party making challenge in Illinois

1913“Where a claim is asserted by one party against another, if the party making the claim honestly supposes that he has a good cause of action, compromise and satisfaction of the right asserted is a sufficient consideration to uphold a contract fairly entered into, even if, in fact, his claim could not have been enforced, either in whole or in part, at law or in equity. ‘The compromise of a doubtful right, where there is neither actual nor constructive fraud and the parties act in good faith, is sufficient consideration to support a promise. ’ ” Walker v. Shepard, 210 Ill. 112 ; McKinley v. Watki

1912In Walker v. Shepard, 210 Ill. 100 , it is said: “Where a claim is asserted by one party against another, if the party making the claim.honestly supposes that he has a good cause of action, compromise and satisfaction of the right asserted is a sufficient consideration to uphold a contract fairly entered into, even if, in fact, his claim could not have been enforced, either in whole or in part, at law or in equity. ‘The compromise of a doubtful right, where there is neither actual nor constructive fraud and the parties act in good faith, is a sufficient consideration to support a promise.’ McK

2025People v. Mosley, 2015 IL 115872, ¶ 22 .

2025People v. Mosley, 2015 IL 115872 , ¶ 22.

2001Batson, 476 U.S. at 93-94 , 90 L.

2001Batson, 476 U.S. at 93-94 , 90 L.

1956Pelouze v. Slaughter, 241 Ill. 215 , 89 N. E. 259 ; Grubey v. National Bank of Illinois, 133 Ill. 79 , 24 N. E. 575 .

1956Pelouze v. Slaughter, 241 Ill. 215 , 89 N. E. 259 ; Grubey v. National Bank of Illinois, 133 Ill. 79 , 24 N. E. 575 .

1913“Where a claim is asserted by one party against another, if the party making the claim honestly supposes that he has a good cause of action, compromise and satisfaction of the right asserted is a sufficient consideration to uphold a contract fairly entered into, even if, in fact, his claim could not have been enforced, either in whole or in part, at law or in equity. ‘The compromise of a doubtful right, where there is neither actual nor constructive fraud and the parties act in good faith, is sufficient consideration to support a promise. ’ ” Walker v. Shepard, 210 Ill. 112 ; McKinley v. Watki

1912In Walker v. Shepard, 210 Ill. 100 , it is said: “Where a claim is asserted by one party against another, if the party making the claim.honestly supposes that he has a good cause of action, compromise and satisfaction of the right asserted is a sufficient consideration to uphold a contract fairly entered into, even if, in fact, his claim could not have been enforced, either in whole or in part, at law or in equity. ‘The compromise of a doubtful right, where there is neither actual nor constructive fraud and the parties act in good faith, is a sufficient consideration to support a promise.’ McK

1913“Where a claim is asserted by one party against another, if the party making the claim honestly supposes that he has a good cause of action, compromise and satisfaction of the right asserted is a sufficient consideration to uphold a contract fairly entered into, even if, in fact, his claim could not have been enforced, either in whole or in part, at law or in equity. ‘The compromise of a doubtful right, where there is neither actual nor constructive fraud and the parties act in good faith, is sufficient consideration to support a promise. ’ ” Walker v. Shepard, 210 Ill. 112 ; McKinley v. Watki

1912In Walker v. Shepard, 210 Ill. 100 , it is said: “Where a claim is asserted by one party against another, if the party making the claim.honestly supposes that he has a good cause of action, compromise and satisfaction of the right asserted is a sufficient consideration to uphold a contract fairly entered into, even if, in fact, his claim could not have been enforced, either in whole or in part, at law or in equity. ‘The compromise of a doubtful right, where there is neither actual nor constructive fraud and the parties act in good faith, is a sufficient consideration to support a promise.’ McK

2026McDonnell, 192 Ill. 2d at 526 .

2024While a prospective juror may be removed for cause when that person’s “views would prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror” (People v. Armstrong, 183 Ill. 2d 130, 143 (1998)), an equivocal response does not require that a juror be excused for cause (Buss, 187 Ill. 2d at 187 (citing Williams, 173 Ill. 2d at 67 )). ¶ 26 The burden of showing that a venireperson possesses a disqualifying state of mind is on the party making the challenge.

2024While a prospective juror may be removed for cause when that person’s “views would prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror” (People v. Armstrong, 183 Ill. 2d 130, 143 (1998)), an equivocal response does not require that a juror be excused for cause (Buss, 187 Ill. 2d at 187 (citing Williams, 173 Ill. 2d at 67 )). ¶ 26 The burden of showing that a venireperson possesses a disqualifying state of mind is on the party making the challenge.

2022In People v. Borizov, 2019 IL App (2d) 170004, ¶ 29 , the Second District explained the right to a fair and unbiased jury as follows: “The right to a jury trial guarantees to a criminal defendant a fair trial by a panel of impartial jurors. [Citation.] A person is not competent to sit as a juror if -4- his or her state of mind or mental attitude is such that, with him or her as a member of the jury, the defendant will not receive a fair and impartial trial. [Citation.] The burden of showing that a juror possesses a disqualifying state of mind is on the party making the challenge, and the deter

2018In considering a claim that a fee award is "excessive," a reviewing court may consider whether the party making the claim of excessiveness also made the choice "to aggressively litigate this case, raising virtually every conceivable issue." Young , 2015 IL App (1st) 131887 , ¶ 106, 391 Ill.Dec. 361 , 30 N.E.3d 631 .

2018In considering a claim that a fee award is "excessive," a reviewing court may consider whether the party making the claim of excessiveness also made the choice "to aggressively litigate this case, raising virtually every conceivable issue." Young , 2015 IL App (1st) 131887 , ¶ 106, 391 Ill.Dec. 361 , 30 N.E.3d 631 .

1994(See People v. Fabing (1991), 143 Ill. 2d 48, 53 , 570 N.E.2d 329 ; Jihan, 127 Ill. 2d at 385 .) However, the right to challenge a statute as being unconstitutionally vague on its face where the statute clearly applies to the conduct of the party making the challenge does not exist unless first amendment freedoms are involved.

1994(See People v. Fabing (1991), 143 Ill. 2d 48, 53 , 570 N.E.2d 329 ; Jihan, 127 Ill. 2d at 385 .) However, the right to challenge a statute as being unconstitutionally vague on its face where the statute clearly applies to the conduct of the party making the challenge does not exist unless first amendment freedoms are involved.

1989(Garrison, 82 Ill. 2d at 454 .) In the present case, no first amendment issue is involved and so appellee does not have standing to argue that the statute might be vague as applied to someone else.

1989(Garrison, 82 Ill. 2d at 454 .) The right to challenge a statute as being vague on its face where the statute clearly applies to the conduct of the party making the challenge does not exist unless first amendment concerns are involved.

1983In reaching that conclusion the Court applied the rule announced in Finn v. U.S., 123 U.S. 227 , in which Justice Harlan, who delivered the opinion of the Court, stated as follows: “The general rule that the limitation does not operate by its own force as a bar, but is a defense, and that the party making such a defense must plead the Statute, if he wishes the benefit of its provisions, has no application to suits in Court of Claims against the United States.

1976Unless there is some real prejudice involved, there will be no incentive for claiming improper authentication." • 1 It is clear that had defendants made some attempt to obtain certification of the report of proceedings but fell short of being in complete conformity with the requirements of Supreme Court Rule 323, this court would have had the power to treat the report of proceedings as if it were properly authenticated. ( Yoselle v. Yoselle, 54 Ill.

1956Pelouze v. Slaughter, 241 Ill. 215 , 89 N. E. 259 ; Grubey v. National Bank of Illinois, 133 Ill. 79 , 24 N. E. 575 .

1956Pelouze v. Slaughter, 241 Ill. 215 , 89 N. E. 259 ; Grubey v. National Bank of Illinois, 133 Ill. 79 , 24 N. E. 575 .

1919The court cites Parsons on Contracts to the effect that the claim must be of some value in reality, and that the assumption of a supposed liability, which has no foundation in law or in fact, is not a valuable or sufficient consideration, and that where one, through mistake of the law, acknowledges himself under an obligation which the law does not impose, he is not bound by such promise, although, in general, ignorance of the law is no excuse or defense, and Ohitty on Contracts to the effect that it is essential that such claim should be sustainable in law or in equity, and the consideration

1919The court cites Parsons on Contracts to the effect that the claim must be of some value in reality, and that the assumption of a supposed liability, which has no foundation in law or in fact, is not a valuable or sufficient consideration, and that where one, through mistake of the law, acknowledges himself under an obligation which the law does not impose, he is not bound by such promise, although, in general, ignorance of the law is no excuse or defense, and Ohitty on Contracts to the effect that it is essential that such claim should be sustainable in law or in equity, and the consideration

1912In Walker v. Shepard, 210 Ill. 100 , it is said: “Where a claim is asserted by one party against another, if the party making the claim.honestly supposes that he has a good cause of action, compromise and satisfaction of the right asserted is a sufficient consideration to uphold a contract fairly entered into, even if, in fact, his claim could not have been enforced, either in whole or in part, at law or in equity. ‘The compromise of a doubtful right, where there is neither actual nor constructive fraud and the parties act in good faith, is a sufficient consideration to support a promise.’ McK

1902In such case it would not be equitable for the defendant to pay a part of a solicitor’s fee solely earned as his adversary.” To the same effect, in substance, are the very recent cases of Gehrke v. Gehrke, 190 Ill. 166 , and Bliss v. Seeley, 191 Ill. 477 , in the latter of which cases it was held that where a defense was not formal, frivolous or vexatious, but of a substantial character, though held bad in the Supreme Court, solicitor’s fees should not be taxed against the party making such a defense.