 424 (1977): "[I]t was incumbent upon the State to prove 'an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.’ Johnson v Zerbst, 304 US at 464 . "[C]ourts indulge in every reasonable presumption against waiver, e.g., Brookhart v

1985The determination of whether there has been an intelligent waiver of the right to counsel must depend, in each case, upon the particular facts and circumstances surrounding that case, including the background, experience, and conduct of the accused.” This basic test was reaffirmed in Brewer v Williams, 430 US 387, 404 ; 97 S Ct 1232 ; 51 L Ed 2d 424 (1977): "[I]t was incumbent upon the State to prove 'an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.’ Johnson v Zerbst, 304 US at 464 . "[C]ourts indulge in every reasonable presumption against waiver, e.g., Brookhart v

1985The determination of whether there has been an intelligent waiver of the right to counsel must depend, in each case, upon the particular facts and circumstances surrounding that case, including the background, experience, and conduct of the accused.” This basic test was reaffirmed in Brewer v Williams, 430 US 387, 404 ; 97 S Ct 1232 ; 51 L Ed 2d 424 (1977): "[I]t was incumbent upon the State to prove 'an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.’ Johnson v Zerbst, 304 US at 464 . "[C]ourts indulge in every reasonable presumption against waiver, e.g., Brookhart v

1972United States v Wade, supra. “Once a claim of illegal identification is raised the court must hold an evidentiary hearing outside the presence of the jury to determine the merits of the claim.” People v *96 Edmonds, 32 Mich App 172 (1971).

1972United States v Wade, supra. “Once a claim of illegal identification is raised the court must hold an evidentiary hearing outside the presence of the jury to determine the merits of the claim.” People v *96 Edmonds, 32 Mich App 172 (1971).