intelligent waiver in Alabama

2005See also Clemons v. State , 814 So.2d 317 (Ala.Crim.App. 2001) (citing Monte v. State , 690 So.2d 517 (Ala.Crim.App. 1996)); Johnston v. City of Irondale , 671 So.2d 777 (Ala.Crim.App. 1995); Warren v. City of Enterprise , 641 So.2d 1312 (Ala.Crim.App. 1994); Siniard v. State , 491 So.2d 1062 (Ala.Crim.App. 1986).

2002See also Clemons v. State , 814 So.2d 317 (Ala.Crim.App. 2001) (citing Monte v. State , 690 So.2d 517 (Ala.Crim.App. 1996)); Johnston v. City of Irondale , 671 So.2d 777 (Ala.Crim.App. 1995); Warren v. City of Enterprise , 641 So.2d 1312 (Ala.Crim.App. 1994); Siniard v. State , 491 So.2d 1062 (Ala.Crim.App. 1986).

2005See also Clemons v. State , 814 So.2d 317 (Ala.Crim.App. 2001) (citing Monte v. State , 690 So.2d 517 (Ala.Crim.App. 1996)); Johnston v. City of Irondale , 671 So.2d 777 (Ala.Crim.App. 1995); Warren v. City of Enterprise , 641 So.2d 1312 (Ala.Crim.App. 1994); Siniard v. State , 491 So.2d 1062 (Ala.Crim.App. 1986).

2002See also Clemons v. State , 814 So.2d 317 (Ala.Crim.App. 2001) (citing Monte v. State , 690 So.2d 517 (Ala.Crim.App. 1996)); Johnston v. City of Irondale , 671 So.2d 777 (Ala.Crim.App. 1995); Warren v. City of Enterprise , 641 So.2d 1312 (Ala.Crim.App. 1994); Siniard v. State , 491 So.2d 1062 (Ala.Crim.App. 1986).

2005See also Clemons v. State, 814 So.2d 317 (Ala.Crim.App.2001) (citing Monte v. State, 690 So.2d 517 (Ala.Crim.App.1996)); Johnston v. City of Irondale, 671 So.2d 777 (Ala.Crim.

2005See also Clemons v. State , 814 So.2d 317 (Ala.Crim.App. 2001) (citing Monte v. State , 690 So.2d 517 (Ala.Crim.App. 1996)); Johnston v. City of Irondale , 671 So.2d 777 (Ala.Crim.App. 1995); Warren v. City of Enterprise , 641 So.2d 1312 (Ala.Crim.App. 1994); Siniard v. State , 491 So.2d 1062 (Ala.Crim.App. 1986).

2001The defendant "should be made aware of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation, so that the record will establish that `he knows what he is doing and his choice is made with eyes open.'" Faretta , 422 U.S. at 836 , 95 S.Ct. at 2541 (other citations omitted).' " Tomlin v. State , 601 So.2d 124 , 128 (Ala. 1991). `"The determination of whether there has been an intelligent waiver of the right to counsel must depend, in each case, upon the particular facts and circumstances surrounding that case, including the background, experience, and conduct of the accused." Johnson v. Zerbst , 3

1998The defendant 'should be made aware of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation, so that the record will establish that "he knows what he is doing and his choice is made with eyes open." ' Faretta , 422 U.S. at 836 , 95 S.Ct. at 2541 (other citations omitted)." Tomlin v. State , 601 So.2d 124 , 128 (Ala. 1991). " 'The determination of whether there has been an intelligent waiver of the right to counsel must depend, in each case, upon the particular facts and circumstances surrounding that case, including the background, experience, and conduct of the accused.' Johnson v. Zerbst , 3

2001The defendant "should be made aware of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation, so that the record will establish that `he knows what he is doing and his choice is made with eyes open.'" Faretta , 422 U.S. at 836 , 95 S.Ct. at 2541 (other citations omitted).' " Tomlin v. State , 601 So.2d 124 , 128 (Ala. 1991). `"The determination of whether there has been an intelligent waiver of the right to counsel must depend, in each case, upon the particular facts and circumstances surrounding that case, including the background, experience, and conduct of the accused." Johnson v. Zerbst , 3

1998The defendant 'should be made aware of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation, so that the record will establish that "he knows what he is doing and his choice is made with eyes open." ' Faretta , 422 U.S. at 836 , 95 S.Ct. at 2541 (other citations omitted)." Tomlin v. State , 601 So.2d 124 , 128 (Ala. 1991). " 'The determination of whether there has been an intelligent waiver of the right to counsel must depend, in each case, upon the particular facts and circumstances surrounding that case, including the background, experience, and conduct of the accused.' Johnson v. Zerbst , 3

2001The defendant "should be made aware of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation, so that the record will establish that `he knows what he is doing and his choice is made with eyes open.'" Faretta , 422 U.S. at 836 , 95 S.Ct. at 2541 (other citations omitted).' " Tomlin v. State , 601 So.2d 124 , 128 (Ala. 1991). `"The determination of whether there has been an intelligent waiver of the right to counsel must depend, in each case, upon the particular facts and circumstances surrounding that case, including the background, experience, and conduct of the accused." Johnson v. Zerbst , 3

1998The defendant 'should be made aware of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation, so that the record will establish that "he knows what he is doing and his choice is made with eyes open." ' Faretta , 422 U.S. at 836 , 95 S.Ct. at 2541 (other citations omitted)." Tomlin v. State , 601 So.2d 124 , 128 (Ala. 1991). " 'The determination of whether there has been an intelligent waiver of the right to counsel must depend, in each case, upon the particular facts and circumstances surrounding that case, including the background, experience, and conduct of the accused.' Johnson v. Zerbst , 3

1989As this Court observed in Phelps v. State: "Although the defendant argues that counsel should have informed him of the consequences of making a confession, that is one of the functions of the Miranda warnings. 'The Miranda warnings are given not solely to make the suspect aware of the privilege, but also of the consequences of forgoing the privilege.' United States v. McCrary , 643 F.2d 323 , 329 (5th Cir. 1981). ' Miranda implicitly assumes that it is possible for the police to convey to the accused sufficient understanding of his rights to enable him to make an intelligent waiver." Id. at 16

1983"The Miranda warnings are given not solely to make the suspect aware of the privilege, but also of the consequences of foregoing the privilege." United States v. McCrary , 643 F.2d 323 , 329 (5th Cir. 1981). " Miranda implicitly assumes that it is possible for the police to convey to the accused sufficient understanding of his rights to enable him to make an intelligent waiver. . . .

1968Alternatively, if under Cdde 1940, T. 15, § 128 et seq., the committing magistrate is compelled by Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 , 83 S. Ct. 792 , 9 L.Ed.2d 799 , to appoint counsel before indictment, then this enigmatic dilemma would go away.

1968Alternatively, if under Cdde 1940, T. 15, § 128 et seq., the committing magistrate is compelled by Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 , 83 S. Ct. 792 , 9 L.Ed.2d 799 , to appoint counsel before indictment, then this enigmatic dilemma would go away.

1994In these circumstances an intelligent waiver of constitutional rights cannot be assumed." Miranda , 384 U.S. at 495 -96 , 86 S.Ct. 1639 .

1994In these circumstances an intelligent waiver of constitutional rights cannot be assumed." Miranda, 384 U.S. at 495-96 , 86 S.Ct. at 1639 .

1992See also United States v. Noble , 754 F.2d 1324 , 1333 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 818 , 106 S.Ct. 63 , 88 L.Ed.2d 51 (1985); United States v. Bradshaw , 719 F.2d 907 , 911 (7th Cir. 1983). ' "[I]t would be fitting and appropriate for [a waiver] to appear upon the record.' " Cuyler , 446 U.S. at 351 , 100 S.Ct. at 1720 .

1992See also United States v. Noble , 754 F.2d 1324 , 1333 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 818 , 106 S.Ct. 63 , 88 L.Ed.2d 51 (1985); United States v. Bradshaw , 719 F.2d 907 , 911 (7th Cir. 1983). ' "[I]t would be fitting and appropriate for [a waiver] to appear upon the record.' " Cuyler , 446 U.S. at 351 , 100 S.Ct. at 1720 .

1992See also United States v. Noble , 754 F.2d 1324 , 1333 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 818 , 106 S.Ct. 63 , 88 L.Ed.2d 51 (1985); United States v. Bradshaw , 719 F.2d 907 , 911 (7th Cir. 1983). ' "[I]t would be fitting and appropriate for [a waiver] to appear upon the record.' " Cuyler , 446 U.S. at 351 , 100 S.Ct. at 1720 .

1986See People v. Teron, 23 Cal.3d 103 , 588 P.2d 773 , 151 Cal. Rptr. 633 (1979) (defendant in a capital case had a tenth grade education); People v. Torres, 133 Cal.App.3d 265 , 184 Cal.Rptr. 39 (1982) (defendant had tenth grade education).

1986See People v. Teron, 23 Cal.3d 103 , 588 P.2d 773 , 151 Cal. Rptr. 633 (1979) (defendant in a capital case had a tenth grade education); People v. Torres, 133 Cal.App.3d 265 , 184 Cal.Rptr. 39 (1982) (defendant had tenth grade education).

1983But irrespective of who gives the warnings or takes the confessions, the ultimate question is whether the waiver is voluntary in the full sense of the word." Frazier v. United States , 419 F.2d 1161 , 1166 , n. 24 (D.C.

1982In appellant's reply brief, he shows, as his original brief discloses, that he was challenging the ruling of the court on the motion to suppress and was relying upon Thomas v. State , Ala.Cr.App., 370 So.2d 1066 , cert. denied, 370 So.2d 1070 (1979), in which it was held at 370 So.2d 1070 as follows: "The simple question, `did you read the defendant his rights as per the Miranda decision,' does not indicate whether the rights were read before or after questioning, whether the defendant understood the rights and whether he made an intelligent waiver of those rights.

1982In appellant's reply brief, he shows, as his original brief discloses, that he was challenging the ruling of the court on the motion to suppress and was relying upon Thomas v. State , Ala.Cr.App., 370 So.2d 1066 , cert. denied, 370 So.2d 1070 (1979), in which it was held at 370 So.2d 1070 as follows: "The simple question, `did you read the defendant his rights as per the Miranda decision,' does not indicate whether the rights were read before or after questioning, whether the defendant understood the rights and whether he made an intelligent waiver of those rights.

1982In appellant's reply brief, he shows, as his original brief discloses, that he was challenging the ruling of the court on the motion to suppress and was relying upon Thomas v. State , Ala.Cr.App., 370 So.2d 1066 , cert. denied, 370 So.2d 1070 (1979), in which it was held at 370 So.2d 1070 as follows: "The simple question, `did you read the defendant his rights as per the Miranda decision,' does not indicate whether the rights were read before or after questioning, whether the defendant understood the rights and whether he made an intelligent waiver of those rights.

1980In Elrod v. State , 281 Ala. 331 , 202 So.2d 539 , the Supreme Court held: "An `illiterate' is one ignorant of letters and books, unlettered, uninstructed, uneducated, unable to read or write, uncultivated, without book learning. [Citation omitted] While illiteracy is a great misfortune, it does not mean insanity, and does not constitute a defense to crime or render a confession of guilt, otherwise unobjectionable, inadmissible in evidence against him. [Citation omitted] Accused's intelligence, character and situation at the time of the confession of the crime charged are important considerati

1980In Elrod v. State , 281 Ala. 331 , 202 So.2d 539 , the Supreme Court held: "An `illiterate' is one ignorant of letters and books, unlettered, uninstructed, uneducated, unable to read or write, uncultivated, without book learning. [Citation omitted] While illiteracy is a great misfortune, it does not mean insanity, and does not constitute a defense to crime or render a confession of guilt, otherwise unobjectionable, inadmissible in evidence against him. [Citation omitted] Accused's intelligence, character and situation at the time of the confession of the crime charged are important considerati

1977“The Supreme Court of Alabama, through Simpson, J., stated in Goldin v. State, 271 Ala. 678 , 127 So.2d 375 , that: “ ‘ . . .

1977“The Supreme Court of Alabama, through Simpson, J., stated in Goldin v. State, 271 Ala. 678 , 127 So.2d 375 , that: “ ‘ . . .