arrest claim in Georgia

2023Pauldo, 309 Ga. at 135 (2) (noting that “basic biographical questions asked in relation to an arrest are an exception to Miranda because such ‘booking’ questions are unrelated to the investigation and serve a legitimate administrative need and therefore do not qualify as interrogation”) (citing Kirby v. State, 304 Ga. 472, 476 (2) (b) (819 SE2d 468) (2018).

2023Pauldo, 309 Ga. at 135 (2) (noting that “basic biographical questions asked in relation to an arrest are an exception to Miranda because such ‘booking’ questions are unrelated to the investigation and serve a legitimate administrative need and therefore do not qualify as interrogation”) (citing Kirby v. State, 304 Ga. 472, 476 (2) (b) (819 SE2d 468) (2018).

2018Basic biographical questions asked in relation to an arrest are an exception to Miranda because such "booking" questions are unrelated to the investigation and serve a legitimate administrative need and therefore do not qualify as "interrogation." See Pennsylvania v. Muniz , 496 U.S. 582 , 601-602, 110 S.Ct. 2638 , 110 L.Ed.2d 528 (1990) (plurality); Franks v. State , 268 Ga. 238 , 239, 486 S.E.2d 594 (1997).

2018Basic biographical questions asked in relation to an arrest are an exception to Miranda because such "booking" questions are unrelated to the investigation and serve a legitimate administrative need and therefore do not qualify as "interrogation." See Pennsylvania v. Muniz , 496 U.S. 582 , 601-602, 110 S.Ct. 2638 , 110 L.Ed.2d 528 (1990) (plurality); Franks v. State , 268 Ga. 238 , 239, 486 S.E.2d 594 (1997).

2018Basic biographical questions asked in relation to an arrest are an exception to Miranda because such "booking" questions are unrelated to the investigation and serve a legitimate administrative need and therefore do not qualify as "interrogation." See Pennsylvania v. Muniz , 496 U.S. 582 , 601-602, 110 S.Ct. 2638 , 110 L.Ed.2d 528 (1990) (plurality); Franks v. State , 268 Ga. 238 , 239, 486 S.E.2d 594 (1997).

2018Basic biographical questions asked in relation to an arrest are an exception to Miranda because such "booking" questions are unrelated to the investigation and serve a legitimate administrative need and therefore do not qualify as "interrogation." See Pennsylvania v. Muniz , 496 U.S. 582 , 601-602, 110 S.Ct. 2638 , 110 L.Ed.2d 528 (1990) (plurality); Franks v. State , 268 Ga. 238 , 239, 486 S.E.2d 594 (1997).

2003It is well settled that “[t]he elements of a false arrest claim include: (1) an arrest under the process of law, (2) without probable cause, and (3) made maliciously.” Desmond v. Troncalli Mitsubishi, 243 Ga. App. 71, 74 (2) ( 532 SE2d 463 ) (2000), citing OCGA § 51-7-1; Simmons v. Kroger Co., 218 Ga. App. 721, 722-723 (1) ( 463 SE2d 159 ) (1995).

2003It is well settled that “[t]he elements of a false arrest claim include: (1) an arrest under the process of law, (2) without probable cause, and (3) made maliciously.” Desmond v. Troncalli Mitsubishi, 243 Ga. App. 71, 74 (2) ( 532 SE2d 463 ) (2000), citing OCGA § 51-7-1; Simmons v. Kroger Co., 218 Ga. App. 721, 722-723 (1) ( 463 SE2d 159 ) (1995).

1991See generally Collins v. Sadlo, 167 Ga. App. 317 ( 306 SE2d 390 ) (1983).” Williams v. Smith, 179 Ga. App. 712, 714 ( 348 SE2d 50 ) (1986).

1991See generally Collins v. Sadlo, 167 Ga. App. 317 ( 306 SE2d 390 ) (1983).” Williams v. Smith, 179 Ga. App. 712, 714 ( 348 SE2d 50 ) (1986).

2013See Swift, 103 Ga. at 193 (2) (noting that “there must at least have been an arrest and an inquiry before a committing court,” before a malicious prosecution claim is actionable) (emphasis supplied).

1900In Swift v. Witchard, 103 Ga. 193 , it was held that before a criminal prosecution will be actionable there must at least have been an arrest and an inquiry before a committing court.

2023Pauldo, 309 Ga. at 135 (2) (noting that “basic biographical questions asked in relation to an arrest are an exception to Miranda because such 20 The fact that other law enforcement officers, including the arresting officer and another detention officer, were in the booking area during the pat- down search does not convert this routine search into a custodial interrogation.

2023Pauldo, 309 Ga. at 135 (2) (noting that “basic biographical questions asked in relation to an arrest are an exception to Miranda because such ‘booking’ questions are unrelated to the investigation and serve a legitimate administrative need and therefore do not qualify as interrogation”) (citing Kirby v. State, 304 Ga. 472, 476 (2) (b) (819 SE2d 468) (2018).

2020Bailey v. Board of County Commrs., 956 F2d 1112, 1119 (III) (A) (1) n. 4 (11th Cir. 1992). 1 42 USC § 1983 relevantly provides that every person who, under color of statute, custom or usage of any state, subjects or causes to be subjected, any citizen of or person within the jurisdiction of the United States to the deprivation of any rights secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law. 11 “[P]robable cause requires only a probability or substantial chance of any criminal activity.” Illinois v. Gates, 462 U. S. 213, 243 (IV) n. 13 ( 103 SCt 2317

2020Bailey v. Board of County Commrs., 956 F2d 1112, 1119 (III) (A) (1) n. 4 (11th Cir. 1992). 1 42 USC § 1983 relevantly provides that every person who, under color of statute, custom or usage of any state, subjects or causes to be subjected, any citizen of or person within the jurisdiction of the United States to the deprivation of any rights secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law. 11 “[P]robable cause requires only a probability or substantial chance of any criminal activity.” Illinois v. Gates, 462 U. S. 213, 243 (IV) n. 13 ( 103 SCt 2317

2020Once a defendant invokes his rights, subsequent statements by the defendant are admissible only if “the defendant himself initiates the communications with law enforcement authorities.” Mack, 296 Ga. at 244 (2) (following invocation of the right to remain silent).

2016With regard to the exclusionary rule issue in this case, for example, I note that the Supreme Court of the United States has held that a warrantless arrest for crimes committed in the presence of an arresting officer may be reasonable under the Fourth Amendment even if the arrest was in violation of a state arrest statute, see Virginia v. Moore, 553 U. S. 164, 177-178 ( 128 SCt 1598 , 170 LE2d 559) (2008), and several lower courts have rejected exclusion of evidence for violations of state statutes limiting the territorial jurisdiction of the arresting officer, see, e.g., United States v. Sed,

2016With regard to the exclusionary rule issue in this case, for example, I note that the Supreme Court of the United States has held that a warrantless arrest for crimes committed in the presence of an arresting officer may be reasonable under the Fourth Amendment even if the arrest was in violation of a state arrest statute, see Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164, 177-178 ( 128 SCt 1598 , 170 LE2d 559) (2008), and several lower courts have rejected exclusion of evidence for violations of state statutes limiting the territorial jurisdiction of the arresting officer, see, e.g., United States v. Sed,

2016With regard to the exclusionary rule issue in this case, for example, I note that the Supreme Court of the United States has held that a warrantless arrest for crimes committed in the presence of an arresting officer may be reasonable under the Fourth Amendment even if the arrest was in violation of a state arrest statute, see Virginia v. Moore, 553 U. S. 164, 177-178 ( 128 SCt 1598 , 170 LE2d 559) (2008), and several lower courts have rejected exclusion of evidence for violations of state statutes limiting the territorial jurisdiction of the arresting officer, see, e.g., United States v. Sed,

2016With regard to the exclusionary rule issue in this case, for example, I note that the Supreme Court of the United States has held that a warrantless arrest for crimes committed in the presence of an arresting officer may be reasonable under the Fourth Amendment even if the arrest was in violation of a state arrest statute, see Virginia v. Moore, 553 U. S. 164, 177-178 ( 128 SCt 1598 , 170 LE2d 559) (2008), and several lower courts have rejected exclusion of evidence for violations of state statutes limiting the territorial jurisdiction of the arresting officer, see, e.g., United States v. Sed,

2016With regard to the exclusionary rule issue in this case, for example, I note that the Supreme Court of the United States has held that a warrantless arrest for crimes committed in the presence of an arresting officer may be reasonable under the Fourth Amendment even if the arrest was in violation of a state arrest statute, see Virginia v. Moore, 553 U. S. 164, 177-178 ( 128 SCt 1598 , 170 LE2d 559) (2008), and several lower courts have rejected exclusion of evidence for violations of state statutes limiting the territorial jurisdiction of the arresting officer, see, e.g., United States v. Sed,

2016With regard to the exclusionary rule issue in this case, for example, I note that the Supreme Court of the United States has held that a warrantless arrest for crimes committed in the presence of an arresting officer may be reasonable under the Fourth Amendment even if the arrest was in violation of a state arrest statute, see Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164, 177-178 ( 128 SCt 1598 , 170 LE2d 559) (2008), and several lower courts have rejected exclusion of evidence for violations of state statutes limiting the territorial jurisdiction of the arresting officer, see, e.g., United States v. Sed,

2006“The restraint constituting a false imprisonment may arise out of words, acts, gestures or the like, which induce a reasonable apprehension that force will be used if plaintiff does not submit; and it is sufficient if they operate upon the will of the person threatened, and result in a reasonable fear of personal difficulty or personal injuries.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Sinclair Refining Co. v. Meek, 62 Ga. App. 850, 854 (3) ( 10 SE2d 76 ) (1940).

2006"The restraint constituting a false imprisonment may arise out of words, acts, gestures or the like, which induce a reasonable apprehension that force will be used if plaintiff does not submit; and it is sufficient if they operate upon the will of the person threatened, and result in a reasonable fear of personal difficulty or personal injuries." (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Sinclair Refining Co. v. Meek, 62 Ga.App. 850, 854 (3), 10 S.E.2d 76 (1940).

2006Gantt v. Patient Communications Systems, 200 Ga. App. 35, 38 , 406 S.E.2d 796 (1991); Mohamud v. Wachovia Corp., 260 Ga.App. 612 , 580 S.E.2d 259 (2003).

2006Gantt v. Patient Communications Systems, 200 Ga. App. 35, 38 , 406 S.E.2d 796 (1991); Mohamud v. Wachovia Corp., 260 Ga.App. 612 , 580 S.E.2d 259 (2003).

2003It is well settled that “[t]he elements of a false arrest claim include: (1) an arrest under the process of law, (2) without probable cause, and (3) made maliciously.” Desmond v. Troncalli Mitsubishi, 243 Ga. App. 71, 74 (2) ( 532 SE2d 463 ) (2000), citing OCGA § 51-7-1; Simmons v. Kroger Co., 218 Ga. App. 721, 722-723 (1) ( 463 SE2d 159 ) (1995).

2003It is well settled that “[t]he elements of a false arrest claim include: (1) an arrest under the process of law, (2) without probable cause, and (3) made maliciously.” Desmond v. Troncalli Mitsubishi, 243 Ga. App. 71, 74 (2) ( 532 SE2d 463 ) (2000), citing OCGA § 51-7-1; Simmons v. Kroger Co., 218 Ga. App. 721, 722-723 (1) ( 463 SE2d 159 ) (1995).

2003See Stanford v. City of Manchester, 246 Ga. App. 129, 130-131 (1) (c) ( 539 SE2d 845 ) (2000); Franklin, supra; Stover v. Watson, 180 Ga. App. 16 ( 348 SE2d 463 ) (1986) (physical precedent only).

2003See Stanford v. City of Manchester, 246 Ga. App. 129, 130-131 (1) (c) ( 539 SE2d 845 ) (2000); Franklin, supra; Stover v. Watson, 180 Ga. App. 16 ( 348 SE2d 463 ) (1986) (physical precedent only).

2001Davis, supra at 334 (7).

2000Thompson v. State, 175 Ga. App. 645, 648 (3) ( 334 SE2d 312 ) (1985). 2.

2000Thompson v. State, 175 Ga. App. 645, 648 (3) ( 334 SE2d 312 ) (1985). 2.

1997See OCGA § 40-6-392 (a) (1); State v. Richardson, 186 Ga. App. 888, 889 ( 368 SE2d 825 ) (1988). *440 While the defendant’s testimony could not prove, identify, or interpret the results, the defendant could testify to taking the test and how long after the arrest the test was made.

1997See OCGA § 40-6-392 (a) (1); State v. Richardson, 186 Ga. App. 888, 889 ( 368 SE2d 825 ) (1988). *440 While the defendant’s testimony could not prove, identify, or interpret the results, the defendant could testify to taking the test and how long after the arrest the test was made.

1995K-Mart Corp. v. Coker, 261 Ga. 745, 746 (1) ( 410 SE2d 425 ) (1991).

1995K-Mart Corp. v. Coker, 261 Ga. 745, 746 (1) ( 410 SE2d 425 ) (1991).

1991See generally Collins v. Sadlo, 167 Ga. App. 317 ( 306 SE2d 390 ) (1983).” Williams v. Smith, 179 Ga. App. 712, 714 ( 348 SE2d 50 ) (1986).

1991See generally Collins v. Sadlo, 167 Ga. App. 317 ( 306 SE2d 390 ) (1983).” Williams v. Smith, 179 Ga. App. 712, 714 ( 348 SE2d 50 ) (1986).

1990Thus, I would hold that appellees Ingram and Dunn were entitled to summary judgment on the false arrest claim “on the ground that no [such] cause of action had yet accrued.” McCord v. Jones, supra, 168 Ga. App. at 893 . 2.

1990Thus, I would hold that appellees Ingram and Dunn were entitled to summary judgment on the false arrest claim "on the ground that no [such] cause of action had yet accrued." McCord v. Jones, supra, 168 Ga. App. at 893 . 2.

1983See in this connection Morgan v. State, 241 Ga. 485, 486-488 (1) ( 246 SE2d 198 ); Ellis v. State, 248 Ga. 414 (1), 415 ( 283 SE2d 870 ); Borden v. State, 247 Ga. 477, 479 (2), 480 ( 277 SE2d 9 ).

1983See in this connection Morgan v. State, 241 Ga. 485, 486-488 (1) ( 246 SE2d 198 ); Ellis v. State, 248 Ga. 414 (1), 415 ( 283 SE2d 870 ); Borden v. State, 247 Ga. 477, 479 (2), 480 ( 277 SE2d 9 ).