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23 California opinions name it 3 courts 1914–2025 5 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Sanchez v. South Hoover Hospitalgreen2 sentences1993(Jolly v. Eli Lilly & Co., supra, 44 Cal.3d at p. 1109 ; Gutierrez v. Mofid (1985) 39 Cal.3d 892 , 896 . . . ; Sanchez v. South Hoover Hospital (1976) 18 Cal.3d 93 , 99 ... ; [citations].) “Our Supreme Court has often discussed the one-year rule’s requirement of discovery of the negligent cause of injury. 1989(Jolly v. Eli Lilly & Co., supra, 44 Cal.3d at p. 1109 ; 8 Gutierrez v. Mofid (1985) 39 Cal.3d 892, 896 [ 218 Cal.Rptr. 313 , 705 P.2d 886 ]; Sanchez v. South Hoover Hospital (1976) 18 Cal.3d 93, 99 [ 132 Cal.Rptr. 657 , 553 P.2d 1129 ]; Steingart v. Oliver, supra, 198 Cal.App.3d at p. 415 ; Hills v. Aronsohn, supra, 152 Cal.App.3d at p. 759 .) Our Supreme Court has often discussed the one-year rule’s requirement of discovery of the negligent cause of injury. | 1 | 2 |
Gutierrez v. Mofidgreen2 sentences1993(Jolly v. Eli Lilly & Co., supra, 44 Cal.3d at p. 1109 ; Gutierrez v. Mofid (1985) 39 Cal.3d 892 , 896 . . . ; Sanchez v. South Hoover Hospital (1976) 18 Cal.3d 93 , 99 ... ; [citations].) “Our Supreme Court has often discussed the one-year rule’s requirement of discovery of the negligent cause of injury. 1989(Jolly v. Eli Lilly & Co., supra, 44 Cal.3d at p. 1109 ; 8 Gutierrez v. Mofid (1985) 39 Cal.3d 892, 896 [ 218 Cal.Rptr. 313 , 705 P.2d 886 ]; Sanchez v. South Hoover Hospital (1976) 18 Cal.3d 93, 99 [ 132 Cal.Rptr. 657 , 553 P.2d 1129 ]; Steingart v. Oliver, supra, 198 Cal.App.3d at p. 415 ; Hills v. Aronsohn, supra, 152 Cal.App.3d at p. 759 .) Our Supreme Court has often discussed the one-year rule’s requirement of discovery of the negligent cause of injury. | 1 | 2 |
DeVore v. Department of the California Highway Patrolgreen1 sentence2024(See Devore, supra, 221 Cal.App.4th at p. 459 [“the preference for a trial on the merits does not warrant relief if based on a perfunctory recital of diligence in support of excusable neglect”].) As we have explained, the weight of authority suggests that attorney negligence, particularly in the context of a public defender, is primarily a cause of action for personal injury. | 1 | 1 |
Quarry v. Doe Igreen1 sentence2022Section 340.1 and Assembly Bill 218 “Section 340.1 governs the period within which a plaintiff must bring a tort claim based upon childhood sexual abuse.” (Quarry v. Doe I (2012) 53 Cal.4th 945, 952 (Quarry).) After its enactment in 1986, the section was amended repeatedly to expand the statute of limitations and reduce other barriers to claims, including with a one-year claim revival period in 2002. 9 To the extent Plaintiffs cite statutes (e.g. | 1 | 1 |
Huysman v. Kirschgreen2 sentences2007(Huysman v. Kirsch (1936) 6 Cal.2d 302, 312-313 [ 57 P.2d 908 ].) This principle evolved into the well-known discovery rule. 2007(Huysman v. Kirsch (1936) 6 Cal.2d 302, 312-313 [ 57 P.2d 908 ].) This principle evolved into the well-known discovery rule. | 1 | 1 |
Krebenios v. Lindauergreen2 sentences2007(E.g., Krebenios v. Lindauer (1917) 175 Cal. 431, 432 [ 166 P. 17 ]; see Caprioglio, A Four Year Statute Of Limitations For Medical Malpractice Cases: Will Plaintiff’s Case Be Barred? (1971) 2 Pacific L.J. 663, 664-665 (hereafter Four Year Statute.) In that year, the Supreme Court rejected the strict one-year rule, holding that the statute of limitations in medical malpractice cases would not run against a person who was ignorant of his or her cause of action and could not reasonably have ascertained the existence of that claim. 2007(E.g., Krebenios v. Lindauer (1917) 175 Cal. 431, 432 [ 166 P. 17 ]; see Caprioglio, A Four Year Statute Of Limitations For Medical Malpractice Cases: Will Plaintiff’s Case Be Barred? (1971) 2 Pacific L.J. 663, 664-665 (hereafter Four Year Statute.) In that year, the Supreme Court rejected the strict one-year rule, holding that the statute of limitations in medical malpractice cases would not run against a person who was ignorant of his or her cause of action and could not reasonably have ascertained the existence of that claim. | 1 | 1 |
Order of Railroad Telegraphers v. Railway Express Agency, Inc.green2 sentences1995Express Agency (1944) 321 U.S. 342, 348 [ 88 L.Ed. 788, 792 , 64 S.Ct. 582 ]). 1995Express Agency (1944) 321 U.S. 342, 348 [ 88 L.Ed. 788, 792 , 64 S.Ct. 582 ]). | 1 | 1 |
Shain v. Sresovichgreen2 sentences1995First, to fashion a loophole for multiple suits against the same defendant beyond the one-year bar would offend the purposes of statutes of limitations: namely, the promotion of repose (Shain v. Sresovich (1894) 104 Cal. 402, 406 [ 38 P. 51 ]) and the elimination of the surprise that comes through reviving of stale claims (Telegraphers v. Ry. 1995First, to fashion a loophole for multiple suits against the same defendant beyond the one-year bar would offend the purposes of statutes of limitations: namely, the promotion of repose (Shain v. Sresovich (1894) 104 Cal. 402, 406 [ 38 P. 51 ]) and the elimination of the surprise that comes through reviving of stale claims (Telegraphers v. Ry. | 1 | 1 |
Voth v. Wasco Public Utility Districtgreen2 sentences1993Dist. (1976) 56 Cal.App.3d 353, 360 [ 128 Cal.Rptr. 608 ]; Cal. Government Tort Liability Practice (Cont.Ed.Bar 1992) § 6.17, p. 652.) VPD asked the trial court to consider the claims statute, first by way of a motion to dismiss, and then by way of a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. 1993Dist. (1976) 56 Cal.App.3d 353, 360 [ 128 Cal.Rptr. 608 ]; Cal. Government Tort Liability Practice (Cont.Ed.Bar 1992) § 6.17, p. 652.) VPD asked the trial court to consider the claims statute, first by way of a motion to dismiss, and then by way of a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. | 1 | 1 |
Rose v. Fifegreen2 sentences1993When a plaintiff has information which would put a reasonable person on inquiry, when a plaintiff’s ‘reasonably founded suspicions [have been] aroused’ and the plaintiff has ‘become alerted to the necessity for investigation and pursuit of her remedies,’ the one-year period commences. ‘Possession of “presumptive” as well as “actual” knowledge will commence the running of the statute.’ (Sanchez v. South Hoover Hospital, supra, 18 Cal.3d at pp. 101-102 [ 132 Cal.Rptr. 657 , 553 P.2d 1129 ]; accord Jolly v. Eli Lilly & Co., supra, 4[4] Cal.3d at pp. 1110-1111; Gutierrez v. Mofid, supra, 39 Cal.3d 1993When a plaintiff has information which would put a reasonable person on inquiry, when a plaintiff’s ‘reasonably founded suspicions [have been] aroused’ and the plaintiff has ‘become alerted to the necessity for investigation and pursuit of her remedies,’ the one-year period commences. ‘Possession of “presumptive” as well as “actual” knowledge will commence the running of the statute.’ (Sanchez v. South Hoover Hospital, supra, 18 Cal.3d at pp. 101-102 [ 132 Cal.Rptr. 657 , 553 P.2d 1129 ]; accord Jolly v. Eli Lilly & Co., supra, 4[4] Cal.3d at pp. 1110-1111; Gutierrez v. Mofid, supra, 39 Cal.3d | 1 | 1 |
People v. Hernandezgreen2 sentences1986The People here rely on People v. Hernandez (1979) 100 Cal.App.3d 637, 643-645 [ 160 Cal.Rptr. 607 ], holding that section 667.5 does not deny *596 the here claimed equal protection in that: “There are several legitimate state purposes which may have prompted the one-year requirement for out-of-state priors. 1986The People here rely on People v. Hernandez (1979) 100 Cal.App.3d 637, 643-645 [ 160 Cal.Rptr. 607 ], holding that section 667.5 does not deny *596 the here claimed equal protection in that: “There are several legitimate state purposes which may have prompted the one-year requirement for out-of-state priors. | 1 | 1 |
| Record MacHine & Tool Co. v. Pageman Holding Corp.green | 1 | 1 |
County of Santa Clara v. Hayes Co.green2 sentences1974Hess Co. v. City of Susanville (1959) 176 Cal.App.2d 594, 598 [ 1 Cal.Rptr. 586 ], Cf. County of Santa Clara v. Hayes Co. (1954) 43 Cal.2d 615, 619 [ 275 P.2d 456 ]; Record Machine & Tool Co. v. Pageman Holding Corp. (1959) 172 Cal.App. 2d 164, 175 [ 342 P.2d 402 ].) 2 The Myers court noted that the purpose of the one-year claim period was to enable defendants to “make an early investigation of the facts and to enable [them] *416 to decide whether [a] problem call[ed] for litigation or settlement.” (Myers v. County of Orange, supra, at p. 637.) The court apparently was convinced that tolling t 1974Hess Co. v. City of Susanville (1959) 176 Cal.App.2d 594, 598 [ 1 Cal.Rptr. 586 ], Cf. County of Santa Clara v. Hayes Co. (1954) 43 Cal.2d 615, 619 [ 275 P.2d 456 ]; Record Machine & Tool Co. v. Pageman Holding Corp. (1959) 172 Cal.App. 2d 164, 175 [ 342 P.2d 402 ].) 2 The Myers court noted that the purpose of the one-year claim period was to enable defendants to “make an early investigation of the facts and to enable [them] *416 to decide whether [a] problem call[ed] for litigation or settlement.” (Myers v. County of Orange, supra, at p. 637.) The court apparently was convinced that tolling t | 1 | 1 |
Lee C. Hess Co. v. City of Susanvillegreen2 sentences1974Hess Co. v. City of Susanville (1959) 176 Cal.App.2d 594, 598 [ 1 Cal.Rptr. 586 ], Cf. County of Santa Clara v. Hayes Co. (1954) 43 Cal.2d 615, 619 [ 275 P.2d 456 ]; Record Machine & Tool Co. v. Pageman Holding Corp. (1959) 172 Cal.App. 2d 164, 175 [ 342 P.2d 402 ].) 2 The Myers court noted that the purpose of the one-year claim period was to enable defendants to “make an early investigation of the facts and to enable [them] *416 to decide whether [a] problem call[ed] for litigation or settlement.” (Myers v. County of Orange, supra, at p. 637.) The court apparently was convinced that tolling t 1974Hess Co. v. City of Susanville (1959) 176 Cal.App.2d 594, 598 [ 1 Cal.Rptr. 586 ], Cf. County of Santa Clara v. Hayes Co. (1954) 43 Cal.2d 615, 619 [ 275 P.2d 456 ]; Record Machine & Tool Co. v. Pageman Holding Corp. (1959) 172 Cal.App. 2d 164, 175 [ 342 P.2d 402 ].) 2 The Myers court noted that the purpose of the one-year claim period was to enable defendants to “make an early investigation of the facts and to enable [them] *416 to decide whether [a] problem call[ed] for litigation or settlement.” (Myers v. County of Orange, supra, at p. 637.) The court apparently was convinced that tolling t | 1 | 1 |
| Zeilenga v. Nelsongreen | 1 | 1 |
| Ridge v. Boulder Creek Union Junior-Senior High School Districtgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Dillon v. Board of Pension Commissionersgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Rowan v. City & County of San Franciscogreen | 1 | 1 |
| Johnson v. City of Oaklandgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Driscoll v. City of Los Angelesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Pineda v. Bank of America, N.A.
green
2 sentences2025Focusing on the precise language of the statute, the critical word linked to the one-year requirement is “the.” Instead of saying “at least one year preceding” or “at least a year preceding,” the Legislature chose the phrase “at least the year preceding.” (§ 27701, italics added.) “The” is a definite article which “refers to a specific person, place, or thing.” (Pineda v. Bank of America, N.A. (2010) 50 Cal.4th 1389, 1396 ; see also CD Investment Co. v. California Ins. 2025Focusing on the precise language of the statute, the critical word linked to the one-year requirement is “the.” Instead of saying “at least one year preceding” or “at least a year preceding,” the Legislature chose the phrase “at least the year preceding.” (§ 27701, italics added.) “The” is a definite article which “refers to a specific person, place, or thing.” (Pineda v. Bank of America, N.A. (2010) 50 Cal.4th 1389, 1396 ; see also CD Investment Co. v. California Ins. | 2 | 2025–2025 |
CD Investment Co. v. California Insurance Guarantee Ass'n
green
2 sentences2025Guarantee Assn. (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 1410, 1421 .) It contrasts with the word “a,” which is an indefinite article that “signals a general reference.” (Pineda, at p. 1396; see also CD Investment Co., at p. 1421.) The use of the definite article “the” before “year preceding” in section 27701 indicates a reference to the one year immediately prior to election or appointment. 2025Guarantee Assn. (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 1410, 1421 .) It contrasts with the word “a,” which is an indefinite article that “signals a general reference.” (Pineda, at p. 1396; see also CD Investment Co., at p. 1421.) The use of the definite article “the” before “year preceding” in section 27701 indicates a reference to the one year immediately prior to election or appointment. | 2 | 2025–2025 |
Jolly v. Eli Lilly & Co.
green
2 sentences1993(Jolly v. Eli Lilly & Co., supra, 44 Cal.3d at p. 1109 ; Gutierrez v. Mofid (1985) 39 Cal.3d 892 , 896 . . . ; Sanchez v. South Hoover Hospital (1976) 18 Cal.3d 93 , 99 ... ; [citations].) “Our Supreme Court has often discussed the one-year rule’s requirement of discovery of the negligent cause of injury. 1989(Jolly v. Eli Lilly & Co., supra, 44 Cal.3d at p. 1109 ; 8 Gutierrez v. Mofid (1985) 39 Cal.3d 892, 896 [ 218 Cal.Rptr. 313 , 705 P.2d 886 ]; Sanchez v. South Hoover Hospital (1976) 18 Cal.3d 93, 99 [ 132 Cal.Rptr. 657 , 553 P.2d 1129 ]; Steingart v. Oliver, supra, 198 Cal.App.3d at p. 415 ; Hills v. Aronsohn, supra, 152 Cal.App.3d at p. 759 .) Our Supreme Court has often discussed the one-year rule’s requirement of discovery of the negligent cause of injury. | 2 | 1989–1993 |
Collier v. City of Pasadena
green
1 sentence2021(Collier, supra, 142 Cal.App.3d at p. 924 .) Moreover, Krueger has never demonstrated with competent evidence why the important public interest in having a one-year standard, specified, and agreed-upon limitation period to bring suit against CSAA should or must yield on the facts of this case to Krueger’s interest in being able to sue CSAA over its alleged bad faith after more than 17. three times the limitation period had passed. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Johnson v. Hamilton
green
1 sentence2016Instead, based on an inquiry from the Secretary of State about the constitutionality of the one-year residency requirement, the Attorney General opined that the Secretary of State had no authority to enforce that requirement and declined to reach the constitutional issue posed by the Secretary of State. ( 62 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 365 , 369 (1979) [“It is concluded that the Secretary of State is not authorized to enforce the provision of article IV, section 2, subdivision (c) of the California Constitution imposing a one year residence prerequisite for membership in the Legislature”].) In doing so, | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Freeman v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance
green
1 sentence1996The performance of this duty necessarily requires the court to examine and, to a limited extent, construe the underlying agreement.” {Freeman, supra, 14 Cal.3d at p. 480 .) The court pointed out that the statute required arbitration of two issues only: entitlement to damages and amount of damages. | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Utah Property & Cas. Ins. v. Un. Serv. Auto.
green
1 sentence1994In the case of a policy which did not specify the one-year limitation, the one-year limitation in section 11580.2, subdivision (b)(2) was not incorporated in the policy so as to limit coverage otherwise afforded by the policy. ( 230 Cal.App.3d at p. 1021 .) Because the State Farm policy incorporates the one-year requirement of the statute, the policy is clearly limited to insurance insolvency within the one year following the accident. | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Moore v. California State Board of Accountancy
green
1 sentence1994"In construing a statute, a court's objective is to ascertain and effectuate the underlying legislative intent." (Moore v. California State Bd. of Accountancy (1992) 2 Cal.4th 999, 1012 .) "In determining intent, we look first to the language of the statute, giving effect to its `plain meaning.'" (Kimmel v. Goland (1990) 51 Cal.3d 202, 208-209 .) Also "`we must examine the legislative history and statutory context of the act under scrutiny.' [Citation.]" (Long Beach Police Officers Association v. City of Long Beach (1988) 46 Cal.3d 736, 743 .) "[T]he wider historical circumstances of its enact | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Interinsurance Exchange v. Garcia
green
2 sentences1994(See also dictum, Interinsurance Exchange v. Garcia (1984) 160 Cal.App.3d 419 , 425 and fn. 5 [ 206 Cal.Rptr. 621 ], as applied to post-1984 self-insurer insolvency.) *1305 4. 1994(See also dictum, Interinsurance Exchange v. Garcia (1984) 160 Cal.App.3d 419 , 425 and fn. 5 [ 206 Cal.Rptr. 621 ], as applied to post-1984 self-insurer insolvency.) *1305 4. | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Kimmel v. Goland
green
1 sentence1994"In construing a statute, a court's objective is to ascertain and effectuate the underlying legislative intent." (Moore v. California State Bd. of Accountancy (1992) 2 Cal.4th 999, 1012 .) "In determining intent, we look first to the language of the statute, giving effect to its `plain meaning.'" (Kimmel v. Goland (1990) 51 Cal.3d 202, 208-209 .) Also "`we must examine the legislative history and statutory context of the act under scrutiny.' [Citation.]" (Long Beach Police Officers Association v. City of Long Beach (1988) 46 Cal.3d 736, 743 .) "[T]he wider historical circumstances of its enact | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Long Beach Police Officers Assn. v. City of Long Beach
green
1 sentence1994"In construing a statute, a court's objective is to ascertain and effectuate the underlying legislative intent." (Moore v. California State Bd. of Accountancy (1992) 2 Cal.4th 999, 1012 .) "In determining intent, we look first to the language of the statute, giving effect to its `plain meaning.'" (Kimmel v. Goland (1990) 51 Cal.3d 202, 208-209 .) Also "`we must examine the legislative history and statutory context of the act under scrutiny.' [Citation.]" (Long Beach Police Officers Association v. City of Long Beach (1988) 46 Cal.3d 736, 743 .) "[T]he wider historical circumstances of its enact | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Loehr v. Ventura County Community College District
green
2 sentences1990(See Loehr v. Ventura County Community College Dist. (1983) 147 Cal.App.3d 1071 [ 195 Cal.Rptr. 576 ].) Because there is no breach of contract action before us, we have no occasion or basis to comment on the applicability of the claim requirement or whether it may be excused. 1990(See Loehr v. Ventura County Community College Dist. (1983) 147 Cal.App.3d 1071 [ 195 Cal.Rptr. 576 ].) Because there is no breach of contract action before us, we have no occasion or basis to comment on the applicability of the claim requirement or whether it may be excused. | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Prudential-LMI Commercial Insurance v. Superior Court
green
1 sentence1990Although the statute was equitably tolled for the earlier period beginning with plaintiffs’ notice of damage to State Farm (Prudential, 51 Cal.3d at p. 693 ), to avoid the one-year bar plaintiffs must have given that notice immediately after the loss. 5 Plaintiffs’ general, pre-Prudential allegations that they gave “timely notice of claim, proof of loss, and demand for benefits” provide no assurance that the action was timely. | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Bachis v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance
green
2 sentences1990Co. (1968) 265 Cal.App.2d 722 [ 71 Cal.Rptr. 486 ], defendants contend declaratory relief as to DiBona is improper because he possesses a “fully matured cause of action for damages . . . and ... no declaration concerning future rights and duties is necessary, proper or even possible . . . .” (Id. at p. 723.) They further assert that amendment of the complaint would be improper because DiBona failed to comply with the one-year claim filing requirement of Government Code section 911.2. 1990Co. (1968) 265 Cal.App.2d 722 [ 71 Cal.Rptr. 486 ], defendants contend declaratory relief as to DiBona is improper because he possesses a “fully matured cause of action for damages . . . and ... no declaration concerning future rights and duties is necessary, proper or even possible . . . .” (Id. at p. 723.) They further assert that amendment of the complaint would be improper because DiBona failed to comply with the one-year claim filing requirement of Government Code section 911.2. | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Hills v. Aronsohn
green
1 sentence1989(Jolly v. Eli Lilly & Co., supra, 44 Cal.3d at p. 1109 ; 8 Gutierrez v. Mofid (1985) 39 Cal.3d 892, 896 [ 218 Cal.Rptr. 313 , 705 P.2d 886 ]; Sanchez v. South Hoover Hospital (1976) 18 Cal.3d 93, 99 [ 132 Cal.Rptr. 657 , 553 P.2d 1129 ]; Steingart v. Oliver, supra, 198 Cal.App.3d at p. 415 ; Hills v. Aronsohn, supra, 152 Cal.App.3d at p. 759 .) Our Supreme Court has often discussed the one-year rule’s requirement of discovery of the negligent cause of injury. | 1 | 1989–1989 |
Steingart v. White
green
1 sentence1989(Jolly v. Eli Lilly & Co., supra, 44 Cal.3d at p. 1109 ; 8 Gutierrez v. Mofid (1985) 39 Cal.3d 892, 896 [ 218 Cal.Rptr. 313 , 705 P.2d 886 ]; Sanchez v. South Hoover Hospital (1976) 18 Cal.3d 93, 99 [ 132 Cal.Rptr. 657 , 553 P.2d 1129 ]; Steingart v. Oliver, supra, 198 Cal.App.3d at p. 415 ; Hills v. Aronsohn, supra, 152 Cal.App.3d at p. 759 .) Our Supreme Court has often discussed the one-year rule’s requirement of discovery of the negligent cause of injury. | 1 | 1989–1989 |
County of San Diego v. Sanfax Corp.
green
2 sentences1978Clearly, the Supreme Court in County of San Diego v. Sanfax Corp. (1977) supra, 19 Cal.3d 862 , viewed the one-year requirement for bringing claims for personal injuries (no matter how fragmented, subdivided, and subrogated the claims have become), a lesser hardship than imposition of indeterminate liability on the tortfeasor. 1978Clearly, the Supreme Court in County of San Diego v. Sanfax Corp. (1977) supra, 19 Cal.3d 862 , viewed the one-year requirement for bringing claims for personal injuries (no matter how fragmented, subdivided, and subrogated the claims have become), a lesser hardship than imposition of indeterminate liability on the tortfeasor. | 1 | 1978–1978 |
| United States v. Wessel, Duval & Co. green | 1 | 1967–1967 |
| People v. Davis green | 1 | 1914–1914 |
| Title Ins. Trust Co. v. Calif. Etc. Co. green | 1 | 1914–1914 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.