Mathews test in California

2025(See Mackey v. Montrym (1979) 443 U.S. 1, 10 [“suspension of a driver’s license for statutorily defined cause implicates a . . . protectible property interest”]; Dixon v. Love (1977) 431 U.S. 105, 112 [“It is clear that the Due Process Clause applies to the deprivation of a driver’s license by 6 The trial court referred to these considerations as the “Oberholzer/Mathews factors[.]” (See Mathews v. Eldridge (1976) 424 U.S. 319 , 334–335; Oberholzer v. Commission on Judicial Performance (1999) 20 Cal.4th 371 , 390–391.) 12 the State”]; Clarke v. Gordon (2024) 104 Cal.App.5th 1267 , 1274– 1275.)

2023The Mathews Test Mathews, supra, 424 U.S. 31 “articulated a more general balancing test of three factors ‘for resolving what process is constitutionally due’ [citation]: (1) the private interest affected by the government action; (2) ‘the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards’; and 16 (3) the government’s interest. [Citation.] Like the Barker test, the Mathews test ‘involve[s] careful balancing of the competing interests . . . .’ ” (Tran, supra, 62 Cal.App.5th at p. 348.)

2021(See People v. Allen (2008) 44 Cal.4th 843, 869 [defendants have a “dignitary interest in being heard,” and the “government has no interest in assuming a paternal role to prevent a defendant from pursuing a strategically misguided path”]; People v. Ramirez, supra, 25 Cal.3d at p. 275 [“‘Only through [oral] participation can the individual gain a meaningful understanding of what is 39 One of the Lents’ primary arguments is not based on any of the three Mathews factors.

2021(See People v. Allen (2008) 44 Cal.4th 843, 869 [defendants have a “dignitary interest in being heard,” and the “government has no interest in assuming a paternal role to prevent a defendant from pursuing a strategically misguided path”]; People v. Ramirez, supra, 25 Cal.3d at p. 275 [“‘Only through [oral] participation can the individual gain a meaningful understanding of what is 39 One of the Lents’ primary arguments is not based on any of the three Mathews factors.

2021Mathews test Mathews, supra, 424 U.S. 319 , articulated a more general balancing test of three factors “for resolving what process is constitutionally due” (Butler, supra, 55 Cal.App.5th at p. 639): (1) the private interest affected by the government action; (2) “the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards”; and (3) the government’s interest. ( Mathews, supra, at p. 335 .) Like the Barker test, the Mathews test “involve[s] careful balancing of the competing interests . . . .

2021Mathews test Mathews, supra, 424 U.S. 319 , articulated a more general balancing test of three factors “for resolving what process is constitutionally due” (Butler, supra, 55 Cal.App.5th at p. 639): (1) the private interest affected by the government action; (2) “the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards”; and (3) the government’s interest. ( Mathews, supra, at p. 335 .) Like the Barker test, the Mathews test “involve[s] careful balancing of the competing interests . . . .

2018(See, e.g., Today's Fresh Start, Inc. v. Los Angeles County Office of Education (2013) 57 Cal.4th 197 , 212-213, 159 Cal.Rptr.3d 358 , 303 P.3d 1140 [ Mathews test utilized in analyzing due process challenge to county's practice of revoking charter schools]; California Teachers Ass'n. v. State of California (1999) 20 Cal.4th 327 , 348-350, 84 Cal.Rptr.2d 425 , 975 P.2d 622 [ Mathews test utilized in analyzing due process challenge to statute requiring teachers to pay half of costs for administrative law judge].) We deny McClinton's request for judicial notice of the "hypothetical." There is no

2018(See, e.g., Today's Fresh Start, Inc. v. Los Angeles County Office of Education (2013) 57 Cal.4th 197 , 212-213, 159 Cal.Rptr.3d 358 , 303 P.3d 1140 [ Mathews test utilized in analyzing due process challenge to county's practice of revoking charter schools]; California Teachers Ass'n. v. State of California (1999) 20 Cal.4th 327 , 348-350, 84 Cal.Rptr.2d 425 , 975 P.2d 622 [ Mathews test utilized in analyzing due process challenge to statute requiring teachers to pay half of costs for administrative law judge].) We deny McClinton's request for judicial notice of the "hypothetical." There is no

2025(See Mackey v. Montrym (1979) 443 U.S. 1, 10 [“suspension of a driver’s license for statutorily defined cause implicates a . . . protectible property interest”]; Dixon v. Love (1977) 431 U.S. 105, 112 [“It is clear that the Due Process Clause applies to the deprivation of a driver’s license by 6 The trial court referred to these considerations as the “Oberholzer/Mathews factors[.]” (See Mathews v. Eldridge (1976) 424 U.S. 319 , 334–335; Oberholzer v. Commission on Judicial Performance (1999) 20 Cal.4th 371 , 390–391.) 12 the State”]; Clarke v. Gordon (2024) 104 Cal.App.5th 1267 , 1274– 1275.)

2019Relying *513 in large part on the principles articulated in Mathews , the Machado court held that due process principles were satisfied when the hearing is provided following issuance of a cleanup and abatement order. ( Machado, supra , 90 Cal.App.4th at pp. 725-726, 109 Cal.Rptr.2d 116 .) In reaching this conclusion, the Machado court analyzed the three Mathews factors and concluded the dairy had been afforded due process, reasoning that because the cleanup and abatement order there did not impose criminal or civil penalties there was no substantial deprivation of the private interest of the

2018(See, e.g., Today's Fresh Start, Inc. v. Los Angeles County Office of Education (2013) 57 Cal.4th 197 , 212-213, 159 Cal.Rptr.3d 358 , 303 P.3d 1140 [ Mathews test utilized in analyzing due process challenge to county's practice of revoking charter schools]; California Teachers Ass'n. v. State of California (1999) 20 Cal.4th 327 , 348-350, 84 Cal.Rptr.2d 425 , 975 P.2d 622 [ Mathews test utilized in analyzing due process challenge to statute requiring teachers to pay half of costs for administrative law judge].) We deny McClinton's request for judicial notice of the "hypothetical." There is no

2018(See, e.g., Today's Fresh Start, Inc. v. Los Angeles County Office of Education (2013) 57 Cal.4th 197 , 212-213, 159 Cal.Rptr.3d 358 , 303 P.3d 1140 [ Mathews test utilized in analyzing due process challenge to county's practice of revoking charter schools]; California Teachers Ass'n. v. State of California (1999) 20 Cal.4th 327 , 348-350, 84 Cal.Rptr.2d 425 , 975 P.2d 622 [ Mathews test utilized in analyzing due process challenge to statute requiring teachers to pay half of costs for administrative law judge].) We deny McClinton's request for judicial notice of the "hypothetical." There is no

2025(See Conservatorship of John L. (2010) 48 Cal.4th 131, 150, 154 (John L.) [applying Mathews factors “to determine whether a particular procedure or absence of a procedure violates due process”]; Ben C., supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 543 [applying Mathews factors in deciding that the LPS Act does not require Anders/Wende review].) Camacho, however, held that the Barker test, rather than the Mathews test, was more suitable for deciding whether an alleged SVP was deprived of his constitutional right to a timely trial.

2025(See Conservatorship of John L. (2010) 48 Cal.4th 131, 150, 154 (John L.) [applying Mathews factors “to determine whether a particular procedure or absence of a procedure violates due process”]; Ben C., supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 543 [applying Mathews factors in deciding that the LPS Act does not require Anders/Wende review].) Camacho, however, held that the Barker test, rather than the Mathews test, was more suitable for deciding whether an alleged SVP was deprived of his constitutional right to a timely trial.

2025(See Conservatorship of John L. (2010) 48 Cal.4th 131, 150, 154 (John L.) [applying Mathews factors “to determine whether a particular procedure or absence of a procedure violates due process”]; Ben C., supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 543 [applying Mathews factors in deciding that the LPS Act does not require Anders/Wende review].) Camacho, however, held that the Barker test, rather than the Mathews test, was more suitable for deciding whether an alleged SVP was deprived of his constitutional right to a timely trial.

2025(See Conservatorship of John L. (2010) 48 Cal.4th 131, 150, 154 (John L.) [applying Mathews factors “to determine whether a particular procedure or absence of a procedure violates due process”]; Ben C., supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 543 [applying Mathews factors in deciding that the LPS Act does not require Anders/Wende review].) Camacho, however, held that the Barker test, rather than the Mathews test, was more suitable for deciding whether an alleged SVP was deprived of his constitutional right to a timely trial.

2021(See People v. Allen (2008) 44 Cal.4th 843, 869 [defendants have a “dignitary interest in being heard,” and the “government has no interest in assuming a paternal role to prevent a defendant from pursuing a strategically misguided path”]; People v. Ramirez, supra, 25 Cal.3d at p. 275 [“‘Only through [oral] participation can the individual gain a meaningful understanding of what is 39 One of the Lents’ primary arguments is not based on any of the three Mathews factors.

2021(See People v. Allen (2008) 44 Cal.4th 843, 869 [defendants have a “dignitary interest in being heard,” and the “government has no interest in assuming a paternal role to prevent a defendant from pursuing a strategically misguided path”]; People v. Ramirez, supra, 25 Cal.3d at p. 275 [“‘Only through [oral] participation can the individual gain a meaningful understanding of what is 39 One of the Lents’ primary arguments is not based on any of the three Mathews factors.

2018"Courts may not insert words or add provisions to an unambiguous statute." ( Hudson v. Superior Court (2017) 7 Cal.App.5th 1165 , 1172, 213 Cal.Rptr.3d 277 .) " 'We may not rewrite the statute to conform to an assumed intention that does not appear in its language.' " ( Id ., at p. 1173, 213 Cal.Rptr.3d 277 ; see also Vasquez v. State of California (2008) 45 Cal.4th 243 , 253, 85 Cal.Rptr.3d 466 , 195 P.3d 1049 .) The consecutive sentence was unauthorized.

2018"Courts may not insert words or add provisions to an unambiguous statute." ( Hudson v. Superior Court (2017) 7 Cal.App.5th 1165 , 1172, 213 Cal.Rptr.3d 277 .) " 'We may not rewrite the statute to conform to an assumed intention that does not appear in its language.' " ( Id ., at p. 1173, 213 Cal.Rptr.3d 277 ; see also Vasquez v. State of California (2008) 45 Cal.4th 243 , 253, 85 Cal.Rptr.3d 466 , 195 P.3d 1049 .) The consecutive sentence was unauthorized.

2014(Mathews v. Eldridge, supra, 424 U.S. at p. 335 [ 47 L.Ed.2d at p. 33 ]; Reardon v. U.S. (1st Cir. 1991) 947 F.2d 1509, 1518 (Reardon).) We apply the Mathews test to the facts alleged here.

2014(Mathews v. Eldridge, supra, 424 U.S. at p. 335 [ 47 L.Ed.2d at p. 33 ]; Reardon v. U.S. (1st Cir. 1991) 947 F.2d 1509, 1518 (Reardon).) We apply the Mathews test to the facts alleged here.

2022(Landau, supra, 214 Cal.App.4th at 37 [“A potential civil committee may not seek to continue his trial over and over again and then be heard to complain the court violated due process by 30 granting his requests”]; id. at 41-42 [“given the fact that the preceding 14-month-plus delay was at appellant’s request, we find the delay from November 5, 2007, to the start of trial proceedings on December 18, 2007, did not amount to a denial of due process under the Mathews analysis”].)10 B.

2022(Landau, supra, 214 Cal.App.4th at 37 [“A potential civil committee may not seek to continue his trial over and over again and then be heard to complain the court violated due process by 30 granting his requests”]; id. at 41-42 [“given the fact that the preceding 14-month-plus delay was at appellant’s request, we find the delay from November 5, 2007, to the start of trial proceedings on December 18, 2007, did not amount to a denial of due process under the Mathews analysis”].)10 B.

2022Standard of review “We review for abuse of discretion a trial court’s ruling on a motion to dismiss for prejudicial pretrial delay.” (People v. Superior Court (Vasquez) (2018) 27 Cal.App.5th 36, 55 (Vasquez).) “Under an abuse of discretion standard, ‘ “[t]he trial court’s findings of fact are reviewed for substantial evidence, its conclusions of law are reviewed de novo, and its application of the law to the facts is reversible only if arbitrary and capricious.” ’ [Citations.]” (Ibid.) 11.

2022Standard of review “We review for abuse of discretion a trial court’s ruling on a motion to dismiss for prejudicial pretrial delay.” (People v. Superior Court (Vasquez) (2018) 27 Cal.App.5th 36, 55 (Vasquez).) “Under an abuse of discretion standard, ‘ “[t]he trial court’s findings of fact are reviewed for substantial evidence, its conclusions of law are reviewed de novo, and its application of the law to the facts is reversible only if arbitrary and capricious.” ’ [Citations.]” (Ibid.) 11.

2025(See Mackey v. Montrym (1979) 443 U.S. 1, 10 [“suspension of a driver’s license for statutorily defined cause implicates a . . . protectible property interest”]; Dixon v. Love (1977) 431 U.S. 105, 112 [“It is clear that the Due Process Clause applies to the deprivation of a driver’s license by 6 The trial court referred to these considerations as the “Oberholzer/Mathews factors[.]” (See Mathews v. Eldridge (1976) 424 U.S. 319 , 334–335; Oberholzer v. Commission on Judicial Performance (1999) 20 Cal.4th 371 , 390–391.) 12 the State”]; Clarke v. Gordon (2024) 104 Cal.App.5th 1267 , 1274– 1275.)

2023Further, any error counsel made in failing to file a dismissal motion was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt under the standard set forth in Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24 (Chapman), as the court likely 20 would have properly denied it based on the stark differences between this case and Vasquez.

2017Cir. 2012) 670 F.3d 999, 14 . 1013 (Juvenile Male); see Iraheta v. Superior Court (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 1500 [applying the Mathews framework in determining that named defendants in civil gang injunction proceeding were not entitled to counsel on due process grounds].) In applying the Mathews balancing inquiry in the second step of the due process analysis, courts consider: (1) “the private interest that will be affected by the official action”; (2) “the risk of erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute proced

2017Cir. 2012) 670 F.3d 999, 14 . 1013 (Juvenile Male); see Iraheta v. Superior Court (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 1500 [applying the Mathews framework in determining that named defendants in civil gang injunction proceeding were not entitled to counsel on due process grounds].) In applying the Mathews balancing inquiry in the second step of the due process analysis, courts consider: (1) “the private interest that will be affected by the official action”; (2) “the risk of erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute proced