Mathews factors in Illinois

2025Williams, 139 Ill. 2d at 45 (quoting Boddie, 401 U.S. at 376 ). - 16 - ¶ 46 Following this court’s precedent in Williams, 139 Ill. 2d at 28, 63 , and the Mathews factors (Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976)) applied there, I would conclude that the Cook/Sangamon County venue statute in this case is arbitrary and unreasonable, effectively deprives plaintiff of its right to meaningful access to the legal process, and violates due process.

2025Williams, 139 Ill. 2d at 45 (quoting Boddie, 401 U.S. at 376 ). - 16 - ¶ 46 Following this court’s precedent in Williams, 139 Ill. 2d at 28, 63 , and the Mathews factors (Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976)) applied there, I would conclude that the Cook/Sangamon County venue statute in this case is arbitrary and unreasonable, effectively deprives plaintiff of its right to meaningful access to the legal process, and violates due process.

2020See M.H., 196 Ill. 2d at 363-64; see also Andrea F., 208 Ill. 2d at 165 . ¶ 48 Our application of the Mathews factors to the case at bar demonstrates that due process does not require this court to vacate the proceedings following the dispositional hearing.

2020See M.H., 196 Ill. 2d at 363-64; see also Andrea F., 208 Ill. 2d at 165 . ¶ 48 Our application of the Mathews factors to the case at bar demonstrates that due process does not require this court to vacate the proceedings following the dispositional hearing.

2020See M.H., 196 Ill. 2d at 363-64; see also Andrea F., 208 Ill. 2d at 165 . ¶ 48 Our application of the Mathews factors to the case at bar demonstrates that due process does not require this court to vacate the proceedings following the dispositional hearing.

2020See M.H., 196 Ill. 2d at 363-64; see also Andrea F., 208 Ill. 2d at 165 . ¶ 48 Our application of the Mathews factors to the case at bar demonstrates that due process does not require this court to vacate the proceedings following the dispositional hearing.

2015App. 3d 167, 176 (2004) (applying Mathews factors in the context of termination proceedings); In re M.R., 316 Ill.

2015App. 3d 167, 176 (2004) (applying Mathews factors in the context of termination proceedings); In re M.R., 316 Ill.

1986Ed. 2d 640 , 101 S. Ct. 2153 .) Under the Mathews test, three distinct factors are to be balanced: (1) the private interests affected by the proceedings; (2) the risk of erroneous deprivation of private interests resulting from the State’s chosen procedure; and (3) the countervailing State interest supporting use of the challenged procedure.

1986Ed. 2d 640 , 101 S. Ct. 2153 .) Under the Mathews test, three distinct factors are to be balanced: (1) the private interests affected by the proceedings; (2) the risk of erroneous deprivation of private interests resulting from the State’s chosen procedure; and (3) the countervailing State interest supporting use of the challenged procedure.

2011In order to determine whether procedures are constitutionally sufficient, courts balance three factors: "First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail." Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335 , 96 S.Ct. 893 ; see also People v.

2011In order to determine whether procedures are constitutionally sufficient, courts balance three factors: "First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail." Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335 , 96 S.Ct. 893 ; see also People v.

2001See also Vanessa C., 316 Ill.

2001See also Vanessa C., 316 Ill.

1999With respect to the first and second prongs of the Mathews analysis, the court reasoned that, because many claimants appear pro se before the Department, “the [claimants’] interest would be better served by maintaining the informal nature of the present investigatory system, rather than injecting formalistic requirements with which only trained advocates could comply.” Luckett, 966 F.2d at 214-15.

1999With respect to the first and second prongs of the Mathews analysis, the court reasoned that, because many claimants appear pro se before the Department, “the [claimants’] interest would be better served by maintaining the informal nature of the present investigatory system, rather than injecting formalistic requirements with which only trained advocates could comply.” Luckett, 966 F.2d at 214-15.

2003In re A.A., 324 Ill.

2003In re A.A., 324 Ill.

2001See also Santosky, 455 U.S. 745 , 102 S.Ct. 1388 , 71 L.Ed.2d 599 (determining the standard of proof required in a parental rights termination case and applying the Mathews factors, the Court: (1) reiterated the parent's fundamental liberty interest in raising a *1141 child; (2) noted an increased burden of proof could reduce the possibility of erroneous terminations; and (3) stated a higher standard would promote the welfare of the child through accurate decisions without any burdens for the State or the fact finder).

2001See also Santosky, 455 U.S. 745 , 102 S.Ct. 1388 , 71 L.Ed.2d 599 (determining the standard of proof required in a parental rights termination case and applying the Mathews factors, the Court: (1) reiterated the parent's fundamental liberty interest in raising a *1141 child; (2) noted an increased burden of proof could reduce the possibility of erroneous terminations; and (3) stated a higher standard would promote the welfare of the child through accurate decisions without any burdens for the State or the fact finder).

2022In re M.B., 2019 IL App (2d) 181008, ¶ 20 (citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976)).

2022In re M.B., 2019 IL App (2d) 181008, ¶ 20 (citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976)).

2011Id. at 67. ¶ 78 Persuaded by the approach taken in Krimstock, the circuit court in this case reasoned that the vehicle-forfeiture provisions of Illinois' Criminal Code were facially invalid and unenforceable under the due process clauses of the Illinois Constitution and the fifth and fourteenth amendments of the United States Constitution because they did not provide any mechanism for a prompt, probable cause hearing after a vehicle was seized where claimants could test the State's right to retain their vehicles while they awaited trial on the merits of the forfeiture action and where the *109

2011Id. at 67 . ¶ 78 Persuaded by the approach taken in Krimstock, the circuit court in this case reasoned that the vehicle-forfeiture provisions of Illinois’ Criminal Code were facially invalid and unenforceable under the due process clauses of the Illinois Constitution and the fifth and fourteenth amendments of the United States Constitution because they did not provide any mechanism for a prompt, probable cause hearing after a vehicle was seized where claimants could test the State’s right to retain their vehicles while they awaited trial on the merits of the forfeiture action and where the Sta

2011Morgan, 253 P.3d at 403. ¶ 70 Based on our analysis of the Mathews factors, which is supported by the Illinois case of Akers and case law from other jurisdictions considering analogous statutes, we find that there is no due process right to a fitness evaluation in the case of a proceeding under the Act. ¶ 71 III.

2011Morgan, 253 P.3d at 403. ¶ 70 Based on our analysis of the Mathews factors, which is supported by the Illinois case of Akers and case law from other jurisdictions considering analogous statutes, we find that there is no due process right to a fitness evaluation in the case of a proceeding under the Act. ¶ 71 III.

2004Mallen, 486 U.S. at 242 , 100 L.

2004Mallen, 486 U.S. at 242 , 100 L.

2001In D.R., 307 Ill.App.3d at 482-84 , 241 Ill.

2001In D.R., 307 Ill.App.3d at 482-84 , 241 Ill.

2026See id. (citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976)).

2025Balancing the Mathews Factors ¶ 43 After balancing the above Mathews factors, we conclude the City “ ‘met the fundamental requirements of due process—the opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and - 18 - in a meaningful manner.’ ” Piasa Armory, LLC, 2025 IL 130539 , ¶ 15 (quoting In re Robert S., 213 Ill. 2d 30, 49 (2004)).

2025Balancing the Mathews Factors ¶ 43 After balancing the above Mathews factors, we conclude the City “ ‘met the fundamental requirements of due process—the opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and - 18 - in a meaningful manner.’ ” Piasa Armory, LLC, 2025 IL 130539 , ¶ 15 (quoting In re Robert S., 213 Ill. 2d 30, 49 (2004)).

2025See People v. Jones, 2024 IL App (1st) 221555, ¶ 54 (“[A] defendant is entitled to an instruction as to any recognized defense for which there exists evidence sufficient for a reasonable jury to find in his favor.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)); People v. Grabow, 2022 IL App (2d) 210151, ¶ 20 (same); People v. Kratovil, 351 Ill.

2025See People v. Jones, 2024 IL App (1st) 221555, ¶ 54 (“[A] defendant is entitled to an instruction as to any recognized defense for which there exists evidence sufficient for a reasonable jury to find in his favor.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)); People v. Grabow, 2022 IL App (2d) 210151, ¶ 20 (same); People v. Kratovil, 351 Ill.

2025See People v. Jones, 2024 IL App (1st) 221555, ¶ 54 (“[A] defendant is entitled to an instruction as to any recognized defense for which there exists evidence sufficient for a reasonable jury to find in his favor.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)); People v. Grabow, 2022 IL App (2d) 210151, ¶ 20 (same); People v. Kratovil, 351 Ill.

2025See People v. Jones, 2024 IL App (1st) 221555, ¶ 54 (“[A] defendant is entitled to an instruction as to any recognized defense for which there exists evidence sufficient for a reasonable jury to find in his favor.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)); People v. Grabow, 2022 IL App (2d) 210151, ¶ 20 (same); People v. Kratovil, 351 Ill.

2025See People v. Jones, 2024 IL App (1st) 221555, ¶ 54 (“[A] defendant is entitled to an instruction as to any recognized defense for which there exists evidence sufficient for a reasonable jury to find in his favor.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)); People v. Grabow, 2022 IL App (2d) 210151, ¶ 20 (same); People v. Kratovil, 351 Ill.

2025See People v. Jones, 2024 IL App (1st) 221555, ¶ 54 (“[A] defendant is entitled to an instruction as to any recognized defense for which there exists evidence sufficient for a reasonable jury to find in his favor.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)); People v. Grabow, 2022 IL App (2d) 210151, ¶ 20 (same); People v. Kratovil, 351 Ill.

2025Id. at 67-73 . ¶ 20 In the instant case, the circuit court largely considered the “convenience” of Madison County and the “inconvenience” of Sangamon County as a forum for plaintiff in determining that the first two Mathews factors weighed heavily in -8- plaintiff’s favor.

2025Williams, 139 Ill. 2d at 62 . ¶ 26 Balancing all of the Mathews factors ultimately yields the conclusion that section 2-101.5 is not unconstitutional as applied specifically to plaintiff because requiring plaintiff to litigate in Sangamon County does not deprive it of the opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.

2024In doing so, the supreme court analyzed the Mathews factors and weighed the government’s interest “in minimizing the number of times the alleged victim is subject to adversarial proceedings prior to trial” against the defendant’s “fundamental interest *** to move about without restriction pending trial.” Deleon, 2020 IL 124744, ¶¶ 29, 31 .

2024In doing so, the supreme court analyzed the Mathews factors and weighed the government’s interest “in minimizing the number of times the alleged victim is subject to adversarial proceedings prior to trial” against the defendant’s “fundamental interest *** to move about without restriction pending trial.” Deleon, 2020 IL 124744, ¶¶ 29, 31 .