one-year requirement in Connecticut

1998In re Romance M., 30 Conn. App. 839 , 622 A.2d 1047 (1993), In re Christine F., 6 Conn App. 360 , 505 A.2d 734 (1986).

1998In re Romance M., 30 Conn. App. 839 , 622 A.2d 1047 (1993), In re Christine F., 6 Conn App. 360 , 505 A.2d 734 (1986).

2001It approved a one year requirement for municipal office in Castner v. Homer, 598 P.2d 953 (Alaska 1979), but struck down athree year requirement in Peloza v. Freas, 871 P.2d 687 (Alaska 1994).

2001It approved a one year requirement for municipal office in Castner v. Homer , 598 P.2d 953 (Alaska 1979), but struck down a three year requirement in Peloza v. Freas , 871 P.2d 687 (Alaska 1994).

2001It approved a one year requirement for municipal office in Castner v. Homer, 598 P.2d 953 (Alaska 1979), but struck down athree year requirement in Peloza v. Freas, 871 P.2d 687 (Alaska 1994).

2001It approved a one year requirement for municipal office in Castner v. Homer , 598 P.2d 953 (Alaska 1979), but struck down a three year requirement in Peloza v. Freas , 871 P.2d 687 (Alaska 1994).

1998In re Romance M., 30 Conn. App. 839 , 622 A.2d 1047 (1993), In re Christine F., 6 Conn App. 360 , 505 A.2d 734 (1986).

1994In re Christine F. , 6 Conn. App. 360 , 371 (1986).

1983Rather, it concluded that “the Unions’ status must be recognized for a reasonable period despite the loss of majority employee support.” (Emphasis added.) Id., 1383 . 9 We believe that the rationale of Cayuga Crushed Stone, Inc., is sound and we adopt this “reasonable period” standard as the rule in Connecticut. *345 The board, in its conclusion, held that “[a] reasonable time for a recognized representative to make substantial headway towards obtaining a contract is one year from the date of recognition and we interpret the Act as prescribing such a duration for the recognition and its exclus

1983Rather, it concluded that "the Unions' status must be recognized for a reasonable period despite the loss of majority employee support." (Emphasis added.) Id., 1383 . 9 We believe that the rationale of Cayuga Crushed Stone, Inc., is sound and we adopt this "reasonable period" standard as the rule in Connecticut. *Page 345 The board, in its conclusion, held that "[a] reasonable time for a recognized representative to make substantial headway towards obtaining a contract is one year from the date of recognition and we interpret the Act as prescribing such a duration for the recognition and its e

2019Section 52-555 authorizes an executor or administrator of an estate to bring an action to recover damages on behalf of the estate against a party legally at fault for injuries resulting in the death of the decedent "provided no action shall be brought to recover such damages and disbursements but within two years from the date of death, and except that no such action may be brought more than five years from the date of the act or omission complained of." As the plaintiff correctly notes, § 52-555, the wrongful death statute, creates a statutory cause of action that did not exist at common law

2019Section 52-555 authorizes an executor or administrator of an estate to bring an action to recover damages on behalf of the estate against a party legally at fault for injuries resulting in the death of the decedent "provided no action shall be brought to recover such damages and disbursements but within two years from the date of death, and except that no such action may be brought more than five years from the date of the act or omission complained of." As the plaintiff correctly notes, § 52-555, the wrongful death statute, creates a statutory cause of action that did not exist at common law

2000In re Juvenile Appeal (83-CD), 189 Conn. 276 , 284 (1983).

2000Martin v. Bristol Associates , 22 Conn. App. 625 (1990).

1998Abandonment General Statutes sec. 17a-112 (c)(3)(A) provides that a ground for termination exists when "[t]he child has been abandoned by the parent in the sense that the parent has failed to maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern, or responsibility as to the welfare of the child." "Attempts to achieve contact with a child, telephone calls, the sending of cards and gifts, and financial support are indicia of `interest, concern or responsibility' for the welfare of the child." In re Migdalia M. , 6 Conn. App. 194 ,208-209, cert. denied , 199 Conn. 809 (1986).

1998DCF does not claim reliance on this amendment, apparently because of concerns that a substantive change in the law should not apply retroactively to a petition, such as the petition here, filed before the effective date of the new law. 6 Here, as in Luis C. , "[w]hile placement within the extended family or in an Hispanic foster home might have been better than use of [a] non-Hispanic foster home, those alternative options have not been available." 210 Conn. at 168 .

1998Abandonment General Statutes sec. 17a-112 (c)(3)(A) provides that a ground for termination exists when "[t]he child has been abandoned by the parent in the sense that the parent has failed to maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern, or responsibility as to the welfare of the child." "Attempts to achieve contact with a child, telephone calls, the sending of cards and gifts, and financial support are indicia of `interest, concern or responsibility' for the welfare of the child." In re Migdalia M. , 6 Conn. App. 194 ,208-209, cert. denied , 199 Conn. 809 (1986).

1995SECOND COUNT: "At common law there is no cause of action based upon negligence in selling alcohol to adults who are known to be intoxicated." Quinett v. Newman , 213 Conn. 343 , 345 , 566 A.2d 786 (1990).

1994This Court adopts DCF's second argument, the one year statutory requirement was met, as analyzed in [ In re Saba P. ], 13 Conn. App. 605 (1988).

1993“Because the statute entrusts the decision concerning waiver to the discretion of the trial court, the only issue on appeal is whether the trial court abused its discretion.” In re Baby Girl B., 224 Conn. 263, 301 , 618 A.2d 1 (1992).

1993“Because the statute entrusts the decision concerning waiver to the discretion of the trial court, the only issue on appeal is whether the trial court abused its discretion.” In re Baby Girl B., 224 Conn. 263, 301 , 618 A.2d 1 (1992).

1990In In re Juvenile Appeal (88-DE), 190 Conn. 310 , 460 A.2d 1277 (1983), the court held that the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel did not apply because the first termination case was dismissed by a trial court not on the merits, but rather because the one year requirement of General Statutes § 17-43a should not have been waived.

1990In In re Juvenile Appeal (88-DE), 190 Conn. 310 , 460 A.2d 1277 (1983), the court held that the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel did not apply because the first termination case was dismissed by a trial court not on the merits, but rather because the one year requirement of General Statutes § 17-43a should not have been waived.