Mathews analysis in Pennsylvania

2014Welfare, 535 Pa. 440 , 636 A.2d 142 (1994), the Commonwealth Court looked to the seminal administrative law decision of Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 , 96 S.Ct. 893 , 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976), for guidance in assessing a due process claim for violation of an individual’s right to protect his or her reputation. 1 It applied the Mathews factors, and based thereon concluded that the adverse effects on an alleged child abuse perpetrator’s reputation and employment opportunities required that evidence presented at an expungement hearing be clear and convincing in order to maintain the summary of th

2014Welfare, 535 Pa. 440 , 636 A.2d 142 (1994), the Commonwealth Court looked to the seminal administrative law decision of Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 , 96 S.Ct. 893 , 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976), for guidance in assessing a due process claim for violation of an individual’s right to protect his or her reputation. 1 It applied the Mathews factors, and based thereon concluded that the adverse effects on an alleged child abuse perpetrator’s reputation and employment opportunities required that evidence presented at an expungement hearing be clear and convincing in order to maintain the summary of th

2017Commonwealth v. Basemore, 744 A.2d 717, 726-27 (Pa. 2000) (“A reply brief, however, is an inappropriate means for presenting a new and substantively different issue than that addressed in the original brief”). 13 We need not apply the Mathews test to determine the constitutionality of Pennsylvania’s current process under the Child Protective Services Law— providing a post-deprivation rather than a pre-deprivation hearing—because here, the Department violated Petitioner’s right to due process by not providing any form of a hearing.

2017Commonwealth v. Basemore, 744 A.2d 717, 726-27 (Pa. 2000) (“A reply brief, however, is an inappropriate means for presenting a new and substantively different issue than that addressed in the original brief”). 13 We need not apply the Mathews test to determine the constitutionality of Pennsylvania’s current process under the Child Protective Services Law— providing a post-deprivation rather than a pre-deprivation hearing—because here, the Department violated Petitioner’s right to due process by not providing any form of a hearing.

2025As we have described it, under the Mathews test, “[a]scertaining what process is due entails a balancing of three considerations: (1) the private interest affected by the governmental action; (2) the risk of an erroneous deprivation together with the value of additional or substitute safeguards; and (3) the state interest involved, including the administrative burden the additional or substitute procedural requirements would impose on the state.” Bundy v. Wetzel, 184 A.3d 551, 557 (Pa. 2018), citing Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335 .

2025As we have described it, under the Mathews test, “[a]scertaining what process is due entails a balancing of three considerations: (1) the private interest affected by the governmental action; (2) the risk of an erroneous deprivation together with the value of additional or substitute safeguards; and (3) the state interest involved, including the administrative burden the additional or substitute procedural requirements would impose on the state.” Bundy v. Wetzel, 184 A.3d 551, 557 (Pa. 2018), citing Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335 .

2025As we have described it, under the Mathews test, “[a]scertaining what process is due entails a balancing of three considerations: (1) the private interest affected by the governmental action; (2) the risk of an erroneous deprivation together with the value of additional or substitute safeguards; and (3) the state interest involved, including the administrative burden the additional or substitute procedural requirements would impose on the state.” Bundy v. Wetzel, 184 A.3d 551, 557 (Pa. 2018), citing Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335 .

2025As we have described it, under the Mathews test, “[a]scertaining what process is due entails a balancing of three considerations: (1) the private interest affected by the governmental action; (2) the risk of an erroneous deprivation together with the value of additional or substitute safeguards; and (3) the state interest involved, including the administrative burden the additional or substitute procedural requirements would impose on the state.” Bundy v. Wetzel, 184 A.3d 551, 557 (Pa. 2018), citing Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335 .

2025Regarding the first prong of the Mathews test – the private interest affected by the CPSL – this Court has recognized that the “[p]lacement on a registry for alleged child abuse causes damage to the alleged abuser, primarily in the form of reputational harm and employment repercussions.” C.S., 184 A.3d at 607 (citation 18 and quotation omitted). “[T]hat harm occurs to an individual’s reputation the moment the abuse is reported, the aggravation of which continues unless or until the record is expunged.” Id.

2025Regarding the first prong of the Mathews test – the private interest affected by the CPSL – this Court has recognized that the “[p]lacement on a registry for alleged child abuse causes damage to the alleged abuser, primarily in the form of reputational harm and employment repercussions.” C.S., 184 A.3d at 607 (citation 18 and quotation omitted). “[T]hat harm occurs to an individual’s reputation the moment the abuse is reported, the aggravation of which continues unless or until the record is expunged.” Id.

2025Without question, the Board (acting through the elections office staff) violated procedural due process when it segregated electors’ presumptively disqualified ballots, and then, via unnecessarily opaque coding in the SURE system, knowingly triggered an email notice to electors that affirmatively misled them about their voting rights.52 See, e.g., In re R.M., 790 A.2d 300, 306-07 (Pa. 2002) (parenthetically explaining “notice which is confusing, misleading, or inaccurate is insufficient to meet procedural due process requirements, because such notice does not adequately safeguard the right to

2025Without question, the Board (acting through the elections office staff) violated procedural due process when it segregated electors’ presumptively disqualified ballots, and then, via unnecessarily opaque coding in the SURE system, knowingly triggered an email notice to electors that affirmatively misled them about their voting rights.52 See, e.g., In re R.M., 790 A.2d 300, 306-07 (Pa. 2002) (parenthetically explaining “notice which is confusing, misleading, or inaccurate is insufficient to meet procedural due process requirements, because such notice does not adequately safeguard the right to

2025Without question, the Board (acting through the elections office staff) violated procedural due process when it segregated electors’ presumptively disqualified ballots, and then, via unnecessarily opaque coding in the SURE system, knowingly triggered an email notice to electors that affirmatively misled them about their voting rights.52 See, e.g., In re R.M., 790 A.2d 300, 306-07 (Pa. 2002) (parenthetically explaining “notice which is confusing, misleading, or inaccurate is insufficient to meet procedural due process requirements, because such notice does not adequately safeguard the right to

2025Without question, the Board (acting through the elections office staff) violated procedural due process when it segregated electors’ presumptively disqualified ballots, and then, via unnecessarily opaque coding in the SURE system, knowingly triggered an email notice to electors that affirmatively misled them about their voting rights.52 See, e.g., In re R.M., 790 A.2d 300, 306-07 (Pa. 2002) (parenthetically explaining “notice which is confusing, misleading, or inaccurate is insufficient to meet procedural due process requirements, because such notice does not adequately safeguard the right to

2025In line with this balancing test, we have acknowledged that “[d]ue process is a flexible concept which ‘varies with the particular situation.’” Id., quoting Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 127 (1990).

2025In line with this balancing test, we have acknowledged that “[d]ue process is a flexible concept which ‘varies with the particular situation.’” Id., quoting Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 127 (1990).

2024Petitioner asserts the Court applied the Bundy/Mathews factors in Fortieth I to conclude: The private interest affected by [the grand jury report] is a fundamental one equivalent to life, liberty and property; the risk of an erroneous deprivation is substantial in light of the inherent limitations of the grand jury system, and the administrative burden in providing some additional process [beyond that provided for in the IGJA] is not too great a requirement. [J-4-2024] - 14 Id. at 50 (quoting Fortieth I, 190 A.3d at 575, n. 23 (second set of brackets provided by Petitioner)).

2024See Fortieth I, 190 A.3d at 575, n.23 .

2020See McCauley, supra. Thus, the record does not support Mathews’ claim that he was not informed of possible defenses or the evidence against him or that he was bullied into entering a plea.

2018Mathews v. Eldridge , 424 U.S. 319 , 335, 96 S.Ct. 893 , 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976) ; see City of Philadelphia v. Perfetti , 119 A.3d 396 , 403 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2015) (en banc).

2018Mathews v. Eldridge , 424 U.S. 319 , 335, 96 S.Ct. 893 , 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976) ; see City of Philadelphia v. Perfetti , 119 A.3d 396 , 403 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2015) (en banc).

1991The second stage of the Mathews inquiry “requires consideration of the likelihood of an erroneous deprivation of the private interest involved as a consequence of the procedures used.” Mackey v. Montrym, 443 U.S. at 13, 99 S.Ct. at 2618 .

1991The second stage of the Mathews inquiry “requires consideration of the likelihood of an erroneous deprivation of the private interest involved as a consequence of the procedures used.” Mackey v. Montrym, 443 U.S. at 13, 99 S.Ct. at 2618 .