Mathews test (Arizona) · Go Syfert
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Mathews test in Arizona

10 Arizona opinions name it 2 courts 1999–2025 3 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by Arizona courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (8)

CaseFollowedCited
Mathews v. Eldridgegreen
scotus · 1976 · cited in 4 Arizona opinions naming this issue, 1999–2017
2 sentences

2010Id. at 335 , 96 S.Ct. 893 . ¶ 10 Although Mathews involved the deprivation of a property interest, id. at 332 , 96 S.Ct. 893 , the Supreme Court has repeatedly applied Mathews in cases involving important liberty interests, see, e.g., Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 225 , 125 S.Ct. 2384 , 162 L.Ed.2d 174 (2005) (using Mathews analysis to determine due process required before assigning an inmate to a high-security facility); Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 528-29 , 124 S.Ct. 2633 (using Mathews analysis to determine scope of process due to United States citizens detained as enemy combatants).

2010Id. at 335 , 96 S.Ct. 893 . ¶ 10 Although Mathews involved the deprivation of a property interest, id. at 332 , 96 S.Ct. 893 , the Supreme Court has repeatedly applied Mathews in cases involving important liberty interests, see, e.g., Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 225 , 125 S.Ct. 2384 , 162 L.Ed.2d 174 (2005) (using Mathews analysis to determine due process required before assigning an inmate to a high-security facility); Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 528-29 , 124 S.Ct. 2633 (using Mathews analysis to determine scope of process due to United States citizens detained as enemy combatants).

14
Santosky v. Kramergreen
scotus · 1982 · cited in 3 Arizona opinions naming this issue, 2005–2019
2 sentences

2019See Santosky , 455 U.S. at 754 , 102 S.Ct. 1388 (applying Mathews factors to determine the appropriate burden of proof in child termination cases).

2019See Santosky , 455 U.S. at 754 , 102 S.Ct. 1388 (applying Mathews factors to determine the appropriate burden of proof in child termination cases).

13
Kent K. v. Bobby M.green
ariz · 2005 · cited in 2 Arizona opinions naming this issue, 2017–2021
2 sentences

2021Dep’t of Child Safety v. Beene, 235 Ariz. 300, 305, ¶ 11 (App. 2014); see also Kent K. v. Bobby M., 210 Ariz. 279, 286, ¶ 33 (2005) (applying the Mathews test to a privately-initiated termination action).

2021Dep’t of Child Safety v. Beene, 235 Ariz. 300, 305, ¶ 11 (App. 2014); see also Kent K. v. Bobby M., 210 Ariz. 279, 286, ¶ 33 (2005) (applying the Mathews test to a privately-initiated termination action).

12
Department of Child Safety v. Beenegreen
arizctapp · 2014 · cited in 2 Arizona opinions naming this issue, 2021–2021
2 sentences

2021Dep’t of Child Safety v. Beene, 235 Ariz. 300, 305, ¶ 11 (App. 2014); see also Kent K. v. Bobby M., 210 Ariz. 279, 286, ¶ 33 (2005) (applying the Mathews test to a privately-initiated termination action).

2021Dep’t of Child Safety v. Beene, 235 Ariz. 300, 305, ¶ 11 (App. 2014); see also Kent K. v. Bobby M., 210 Ariz. 279, 286, ¶ 33 (2005) (applying the Mathews test to a privately-initiated termination action).

12
State v. Soulegreen
ariz · 1991 · cited in 1 Arizona opinions naming this issue, 2016–2016
2 sentences

2016Instead, the State’s justifications are feeble: first, “the Mathews rule fosters perjury and more litigation,” because “[t]o allow a defendant to testify as to two defenses that cannot both be true is equivalent to sanctioning a defendant’s perjury”; and second, “allowing inconsistent defenses may confuse the jury.” Soule, 168 Ariz. at 136 , 811 P.2d at 1073 . ¶43 Those justifications repeatedly have been debunked.

2016Instead, the State’s justifications are feeble: first, “the Mathews rule fosters perjury and more litigation,” because “[t]o allow a defendant to testify as to two defenses that cannot both be true is equivalent to sanctioning a defendant’s perjury”; and second, “allowing inconsistent defenses may confuse the jury.” Soule, 168 Ariz. at 136 , 811 P.2d at 1073 . ¶43 Those justifications repeatedly have been debunked.

11
In Matter of WJCgreen
wisctapp · 1985 · cited in 1 Arizona opinions naming this issue, 2010–2010
2 sentences

2010See In re W.J.C., 124 Wis.2d 238 , 369 N.W.2d 162, 163-64 (Wis. Ct.App.1985) (applying Mathews analysis to civil commitment proceedings).

2010See In re W.J.C., 124 Wis.2d 238 , 369 N.W.2d 162, 163-64 (Wis. Ct.App.1985) (applying Mathews analysis to civil commitment proceedings).

11
Mendonza v. Commonwealthgreen
mass · 1996 · cited in 1 Arizona opinions naming this issue, 1999–1999
2 sentences

1999See also Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437, 443 , 112 S.Ct. 2572, 2576 , 120 L.Ed.2d 353 (1992) (holding that the Mathews test “does not provide the appropriate framework for assessing the validity of state procedural rules which ... are part of the criminal process”); Mendonza v. Commonwealth, 423 Mass. 771 , 673 N.E.2d 22, 28 (1996) (“The looming danger in [concluding that] any and all deprivations of liberty need only be tested by the test of due process in general ..., [see] Mathews v. Eldridge ..., is that the distinctive nature of the procedural guarantees of the criminal process enshri

1999See also Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437, 443 , 112 S.Ct. 2572, 2576 , 120 L.Ed.2d 353 (1992) (holding that the Mathews test “does not provide the appropriate framework for assessing the validity of state procedural rules which ... are part of the criminal process”); Mendonza v. Commonwealth, 423 Mass. 771 , 673 N.E.2d 22, 28 (1996) (“The looming danger in [concluding that] any and all deprivations of liberty need only be tested by the test of due process in general ..., [see] Mathews v. Eldridge ..., is that the distinctive nature of the procedural guarantees of the criminal process enshri

11
Medina v. Californiagreen
scotus · 1992 · cited in 1 Arizona opinions naming this issue, 1999–1999
2 sentences

1999See also Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437, 443 , 112 S.Ct. 2572, 2576 , 120 L.Ed.2d 353 (1992) (holding that the Mathews test “does not provide the appropriate framework for assessing the validity of state procedural rules which ... are part of the criminal process”); Mendonza v. Commonwealth, 423 Mass. 771 , 673 N.E.2d 22, 28 (1996) (“The looming danger in [concluding that] any and all deprivations of liberty need only be tested by the test of due process in general ..., [see] Mathews v. Eldridge ..., is that the distinctive nature of the procedural guarantees of the criminal process enshri

1999See also Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437, 443 , 112 S.Ct. 2572, 2576 , 120 L.Ed.2d 353 (1992) (holding that the Mathews test “does not provide the appropriate framework for assessing the validity of state procedural rules which ... are part of the criminal process”); Mendonza v. Commonwealth, 423 Mass. 771 , 673 N.E.2d 22, 28 (1996) (“The looming danger in [concluding that] any and all deprivations of liberty need only be tested by the test of due process in general ..., [see] Mathews v. Eldridge ..., is that the distinctive nature of the procedural guarantees of the criminal process enshri

11

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

CaseNegativeCited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Arizona. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (7)

CaseCitedYears
Lassiter v. Department of Social Servs. of Durham Cty. green
scotus · 1981
2 sentences

2005Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 27 , 101 S.Ct. 2153 , 68 L.Ed.2d 640 (1981)). ¶ 41 After balancing these three Mathews factors, we conclude that due process does not require imposing the clear and convincing evidence standard for an inquiry into the best interests of the child pursuant to A.R.S. § 8-533.B.

2005Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 27 , 101 S.Ct. 2153 , 68 L.Ed.2d 640 (1981)). ¶ 41 After balancing these three Mathews factors, we conclude that due process does not require imposing the clear and convincing evidence standard for an inquiry into the best interests of the child pursuant to A.R.S. § 8-533.B.

22005–2019
In Re Mh2010-002637 green
arizctapp · 2011
2 sentences

2025MH2010-002637, 228 Ariz. at 79 3 IN RE: MH2025-001114 Decision of the Court ¶¶ 16-17 (applying the Mathews test in Arizona civil commitment case).

2025MH2010-002637, 228 Ariz. at 79 3 IN RE: MH2025-001114 Decision of the Court ¶¶ 16-17 (applying the Mathews test in Arizona civil commitment case).

12025–2025
Sorrells v. United States green
scotus · 1932
2 sentences

2016As the Court remarked in Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 451 , 53 S.Ct. 210 , “Objections to the defense of entrapment are also urged upon practical grounds.

2016As the Court remarked in Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 451 , 53 S.Ct. 210 , “Objections to the defense of entrapment are also urged upon practical grounds.

12016–2016
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld green
scotus · 2004
2 sentences

2010Id. at 335 , 96 S.Ct. 893 . ¶ 10 Although Mathews involved the deprivation of a property interest, id. at 332 , 96 S.Ct. 893 , the Supreme Court has repeatedly applied Mathews in cases involving important liberty interests, see, e.g., Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 225 , 125 S.Ct. 2384 , 162 L.Ed.2d 174 (2005) (using Mathews analysis to determine due process required before assigning an inmate to a high-security facility); Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 528-29 , 124 S.Ct. 2633 (using Mathews analysis to determine scope of process due to United States citizens detained as enemy combatants).

2010Id. at 335 , 96 S.Ct. 893 . ¶ 10 Although Mathews involved the deprivation of a property interest, id. at 332 , 96 S.Ct. 893 , the Supreme Court has repeatedly applied Mathews in cases involving important liberty interests, see, e.g., Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 225 , 125 S.Ct. 2384 , 162 L.Ed.2d 174 (2005) (using Mathews analysis to determine due process required before assigning an inmate to a high-security facility); Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 528-29 , 124 S.Ct. 2633 (using Mathews analysis to determine scope of process due to United States citizens detained as enemy combatants).

12010–2010
Wilkinson v. Austin green
scotus · 2005
2 sentences

2010Id. at 335 , 96 S.Ct. 893 . ¶ 10 Although Mathews involved the deprivation of a property interest, id. at 332 , 96 S.Ct. 893 , the Supreme Court has repeatedly applied Mathews in cases involving important liberty interests, see, e.g., Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 225 , 125 S.Ct. 2384 , 162 L.Ed.2d 174 (2005) (using Mathews analysis to determine due process required before assigning an inmate to a high-security facility); Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 528-29 , 124 S.Ct. 2633 (using Mathews analysis to determine scope of process due to United States citizens detained as enemy combatants).

2010Id. at 335 , 96 S.Ct. 893 . ¶ 10 Although Mathews involved the deprivation of a property interest, id. at 332 , 96 S.Ct. 893 , the Supreme Court has repeatedly applied Mathews in cases involving important liberty interests, see, e.g., Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 225 , 125 S.Ct. 2384 , 162 L.Ed.2d 174 (2005) (using Mathews analysis to determine due process required before assigning an inmate to a high-security facility); Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 528-29 , 124 S.Ct. 2633 (using Mathews analysis to determine scope of process due to United States citizens detained as enemy combatants).

12010–2010
Michael J. v. Arizona Department of Economic Security green
ariz · 2000
2 sentences

2005Under Mathews , determining the minimum standard of proof required to afford due process involves consideration of three factors: “First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government’s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.” 424 U.S. at 335 , 96 S.Ct. 893 . ¶

2005Under Mathews , determining the minimum standard of proof required to afford due process involves consideration of three factors: “First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government’s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.” 424 U.S. at 335 , 96 S.Ct. 893 . ¶

12005–2005
R. G. Britton, Appellant-Cross v. Harold Eugene Rogers, Appellee-Cross green
ca8 · 1980
2 sentences

1999Mathews, 424 U.S. at 334-35 , 96 S.Ct. at 902-03 . ¶ 7 The court of appeals, relying on Britton v. Rogers, 631 F.2d 572 (8th Cir.1980), applied the Mathews test to determine whether A.R.S. § 13-703.A violated appellant’s right to due process.

1999Mathews, 424 U.S. at 334-35 , 96 S.Ct. at 902-03 . ¶ 7 The court of appeals, relying on Britton v. Rogers, 631 F.2d 572 (8th Cir.1980), applied the Mathews test to determine whether A.R.S. § 13-703.A violated appellant’s right to due process.

11999–1999

Statutes the citing opinions construe

AZ § Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 12-120.24 (5) AZ § Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 8-533 (5)

Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.

Where else courts name it

WA 92 (1986–2026) NM 58 (1997–2025) IL 57 (1979–2026) CA 40 (1981–2025) PA 26 (1990–2025) NJ 25 (1990–2026) CT 22 (1996–2025) IN 21 (1995–2025) OH 20 (1986–2025) MN 20 (1991–2026) TX 15 (1990–2024) OR 11 (1993–2026) MD 11 (1998–2021) IA 10 (2012–2025) NY 10 (1998–2024) AZ 10 (1999–2025) ME 9 (2000–2022) AK 9 (2000–2025) KS 8 (1995–2024) HI 7 (1993–2026) ID 6 (2006–2013) WI 6 (1986–2025) WY 5 (1995–2025) MA 5 (2005–2017) UT 4 (1995–2014) MS 4 (2008–2021) MO 4 (1998–2023) KY 4 (2005–2024) VT 3 (1993–2017) MT 3 (1998–2008) NE 3 (2001–2017) VA 3 (2002–2019) GA 3 (1997–2022) RI 3 (1994–2015) ND 3 (2007–2007) CO 3 (1988–2025) DC 2 (1994–2024) LA 2 (1989–1994) SD 2 (2011–2022) SC 2 (1996–2022) MI 2 (1985–2012)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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