intelligent waiver in California

2014(See Johnson v. Zerbst (1938) 304 U.S. 458, 464 [ 58 S.Ct. 1019 ] ["waiver is ordinarily an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege" and whether there has been "an intelligent waiver" of a constitutional right depends "upon the particular facts and circumstances" of the case]; see also Patricia T., supra, 91 Cal.App.4th at p. 406 .) Our review of the record indicates that mother's submission satisfied that standard.

2014(See Johnson v. Zerbst (1938) 304 U.S. 458, 464 [ 58 S.Ct. 1019 ] ["waiver is ordinarily an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege" and whether there has been "an intelligent waiver" of a constitutional right depends "upon the particular facts and circumstances" of the case]; see also Patricia T., supra, 91 Cal.App.4th at p. 406 .) Our review of the record indicates that mother's submission satisfied that standard.

2024Applicable law “In Pitchess[, our high court] held that a criminal defendant’s fundamental right to a fair trial and an intelligent defense in light of all relevant and reasonably accessible information entitled a defendant, who was asserting self-defense to a charge of battery on a police officer, to discovery of police personnel records.” (City of San Jose v. Superior Court (1993) 5 Cal.4th 47, 52 , citing Pitchess, supra, 11 Cal.3d at pp. 535–537.) “In 1978, the California Legislature codified the holding of Pitchess by enacting Penal Code sections 832.7 and 832.8, as well as Evidence Code

2024Pitchess Motion In Pitchess, our Supreme Court held a defendant has a right to discovery of the personnel records of peace officers to ensure “a fair trial and an intelligent defense in light of all relevant and reasonably accessible information.” (Pitchess, supra, 11 Cal.3d at p. 535 .) Here, appellant made a Pitchess motion with respect to Ragadio, Almaguer, Jasper, and other deputies and investigators who participated in his arrest and interviews.

1995The court stated: “[I]t is settled that ‘The determination of whether there has been an intelligent waiver of the right to counsel must depend, in each case, upon the particular facts and circumstances surrounding that case, including the background, experience, and conduct of the accused.’ (Johnson v. Zerbst (1938) supra, 304 U.S. 458 , 464 . . . ; accord, In re Johnson (1965) supra, 62 Cal.2d 325, 335 [ 42 Cal.Rptr. 228 , 398 P.2d 420 ].) This rule applies to minors as well as adults, and the age of the defendant is simply a factor, although an important one, to be weighed with many others i

1995The court stated: “[I]t is settled that ‘The determination of whether there has been an intelligent waiver of the right to counsel must depend, in each case, upon the particular facts and circumstances surrounding that case, including the background, experience, and conduct of the accused.’ (Johnson v. Zerbst (1938) supra, 304 U.S. 458 , 464 . . . ; accord, In re Johnson (1965) supra, 62 Cal.2d 325, 335 [ 42 Cal.Rptr. 228 , 398 P.2d 420 ].) This rule applies to minors as well as adults, and the age of the defendant is simply a factor, although an important one, to be weighed with many others i

1979In re Johnson (1965) 62 Cal.2d 325 [ 42 Cal.Rptr. 228 , 398 P.2d 420 ] drew on those cases to require determinations by the judge concerning counsel waivers in misdemeanor cases as follows: “Moreover, it is settled that ‘The determination of whether there has been an intelligent waiver of the right to counsel must depend, in each case, upon the particular facts and circumstances surrounding that case, including the background, experience, and conduct of the accused.’ (Italics added.) (Johnson v. Zerbst (1938) supra, 304 U.S. 458, 464 ; accord, People v. Chesser (1947) supra, 29 Cal.2d 815, 822

1969(Johnson v. Zerbst (1938) 304 U.S. 458 [ 82 L.Ed. 1461 , 58 S.Ct. 1019 , 146 A.L.R. 357 ].) “The determination of whether there has been an intelligent waiver of counsel involves a consideration of the nature of the charge, thé facts and circumstances of the ease, and the education, experience, mental competence and conduct of the accused. [Citations.]” (People v. Chesser (1947) 29 Cal.2d 815, 822 [ 178 P.2d 761 , 170 A.L.R. 246 ]; In re James (1952) 38 Cal.2d 302, 313 [ 240 P.2d 596 ].) In the instant case the record fairly establishes that defendant is competent and well oriented to the situ

1988“Unlike the statutory development of civil discovery in California, the right of an accused to seek discovery in the course of preparing his defense to a criminal prosecution is a judicially created doctrine evolving in the absence of guiding legislation. [Citations.] A defendant’s motion to discover is addressed solely to the sound discretion of the trial court, which has inherent power to order discovery when the interests of justice so demand. [Citations.] Allowing an accused the right to discover is based on the fundamental proposition that he is entitled to a fair trial and an intelligent

1988“Unlike the statutory development of civil discovery in California, the right of an accused to seek discovery in the course of preparing his defense to a criminal prosecution is a judicially created doctrine evolving in the absence of guiding legislation. [Citations.] A defendant’s motion to discover is addressed solely to the sound discretion of the trial court, which has inherent power to order discovery when the interests of justice so demand. [Citations.] Allowing an accused the right to discover is based on the fundamental proposition that he is entitled to a fair trial and an intelligent

1985A brief review of the law of discovery in criminal cases is helpful in resolving this claim. (4) The power of a trial court to provide for discovery in criminal cases exists "even in the absence of constitutional mandate or enabling legislation." ( Reynolds v. Superior Court (1974) 12 Cal.3d 834, 837 [ 117 Cal. Rptr. 437 , 528 P.2d 45 ].) Such power is among those inherent in "every court to develop rules of procedure aimed at facilitating the administration of criminal justice and promoting the orderly ascertainment of the truth." ( Joe Z. v. Superior Court, supra, 3 Cal.3d at pp. 801-802.) T

1985A brief review of the law of discovery in criminal cases is helpful in resolving this claim. (4) The power of a trial court to provide for discovery in criminal cases exists "even in the absence of constitutional mandate or enabling legislation." ( Reynolds v. Superior Court (1974) 12 Cal.3d 834, 837 [ 117 Cal. Rptr. 437 , 528 P.2d 45 ].) Such power is among those inherent in "every court to develop rules of procedure aimed at facilitating the administration of criminal justice and promoting the orderly ascertainment of the truth." ( Joe Z. v. Superior Court, supra, 3 Cal.3d at pp. 801-802.) T

2014(People v. Gaines (2009) 46 Cal.4th 172, 179 .) This right, established in Pitchess and subsequently codified in Evidence Code sections 1043 through 1045, is “based on the ‘fundamental proposition that [an accused] is entitled to a fair trial and an intelligent defense in light of all relevant and reasonably accessible information.’ [Citation.]” (City of Santa Cruz v. Municipal Court (1989) 49 Cal.3d 74, 84 .) The statutory scheme “carefully balances two directly conflicting interests: the peace officer’s just claim to confidentiality, and the criminal defendant’s equally compelling interest i

2014(People v. Gaines (2009) 46 Cal.4th 172, 179 (Gaines).) This right, established in Pitchess and subsequently codified in Evidence Code sections 1043 through 1045, is “based on the ‘fundamental proposition that [an accused] is entitled to a fair trial and an intelligent defense in light of all relevant and reasonably accessible information.’ [Citation.]” (City of Santa Cruz v. Municipal Court (1989) 49 Cal.3d 74, 84 (Santa Cruz).) The statutory scheme “carefully balances two directly conflicting interests: the peace officer’s just claim to confidentiality, and the criminal defendant’s equally c

1986The exercise of the power of a trial court to provide for discovery in criminal cases is consistent with “ ‘the fundamental proposition that [the accused] is entitled to a fair trial and an intelligent defense in light of all relevant and reasonably accessible information.’ ” (People v. Memro (1985) 38 Cal.3d 658, 677 [ 214 Cal.Rptr. 832 , 700 P.2d 446 ], quoting Pitchess v. Superior Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d 531, 535 [ 113 Cal.Rptr. 897 , 522 P.2d 305 ]; Hammarley v. Superior Court, supra, 89 Cal.App.3d atpp. 398-399.) An accused is entitled to any “ ‘pretrial knowledge of any unprivileged evide

1986The exercise of the power of a trial court to provide for discovery in criminal cases is consistent with “ ‘the fundamental proposition that [the accused] is entitled to a fair trial and an intelligent defense in light of all relevant and reasonably accessible information.’ ” (People v. Memro (1985) 38 Cal.3d 658, 677 [ 214 Cal.Rptr. 832 , 700 P.2d 446 ], quoting Pitchess v. Superior Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d 531, 535 [ 113 Cal.Rptr. 897 , 522 P.2d 305 ]; Hammarley v. Superior Court, supra, 89 Cal.App.3d atpp. 398-399.) An accused is entitled to any “ ‘pretrial knowledge of any unprivileged evide

1991The court found Sergeant Chenault’s testimony more credible than the minor’s; that the minor had been properly advised of his Miranda rights; and that the minor had not asked to see his mother during the interview period. *75 I “The admissibility of a confession depends upon the totality of the circumstances existing at the time the confession was obtained. [Citations.] A minor can effectively waive his constitutional rights (People v. Lara (1967) 67 Cal.2d 365, 390-391 . . .) [footnote omitted] but age, intelligence, education and ability to comprehend the meaning and effect of his confession

1982(People v. Sanchez (1969) 70 Cal.2d 562, 572 [ 75 Cal.Rptr. 642 , 451 P.2d 74 ].) A minor can effectively waive his constitutional rights (People v. Lara (1967) 67 Cal.2d *712 365, 390-391 [ 62 Cal.Rptr. 586 , 432 P.2d 202 ]), but age, intelligence, education and ability to comprehend the meaning and effect of his confession are factors in that totality of circumstances to be weighed along with other circumstances in determining whether the confession was a product of free will and an intelligent waiver of the minor’s Fifth Amendment rights.

1990Code, § 1043 et seq.; Memro, supra, 38 Cal.3d at p. 677 [“The exercise of [discovery] powers is consistent with ‘the fundamental proposition that [the accused] is entitled to a fair trial and an intelligent defense in light of all relevant and reasonably accessible information.’ ”].) Indeed, the California Supreme Court over 30 years ago adumbrated the holding in Brady .

1989(People v. Reber (1986) 177 Cal.App.3d 523, 531 [ 223 Cal.Rptr. 139 ].) The exercise of the power of the trial court to provide for discovery in criminal cases is consistent with “ ‘the fundamental proposition that [the *148 accused] is entitled to a fair trial and an intelligent defense in light of all relevant and reasonably accessible information.’ ” (People v. Memro (1985) 38 Cal.3d 658, 677 [ 214 Cal.Rptr. 832 , 700 P.2d 446 ], quoting Pitchess v. Superior Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d 531, 535 [ 113 Cal.Rptr. 897 , 522 P.2d 305 ].) An accused is entitled to any “ ‘pretrial knowledge of any unpr

1978(Joe Z. v. Superior Court, 3 Cal.3d 797, 806 [ 91 Cal.Rptr. 594 , 478 P.2d 26 ]; see Hill v. Superior Court, supra, 10 Cal.3d at pp. 817-819.) While one of the values underlying our judicially created system of pretrial discovery in criminal cases is “the fundamental proposition that he [the accused] is entitled to a fair trial and an intelligent defense in light of all relevant and reasonably accessible information” (Pitchess v. Superior Court, supra, 11 Cal.3d at p. 535 ; see also Hill v. Superior Court, supra, 10 Cal.3d at p. 816 ; Cash v. Superior Court, 53 Cal.2d 72, 75 [ 346 P.2d 407 ]),

1978(Joe Z. v. Superior Court, 3 Cal.3d 797, 806 [ 91 Cal.Rptr. 594 , 478 P.2d 26 ]; see Hill v. Superior Court, supra, 10 Cal.3d at pp. 817-819.) While one of the values underlying our judicially created system of pretrial discovery in criminal cases is “the fundamental proposition that he [the accused] is entitled to a fair trial and an intelligent defense in light of all relevant and reasonably accessible information” (Pitchess v. Superior Court, supra, 11 Cal.3d at p. 535 ; see also Hill v. Superior Court, supra, 10 Cal.3d at p. 816 ; Cash v. Superior Court, 53 Cal.2d 72, 75 [ 346 P.2d 407 ]),

1969(Johnson v. Zerbst (1938) 304 U.S. 458 [ 82 L.Ed. 1461 , 58 S.Ct. 1019 , 146 A.L.R. 357 ].) “The determination of whether there has been an intelligent waiver of counsel involves a consideration of the nature of the charge, thé facts and circumstances of the ease, and the education, experience, mental competence and conduct of the accused. [Citations.]” (People v. Chesser (1947) 29 Cal.2d 815, 822 [ 178 P.2d 761 , 170 A.L.R. 246 ]; In re James (1952) 38 Cal.2d 302, 313 [ 240 P.2d 596 ].) In the instant case the record fairly establishes that defendant is competent and well oriented to the situ

1969Under these facts the court observed (p. 335) : “ [13] Moreover, it is settled that ‘The determination of whether there has been an intelligent waiver of the right to counsel must depend, in each ease, upon the particular facts and circumstances surrounding that case, including the background, experience, and conduct of the accused. ’ (Italics added.) (Johnson v. Zerbst (1938) supra, 304 U.S. 458, 464 [ 82 L.Ed. 1461, 1466 , 58 S.Ct. 1019 , 146 A.L.R. 357 ]; accord, People v. Chesser (1947) supra, 29 Cal.2d 815, 822 [ 178 P.2d 761 , 170 A.L.R. 246 ] [4].) [14] Manifestly that determination mus

1962(In re Connor, 16 Cal.2d 701 [ 108 P.2d 10 ]; People v. Chessman, 38 Cal.2d 166 [ 238 P.2d 1001 ].) Whether there has been an intelligent waiver of counsel involves the consideration of the nature of the charge, the facts and circumstances of the case, and the education, experience, mental competence, and conduct of the accused.

1962(In re Connor, 16 Cal.2d 701 [ 108 P.2d 10 ]; People v. Chessman, 38 Cal.2d 166 [ 238 P.2d 1001 ].) Whether there has been an intelligent waiver of counsel involves the consideration of the nature of the charge, the facts and circumstances of the case, and the education, experience, mental competence, and conduct of the accused.

2024Under Pitchess, “a criminal defendant has a limited right to discovery of peace officer personnel records in order to ensure ‘a fair trial and an intelligent defense in light 36 of all relevant and reasonably accessible information.’ ” (Alford v. Superior Court (2003) 29 Cal.4th 1033, 1037, fn. 3 , overruled on other grounds in Facebook Inc. v. Superior Court (Touchstone) (2020) 10 Cal.5th 329 .) “A trial court’s ruling on a motion for access to law enforcement personnel records is subject to review for abuse of discretion.” (People v. Hughes (2002) 27 Cal.4th 287, 330 .) We have independently

2021Under Pitchess, supra, 11 Cal.3d 531 , “a criminal defendant has a limited right to discovery of peace officer personnel records in order to ensure ‘a fair trial and an intelligent defense in light of all relevant and reasonably accessible information.’” 15 (Alford v. Superior Court (2003) 29 Cal.4th 1033, 1037, fn. 3 ; accord, Chambers v. Superior Court (2007) 42 Cal.4th 673, 679 .) In 1978, the California Legislature codified Pitchess motion privileges and procedures through the enactment of Penal Code sections 832.7 and 832.8, and Evidence Code sections 1043 through 1045.

1987In California, a defendant’s right to pretrial discovery is founded upon “the fundamental proposition that he is entitled to a fair trial and an intelligent defense in light of all relevant and reasonably accessible information. [Citation.]” (Pitchess v. Superior Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d 531, 535 [ 113 Cal.Rptr. 897 , 522 P.2d 305 ].) Even in this context, however, it has been consistently held that a defendant must establish “some cause for discovery other than ‘a mere desire for the benefit of all information which has been obtained by the People in their investigation of the crime.’ [Citation

1987In California, a defendant’s right to pretrial discovery is founded upon “the fundamental proposition that he is entitled to a fair trial and an intelligent defense in light of all relevant and reasonably accessible information. [Citation.]” (Pitchess v. Superior Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d 531, 535 [ 113 Cal.Rptr. 897 , 522 P.2d 305 ].) Even in this context, however, it has been consistently held that a defendant must establish “some cause for discovery other than ‘a mere desire for the benefit of all information which has been obtained by the People in their investigation of the crime.’ [Citation

1978(Hill v. Superior Court (1974) 10 Cal.3d 812, 816 [ 112 Cal.Rptr. 257 , 518 P.2d 1353 ]; People v. Terry (1962) 57 Cal.2d 538, 560-561 [ 21 Cal.Rptr. 185 , 370 P.2d 985 ]; Powell v. Superior Court (1957) 48 Cal.2d 704, 708 [ 312 P.2d 698 ]; Vetter v. Superior Court (1961) 189 Cal.App.2d 132, 134 [ 10 Cal.Rptr. 890 ].) Allowing an accused the right to discover is based on the fundamental proposition that he is entitled to a fair trial and an intelligent defense in light of all relevant and reasonably accessible information.

1978(Hill v. Superior Court (1974) 10 Cal.3d 812, 816 [ 112 Cal.Rptr. 257 , 518 P.2d 1353 ]; People v. Terry (1962) 57 Cal.2d 538, 560-561 [ 21 Cal.Rptr. 185 , 370 P.2d 985 ]; Powell v. Superior Court (1957) 48 Cal.2d 704, 708 [ 312 P.2d 698 ]; Vetter v. Superior Court (1961) 189 Cal.App.2d 132, 134 [ 10 Cal.Rptr. 890 ].) Allowing an accused the right to discover is based on the fundamental proposition that he is entitled to a fair trial and an intelligent defense in light of all relevant and reasonably accessible information.

1967“The determination of whether there has been an intelligent waiver . . . must depend, in each case, upon the particular facts and circumstances surrounding that case, including the background, experience, and conduct of the accused.” (Johnson v. Zerbst, supra, 304 U.S. 458, 464 [ 82 L.Ed. 1461, 1466 , 58 S.Ct. 1019 , 146 A.L.R. 357 ] ; In re Woods, 64 Cal.2d 3, 8 [ 48 Cal.Rptr. 689 , 409 P.2d 913 ] ; In re Luce, 64 Cal.2d 11, 14 [ 48 Cal.Rptr. 694 , 409 P.2d 918 ] ; In re *630 Johnson, 62 Cal.2d 325, 335 [ 42 Cal.Rptr. 228 , 398 P.2d 420 ] ; People v. Chesser, 29 Cal.2d 815, 822 [ 178 P.2d 761

1967“The determination of whether there has been an intelligent waiver . . . must depend, in each case, upon the particular facts and circumstances surrounding that case, including the background, experience, and conduct of the accused.” (Johnson v. Zerbst, supra, 304 U.S. 458, 464 [ 82 L.Ed. 1461, 1466 , 58 S.Ct. 1019 , 146 A.L.R. 357 ] ; In re Woods, 64 Cal.2d 3, 8 [ 48 Cal.Rptr. 689 , 409 P.2d 913 ] ; In re Luce, 64 Cal.2d 11, 14 [ 48 Cal.Rptr. 694 , 409 P.2d 918 ] ; In re *630 Johnson, 62 Cal.2d 325, 335 [ 42 Cal.Rptr. 228 , 398 P.2d 420 ] ; People v. Chesser, 29 Cal.2d 815, 822 [ 178 P.2d 761

2024Applicable law “In Pitchess[, our high court] held that a criminal defendant’s fundamental right to a fair trial and an intelligent defense in light of all relevant and reasonably accessible information entitled a defendant, who was asserting self-defense to a charge of battery on a police officer, to discovery of police personnel records.” (City of San Jose v. Superior Court (1993) 5 Cal.4th 47, 52 , citing Pitchess, supra, 11 Cal.3d at pp. 535–537.) “In 1978, the California Legislature codified the holding of Pitchess by enacting Penal Code sections 832.7 and 832.8, as well as Evidence Code

2024Applicable law “In Pitchess[, our high court] held that a criminal defendant’s fundamental right to a fair trial and an intelligent defense in light of all relevant and reasonably accessible information entitled a defendant, who was asserting self-defense to a charge of battery on a police officer, to discovery of police personnel records.” (City of San Jose v. Superior Court (1993) 5 Cal.4th 47, 52 , citing Pitchess, supra, 11 Cal.3d at pp. 535–537.) “In 1978, the California Legislature codified the holding of Pitchess by enacting Penal Code sections 832.7 and 832.8, as well as Evidence Code

1990The record includes the court's statement that the plea was "free and voluntary, predicated on a factual basis, with an intelligent waiver of rights and with understanding of the nature of the charges and possible consequences." The record, however, does not set forth, in express terms, defendant's personal waiver of each of the individual constitutional rights, as required by Boykin ( supra, 395 U.S. 238 ) and Tahl ( supra, 1 Cal.3d 122 ).

1990The record includes the court’s statement that the plea was “free and voluntary, predicated on a factual basis, with an intelligent waiver of rights and with understanding of the nature of the charges and possible consequences.” The record, however, does not set forth, in express terms, defendant’s personal waiver of each of the individual constitutional rights, as required by Boykin (supra, 395 U.S. 238 ) and Tahl (supra, 1 Cal.3d 122 ).

1990The record includes the court's statement that the plea was "free and voluntary, predicated on a factual basis, with an intelligent waiver of rights and with understanding of the nature of the charges and possible consequences." The record, however, does not set forth, in express terms, defendant's personal waiver of each of the individual constitutional rights, as required by Boykin ( supra, 395 U.S. 238 ) and Tahl ( supra, 1 Cal.3d 122 ).

1990The record includes the court’s statement that the plea was “free and voluntary, predicated on a factual basis, with an intelligent waiver of rights and with understanding of the nature of the charges and possible consequences.” The record, however, does not set forth, in express terms, defendant’s personal waiver of each of the individual constitutional rights, as required by Boykin (supra, 395 U.S. 238 ) and Tahl (supra, 1 Cal.3d 122 ).

1973Compliance with the spirit of the constitutional mandate that an intelligent waiver of counsel must affirmatively appear in the record may be efficiently achieved in such cases in a variety of acceptable ways.” (Fn. omitted.) ( 62 Cal.2d at p. 336 .) The Johnson decision thus teaches that in evaluating the procedures utilized in inferior courts for advising defendants of their rights and obtaining “on the record” waivers, the realities of the typical municipal and justice court environment cannot be ignored, and that, so long as the spirit of the constitutional principles are respected, “the c

1973Compliance with the spirit of the constitutional mandate that an intelligent waiver of counsel must affirmatively appear in the record may be efficiently achieved in such cases in a variety of acceptable ways.” (Fn. omitted.) ( 62 Cal.2d at p. 336 .) The Johnson decision thus teaches that in evaluating the procedures utilized in inferior courts for advising defendants of their rights and obtaining “on the record” waivers, the realities of the typical municipal and justice court environment cannot be ignored, and that, so long as the spirit of the constitutional principles are respected, “the c

1969(Johnson v. Zerbst (1938) 304 U.S. 458 [ 82 L.Ed. 1461 , 58 S.Ct. 1019 , 146 A.L.R. 357 ].) “The determination of whether there has been an intelligent waiver of counsel involves a consideration of the nature of the charge, thé facts and circumstances of the ease, and the education, experience, mental competence and conduct of the accused. [Citations.]” (People v. Chesser (1947) 29 Cal.2d 815, 822 [ 178 P.2d 761 , 170 A.L.R. 246 ]; In re James (1952) 38 Cal.2d 302, 313 [ 240 P.2d 596 ].) In the instant case the record fairly establishes that defendant is competent and well oriented to the situ

1969(Johnson v. Zerbst (1938) 304 U.S. 458 [ 82 L.Ed. 1461 , 58 S.Ct. 1019 , 146 A.L.R. 357 ].) “The determination of whether there has been an intelligent waiver of counsel involves a consideration of the nature of the charge, thé facts and circumstances of the ease, and the education, experience, mental competence and conduct of the accused. [Citations.]” (People v. Chesser (1947) 29 Cal.2d 815, 822 [ 178 P.2d 761 , 170 A.L.R. 246 ]; In re James (1952) 38 Cal.2d 302, 313 [ 240 P.2d 596 ].) In the instant case the record fairly establishes that defendant is competent and well oriented to the situ

2006We have also repeatedly stated that “a criminal defendant’s right to discovery is based on the ‘fundamental proposition that [an accused] is entitled to a fair trial and an intelligent defense in light of all relevant and reasonably accessible information.’ ” (City of Santa Cruz v. Municipal Court (1989) 49 Cal.3d 74, 84 [ 260 Cal.Rptr. 520 , 776 P.2d 222 ], italics added, quoting Pitchess v. Superior Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d 531, 535 [ 113 Cal.Rptr. 897 , 522 P.2d 305 ]; accord, People v. Luttenberger (1990) 50 Cal.3d 1, 17 [ 265 Cal.Rptr. 690 , 784 P.2d 633 ].) Denial of discovery of potential

2006We have also repeatedly stated that “a criminal defendant’s right to discovery is based on the ‘fundamental proposition that [an accused] is entitled to a fair trial and an intelligent defense in light of all relevant and reasonably accessible information.’ ” (City of Santa Cruz v. Municipal Court (1989) 49 Cal.3d 74, 84 [ 260 Cal.Rptr. 520 , 776 P.2d 222 ], italics added, quoting Pitchess v. Superior Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d 531, 535 [ 113 Cal.Rptr. 897 , 522 P.2d 305 ]; accord, People v. Luttenberger (1990) 50 Cal.3d 1, 17 [ 265 Cal.Rptr. 690 , 784 P.2d 633 ].) Denial of discovery of potential

1970Only if he is so notified can his election to proceed in the absence of counsel be deemed an intelligent waiver of the accrued right. ( United States v. Wade, supra, 388 U.S. 218, 237 ....)" (Italics added.) ( 1 Cal.3d at p. 345 .) [3] (3) It is contended that in this case defendant was sufficiently advised of his rights to allow an intelligent waiver because he was given a full Miranda warning at the time of his arrest — which occurred on the day of the lineup. [4] As indicated above, it was the factor of a Miranda warning *135 at the time of arrest which formed the basis of the trial court's

1970Wade, supra, 388 U.S. 218, 237 . . . .)” (Italics added.) ( 1 Cal.3d atp. 345 .) 3 It is contended that in this case defendant was sufficiently advised of his rights to allow an intelligent waiver because he was given a full Miranda warning at the time of his arrest—which occurred on the day of the lineup. 4 As indicated above, it was the factor of a Miranda warning at the time of arrest which formed the basis of the trial court’s denial of the pretrial motion to suppress identification evidence (see fn. 2, ante).

2024Applicable law “In Pitchess[, our high court] held that a criminal defendant’s fundamental right to a fair trial and an intelligent defense in light of all relevant and reasonably accessible information entitled a defendant, who was asserting self-defense to a charge of battery on a police officer, to discovery of police personnel records.” (City of San Jose v. Superior Court (1993) 5 Cal.4th 47, 52 , citing Pitchess, supra, 11 Cal.3d at pp. 535–537.) “In 1978, the California Legislature codified the holding of Pitchess by enacting Penal Code sections 832.7 and 832.8, as well as Evidence Code

2023“In Pitchess[, our high court] held that a criminal defendant’s fundamental right to a fair trial and an intelligent defense in light of all relevant and reasonably accessible information entitled a defendant, who was asserting self-defense to a charge of battery on a police officer, to discovery of police personnel records.” (City of San Jose v. Superior Court (1993) 5 Cal.4th 47, 52 (City of San Jose), citing Pitchess, supra, 11 Cal.3d at pp. 535–537.) “In 1978, the California Legislature codified the holding of Pitchess by enacting Penal Code sections 832.7 and 832.8, as well as Evidence Co